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Chapter	1.	Introduction	and	Importance	of	Topic	and	Description	
of	Structure	of	Thesis	
1.1 	Resumen	
1.1.1 Tema	de	la	Tesis	
La cooperativas agrarias han sido el objeto de cambios políticos, legislativos y 
organizacionales frecuentes que han buscado tanto hacerlas más competitivas como, 
simplemente, garantizar su supervivencia. Detrás de muchos de estos cambios ha estado a 
menudo la lógica de esquemas organizativos y teorías económicas más propios de 
compañías de inversores privados (Investor Owned Firms o IOF), con características 
propias de las del contrato y de los derechos de propiedad, que ignoran otras formas 
empresariales y sus particularidades. El reajuste de los derechos de propiedad, relaciones 
contractuales y derechos de control relacionados (gobernanza), propuestos como 
“remedios” a “debilidades” identificadas, han sido examinados desde la perspectiva de las 
teorías de la agencia, de los derechos de propiedad, del contrato incompleto, y la de los 
costos económicos de las transacciones (variantes de las New Institutional Economics o 
NIE) y criticadas usando la teoría institucional, de contratos relacionales, estudios críticos 
legales y, finalmente, contribuciones provenientes de la teoría cooperativa. La teoría 
institucional guía esta investigación mientras explica la doble cuestión de por qué y cómo 
ciertas caracterizaciones del contrato y de la propiedad, y sus correspondientes teorías 
económicas institucionales, acabaron atrincherándose en los análisis de las cooperativas 
de tal modo que éstas han acabado siendo evaluadas desde los parámetros de los IOF. Para 
suplementar la teoría institucional y la cooperativa, en esta tesis se han utilizado las muy 
valiosas reflexiones del trabajo de Elinor Ostrom (2005) sobre la diversidad de las formas 
organizativas, instituciones de acción colectiva (1990), la gobernanza de la propiedad 
común y los “campos de acción”. 
Aunque el campo teórico sobre las cooperativas es muy amplio, los análisis de las 
implicaciones sobre la “teoría cooperativa de la compañía” están a menudo lastrados por 
su énfasis en las cooperativas agrarias. La literatura económica usual no suele tener en 
cuenta la forma cooperativa de negocios que depende de una atribución de derechos de 
propiedad que no encaja con la visión dual de “mercados (derechos de propiedad 
autónomos y diferenciados poseídos por las partes intervinientes en un intercambio 
comercial) y “compañías” (con derechos de propiedad definidos en una estructura legal) 
(Ménard, 2007). Como resultado, el legislador y el administrador públicos todavía tienen 
dificultades para crear marcos que recojan o respondan a las características del 
cooperativismo: tratan a las cooperativas como algo “especial” (no comercial y por lo tanto 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Importance of topic and Description of Structure of Thesis 
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débil, y socialmente orientadas), aberrante (cuando no anacrónico) o, a veces, como si 
fuesen una compañía normal. Una tendencia relacionada con esto es tratar a las 
cooperativas como una compañía normal pero luego exigir su orientación social y su 
comportamiento sostenible. 
Teniendo en cuenta las características de la empresa cooperativa, como forma “híbrida” de 
negocio, exploramos el caso específico de las cooperativas agrarias como un ejemplo del 
reajuste de los derechos de propiedad y de control. En el trabajo de Williamson (1994) y 
de Ménard (2012, 2007) la observación de los híbridos ofrece un paso adelante hacia un 
marco teórico para el estudio de las formas cooperativas, del “mutualismo” y del modelo 
de asociación en ciertas cooperativas italianas. Se contemplan aquí dos formas distintas de 
interpretación de los híbridos en relación a las cooperativas: primero, la tendencia de la 
cooperativa tradicional a adoptar las características propias de la compañía propiedad del 
inversor y, segundo, la de las fórmulas varias que no caben dentro de las relaciones de 
mercado puras ni con los límites de la empresa (este es el caso de las cooperativas). 
Ostrom (1990, 2005) demostró la variedad de estructuras empresariales que surgieron 
durante el manejo de los bienes comunales (esto es, “instituciones de acción colectiva”) y 
la diversidad de formas que puede adoptar un proyecto económico. Su análisis de los 
derechos de propiedad y de la naturaleza de las relaciones contractuales es de utilidad 
para el estudio de las cooperativas agrícolas (a pesar de que su análisis institucional y su 
esquema de desarrollo es extremadamente complejo y no será aplicado aquí 
completamente). 
Con respecto a la definición legal y la preocupación por la integridad del ADN de la 
cooperativa, el trabajo de Henrÿ (2012) es usado para establecer las características 
esenciales de la “ley cooperativa”, y el de Zamagni y Zamagni (2010) es utilizado para la 
defensa del modelo de negocio cooperativo. 
Reconociendo que el derecho es solo una, entre muchas instituciones interrelacionadas, 
esta tesis se centra en las estructuras organizativas y de gobernanza, circunstancias 
culturales e históricas y contextos institucionales generales, que permitiendo u 
obstruyendo, tienen un impacto en las cooperativas agrícolas. Se identifican los factores 
relevantes endógenos y exógenos que influyen en el éxito del cooperativismo agrario. Para 
ello se usa una aproximación multidisciplinar que se basa en teorías y perspectivas 
provenientes de áreas como el derecho, la sociología, la economía y los estudios 
empresariales. También se usa un análisis institucional a varios niveles (tal y como se 
describe en la sección de Metodología del Capítulo 4). 
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Con el fin de centrar y aplicar la parte teórica de esta tesis, las cooperativas agrarias en 
España son examinadas a través de ocho subsectores, para lo que se usa una metodología 
mixta (cualitativa, cuantitativa, encuesta y estudio de casos) a fin de establecer su posición 
en el mercado, identificar los factores que contribuyen a su éxito o fracaso, los retos a que 
se enfrentan y los marcos legislativos, políticos y organizativos que han sido o están 
siendo impuestos. Se hace un análisis a varios niveles: estatal (legislación y política), 
sector (las cooperativas agrarias españolas), subsector (ocho subsectores), a nivel de la 
empresa agraria cooperativa (encuesta de cooperativas), y de comunidad (el grupo o 
cluster de cooperativas de Almería; véase la referencia al caso estudiado más abajo). 
Un reto central para el sector de las cooperativas agrarias es el de los desequilibrios en la 
cadena alimentaria. Esta cuestión ofrece un área en la que estudiar las cooperativas 
agrarias, la identificación de sus éxitos y fracasos, y la legislación y políticas que se han 
implementado para “arreglar” el problema, y que a menudo se basan en asumir los 
principios de teorías económicas basadas en IOF. El análisis comienza con los siguientes 
factores relacionados con las cooperativas: i) posición en la cadena alimentaria, ii) 
gobernanza interna, y iii) contexto institucional. De esto se hace un análisis más detallado 
en el Capítulo 5, donde se identifican y evalúan la legislación y las políticas que afectan a 
las cooperativas agrarias españolas. Es ahí donde el contraste entre la situación de las 
cooperativas agrarias de España, incluyendo sus necesidades, y las “soluciones” 
legislativas y políticas se hacen más evidentes. 
También se consideran los intereses encontrados que se aprecian en la legislación y 
políticas de cooperativas (por ejemplo, la adopción de medidas tipo “inversor propietario” 
y un énfasis en el crecimiento contra objetivos sociales y la identidad cooperativista) y la 
disonancia estructural entre el propósito, objetivos y fuerzas. Además, se examinan la 
“sabiduría aparente” de los remedios legislativos y organizativos para la “debilidad” del 
cooperativismo para ver hasta qué punto aquélla ha sido necesaria, desde una perspectiva 
empírica, en España. 
Yendo de lo general a lo específico, el estudio en profundidad de un caso pondera el 
desarrollo de las cooperativas de frutas y hortalizas de Almería utilizando el trabajo de 
Cook y Burress (2009) sobre la estructura del ciclo cooperativo donde las cooperativas no 
son tratadas como algo estático o un “nexo de contratos”, que produce conflictos y 
cuestiones de tipo legal y de propiedad, sino como un proceso dinámico en el que quienes 
toman las decisiones en la cooperativa tienen una posición única para seleccionar 
“soluciones regeneradoras”. Esta estructura conecta con las teorías de Ostrom sobre la 
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acción colectiva y la diversidad de las formas de empresa dentro de un “campo de acción” 
antes mencionadas, ilustrando que las cooperativas agrícolas pueden vencer muchos de 
los problemas de la forma de negocio cooperativo identificadas por las teorías NIE cuando 
se apoyan de manera decidida en las instituciones y valores cooperativos, en vez de 
adoptar estrategias IOF. 
Mientras que la estructura del ciclo vital de Cook y Burres es aplicable a cooperativas 
específicas, aquí es usado para examinar el cluster	de cooperativas de frutas y hortalizas 
de Almería. Como resultado, esta tesis señala la validez de comprender la legislación y las 
iniciativas políticas hechas a medida de las necesidades de los diferentes tipos de 
cooperativas agrarias basándose en su estado particular de crecimiento (Justificación 
Económica; Diseño Organizativo; Crecimiento-Gloria-Heterogeneidad; Reconocimiento e 
Introspección; y Decisión). Además, la estrategia (por ejemplo, cooperativas locales, de 
sector, nacionales e internacionales) se considera relevante para una efectiva toma de 
decisiones políticas. 
Las conclusiones se basan en una síntesis de los resultados obtenidos del análisis 
cuantitativo y cualitativo de las cooperativas españolas y del caso de Almería. 
Esta tesis ofrece una visión global de las cooperativas agrarias españolas y de la influencia 
de los contextos institucionales. También contribuye a la todavía escasa literatura 
multidisciplinar sobre la relación de la teoría legal y las teorías económicas (derechos 
contractuales y de propiedad que fundamentan nuevas economías institucionales y 
conceptos económicos y estructuras) y sus influencias en las iniciativas legislativas y 
políticas en relación con la organización de las cooperativas agrarias. 
1.1.2 Estructura	de	la	Tesis	
El Capítulo 1 introduce la importancia y justificación del tema de la tesis, refiriéndose no 
solo a la importancia económica de las cooperativas en general y de las cooperativas 
agrarias en particular sino también al impacto potencial para los temas de la economía 
general, la sociedad y el medio ambiente en la Unión Europea. 
El Capítulo 2 presenta y revisa la literatura multidisciplinar y las bases teóricas de las que 
parte esta tesis. La revisión de la literatura incluye los temas de las cooperativas y las 
entidades empresariales sociales, las teorías económicas y organizativas de la empresa 
(teoría de la agencia; teoría de los derechos de propiedad/del contrato incompleto; costos 
económicos de las transacciones y la teoría de la nueva economía institucional), teoría 
institucional y la teoría del contrato y de la critica legal (teoría del contrato; estudios de 
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critica legal; teoría del contrato relacional). Se incluyen las teorías híbridas de la compañía 
y se presentan las iniciativas legislativas que resultan en entidades híbridas. 
El Capítulo 3 desarrolla la hipótesis que será discutida a partir de ahora y los objetivos 
generales y específicos relacionados. El Capítulo 4 describe y justifica las metodologías 
escogidas. La que resulta más apropiada al tema es la de “varios niveles” y la “Mixta” que 
incluyo datos empíricos, encuestas, estudios de casos, entrevistas con expertos y actores 
sectoriales, y su triangulación. Tanto los métodos cuantitativos como los cualitativos son 
empleados aquí. 
El Capítulo 5 ofrece una visión general de las cooperativas agrarias en España. El análisis 
de ocho sub-categorías de cooperativas agrarias forma el corazón de la investigación en 
esta tesis, donde se combinan análisis cuantitativos con los cualitativos. Se incluyen aquí 
los resultados de una encuesta de las cinco principales cooperativas (por volumen de 
negocio) de cada sector, en total 32 cooperativas (algunos sub-sectores no tienen esas 5 
principales cooperativas, y otras están presentes en más de un sub-sector). Además, este 
capítulo contiene una revisión extensa comentada de la legislación y políticas que afectan 
a las cooperativas agrarias. 
El Capítulo 6 se basa en el trabajo del capítulo previo y presenta el estudio del caso del 
sector cooperativo almeriense de frutas y hortalizas, incluyendo, como tema central, su 
relación con el cooperativismo crediticio. El tema es importante ya que la teoría 
económica tradicional ha mantenido durante mucho tiempo que uno de los problemas 
inherentes de las cooperativas es la falta de capital y de acceso al crédito. La reciente ley 
andaluza de cooperativas es analizada desde la perspectiva de su relevancia e idoneidad 
parar los retos a los que se enfrentan estas cooperativas. 
El capítulo 7, que es una síntesis del trabajo, analiza y combina las observaciones teóricas 
del Capítulo 2 con los resultados de los Capítulos 5 y 6, que son discutidos en el contexto 
de las hipótesis. El Capítulo 8 presenta las conclusiones de la tesis, mientras que el 
Capitulo 9 identifica futuras áreas de investigación 
1.2 Summary	
1.2.1 Theme	of	Thesis	
Agricultural cooperatives have been subject to frequent policy, legislative and 
organizational change in order to address competition and survival. As a rationale for 
many of these changes, organizational and economic theories based on investor owned 
firms (IOF) and related characterizations of contract and property rights have often been 
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utilized, ignoring other enterprise forms and their distinct characteristics. The 
readjustment of property rights, contractual relations and related control rights 
(governance) put forth as “remedies” to identified “weaknesses” are examined in agency 
theory, property rights theory, incomplete contract theory and transaction cost economics 
(variants of New Institutional Economics “NIE”) and critiqued using institutional theory, 
relational contract theory, critical legal studies and contributions from cooperative theory. 
Institutional theory guides the research into why and how certain characterizations of 
contract and property, and their corresponding institutional economic theories, came to 
be entrenched such that cooperatives are evaluated within an IOF framework. Insights 
from Elinor Ostrom´s work on the diversity of organizational form (2005), institutions for 
collective action (1990), the governance of common property and “action arenas” are used 
to supplement institutional and cooperative theory.  
While the range of theories is wide, they are anchored in the analysis of their implications 
for the “cooperative theory of the firm” with emphasis on agricultural cooperatives. The 
standard economic literature does not take into account the cooperative business form 
which depends on an allocation of property rights that do not fit well within the traditional 
dualistic view of “markets” (autonomous and distinctive property rights held by parties 
who enter into market exchanges) and “firms” (with property rights unified within a 
legally defined structure) (Ménard, 2007). As a result, legislative and policy makers still 
have difficulty in creating frameworks which acknowledge cooperative characteristics: 
they treat cooperatives as “special” (non-market and thus soft and socially oriented), 
aberrant (including anachronistic) or as if they were the same as any other “regular” fully 
integrated firm. A related tendency is to treat the cooperative as a “regular” firm but then 
demand of it socially oriented and sustainable behavior.  
Taking into account the characteristics of the cooperative enterprise, the cooperative as a 
“hybrid” form of business organization is explored as an example of the readjustment of 
property and control rights in agricultural cooperatives.	Williamson’s	 later work (1994) 
and Ménard’s (2012, 2007) observations on hybrids provide a step towards a theoretical 
framework of cooperative organizational forms, as does the consideration of the role of 
“mutualism” and the multistakeholder model of certain Italian cooperatives. Two different 
interpretations of hybrids in relation to cooperative form are considered: first, the 
tendency of traditional cooperatives to adopt investor owned company characteristics and 
second, that of various arrangements which fall neither under pure market relationships 
nor within firm boundaries (cooperatives being such an arrangement).	 Ostrom (1990, 
2005) demonstrated the various enterprise structures that arose whilst managing 
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common economic goods (that is, “institutions for collective action”) and the diversity of 
forms of economic enterprise. Her analysis of property rights and the nature of contractual 
relations are useful for the study of agricultural cooperatives (although her extremely 
complex Institutional Analysis and Development framework will not be fully applied 
herein). 
With respect to legal definition and the concern for the integrity of the cooperative “DNA”, 
the work of Henrÿ (2012) is used to set out the core characteristics of “cooperative law” 
and that of Zamagni and Zamagni (2010), amongst others, utilized as a defense of the 
cooperative business form. 
Recognising that law is only but one of many inter-related institutions, this thesis will also 
focus on organizational and governance structures, cultural and historical circumstances 
and general institutional environments, both enabling and hindering, that have an impact 
on agricultural cooperatives. Relevant endogenous and exogenous factors will be 
identified that influence agricultural cooperative success. A multidisciplinary approach is 
used, relying on theories and perspectives from the areas of law, sociology, economics and 
business studies. A multi-level institutional analysis is used (described further in 
Methodology-Chapter 4). 
To focus and apply the theoretical part of this thesis, agricultural cooperatives in Spain are 
extensively examined in eight sub-sectors, using a mixed methodology (qualitative, 
quantitative, survey and case study), in order to establish their position in the market, 
ascertain the factors which contribute to success or failure, the challenges they face and 
the legislative, policy and organisational “fixes” that have been or are being proposed. A 
multilevel analysis is performed at the state level (legislation and policy), sector level 
(Spanish agricultural cooperatives), sub-sector level (eight main sub-sectors), cooperative 
enterprise (farm) level (survey of cooperatives), and the community level (Almería 
cooperative cluster—see reference to the case study below). 
A central challenge for agricultural cooperatives is the lack of balance in the food supply 
chain. This theme provides an arena in which to explore agricultural cooperatives, the 
identification of their success and failures and the legislation and policy that has been 
brought into force and that is proposed to “fix” the problem, often resorting to economic 
theories reliant on IOF assumptions. The analysis begins with those factors which relate to 
cooperatives´ (i) position in the food supply chain, (ii) internal governance, and (iii) the 
institutional environment. A more detailed analysis is then found within Chapter 5, 
identifying and evaluating legislation and policy which affects Spanish agricultural 
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cooperatives. It is here that the contrast between the state of Spain´s agricultural 
cooperatives, including their necessities, and the legislative and policy “solutions” will be 
evident. 
Competing interests of agricultural cooperative legislation and policy (e.g. adoption of 
“investor owned” measures and an emphasis on growth vs. social goals and cooperative 
identity) and the structural dissonance between agricultural purpose, objectives and 
strengths are considered. The “perceived wisdom” of legislative and organizational 
remedies for cooperative “weaknesses” is examined to ascertain whether there has been 
empirical support for the necessity of such measures in Spain. 
Moving from the general to the specific, an in-depth case study considers the development 
of the fruit and vegetable (F&V) cooperatives of Almería utilizing the work of Cook and 
Burress (2009) with respect to the cooperative life cycle framework wherein cooperatives 
are treated not as a static “nexus of contracts” which produce property or contract issues 
or conflicts, but rather as a dynamic process throughout which cooperative decision 
makers are uniquely able to select “regenerative solutions”. This framework dovetails into 
Ostrom´s theories on collective action and the study of the diversity of enterprise forms 
within an “action arena”, illustrating that agricultural cooperatives can overcome many of 
the problems with the cooperative business form identified by NIE theories by relying 
more heavily on cooperative institutions and values, rather than adopting IOF strategies. 
While Cook and Burress’ lifecycle framework is applicable to individual cooperatives, here 
it is extended to examine the Almería F&V cluster. As a result, this thesis also notes the 
usefulness of understanding legislative and policy initiatives tailored to meet the needs of 
different types of agricultural cooperatives based on their particular stage of growth 
(Economic Justification; Organizational Design; Growth-Glory-Heterogeneity; Recognition 
and Introspection; and Choice). In addition, strategy (i.e. local cooperatives, niche 
cooperatives, national cooperatives and international cooperatives) is considered relevant 
for effective policy making. 
Conclusions are based on a synthesis of findings from the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of Spanish cooperatives and the Almería case study. 
This thesis provides a comprehensive view of Spanish agricultural cooperatives and the 
influence of institutional environments. It also contributes to the scant multidisciplinary 
literature on the relationship between theoretical legal and economic theories 
(contractual and property rights underpinnings of new institutional economics and 
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economic concepts and frameworks) and their influence on legislative and policy 
initiatives in relation to agricultural cooperative organization. 
1.2.2 	Structure	of	Thesis	
Chapter 1 introduces the importance and justification of the thesis topic, referring to not 
only the economic importance of cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives but also the 
potential impact on general economic, social and environmental issues for the European 
Union. 
Chapter 2 sets out the multidisciplinary literature review and theoretical base from which 
this thesis takes as its starting point. The literature review includes the subject matters of 
cooperatives and social economy entities, economic and organizational theories of the 
firm (agency theory, property rights theory/incomplete contract, transaction cost 
economics and new institutional economic theory), institutional theory and contract and 
critical legal theory (contract theory, critical legal studies and relational contract theory). 
Hybrid theories of the firm are introduced and legislative initiatives which result in hybrid 
entities are set out. 
Chapter 3 develops the hypothesis which will be discussed herein and the general and 
specific objectives with which they are related. Chapter 4 describes and justifies the 
methodologies chosen. The methodology most suited to the subject matter is a “multilevel” 
and “mixed methodology” which includes empirical data, surveys, case studies, interviews 
with experts and sector actors and the triangulation of the same. Both quantitative and 
qualitative methods are employed.  
Chapter 5 provides an overview of agricultural cooperatives in Spain. As well, an eight 
sub-sector analysis of agricultural cooperatives forms the research core of the thesis, 
combining both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Included in the study are the results 
of a survey of the top five cooperatives per sector (by turnover) resulting in 32 
agricultural cooperatives in Spain (certain sub-sectors not having a top five, and others 
being represented in more than one sub-sector). In addition, Chapter 5 contains an 
extensive review and commentary on legislative and policy measures which affect 
agricultural cooperatives.  
Chapter 6 builds on the work of Chapter 5 and presents a case study of the Almeria fruit 
and vegetable (F&V) cooperative sector, including its relationship with cooperative 
finance as a central institutional theme. This aspect is important, as traditional economic 
theory has long held that one of the main inherent problems in the cooperative form was 
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the lack of available capital and access to finance. The recent Andalusian cooperative law 
will be analysed from the perspective of its relevance and appropriateness for the 
challenges faced by such cooperatives. 
Chapter 7, serving as a synthesis, will analyse and combine the theoretical observations of 
Chapter 2 and the results from Chapters 5 and 6 and discuss such results in the context of 
the hypotheses. Chapter 8 will set out the thesis conclusions while Chapter 9 will identify 
future areas of research.  
1.3	Introduction	of	topic 
 
The last 20 years (since 1992) have brought about a series of agricultural sector policy 
and legislative reforms by various European governments and institutions. While the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and proposed changes thereto, often dominate the 
conversation, it is accompanied by other relevant legislative and policy initiatives as the 
agenda in support of a sector that provides employment to more than 13.4 million farmers 
and 310,000 enterprises (Cogeca, 2010) is under continual adjustment. Agriculture of 
course does not just concern employment or food production, for it is an activity that 
occupies over 45% of the European Community´s area, thus profoundly affecting general 
economic, social and environmental conditions in the European Union. 
In light of this, wrapped up in any discussion of the “survival” of agricultural cooperatives 
and applicable agricultural legislation and policy will be a concern for social issues (e.g. 
rural development), efficient land use and increased production, environmental issues and 
a softer environmental “footprint”, consumer demands and necessities, concerns about 
food security and safety and attempts to maintain a balanced agricultural food chain. The 
latter point is of particular importance as the downward trend on agricultural product 
prices, in large part caused by imbalances in the supply chain, has posed a severe threat to 
the stability and viability of the European agricultural sector (Baamonde, 2011; Euricse, 
2010; Copa-Cogeca, 2010; DG Agri, 2009). In addition, like any other sector, agriculture is 
subject to the pressures of global competition and the need to consolidate and innovate, all 
the while being required to find adequate financing and credit to support its business 
activities. The quite extraordinary demands on this sector, as enumerated above, require 
solutions that need to address a broad range of socio-economic and environmental issues. 
In Spain cooperatives are within the definition of “social economy” enterprises (Social 
Economy Law 5/2011, 29 March). Their dual role as economic enterprises and as 
autonomous self-help organizations, play a meaningful role in improving the socio-
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economic conditions of their members and their local communities. Zamagni and Zamagni 
have referred to the cooperative as a “genuine, dual faced Janus” with two distinct if not 
conflicting dimensions. First the “economic dimension of the enterprise operates within 
the market and accepts its logic”, and as well, the second, social dimension pursues “meta-
economic aims and produces positive externalities for other agents and for the entire 
community” (Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010:1). Levi (Levi, 2005) refers to them as the 
enfants	terribles of organizations, 
…cooperatives can be seen as symptoms of a wider phenomenon, namely the 
hegemony of the economic neo-classical paradigm which makes it so difficult to 
conceive an organizational model that blends the economic enterprise and the 
social concern… 
In spite of the fact that the cooperative business form has progressively “disappeared” 
from economic and business textbooks (Kalmi, 2006) it is a business form that has been 
shown to be useful for many sectors, particularly agriculture (Hansmann, 1996, 1999; 
Hendrikse, 2004; Iliopoulos and Cook, 2005). The 2001 United Nations Guidelines sets out 
the creation of a supportive environment for cooperatives, as does the International 
Labour Organisation Promotion of Cooperatives Recommendation 2002 (ILO, 2002). 
The year 2012 was declared by the United Nations as the International Year of 
Cooperatives (IYC) and the IYC materials noted that the cooperative business model is 
utilised by multinational, national and local enterprises, providing effective and 
competitive business solutions in a wide array of sectors (United Nations, 2011). Over the 
years, cooperatives enterprises have successfully operated member-owned people-
centered businesses while also serving as catalysts for social and technical innovation and 
providing social organization and cohesion (Birchall, 2010). 
Under the umbrella of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), it is estimated that one 
billion people are members of cooperatives. The 300 top cooperatives alone are 
responsible for an aggregate turnover of 2 trillion USD making them the size of the 10th 
economy of the world (ICA, 2012 based on 2010 figures1). Cooperatives represent a model 
of economic enterprise, which when effectively implemented, promotes democratic and 
human values as well as respect for the environment. They represent another model of 
economic enterprise, amongst the diversity of available business forms, that promotes 
community self reliance and benefits society in general. Cooperatives create, improve and 
protect income as well as generate employment opportunities. As of 2007, cooperatives 
were responsible for more than 100 million jobs worldwide (ICA, 2012). The cooperative 
                                                                  
1 Information from ICA’s webpage: http://ica.coop/ 
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sector contributes to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and 
represents an alternative to the bipolar model of market and state institutions, providing 
risk management, investment in new technologies, infrastructure to meet the increasing 
and diversifying demand for general services, all of which would not be possible for 
resource/capital poor communities. In both developing and developed countries, where 
state resources are particularly scarce due to the impact of the global financial crisis and 
other factors, cooperatives have the potential to meet needs and spur innovation and 
growth in a cost effective manner. In meeting the most basic of needs (in any society) such 
as food (agricultural production and distribution), water, energy and financial credit, 
cooperatives have a long history of success (Birchall, 2010). 
However, as Henrÿ (2012:1) points out, such recognition was a breakthrough, as for 
decades 
many national government, regional and international, governmental and non-
governmental organisations were reluctant to recognize cooperatives as a viable 
business model worthy of being promoted on an equal footing with what continues 
to be portrayed as the most efficient type of enterprise, namely stock companies.  
 
Thus, another important point to consider in the economic and business analysis of any 
sector is the diversity of business forms present. Although cooperatives have been seen as 
being idealistic and anachronistic they have been recently gaining ground, not only in 
agriculture and finance, but also in other areas such as social and health services and other 
public services sectors such as electricity (Birchall, 2010). However, while diversity has 
been seen as a strength in other disciplines, “an open discussion on diversity in economics 
(meaning both diversity of enterprise types and diversity in the possible combinations of 
public and private sector roles in different economic systems) has long been taboo” 
(Borzaga, Ferri and Sabatini, 2011).  
Since 2007 and the ongoing global financial crisis, the cooperative and similar socio-
economic enterprises, have performed consistently well and have demonstrated a 
resilience often lacking in the for-profit maximisation, shareholder model, the latter 
economic model having disappointed far before the financial crisis, where  
[g]lobalization and liberalization ignited intense growth in several emerging 
countries but many other nations were left behind. Deep inequality in income and 
wealth distribution grew almost everywhere. In the rich countries, the middle and 
low classes were able to temporarily preserve their living standards only by 
resorting to a remarkable accumulation of private debt. In most countries public 
debt was not curbed at all. Privatizations resulted neither in more efficiency nor in 
improved customer satisfaction. (Borzaga, Ferri and Sabatini, 2011; See also 
Stiglitz, 2012) 
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With respect to agriculture, the European Union Center for Research in Cooperatives and 
Social Enterprise in its submission to the EU Commission (EURICSE, 2010) noted that 
cooperative agriculture represents an “exceptional tool” which is able to both be an 
expression of the expectations of the community it belongs to and facilitate the 
aggregation, integration and concentration of agricultural production. In doing so, it gives 
more strength to small producers and at least partially restores a balance in the 
bargaining power of the various components of the supply chain. Since their main 
objective is the growth of their members and an increase in their remuneration (i.e. the 
cooperative principle of equality in the distribution of the wealth created by its activity), 
cooperatives aid the transfer of income to smaller producers, thereby preserving the 
vitality of rural areas both by providing meaningful employment and by protecting the 
social and ecological value of the farming communities. 
Having established above the importance of cooperatives as a business form and also as a 
“tool” for agricultural production, it is time to focus in on how this “dual faced Janus” or 
“enfant	terrible” is dealt with with respect to organizational form and the legislative and 
policy framework of agricultural cooperatives, keeping in mind the socio-economic and 
environmental demands which are put on the sector. Changes in organizational form are 
of particular interest, given a concern for the “watering down” of cooperative values, 
where isomorphic tendencies towards the investor owned firm (IOF) are often held 
responsible.  
In order to do so, this thesis will consider the extent to which the “remedy” of adopted 
cooperative legislation and related policy is informed by economic organizational theories, 
based on certain characterisations of contract and property that are more appropriate for 
the IOF than a cooperative. It is argued herein that a “modern” contractual approach to 
procedural regulation and a formalistic approach to law often results in a “private law” 
ordering of social and economic interests as opposed to regulation based on achieving 
social and economic objectives. As well, the very concept of “efficiency” so often used as a 
core assumption to evaluate the allocation of property and contractual functions is itself 
legally constructed and affected by policy measures which may be heavily influenced by 
political matters (e.g. CAP). The “rules of the game” (the creation of a market) is a result of 
legal constructs. 
Accepting certain theories of contract and property, organizational and economic theories 
of the firm have been constructed which effectively have transformed the regulation and 
governance of the cooperative into a “nexus of contracts”. When these theories of the firm 
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are used to study and evaluate cooperatives, it places them in the sphere of private 
contractual ordering. This results in the marginalization of the characteristics of the 
cooperative business form and social or policy driven regulation and the use of the “unit of 
contract” as a cornerstone of theory.  
But the analysis does not stop there: for it is precisely such theories which are used in the 
identification of “problems” within business entities, generating “testable” predictions and 
hypothesis and the gathering of empirical results to provide support for legislative change 
to “fix” the problem. While it is doubtful that these theories are adequate for an IOF, 
whether they are relevant to the cooperative enterprise structure, given their unique 
formulation of contract and property rights, is of even more concern. Below, Figure 1.1 
sets out the process: 
Figure	1.1	Identification	of	problems	and	generation	of	testable	predictions	
 
Observations	on	Institutional	Process
• Institutional approach addresses how legal institutions, whether by legislation 
or legal concepts and methods, influence organisation form. 
• Law, as an institutional force, attempts to reconcile two seemingly contradictory 
concepts at work: the maintenance of the concept of cooperatives and emphasis 
on the social economy and the second, a trend towards embracing investor-
owner organisational design. 
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• As a result, the “public” goals of the cooperative, represented by traditional 
cooperatives for example, are “privatised” through changes to property 
structures and the introduction of property rights. 
• The legal form of shareholder-owned, widely-held corporation is seen as the 
“legitimate” form, one that is “exported” to analyse other jurisdictions and other 
business forms. 
• The preference for “markets” is seen to provide a “solution” for a loss of 
confidence in institutional structures. A “legalisation” of public discourse and 
goals occurs, which denies the implicit influence of legal structures on social 
policy making. 
• However, when contract and property are seen as historical narratives or 
contextual concepts, depending on use and characterisations, the organisational 
theories and economic theories of the firm which rely on them and the resulting 
“problems” and subsequent “remedies” become questionable. 
• Necessity of recognising law's role in the creation of markets, thus collapsing the 
distinction between markets and hierarchies. 
• Need to rework organisational theories and economic theories of the firm (which 
are questionable in relation to investor-owned corporations in any event) and 
the legal concepts which underlie them to reconstruct an innovative cooperative 
organisational and legal theory.  
 
 
Agricultural cooperatives have played an important historical role in improving farmers´ 
incomes and allowing them to capture a larger portion of “value added” in the supply 
chain. They can improve bargaining power, creating economies of scale. They play a role in 
reducing market risk, reducing transaction costs, provide access to resources, strengthen 
competitive position through product innovation and significantly contribute to “food 
security” through quality and safety protocols (Valentinov, 2007; Bijman, 2006). Given 
their importance and contribution to society, is the institutional environment which 
governs them addressing the challenges agricultural cooperatives face? 
While reference will be made to legislative proposals and organizational form in other 
European countries, as well as the United States and Canada, in order to ground the 
theoretical observations herein, the thesis will focus on Spanish agricultural cooperatives 
(eight sub-sectors), identifying their characteristics, position, challenges and needs. 
Relevant Spanish legislative and policy initiatives in relation to the Spanish agricultural 
cooperative sector (and with reference to important EU policies), with a particular focus 
on Almería in the context of Andalusian legislation and policy, will be reviewed. 
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Chapter	2.	Theoretical	Bases	and	Selected	Literature	Review 
 
Theories	 cumulate.	 They	 are	 refined	 and	 reformulated,	 corrected	 and	
expanded.	Thus,	we	are	not	 living	 in	 the	world	of	Popper—[theories	are	not]	
shot	down	with	a	falsification	bullet.	(Newell,	1990:4) 
2.1	Introduction	
Agricultural cooperatives have experienced significant changes in organizational form 
“induced” by legislative reform in an effort to deal with competition and survival. An 
important theme is the redesign of property structures and an emphasis on contractual 
ordering and contractual relations (Hendrikse, 2004; Cook, 2004; Cook and Chaddad, 
2004; Iliopoulos and Cook, 2005; Cook and Iliopoulos, 1995). Underlying any number of 
articles about agricultural cooperatives is the question as to whether the cooperative 
business model, an important and historic figure in the social economy, can compete and 
survive in a changing and “globalised” environment (Baamonde, 2011; Copa Cogeca, 2010; 
DG Agriculture COM, 2009; Chaddad and Cook, 2003; USDA, 2002a, 2002b).2  
In light of this, we are left with the question “what can be done to guarantee the 
continuation or promotion of agricultural cooperatives?” In such literature, while there is 
an acknowledgement of the utility of the cooperative form, there is also a recognition that 
agricultural cooperatives need to be more “competitive” in a changing, global economy.  
Related to the consideration of contract and property rights, is the concern for 
consolidation in the sector. Spanish agricultural co-operatives are small in size compared 
to European standards in spite of the fact that the average turnover went from 2.7 million 
Euros in 2000 to 4.4 million Euros in 2007. Only 39% have more than 1,000 members and 
only 1.7% of these cooperatives have a turnover above 30 million Euros, 77% have less 
than 5 million Euros and 39% less than a million. In contrast, the European average farm 
turnover is above 10 million (Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias, 2010a; OSCAE, 2009).  
This situation creates difficulties for Spanish agricultural cooperatives in relation to the 
concentration of offer, investment needs for new projects, achieving economies of scale 
and wielding market power. Many studies have pointed to excessive “atomization” of 
cooperatives (Campos i Climent, 2011; Vargas, 2007; Juliá and Meliá, 2003; Meliá, 2004; 
Montero and Montero, 2005; Juliá and Server, 1999; Caballer, 1995). Cooperatives 
                                                                  
2 With respect to analyzing trends for survival of enterprise forms, Hansmann (2001) used an “institutional” 
and/or historical  analysis in dispensing a verdict as to the competitiveness of the cooperative form claiming 
that there is a logical progression to a particular form of business organization (the limited, shareholder 
owned corporation) due to its “inherent superiority”.  This position holds some irony a decade later, but the 
underpinnings of  the shareholder owned firm has not been seriously questioned as a business form; instead 
any deficiencies being the subject matter for “governance” or “corporate social responsibility”. 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Bases and Selected Literature Review 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
18 
 
Agroalimentarias (the national confederation) in their strategic plan for Spanish 
agricultural cooperatives called for addressing this issue in order to achieve a competitive 
dimension (OSCAE, 2010, 2007) and continue to do so. As a general rule in all sectors of 
the Spanish market there has been pressure to consolidate and agricultural cooperatives 
have experienced the same pressures, with the resulting mergers and acquisitions, group 
formation, integration of cooperatives into second tier cooperatives, etc. (Meliá and 
Martínez, 2011). 
It is well documented that over the last few decades the large multinational  distributors 
(both European and global), supermarkets and processors have gained an immense 
economic power in the food chain (Clarke, 2002; Dobson, et al 2001; DG Agriculture, 2009, 
DG Agriculture COM, 2009). This issue also figures into the discussion of post 2013 CAP. 
Recently in Spain the Competition Board (Comisión Nacional de Competencia, 2011) has 
recognized this imbalance of power. Given that agricultural in Europe is for the most part 
highly fragmented, indeed in Spain, “atomised”, this imbalance in the food supply chain 
results in constant downward pressure on prices and a call for changes to meet these 
challenges at the farm organizational level. 
As a result of the discussions in the High Level Group on Competitiveness in the Agro-Food 
Industry, the European Commission issued a Communication (DG Agriculture COM, 2009) 
on “A better functioning food supply chain in Europe”. This communication stressed that 
the “significant imbalances in bargaining power between contracting parties are a 
common occurrence” in the food supply chain. The study noted that such imbalances could 
lead to “unfair trading practices, as larger and more powerful actors seek to impose 
contractual arrangements to their advantage, either through better prices or through 
improved terms and conditions”. It was also noted that abusive practices could occur at 
every link of the chain through diverse practices.  
Consequently, the EU Commission committed itself to "promote and facilitate the 
restructuring and consolidation of the agricultural sector both in the context of the Rural 
Development policy, notably by encouraging the creation of voluntary agricultural 
producer organisations, and in the broader context of post 2013 Common Agricultural 
Policy." Although producer organisations may take any allowed corporate form, in Spain 
they are predominantly cooperatives or entities with similar characteristics 
(characteristics of POs are set out in Chapter 5.1.3). 
Depending on country and legislative regimes, as well as historical and cultural conditions, 
changes that have occurred in agricultural cooperatives have been distinct in form and 
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nature.3 This chapter identifies some general “remedies”, some of which have been 
adopted or proposed in cooperative organization, legislation and policy (Chapter 5 will 
provide more detail in relation to Spanish agricultural cooperatives) and explore how 
these changes have been informed and/or justified by economic organisational theories, 
an important part of which concern particular characterizations of contract and property. 
Herein, various theories concerning property and contract rights, new institutional 
economics/transaction cost economics, institutional theory (sociology) and legal theory 
(critical legal studies, relational contract and law and economics) are set out.  
As mentioned above, the theory of “hybrids” in institutional organisational forms is 
introduced relying on the work of Ménard (2007, 2012a and 2012b), Chaddad and Cook 
(2004), Iliopoulos and Cook (2005) and Spear (2012) along with the later work of Oliver 
Williamson. While “hybrids” in cooperative theory have at times referred to the adoption 
of “investor owned firm” (IOF) characteristics and a fear for the degradation of the 
cooperative form, the work of Borzaga and Defourney (2001) and Galera (2004) presents 
another characterization of hybrids and the cooperative form by way of “social 
enterprises” and the introduction of a new form of cooperative enterprise which 
decoupled the necessary linkage of property rights and membership (mutuality), creating 
a multi-stakeholder model. Particularly important in this latter model of hybrid and the 
work of Elinor Ostrom (2010, 2005, 1990) is the rethinking of traditionally held notions of 
property rights, which incidentally provide the foundation for much economic thought, 
theories of the firm and contract and institutional theory. Questioning whether these 
traditional theories are adequate for the study of cooperative organization, policy and 
legislation, this chapter then sets out the “diversity of institutional forms” and governance 
of common property ideas of Ostrom in order to provide new theoretical avenues for the 
explanation for and study of cooperative organisations and the potential new role of 
cooperatives in advanced economies. 
The encouragement of hybrid forms and arguments for increased cooperative integration 
are practical policy initiatives which may be informed by both traditional and “reworked” 
                                                                  
3 For some examples see: Karlson, D. (2005); Nilsson, J., (1999); United States Department of Agriculture, 
(2002); Fernández Guadaño, J., (2006); Sousa, J. and Herman, R. Eds., (2007); G.W.J. Hendrikse, Ed. (2004); 
Baarda, J. R. (2003). 
However, it is worth pointing out that according to a report from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, for the 
approximate 10 year perioed between 1992 and 2002 less than 5% of cooperatives converted into non-
cooperative enterprises and the frequency with which cooperatives acquired non-cooperatives was three 
times more frequent than non-cooperatives acquiring cooperatives. The most dominanat form of restructuring 
occurred within the cooperative sector. See United States Department of Agriculture (2002) Cooperative	
Conversion	and	Restructuring	 in	Theory	and	Practice	USDA Rural Business Cooperative Service RBS Research 
Report 185.  
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theories and the importance of such measures will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6 in the 
analysis of agricultural cooperatives in Spain and thereafter in the Almería case study. 
2.2	Definitions	of	“traditional”	cooperatives	
Before beginning an analysis of theories and remedies it is important to understand the 
general characteristics of the cooperative business form. While cooperatives vary in 
structure across the world, many rely on the seven general principles of the International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA): 
Definition:	
A cooperative is an autonomous	association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common	 economic,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 needs and aspirations through a jointly‐
owned and democratically	controlled	enterprise. 
Values:	
Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, 
equity, and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, cooperative members believe in 
the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility, and caring for others. 
Principles:	
The cooperative	principles	are	guidelines by which cooperatives put their values into 
practice. 
1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership 
Cooperatives are voluntary organizations, open	to	all	persons able to use their services 
and willing	 to	 accept	 the	 responsibilities	 of	 membership, without gender, social, 
racial, political, or religious discrimination. 
2nd Principle: Democratic member Control 
Cooperatives are democratic	 organizations	 controlled	 by	 their	 members, who 
actively	participate	in	setting	their	policies	and	making	decisions. Men and women 
serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary	
cooperatives	 members have equal voting rights (one	 member,	 one	 vote) and 
cooperatives at other	levels are organized in a democratic	manner. 
3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation 
Members	contribute	equitably	 to,	and	democratically	control,	 the	capital	of	 their	
cooperative. At least part	 of	 that	 capital	 is usually the common	 property	 of	 the	
cooperative. They usually receive limited	compensation,	if	any,	on	capital	subscribed	
as	 a	 condition	 of	 membership. Members allocate	 surpluses for any or all of the 
following	purposes: developing the cooperative, possibly by setting up reserves,	part	
of	which	at	 least	would	be	 indivisible;	benefiting	members	 in	proportion	 to	 their	
transactions	 with the cooperative; and supporting other activities approved by the 
membership. 
4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence 
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Cooperatives are autonomous,	self‐help	organizations	controlled	by	their	members. 
If they enter	into	agreements with other organizations, including governments, or raise	
capital	from	external	sources, they do so on terms that	ensure	democratic	control	by	
their	members	and	maintain	their	cooperative	autonomy. 
5th Principle: Education, Training and Information 
Cooperatives provide education	 and	 training	 for	 their	 members, elected 
representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the 
development of their cooperatives. They inform	the	general	public - particularly young 
people and opinion leaders - about the nature	and	benefits	of	cooperation. 
6th Principle: Cooperation among Cooperatives 
Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen	 the	 cooperative	
movement	by	working	together	through	local,	national,	regional,	and	international	
structures. 
7th Principle: Concern for Community  
While focusing on member needs, cooperatives work for the sustainable	development	
of	their	communities	through	policies	accepted	by	their	members.  
Source: International Cooperative Alliance Statement on the Cooperative Identity, adopted in 
Manchester (U.K.) 23 September, 1995. (Emphasis added by author) 
Spanish cooperative law, to be discussed in Chapter 5 in more detail, generally follows the 
ICA model, although there have been changes which reflect a more IOF stance. In the case 
of the recent Andalusian cooperative law, both IOF characteristics (proportional voting, 
outside investors) and more cooperative characteristics, such as ICA Principles 6 and 7 
and gender equality, have been adopted at the same time. In contrast, a more simplified 
concept of cooperatives adopted by institutions in other jurisdiction, is more pragmatic, 
focusing on the three pillars of “user owned, user controlled and user benefits” (Dunn, 
1998), such as in the case of the United States Department of Agriculture.  
The ILO R.193 definitions which Henrÿ (2012:30) points to as the nucleus of the public 
international cooperative law states “the term cooperative means an autonomous 
association of person united voluntarily to meet common economic, social and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise” 
(Paragraph 2, Paragraph 3 of R. 193 adds further to such definition).  
What is important to highlight at this stage, in understanding the theoretical constructs of 
property and contract, is the fact that in traditional cooperative organisations the 
“owners” are the users, they “govern” and are, at the same time, the beneficiaries. Or to 
state the case even more explicitly, as Hansmann (1988) does, ownership and control are 
not separated (at least theoretically, although control may be ceded to managers). In the 
traditional agricultural cooperative, the ownership structure is straightforward: farmer-
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members own the enterprise. They provide the equity capital and have both income rights 
and control rights.  
An important feature of cooperatives is the characterization of “profit”. The neo-classical 
economic idea of “profit” links accumulation of profits to the distribution of the same. 
Distribution is linked to ownership. In the cooperative model “surplus”, which is the 
income from transactions with cooperative members, and “profits”, which is income from 
transactions with non-members, are distributed to the cooperative members. The 
cooperative takes only what is needed for operating expenses before such distribution.  
As well, cooperatives do not have the “normal” property and ownership relations of IOFs, 
upon which most economic and legal theories of the “firm” are based. In the neo-classical 
view, clearly defined property rights are allocated and thus they can then be the subject of 
contractual dealings. Alternatively, the property can simply be “state” property and thus 
out of the realm of private ordering. However, cooperatives inhabit another paradigm that 
is neither “clearly defined” (individualized) nor state, nor do they fall “in-between” private 
and public. Cooperative property is held at the collective member level.4  
As an example of legislative change in the agricultural cooperative area, we can see that at 
the core of the theoretical justifications for legislative change were particular notions of 
contract and property rights theories. Individual states in the U.S. enacted special 
legislation to facilitate the “new generation cooperatives” (NGC, which will be dealt with in 
more detail below). The allocation of property rights and the focus on contractual 
relations were seen to create conditions for fostering equity investment as a key element 
in the attempt to ensure the survival of cooperatives, something that the traditional jointly 
held property was seen to inhibit (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000; Cook and Chaddad 2003, 
2004; Cook, 2005). On the European level, the Statute for European Cooperatives (Council 
Regulation No. 1435/2003 brought into force in August 2006) is meant to encourage cross 
border activities amongst cooperatives in EU states. In an effort to “readjust” and “correct” 
contract and property rights allocations, external non-member/non user investment is 
permitted, albeit with limits on voting rights. Returns on investment may be made on 
paid-up capital and ¨quasi-equity¨ interests.  
It is important to note that legislative change does not necessarily signify an open change 
in the legal status of “cooperative” but rather can allow for the possibility of “hybrid” types 
of organizations (described below), based on changes in ownership structures, within the 
                                                                  
4 It is of the utmost importance though to understand that collective ownership used here has nothing to do 
with state ownership or socialist cooperative models. 
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same legal identity, i.e. in the USA at least, a NGC is still a “cooperative” and an LLC can still 
refer to itself as a “cooperative”. 
Henrÿ (2012) provides a useful list of the distinctions between IOFs and cooperatives, 
comparing them in terms of their capital structure, management and control. In addition 
to the points mentioned above on collectively held property, profits and ownership, we 
can add the following (adapted from Henrÿ): 
 cooperatives are people centered and based on member use and on transactional 
relationships/IOF are capital centered and investor driven and based on 
investment relationships 
 the content of relationships is different where membership in cooperatives is a 
structural element of the enterprise/in IOF, who owns the share is accidental and 
incidental 
 cooperative shares do not represent a	share in an asset nor are they investments 
 cooperatives seek to serve members (in agricultural cooperatives this includes 
obtaining good prices for product) and to meet their economic-social and cultural 
needs/IOFs must strive to produce the highest return on capital for their 
shareholders, cutting the cost of product to minimize costs 
 positive results are divided between profits on transactions with third parties and 
surplus on transactions with members. Cooperatives do not distribute profit and 
divide surplus proportionately/IOFs distribute profits 
 management of cooperative capital is meant to serve members (present and 
future) and thus capital is preserved over time/IOF management is geared toward 
capital investments and growth (usually short term)  
 cooperatives usually operate on one vote-one member and have democratic 
control/IOF votes are related to invested capital 
Henrÿ goes on to mention other characteristics that go beyond capital structure, 
management and control: 
 in IOFs capital hires labour/cooperatives reverse this relationship 
 cooperative growth is through consolidation/IOFs through M&A 
 methods of evaluating success differ: IOFs are usually evaluated on quarterly 
profits 
 cooperatives and IOFs (often) play a different role in their communities and 
society at large  
Chapter 2. Theoretical Bases and Selected Literature Review 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
24 
 
Given the significant differences in structure and purpose and contractual and property 
relationships, there is good reason to question theoretical work based on IOF 
characteristics applied to the cooperative business form. 
2.3	Concern	for	Loss	of	Cooperative	Principles	
As mentioned above, given these legislative and/or organizational changes, concerns exist 
as to whether “cooperative principles” are being respected (Henrÿ 2012; Fici 2013; Spear 
2010; Fernández Guandaño 2006; Monzón Campos et al, 1996). There is also concern 
(Hendrikse, ed. 2004) that cooperatives may react to increasing competition and change 
by converting into “normal” investor-owned corporations or limited liability companies, 
thus putting at risk the cooperative as a viable and competitive business organizational 
model and with it, the end of the “social” goals said to be implicit therein. Demutualization 
in the USA, Ireland and elsewhere provides a basis for this concern. 
Henrÿ (2012:4) refers to a “crossroads” in cooperative legislation: 
The decision on which direction to take--further adaptation to perceived pressures 
by the financial market, return to cooperative principles or new paths—has to be 
made in a moment of intellectual crises as far as economies are concerned. In	a	
reciprocal	process,	cooperative	 legislation	has	contributed	to	the	occurrence	of	this	
crisis. (emphasis author) 
The question of whether or not such cooperative principles should	be	 respected and to 
what extent is not answered in this Chapter 2.  Instead, this Chapter explores the 
theoretical underpinnings for the justification of certain “remedies” and “cures” for 
cooperatives based on particular characterizations of property and contract.  
Equally important is the role law plays, as an institutional force, in reconciling two 
seemingly contradictory concepts at work, referred to earlier in Chapter 1 as the “Janus” 
nature of cooperatives (Zamagni and Zamagni 2010) or the enfant	terrible (Levi, 2005 ): 
the first is the maintenance of the concept of the cooperative and emphasis on the 
importance of the social economy and the second, a trend towards embracing investor-
owned organizational design, allowing increasing non-member/non-user investment. 
Whether such changes represent an innovation (a creative response in a new direction), 
an evolution (a progressive response to a changing environment) or imitation (of the 
investor owned firm) depends on which theoretical assumptions are made about the 
nature of business entities, but more importantly about the characterization of the legal 
concepts of property and contract.  
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2.4	 Contract	 and	 Property	 Rights	 Theory	 as	 Basis	 for	 Economic	
Organizational	Theories	and	Organisational/Legislative	Change	
Given that legal concepts inform and motivate particular organizational theories which in 
turn generate testable predictions or hypotheses and which have then justified legislative 
and policy strategies in the agricultural cooperative sector,5 it is useful to analyse the 
accepted notions of contract and property law which are the basis of such economic 
organizational theories. The theories referred to are: agency theory, incomplete contract 
theory or property rights theory and transaction cost economics /new institutional 
economics.  
Relational contract theory is used to investigate and counterpoint the implicit 
characterisations of contract and by extension, property (as the subject of contract), in 
such economic theories. Thereafter, in attempting to understand how these theories 
became accepted by legal structures, institutional theory as well as legal theories such as 
the critical legal studies movement are referred to. Cooperative theory provides a critique 
of the shortcomings of the above economic theories when applied to the cooperative 
enterprise form. 
Various approaches to “hybrid” cooperative forms are also described wherein property 
and control rights have been modified from the “traditional” agricultural cooperative. 
Finally, Ostrom´s reworking of property and contract and governance, along with the 
insights of social enterprise, provide an alternative method of thinking about agricultural 
cooperatives and their institutional environment. Cooperatives are in essence, a method 
by which to hold collective property, according to certain defined rules that such 
community/cooperative defines.  
2.5	 Economic	 theories	 of	 the	 Firm:	 inherent	 contract	 and	 property	
rights	assumptions	
To position the reader in the economic theoretical landscape, below is a description of the 
above mentioned economic/organisational theories with respect to contract and property 
rights. For those familiar with such theories, what is of interest are the implications for the 
cooperative business form. 
                                                                  
5 Most notable is the influential work of Michael Cook at the University of Missouri and various people who 
have worked with him such as Sykuta, Chaddad and Ilopoulos, as well as the work of George Hendrikse. See 
Cook and Iliopoulos (1999, 2000); Cook, et al (2004); Hendrikse, ed. (2004). Current work of Cook and Burress 
seems to adopt more of a “collective entrepreneurship” focus, building upon prior new institutional theories. 
Earlier work on this topic can be found in Porter and Scully (1987). 
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2.5.1	Property	Rights/	Incomplete	Contract	
Property Rights/Incomplete Contract Theories (PRT) of the firm were developed by Oliver 
Hart, John Moore (Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore 1990, 1988) and Sanford Grossman 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986). PRT posits that it is impossible for the parties to a contract to 
set out all the possible contingencies that actually could occur and need to be controlled. 
In response then, a substitute for the unachievable perfect contract needs to be found to 
determine and aid decision making. The allocation of property rights which are not “ill 
defined” supposedly ensures that decision making is guided through the simple procedure 
of people rationally deciding their best interests based on such ownership. The theory in 
essence holds that the future will take care of itself once the assets are properly 
distributed: people will perform their contracts in an efficient manner because they will 
have the incentive to do so, based on their desire to deal with their property in a self 
interested manner.  
Property rights theory relies on the notion that a private enterprise or “contractual self 
ordering” cannot function unless property rights are created in resources. Chaos 
disappears because people must enter into contractual relations to use the property, and 
so, theoretically, does government disappear except to the extent that a legal system to 
define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is necessary (Coase, 1959:12). Once 
property rights are defined, government steps aside and resources are allocated to their 
highest value through the market. Decision-making is mechanical—prompted by the 
single fact of ownership (Williamson 2000:599). 
Setting out the PRT of the firm, Hart and Moore (1998) state: 
This theory takes the view that, first, a	firm	is	defined	by	its	non‐human	assets, and 
second, in the absence of comprehensive contracts, decisions need to be taken over 
how these assets are used. The theory argues that the authority to make such 
decisions ultimately rests with the owner(s) of the firm. More precisely, the 
owners have residual rights of control—that is the right to make all decisions 
except those that have been specified contractually. (emphasis author) 
In addition to the curious depiction of the firm being defined by its non-human assets, it is 
important to note the concept of contract that is implicit in the above quote, and the 
justification that follows. Contract is seen as a written document that could “ideally” 
specify all the terms and conditions which would then be enforceable, if it were not for the 
“imperfect” or “unpredictable” nature of the future. 
In an ideal world, in which the indefinite future can be anticipated and planned for, 
all decisions could be specified in an initial, enforceable contract written by the 
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interested parties when the firm is first set up. The question as to who has 
authority is then irrelevant since there is nothing left to decide. In reality 
transaction costs prevent the writing of comprehensive contracts and so actual 
contracts are incomplete. Under these conditions, the allocation of authority 
matter, since those in authority make decisions with respect to which the initial 
contract is silent. (Hart 1998:1820) 
The logic here is that well defined property rights owners are necessary because contracts 
are incomplete. It is a straw-man argument to lament the unattainability of the “complete” 
contract—akin to the straw-man of the unattainable “perfect market” which is used to 
justify the idea of “market failure”. A few questions may be posed (which will be dealt with 
later in this chapter): if we had a different notion of contract to begin with, one that was 
not ideally determinate how would this change the justification for ownership as a way of 
allocating decision-making power? In addition, what is it about the notion of “ownership” 
that would automatically facilitate efficient decision-making? What would constitute 
“proof” of the relationship between ownership and decision-making?6 For example,	in the 
world of structured finance, actual ownership has long ago ceased to matter. Do people 
really make such decisions based on a particular notion of property rights? Does 
contracting really achieve what PRT theorists claim? From a practical point of view, does 
“ill defined” cooperative property matter? 
2.5.2	Agency	Theory	and	Contract‐justification	for	new	form	of	cooperative	
The overriding intellectual template of contract and agency theory, based on the work of 
Eisenhardt (1989) and expanded on greatly by the work of Jensen and Meckling (Jensen, 
1998, 2000; Jensen and Meckling 1994,1976) amongst others (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; 
Eisenhardt 1985, 1989), is that of a business enterprise as a “nexus” of contracts. Contract 
and agency theory look at the relationship of the contracting economic actors (principal 
and agent) within such organisation. The historical intellectual “birth” of agency theory 
appears to have been on the occasion of the “advent of the modern corporation [which] 
created a separation between ownership and control of wealth” (Davis, Schoorman and 
Donaldson, 1997: 22). The second stage of the “modern corporation” may be seen to be 
non-concentrated (widely held) shareholdings (which, in agency theory is seen to be 
positive as it addresses the “portfolio” issue of diversifying risk). 
                                                                  
6 As an aside, the mass privatization teams (Goldmans/Merrill Lynch), assigned to Russia in the 90s relied 
directly and heavily on the work of Hart. Despite what is generally noted as a failure in the Russian economy 
the World Bank in 2002 (World	Development	Report	 2002:	Building	 Institutions	 for	Markets), reflecting the 
views of NIE, emphasized the importance of institutions that insure property rights for without it “poor 
people” would be unable to use valuable assets for investment and income growth. They also referred to the 
“strong judicial institutions that enforce contracts” so that entrepreneurs would be able to manage risk. 
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In economic theory the principal-agent problem concerns the difficulties that arise under 
conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. 
Two main problems occur in agency relationships: (a) conflicting goals of principal and 
agent and costs of monitoring behavior; and (b) different perspectives on assumption of 
risk or risk sharing, given particular self-interested preferences. Various mechanisms may 
be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, such as profit 
sharing.  
Agency theory by now is a well known, if not tired and over-worked theory, but what is 
important for the purposes of this thesis is how it characterizes property and contract 
relations and thus the nature of firms (and by extension in its application to cooperatives) 
and its consequent analysis of institutional structure.  
Various approaches have been taken to study issues faced by agricultural cooperatives 
resulting in proposals that have been made to increase their access to capital, 
competitiveness and to improve organisational structure. The application of agency theory 
to justify such changes is a popular approach, both within Spain and abroad7 (see an 
analysis of research approaches to agricultural cooperatives and the continuance of 
agency theory related topics in Hendrikse and Feng, 2012 and Cook, Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos, 2004). 
Agency costs arise in trying to exert control or guarantee compliance, often by way of “goal 
alignment”. As Sykuta and Chaddad (1999:72) point out, most applications of agency 
theory focus on the incentive vs. risk sharing trade-off of contracts aimed at aligning the 
interests of the agent with those of the principal. Goal alignment, in agency theory at least, 
usually translates into some contractual arrangement such as executive compensation 
schemes or governance structures. In governance schemes, boards are to control or “keep 
in line” the agents by virtue of contractual controls, a mixture of “carrots and sticks”. 
Directors are ideally independent of management and ensure compliance by monitoring 
and controlling managers to make sure that shareholders’ interests are well served. 
Executive compensation schemes consist in rewarding managers for successfully 
maximising shareholder value. 
Like PRT, agency theory assumes that “complete” or ideal contracts are difficult to 
construct due to the fact that there is incomplete information or “asymmetrical” 
                                                                  
7 In relation to Spain see for example, (Minquez-Vera, A, Martin-Ugedo, J.F. and Arcas-Lario, N. (2010); Marti, E. 
and Aranda-Ogayar, M. (2001); Álvarez Pérez et al. 2000).  
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information. In addition, of particular interest for our purposes is the reductionist unit of 
analysis underlying the theory, that of the contract between the principal and the agent. 
Below is a scheme from Eisenhardt´s (1989) characterisation of agency theory.  
Table	2.1	Agency	Theory	Overview.	
Agency	Theory	Overview	
Key idea  Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion  
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information 
Assumption 
Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle 
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Eisenhardt, M, K. (1989) 
 
Agency theory sets its task as finding the right “fit” between property rights ownership 
and capital structures so as to lower agency costs (Fama, 1980, 1983). It is worth noting 
the particular cornerstone concept of the person in agency theory as a basically 
individualistic and rational, self-interested freely contracting actor, ready to maximise on 
their own wealth. 
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Although cooperatives in their “pure” or “hybrid” form are different than traditional firms, 
where management and ownership are separate, agency theory is seen to be as applicable 
to cooperatives as it is to investor owned enterprises by virtue of the intellectual 
transformation of the cooperative into a “nexus” of contracts. This transformation allows 
the cooperative to enter the institutional “sphere” of contractual ordering, complete with 
the requisite framework for identifying what “matters”.  
In Table 2.2 (further below) the “problems” of traditional cooperatives from an agency 
theory/property rights perspective are briefly detailed. Although the focus on property 
rights is only one of several possible emphases in the development of agency theory, it is a 
particularly useful starting point for the study of cooperatives, for it is the feature which 
most differentiates it from investor-owned firms. The theory holds that designation of 
property rights has a key impact on the incentives for member participation and 
investment, access to capital and success of the cooperative.  
Academics working on new generational cooperatives (NGC) have justified this reworking 
of contract and property rights as a response to solving the “problems” identified by PRT 
and agency theory. 8 Since the early to mid-1990s in North America and Canada there has 
been an emphasis on the restructuring of traditional cooperatives and the creation of 
NGCs (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2004, 2000, 1999; Cook and Chaddad, 2004), led by 
cooperative researchers at the Universities of Missouri and Wisconsin as well as the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2002a, 2002b). In Canada, agricultural cooperative 
researchers at the universities of Saskatchewan (Sousa and Herman 2007; Fulton 2001) 
and Manitoba (Agrifood Research, 2000) are influential participants in seeking the 
reordering of cooperative law contract and property rights. These changes which seek to 
incorporate “incentives” and “corrections” prescribed by a “new institutional economics” 
approach, owe their intellectual base to agency theory, transaction cost analysis, ill-
defined property rights and incomplete contracting theory. (Cook, 2005, 2004, 2000). 
These models propose essentially a re-orientation or re-working of one of the central 
tenants of cooperative theory: contract and property rights.9  
Relying on the conceptual work of Fama and Jensen (1983) and further developed by 
cooperative theorists like Michael Cook (focusing on contracting and property rights) we 
can describe the “problems” of agency theory as grouped into two categories of contracts: 
                                                                  
8 However, some note that the “New Generation Cooperatives” were initially a factual phenomenon which took 
place as part of a “boom” in a particular region in the U.S. The change began in the cooperative business 
community and later, academics and theorists applied agency theory in an effort to explain this phenomenon 
and propose organisational solutions (Cook and Iliopoulos 1999). 
9 See Cook, M. and Iliopoulos, C. (2004, 2000, 1999); Prior to this was Porter, P. and G. Scully (1987). 
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contracts that regulate the residual rights; and secondly, contracts by which decision 
processes are designed.  
Contracts that regulate the residual rights are concerned with obligations, rights and risks 
of the residual claimants (duties and liabilities that are inherent in the role of investor). 
Within this category three	investment-related	incentive	problems are seen to be relevant 
for cooperative business entities: common property problems (including “free rider” 
problems); horizon problems; and portfolio problems. Contracts by which decision 
processes are designed ultimately concern decision	 related incentives. Agency theory in 
relation to cooperatives may suggest the following problems: control problems and 
influence cost problems. 
Every law student learns that one does not own “property” per	 se but that they own 
“rights” to interests in property. These rights (a “bundle” of rights is the common 
metaphor in Anglo-Saxon property law) include the exclusive rights of possession (and the 
right to control), the rights to benefits generated by its use and the right to transfer or 
“alienate” all or part of such rights to others. They may be subject to limitation by law and, 
in addition, may be modified by lawful contract.10 As noted, these assumptions regarding 
property law are the cornerstone of much legal, economic and organisational theory.  
Cooperative structures break some of the most basic assumptions about the common law 
principals of private property, for cooperative capital is unallocated, not easily alienated 
or transferable and the rights to the benefits generated by its use are not rationally 
connected to the actual property. As a result, if contracts are found to be “incomplete”and 
lacking in anticipating and setting out all possible contingencies, the allocation of property 
rights is not available to “solve” the problems of alignment of interests, as incomplete 
contract theory would suggest. 
Thus, in the absence of compelling reasons otherwise, according to agency theory, 
cooperative members may be expected to become unmotivated and apathetic and less 
inclined to invest in the cooperative, which may inhibit the efficiency of the cooperative11. 
                                                                  
10 In English law jurisdictions (including the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc.), such property rights 
are also subject to the principles of equity (equity trumping law). Although clearly outside the scope of this 
thesis, it is interesting to note that equity often limited property rights relying on notions of “fairness” and of 
the common good and reigned in on many occasion the idea that the right to property was absolute and 
individual. I mention it here because much of neo-classical economics and to a certain extent theorists such as 
R. Posner  within New Institutional Economics still rely on a rather U.S. based political right-wing and 
“fundamentalist” notion of what property rights actually mean. Equity also ruled “the commons” before 
property rights, based on the right to exclude, began to be set by precedent. 
11 However, this is not necessarily the case. See Bel Duran and Fernandez Guadaño (2002:110) where they 
refer the obligatory reserve fund as being a merely symbolic figure which does not necessarily have the 
consequence of the “descaptitalizacion” of the cooperative, but merely suggests that firms must find 
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A problem which is related to this is the “free rider” problem and the fairness in the 
treatment of its members. The free rider problem exists both in relation to member/non 
member (hybrid cooperatives) and new member/existing member (“pure” and hybrid 
cooperatives). Basically, gains from cooperative action are enjoyed by individuals that did 
not fully invest in developing the gains, whether they are members or non-members. As 
the number of members that share the common assets of the cooperative increase, the 
return on the assets proportionately declines. The larger the group, the smaller the reward 
for any one individual. When new members join, they benefit from the existing assets of 
the cooperative (rights to residual cash flows based on patronage and rights to participate 
in organisational decisions) and thus act as “free riders”. The membership fee, if there is 
one, rarely approximates the value of the existing assets.12  
From an agency theory perspective the horizon problem exists in cooperatives because 
the residual claims do not extend as far as the economic life of the underlying asset. Thus, 
members are concerned with short term perspectives on their membership, behaving 
“myopically”. Residual claims for cooperatives are contingent rights to cash flows, which 
rights expire when a member ceases to belong to the cooperative. 
These short term preferences may dominate the long term strategic investment strategy of 
the cooperative. There is a perceived disincentive for cooperative members to invest in 
long-term projects and to contribute to growth opportunities. This horizon problem could 
supposedly be solved in an IOF by the shareholder choosing to sell their tradable owner 
shares. However, in a traditional cooperative, such residual rights (individual rights to a 
fair proportion of the cooperative residual) are not tradable. Income streams are 
contractually tied not to the capital that members have contributed but to the volume of 
transactions. The benefits from investments can only be captured over the time of the 
membership and not over the productive life of the assets.  
The portfolio problem is somewhat similar to the horizon problem, but instead of focusing 
on time horizons, it focuses on the member’s available choice of risk/reward profiles. In 
cooperatives, the portfolio problem arises because of the “tied” nature of equity in the 
cooperative. The cooperative investment portfolio may not reflect the interests or risk 
attitudes of any given investor/member but they are unable to reallocate their 
investments. When members of a cooperative have different time horizons this leads to 
different perceptions of the risk/reward profile of the cooperative. According to agency 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
alternative sources of social capital. Whether this is in fact an adequate alternative is explored in Chapter 6 in 
the case of the Almería cooperative model.  
12 In contrast, see Ole Borgen (2003:6) “Rethinking incentive problems in cooperative organisations” where he 
argues that there is a “rational” for existing members to allow other members to join for “free”.  
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theory, all investors should have a portfolio which reflects their particular preferred 
“trade-off” between risk and reward. Without a trading system this is seen to be 
unattainable in a traditional cooperative system and the members become risk adverse 
towards investments, there is less diversification and suboptimal investments are made.  
The control problem in cooperatives is similar in nature to shareholder manager problems 
in investor owned firms, but it is said to be compounded by the lack of external 
competitive market pressure (i.e. equity markets and markets for capital control) that, in 
theory, help “discipline” managers.  
In the world of property rights an owner, subject to certain limitations, has the right to 
decide on its use. However, in business organisations there is usually a separation of 
ownership from decision making. Shareholders receive profits from their property yet the 
use of the property is controlled by professional managers. Management performance is 
often measured by stock performance, the market being seen as a control mechanism. In 
cooperatives ownership and decision control is linked and thus there is not the same 
separation of residual risk bearing nor is there “market” control since shares are not 
tradable. Membership involvement in decision control are necessary and thus cooperative 
boards are often restricted to members only. Agency theory would suggest that although 
redemption of residual claims, competitive pricing and the decision to dissolve the 
cooperative can exercise a control function, this is only an approximation of the market. In 
addition cooperatives cannot use share ownership or options to reward successful 
management and thus decision management and decision control may be result in 
underperformance (Kyriakopoulos, 2000).  
Where there are different groups of owners of the cooperative with opposing interests, 
each entitled to share in the distribution of benefits they may engage in lobbying activities 
to promote their own interests (the “influence cost problem”). Certain members may want 
to pursue particular activities which are of a benefit to them, but not efficient for the 
cooperative as a whole. 
The above analysis of cooperatives and agency theory identifies what agency theory 
defines as the limitations in traditional cooperatives, focusing on the treatment of 
property rights or, more specifically, focusing on the problems that stem from vaguely or 
ill-defined property rights. For agency theory, the effectiveness of contractual relations is 
dependent upon the underlying traditional property rights. Accordingly, it is argued by 
agency theory proponents that a redefinition of property rights will provide a solution. 
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How might each of these problems be overcome or corrected? Jensen and Meckling argue 
that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated 
among the participants in any organisation. Cook and Iliopoulos (1999) point out,  
[h]ence, the free rider problem and the horizon problems require a solution that 
aligns members’ investments with their level of patronage. These investments 
must also reflect changes in the value of the cooperative’s current and future cash 
flows. An answer to the portfolio problems on the other hand, must align members’ 
investment with their preferred level of risk and reward. To correct the control 
problem, a vehicle must be designed that reduces the agency problem and permits 
the board of directors to oversee management’s performance without costly 
monitoring and enforcement measures. According to Agency theory, solutions to 
these problems necessitate a clearer specification of each member’s property 
rights. 
Following from this Cook and Iliopoulos (1999) hypothesise that contracting property 
rights in a cooperative as follows, should avoid the agency problems:  
1. Transferable equity shares 
2. Appreciable equity shares 
3. Defined membership 
4. Legally binding delivery contract or a uniform grower agreement 
5. Minimum up-front equity investment requirements.  
They propose these features as the basis for a new type of agricultural cooperative. The 
characteristics set out below are a generalisation of what one will find in the NGCs in these 
states and provinces. However, it will vary from region to region, depending in some part 
on legislation. What is important to keep in mind is that, in theory, the NGC characteristics 
address the “problems” identified above. 
The main distinguishing characteristics of the NGCs are the following: 
1. delivery rights that are tied to the level of equity investment 
2. closed or controlled memberships 
3. higher level of initial equity investment 
4. transferability and the opportunity for appreciation or depreciation in the value of 
delivery rights 
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1. Delivery	Rights	
Equity shares in a NGC assign membership to producers and they also allocate delivery 
rights and obligations. Producers purchase equity shares that obligate them to deliver a 
certain amount of product to the cooperatives each year. Delivery rights ensure that 
members provide up-front equity capital to the NGC that is proportional to their level of 
use of the cooperative. Any patronage refunds are distributed to members according to the 
level of product that is delivered to the NGC. The total quantity of delivery rights shares 
that the cooperative sells to producers depends on the processing capacity of the 
cooperative’s operations. The price of the delivery share is typically determined by 
dividing the total amount of equity capital that the cooperative requires to finance the 
business, by the processing capacity of the cooperatives facilities.  
Shares that allocate delivery rights are separate from membership shares. Each individual 
holds only one membership share, but can hold more than one delivery rights share. 
Voting rights are attached to membership shares (one vote per person) and the price is 
typically nominal. 
2. Closed	Membership	
Membership is restricted once the targeted amount of delivery shares is sold. New 
members are only allowed if an existing member wishes to sell some of his delivery rights 
shares. Sales of delivery shares typically require prior approval by the board. 
3. Higher	Level	of	Initial	Equity	Investment	
Because of delivery rights, the initial equity investment required from producers is higher 
in NGCs than in traditional cooperatives (typically between 30 and 50 percent of total 
capital requirements.) A minimum required amount of delivery rights that must be 
purchased is usually set by a NGC in order to be eligible for membership.  
As the NGC receives a higher level of upfront financing it is in a position to refund a big 
portion of patronage funds to its members in cash at the end of the year, not having to 
retain such funds in the business as additional equity financing. If the NGC expands 
capacity then it issues more delivery rights shares.  
4. Transferability	and	the	Opportunity	for	Appreciation	or	Depreciation	in	the	Value	of	
Delivery	Rights	
Members are allowed to transfer their delivery shares to other members or other 
producers. The prices of the delivery shares are negotiated between the selling member 
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and the buying producer. The price of the delivery shares fluctuate according to the 
performance and earning potential of the cooperatives.13 
Below a chart illustrates the main differences of traditional vs. NGC in respect to agency 
theory and property rights problems.  
 
Table	2.2	Comparison	of	Traditional	Cooperatives	and	NGC	in	relation	to	Agency	
Theory/Property	Rights	Problems.	
Agency Theory 
Problem 
Property Rights Problem Traditional Coop
Result 
NGC Response 
Common property Collectively owned, 
unallocated property-
profits based on volume 
not investment 
Suboptimal risk adverse 
investment/lack of 
access to capital-“free 
rider” of new members 
regarding existing assets 
Upfront access to capital-
delivery shares and 
member shares separate, 
investment and member 
rights determined in 
advance-defined 
membership 
Horizon Residual claims on net 
income of asset shorter 
than productive life of 
asset 
Lack of liquidity-no 
secondary market 
Delivery rights can be 
traded at MV-entry and 
exit  
Portfolio Lack of transferability 
and appreciation of 
asset-prevents 
adjustment of risk  
Investment decisions 
tied to members—risk 
aversion 
Risk is aligned with 
ownership/level of 
investment-sale or 
transfer of asset align 
risk 
Control No market discipline to 
exercise control-
ownership and decision 
control linked 
Lack of discipline and 
incentives-no external 
pressure  
Less complex structures-
property rights aligned 
through member voting 
Influence Cost Members influence coop 
activities according to 
own business interests 
Influence result of 
centralisation of 
authority and 
homogeneity of 
members 
NGC usually centralised 
and limited to single 
purpose 
Adapted from Katz and Boland (1999) and Hackman (2001) 
 
In a 1996-1997 survey of all rural or agricultural-related cooperative formations in the 
upper Midwest of the United States between 1988 and 1996, Cook and Tong (1997) 
observed that more than 80 percent of the cooperative formations had adopted such non-
traditional cooperative characteristics and that, in their opinion, such “agency related 
problems” had largely been addressed. Cooperatives in North Dakota and Minnesota have 
been key figures in the pioneering of new forms of cooperatives. In addition, states such as 
Missouri and Wisconsin have also had a “boom” in NGCs. Across the border in Canada, 
                                                                  
13 This synopsis of NGC characteristics is taken from “New Generation Cooperatives on the Northern Plains” 
(2000) Agri-Food Research and Development Initiative and the Univ. of Manitoba. It is also reconfirmed by 
Merrett, et al (2007) 
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Manitoba and Saskatchewan and to a lesser degree Alberta, have also been very active in 
NGC formation.  
In a later study, “Directory of Closed-Membership Producer Cooperatives: New Generation 
Cooperatives and Limited Liability Companies in the United States and Canada” by the 
Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs (Merrett, et al, 2007) the number of agricultural 
producer ventures were tracked.  
The study pointed out that in 2003, it was recognized that the number of cooperatives in 
the United States had been in a steady decline for over 3 decades (USDA 1998). In 1986, 
5,369 cooperatives representing 4.6 million members (USDA 1996) existed yet by 1995; 
the number had declined to 4,006, representing only 3.8 million members. Although the 
reduction could be due to several factors, such as the declining number of farmers joining 
cooperatives, an important factor identified by the authors was the “economic 
restructuring” in the agricultural sector. Some had gone bankrupt or merged with the 
rational of competing internationally (Cenex Harvest States 2003; Palmer 2003). But there 
was also a steep increase in the number of NGCs and closed-membership cooperative 
enterprises such as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). Instead of exporting commodities 
unprocessed out of their communities, farmers invested in NGCs and LLCs to locally 
process commodities (Patrie, 1998) thus increasing on-farm incomes while creating local 
nonfarm jobs (Leistritz and Sell 2001; Merrett and Walzer 2003). The study notes that a 
measure of the success and popularity of NGCs/LLCs14 was their increase from fewer than 
a dozen NGCs in the early 1980s to an estimated 457 operational NGCs or LLCs in 2006.  
A few observations may be made here. “Agency problems” are the result of an interpretive 
exercise. Whether these problems have been addressed simply by virtue of a change in 
cooperative characteristics is not self evident, but rather circular logic. Secondly, after 
adopting non-traditional characteristics as a remedy, cooperatives and membership 
declined. Whether this was due to abandoning traditional cooperative characteristics due 
to the “contractualisation” of the member-cooperative relationship is an outstanding 
question. 
2.5.3	Transaction	Costs	Economics	
A transaction cost is a cost that is incurred when engaging in or carrying out an economic 
exchange. Different kinds of transaction costs noted by transaction cost economics (TCE) 
may include information costs, bargaining costs (negotiating and drafting a contract), 
monitoring, compliance and enforcement costs (including but not limited legal costs). 
                                                                  
14 An LLC is similar to an NGC, but allows for nonproducer investments (Brown and Merrett 2000). 
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Critics of TCE note that many important social and environmental costs are not included, 
such exclusions thus not taking into account the positive characteristics of the cooperative 
business form. This will be expanded on in Chapter 2.7. 
In The Nature of the Firm (1937) Ronald Coase introduced the notion that transaction 
costs led to the existence of what he saw as inaccurate focus on pricing systems as a 
coordinating mechanism and the “invisible hand” guiding the market. The paper was 
actually written while he was in the USA in 1931 and 1932 studying vertical and lateral 
integration, in the middle of the great depression where coordination of industrial 
production was increasingly done by governmental planning. His advisor at the LSE had 
warned him against such government planning (Coase, 1994).		
With this observation came the idea that to have an efficient economic system it was 
necessary not only to have markets but also areas of planning within organisations of the 
appropriate size. What this mix should be we would find as a result of competition. The 
emphasis was shifted to looking internally at organisations (although arguably the 
influence of Coase´s work wasn´t picked up by the mainstream until the 1970s). 
In the Problem of Social Cost (1994) he noted that in a regime of zero transaction costs, an 
assumption of standard economics theory, negotiations between the parties would lead to 
those arrangements being made which would maximise wealth irrespective of the initial 
assignment of rights (“Coase Theorum”). He rectified this by saying that the world does 
indeed have positive transaction costs and thus this recognition was the stepping stone to 
study the world with positive transaction costs, that is, whether government 
action/regulation etc. was necessary needed to be studied. To study the world of positive 
transaction costs, study of the legal system (characterised only from a “cost” point of view, 
however) was crucial and important. Coases´ proposed study of the “legal system” though 
more sophisticated than the study of contract as a series of spot transactions still proved 
lacking for it was assumed that the legal system provided a mechanical “umpire”-like 
method for the resolution of contractual issues. Thus, the better and more detailed the 
contract, the lower the cost of enforcement. But the attempt to build the perfect contract 
failed and transaction cost analysis required some fine tuning. Coase, having rejected the 
general equilibrium model of the economy, recognised the study of particular markets as 
specific social institutions.  
It makes little sense for economist to discuss the process of exchange without 
specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place since this 
affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting (1994:11). 
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Coase understood the central point of modern markets: that what is traded is not physical 
entities but rights to perform certain actions and those such rights are established by a 
legal system. “The legal system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic 
system and may in certain respects be said to control it”. He went further by criticising 
economists, who when speaking of market structures, spoke of the number of firms, 
product differentiation, sectors, etc. completely ignoring the influence of the social 
institutions which facilitate exchange (1994;7-8). 
Using Coase´s work as a base, TCE is best represented by the work of Oliver Williamson 
(1996, 1987, 1981, 1979, 1975). TCE follows on in the same vein: the exercise consists of 
determining the “costs” of contracting and attempting to lower transaction cost by 
focusing on the design of contracts which are supplemented by allocations of property 
rights. 
What the theories of agency, PRT and TCE have in common is the idea that contracts are 
incomplete and thus contractual control of property rights must be used to align interest 
and create efficient structures. To the extent that agency theory deals with moral hazard 
or opportunism, TCE and PRT deals with the “hold up” problem—that is, that a contracting 
party will do something within the contractual relation to cause economic harm to the 
other party unless some sort of concession is granted. 
While the two latter theories are “economic” they have a distinct focus from agency 
theory. Agency theory seeks to manipulate compensation through contractual ordering to 
affect certain outcomes. On the other hand, TCE and PRT are more focused on contractual 
decision-making procedures and the extent to which organisations or institutions can be 
designed in light of the nexus of contracts model (i.e. how to design the nexus).  
Ménard (2012) points out that agency theory 
assumes actors	benefiting	 from	an	extended	rationality so that its core prediction 
with respect to the variety and selection of organizational arrangements 
(essentially contracts) refers to information asymmetry and/or risk aversion of 
agents, shaping the trade-off between incentives and insurance. In the a context of 
asymmetric information, it is the degree of risk aversion and the opportunity costs 
involved in participating in a contract that provides the rationales guiding the 
choice of a “well-defined and unique” optimal contract (ex	ante). 
Conversely, he points out that 
transaction cost economics differ in that it does	 not	 require	 assumptions	 about	
rationality	 or	 attitude	 towards	 risk. The alignment hypothesis proposed by 
Williamson (1996, chap.4) relies on the objective	 adequacy	 (or	 inadequacy)	
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between	the	attributes	of	transaction	at	stake	and	organizational	choices	available. 
(emphasis by author) 
In sum, agency theory is about the attempt to contract	 ideal	behavior; TCE is about the 
attempt to contract	an	ideal	organizational	form. 
While PRTs are seen as useful to TCE in that they recognize a central role for property 
rights, TCE noted that such theories failed to acknowledge that the definition and 
enforcement of such property rights is not “costless” (representing a transaction cost in 
the words of Coase) and thus one must go beyond the rules of the game (who owns what 
property and how it is maintained) to include the play of the game (contract). Property 
rights also require enforcement (through legal institutions) which is a cost, thus, much of 
contract dispute and settlement is done by private ordering. As a result, in Williamson’s 
scheme of NIEs the governance	 of the contract relations becomes the focus. The 
transaction is the basic unit of analysis and governance is an effort to craft order, mitigate 
conflict and realise mutual gain. His analysis attempts to align governance structures with 
the transactions which occur in relation to any given entity (firm or cooperative) 
(Williamson, 1996). 
According to Williamson, the focus on the governance of contractual relations began in the 
1970s (Williamson, 1979). This step of course gets us more involved in an institutional 
analysis for it means that we must pay attention to the workings and function of a legal 
system through which contracts are defined, interpreted and enforced. While certain 
“contractarians” may not acknowledge it, not only is the notion of cost free contractual 
ordering a fiction, the notion that it is somehow “private” ordering is also a fiction, for such 
ordering exists within the law of contract as	an	institution: the governance of contractual 
relations becomes the focus of analysis. But “governance” is as far as Williamson takes the 
institutional analysis of contract. 
2.6	Legal	Characterisation	of	Contract	and	Property	Rights	
2.6.1	Introduction	
Empirical and theoretical studies on organizations, including agricultural cooperatives, 
using agency theory, incomplete contracts and transaction cost economics, have 
proliferated (see Hendrikse and Feng, 2012, Cook, Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2004 for a 
study of topics over the last few decades). However, little investigation has been done in 
organizational studies on the appropriateness of such theories and the assumptions about 
contract and property rights with respect to cooperatives and how the acceptance of these 
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ideas have affected legislative and policy change initiatives in relation to cooperative 
entities. 
Less still has law’s role, as an	 institution with its own logic and aims, been considered. 
Simply put, the critical legal (or socio-legal) scholarship on contract and property rights 
has not been merged to any degree with contemporary organizational firm theory. Nor has 
the unique organizational structure of cooperative ownership, not to mention cooperative 
social structure, been taken sufficiently into account. Much empirical research in TCE 
applied to agricultural cooperatives has focused on contract as a method to control the 
risk of ex	post	opportunism or “hold up” problems (e.g. Bijman, 2006). As set out above, 
where contractual methods prove “incomplete” or “imperfect”, the allocation of property 
rights is seen as the remedy to exert control and maximize efficiencies. Where property 
rights don´t solve control and/or efficiency issues, then an emphasis on governance is seen 
to be the solution, Williamson having been an important influence in this field. 
Increasingly empirical studies focus on organizations as a collection of contracts (Smith 
and King, 2007). The Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI) at the 
University of Missouri and the Center for Research on Contracts and the Structure of 
Enterprise at the University of Pittsburg were created to study actual contracts in order to 
lead to a new contract theory and a more accurate organizational theory. But what 
characterizations of contract are used? Setting aside the deficiencies of this positivistic 
approach in relation to interpretive issues, what is important is how contractual relations 
are viewed, not the “black letter” interpretation of a discreet contract. What is the quality 
and nature of these relationships and what is the result of such interactions? How do the 
relationships affect the organization? Ostrom (2005:3) observes, “to understand 
institutions, one needs to know what they are, how and why they are crafted and 
sustained, and what	consequences	they	generate	in	diverse	settings” (emphasis author). 
Given a different characterization of such legal concepts is it possible that we may come to 
understand organizations (and organizational theory) in a different manner and 
consequently, proposed legislative changes may address different concerns? Concretely, a 
new body of cooperative theory may need to be “rebuilt” from the ground up, rejecting 
particular “truths” in theory and legislation based on the characteristics of widely-held 
shareholder owned business entities. Important as well is the recognition of the role of 
law in actually creating markets themselves, and thus the questioning of “efficiency” as an 
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external “market” factor. What is the law of contract and the law of property if not a legal 
construct?15 As Ostrom (1990:22) notes,  
an assertion that the imposition of private property rights is necessary tells us 
nothing about how that bundle of rights is to be defined, how the various attributes 
of the goods involved will be measured….how conflicts will be adjudicated…or how 
the residual interests of the right-holders in the resource system itself will be 
organised.  
With good reason she goes on to observe that “[a]n important lesson that one learns by 
carefully studying the growing number of systematic studies associated with “the new 
institutionalism” is that these “institutional details” are important (2010:22). 
This chapter does not “catalogue” all the various specific cooperative legislative reforms. 
Specific legislative and policy reforms in relation to Spanish cooperatives and agricultural 
cooperatives are the subject of later Chapters 5 and 6. Instead law is considered here as 
part of an institutional framework, not merely an external method of control or a 
“transaction cost”. Law is, amongst other things, an intellectual framework with a 
historical foundation, a text with authors, an “action arena” with participants, a cultural 
form and a form of communication and ordering. This characterisation of law, both public 
and private (contract and property rights), is counter to the idea of a business 
organization as simply a nexus of contracts operating in a societal, historical or economic 
vacuum. 
2.6.2	Institutional	Nature	of	Law	
It is useful to begin with a general definition of “institutionalism”: “the activities and 
mechanisms by which structures, models, rules and problem-solving routines become 
established as a taken-for-granted part of everyday social reality.” (Schneiberg and 
Clemens, 2006:196). DiMaggio, describing actors as socially constructed, sees action as 
being shaped by what is available, “the taken for granted…organizational forms and 
practices” (DiMaggio, 1988:4). 
Ostrom (2010:4) defines institutions as, 
[t]he prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and 
structured interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, 
firms… private associations, and governments at all scales…Individuals	interacting	
                                                                  
15 Ostrom  (2010:651) after relying on studies of property rights around the world, conceptualizes property 
rights systems as containing bundles	of rights rather than a single right and identifies five property rights that 
individuals using a common-pool resource might cumulatively have: (i) access (ii) withdrawal—the right to 
harvest specific products from a resource, (iii) management—the right to transform the resource and regulate 
internal use patterns, (iv) exclusion—the right to decide who will have access, withdrawal, or management 
rights, and (v) alienation—the right to lease or sell any of the other four rights.  
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within	 rule‐structured	 situations	 face	 choices	 regarding	 the	actions	and	 strategies	
they	take,	leading	to	consequences	for	themselves	and	for	others.(emphasis author) 
 
Ostrom´s definition adds a new wrinkle: when analysing “actors” whether individuals or 
enterprises one does not merely look at characteristics or motives of the person or entity 
but as well, the context and the ability	for	choice	of	action. What happens at the level of the 
cooperative is shaped by the organisation of industries, historical, cultural and sociological 
events and state policies and what happens within the cooperative shapes the cooperative 
over time. These things in turn, are reactions to larger world context rather than just 
national level factors, whether economic, technological or political. This point will be 
picked up again in Chapter 6 when dealing with Cook and Burress’ approach to “dynamic” 
or “regenerative” cooperative change and evolution. 
At first glance when we look at the changes that are occurring in agricultural cooperative 
legislation and cooperative organisation, institutional theory appears to be a good “fit” 
(e.g. the various works of Cook, Ménard, 2007, Bager, 1994). In a globalised market, the 
common shareholder-owned, widely-held corporation is the “legitimate” norm and it is 
not a difficult leap to seeing the cooperative sector seeking such legitimacy. Indeed, 
DiMaggio and Powell’s well known article on isomorphism set out to explain precisely why 
this type of phenomena occurred and to answer the question as to why there was such a 
high level of homogeneity of organisational form and practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). In an attempt to understand by which mechanisms such homogeneity was 
achieved, they identified three main types of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic 
and normative. While acknowledging the simplicity of DiMaggio and Powell´s article, it is a 
useful place to start.  
Let us note upfront though, that DiMaggio and Powell made a distinction between 
institutional isomorphism and the kinds of changes that took place due to competition in 
the marketplace: 
Today, however, structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by 
competition or by the need for efficiency. Instead, we will contend, 
bureaucratization and other forms of organisational change occur as the result of 
processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily making them 
more efficient. (DiMaggio, 1983, 147) 
Competitive isomorphism assumes “a system rationality that emphasizes market 
competition, niche changes and fitness measures” (DiMaggio, 1983:145-150). In a 
Darwinian contest, competitive pressures select optimal entities and the non-optimal 
perish. Those organizations which remain are seen to be isomorphic both with each other 
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and to the economic demands of their environment. This theoretical approach should not 
necessarily be discounted in studying agricultural cooperatives, but it misses the mark on 
law’s role in this process, for the very markets and niches are created and defined, at least 
in part, by legal structures. When studying theories of the firm, the underlying concepts of 
contract and property law which inform them and the resulting legislative changes which 
are influenced by such theories, it seems that institutional isomorphism is more relevant 
as it applies to the study of organizations competing for “political power and institutional 
legitimacy” as well as for “social and economic fitness”. 
If we look to law and legislation, we can see that we easily fall within all three categories of 
isomorphism in considering cooperative organisation and legislative reform. 
Corporate form is legally created and constituted, as is contract and property. The modern 
shareholder-owned, widely-held corporation is a powerful cultural icon and to the extent 
that the cooperative does not conform to such model, other organisations, whether 
financial or governmental, are prone to exert coercive force. Shareholder-owned 
corporations are increasingly present within the agricultural sector and with the renewed 
interest in genetically modified crops, alternative energy sources and bio-fuel, this may be 
a trend in the future. 
Similarly, in terms of mimetic isomorphism, the investor owned firm is seen to be more 
“efficient” and more profitable in general. When cultural norms demand that economic 
activity be judged on a particular circumscribed notion of “efficiency” then entities which 
have other goals must either defend their difference or mimic the norm. 
Normative isomorphism is evident in many professional areas, from business schools, law 
schools and agricultural economics departments to financial advisors, bankers and 
accountants. Politicians and legislators often have a legal background and thus, when 
presented with an “economic problem” respond with legalistic solutions. If we look to 
education we can see how professional education affects our view of the “viability” of 
cooperatives. In “The Disappearance of Co-operatives from Economics Textbooks” (Kalmi, 
2006, see also Hill, 2000) we discover that a study of standard economic textbooks in 
2000 yielded absolutely no mention of the cooperative business form.16 However, 
standard economic textbooks in the beginning and mid 20th C. had indeed included 
                                                                  
16 The author notes that in her legal education, curriculum and exam requirements for the common law 
jurisdictions of Ontario, Canada, New York State and England and Wales did not include any mention of the 
cooperative  business form, although sole proprietorships, partnerships, various forms of  unlimited and 
limited companies and trusts were studied. While it may seem odd that trusts were included, they are a key 
figure in many structured finance transactions and to avoid taxes on transfer of wealth. 
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cooperatives as a business form to be studied, but mention of them “disappeared” to the 
point where they are not mentioned presently in any major economics textbooks. 
While the absence of the cooperative business form is evident in professional formation, 
the positive “evangelising” of the shareholder corporation as the “true” legitimate business 
form is very much present. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) argued that there is 
consensus on a shareholder oriented model of the corporation and that alternative models 
of corporate organization have failed (referring to both labour-oriented and state-oriented 
models). They go on to conclude that “[s]ince the dominant corporate ideology of 
shareholder primacy is unlikely to be undone, its success represents the “end of history” 
for corporate law.” 
Convergence in the fine structure of corporate law proceeds more slowly than 
convergence in governance practices. Legal change requires legislative action. 
Nevertheless, we expect shareholder pressure (and	 the	 power	 of shareholder‐
oriented	 ideology)	 to force gradual legal changes, largely but not entirely in the 
direction of Anglo-American corporate and securities laws (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001:441). (emphasis author) 
To organisational scholars, this notion of convergence or evolving to a singular common 
norm is not new (although the explanation may vary). As mentioned above, at the centre 
of DiMaggio’s observation on institutionalism and mimetic isomorphism was the question 
of why so many institutions in a particular sector ended up mimicking each other. Nor is it 
new to legal scholars, particularly common law lawyers, where the common law is 
historically seen to be a progression towards a more efficient and just law, the body of law 
itself is assumed to have an internal logic, which is to be “discovered” and reconciled. 
However, unlike institutional theory’s quest to find out “why?” and “how?” Hansmann and 
Kraakmann resort to prescriptive, normative claims (falling into one of the most common 
philosophical fallacies: the “Is/Ought” assumption, that is, “corporations are	 dominant, 
thus corporations ought	to be dominant”). 
One could conclude (but it is not a necessary conclusion), that cooperatives are not 
studied because they are not “persuasive” or “relevant”. Fair enough. None of this would 
seem out of place but for one thing: Cooperatives do exist and make up a significant part of 
the economic sector worldwide as mentioned above in Chapter 1.2. Their “absence” is 
perhaps due to their “incoherency” with the cultural narrative of the superiority of IOFs 
and shareholder supremacy, which have at their core formal approaches to contract and 
property rights17. 
                                                                  
17 As an aside—an observation which makes this situation seem even odder is the popular emphasis in 
business schools on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in relation to the widely-held investor-owned firm. 
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In contrast then, returning to theories of the firm, if we attempt to understand change 
within the cooperative sector from a “new institutionalism” within the economic sciences 
literature (rational choice theory), then culture and cognition (or “interpretational 
structures”) are left by the wayside and instead strategic or utility maximising models of 
action become the focus of investigation. This approach is somewhat, grudgingly, modified 
in TCE by what Schneiberg notes as “the recognition that formal laws, shared 
understandings, and sunken investments may constrain, channel, or lock-in that 
action”(2006:196). 
However, the distinction between sociological and economic institutionalism may be 
collapsed, when “utility-maximising rationality is understood as a cultural construction” 
(Espeland, 1998:46) thus making it difficult to distinguish between	 “institutions as 
constraints on action” and “institutions as culturally constitutive of	 actors”. This point 
becomes more apparent below, as we see the contribution of	contract and property law 
theories to the “cultural consciousness”, with their	 assumption of “utility maximising 
rationality”. This notion of “efficiency” is relevant both in terms of individuals evaluating 
“rationally” their self-interest (agency theory) or whether it is the evaluation of “efficient” 
governance structures (TCE, Williamson and like minded NIE scholars). 
To ground ourselves a bit in the vast literature, fields and sub-fields of institutional theory 
(whether “new”, sociological or economic) and law and regulation, it is useful to narrow 
what is being addressed in this chapter. When speaking of cooperative law and legislative 
change (and the private law concepts which form a base thereto) we are referring to the 
“higher level” institutions and institutional events and cooperative entities are what we 
may call the “field level”. While the legal system (or systems) is an institution, it is one 
which is informed by many events, just as it has an effect on other organisations, events 
and “lower level” entities. Law itself is not some inherently “coherent” entity or institution 
which is applied in a formulaic fashion. It has both the coercive power of the state behind 
it and/or the informal power of culture as well as a constitutive aspect—by its very nature 
it “creates” and regulates other institutions such as property, corporations, contracts, 
cooperatives and shares, and markets, to name just a few examples. Add to this description 
that it is, as well, a “contested” movement (see Chapter 4-Methodology), and we begin to 
see the complex role of law in organisational change, particularly cooperative 
organisations which contain, by their very nature, “non-contractual” social goals and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
CSR indeed is addressed and taught both in standard business courses but also in business ethics courses. A 
main theme is the conflict between duties to shareholders and duties to the societal good, something which is 
often inherently balanced in a cooperative structure precisely because of its organisational form and social 
goals. 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Bases and Selected Literature Review 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
47 
 
form of property held in a manner very distinct from other contractual/property rights 
found in the “modern corporation”. 
The study of law, policy and legislative change in relation to cooperative organisations, in 
this case agricultural cooperatives, beyond being considered a “transaction cost”, is key to 
understanding organisational changes and tendencies in the agricultural cooperative 
sector. Like other business entities, agricultural cooperatives do not escape the pressures 
or challenges of globalisation, trans-national markets and various trade agreements nor 
the influence of market liberalisation. Laws governing business entities, including 
cooperatives, are called upon to deal with and respond to these local and global pressures. 
What is (in a precise moment of time) a discrete system of law in a particular jurisdiction, 
finds itself responding to or dealing with other systems of law and social ordering that 
have distinct histories, cultures, market systems, policy frameworks and philosophical or 
analytic traditions. Legal systems, traditions and the very nature of legal concepts 
themselves may find themselves in strange waters. If not directly dealing with or 
responding to legal systems, enterprises often need to interact with other global players 
that are informed by such divergent legal and social ordering systems and traditions. What 
results from this may be convergence, conflict, adaptation, evolution, etc. 
In a “modern” system of governance, where the state does not directly control or manage 
social and economic activity it provides the regulatory framework in which such activity is 
governed. Procedural regulation, private law regimes and sector or “self” regulation is 
favoured as a sort of “private-law” ordering of social and economic interests. The law of 
business entities is a type of procedural regulation, and in our case, the law of 
cooperatives is increasingly so, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the original social 
mandate (i.e.the social mandate, if taken seriously, would require substantial system 
change, thus, procedural regulation is preferred to avoid conflict). This type of approach 
fits within a formalistic approach as opposed to an approach based on achieving particular 
social objectives. 
Here then, lies the tension between corporate vs. cooperative entities, for the corporation 
is concerned with the governance or regulation of formal rights of contract and the 
property which is subject to such contract, and the cooperative must address both 
economic and social objectives, the latter being an alien concept in the world of business 
law (it must justify itself according to classical economic valuation—i.e. efficiency and 
profits, calculated on largely non-social systems of value, which leaves no room for the 
valuation of the social). Cooperatives are multidimensional, contain multiple values and 
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objectives (including “contradictory” ones if placed in the “market”) and merge out of 
historically specific circumstances. Within the formal rights scheme, its social objectives 
are “extra-contractual”. 
2.6.3	Legal	Theories	
 
When we talk about the “institution” of law, specifically laws that stipulate organisational 
form, we often speak about the “law” as if it were something that was “evident” and 
without a history of its own. Legal movements and intellectual histories should also be 
linked to organisational and institutional analysis. When contract and property are seen as 
“historical” narratives, where concepts are fluid depending on their use and 
characterisation, the organisational theories which rely on them also become 
“destabilized” or “fractured”. 
As a general comment, business/economic scholars tend to view law from an a	 priori	
perspective: as an existing condition, a parameter, a limitation, a variable, perhaps a “cost”. 
As well, they use a formalistic and mechanistic interpretive point of view: laws are passed 
and enacted, contracts are negotiated with express terms and a written record is agreed 
and signed. Laws are seen to permit or prohibit. To the extent that there is a dispute as to 
what the law or a legal document says, the legal system will employ an “expert” to make a 
correct interpretation. Business scholars are no strangers to theory and, in particular, 
organisations are studied utilising a wide range of complex theories, but the legal 
framework is often sidelined as a set of rules (e.g. as in game theory) or not taken into 
account at all. While it is true that Coase, for example, recognised legal adjudication it was 
as an acknowledgement that law could present “transaction” costs or “externalities”. 
On the other hand, legal scholars, and particularly practising lawyers, are taught to think 
of business entities in terms of their legal “personalities” and “capacity”: they are legal 
entities, creatures of statute and not “organisations”. Jurisdiction and scope of powers are 
used to determine what business entities may or may not do. Coherency is paramount and 
predictability is desired. In terms of contract, this formalist approach “privileges a 
functionalist, purportedly technical and autonomous design and execution of contractual 
agreements over the view of “regulated” contracts” (Zumbansen, 2007:2). The result of 
this approach is a sort of “liberation of contractual relations from the regulatory, policy 
driven arms of government” (Zumbansen, 2007:2-3).  
To the extent that lawyers and legal scholars go beyond the formalist view of law, they 
often find themselves in the realm of historical, political/economic, sociology or 
institutional analysis. Law and Economics is a predominant related school of thought for 
Chapter 2. Theoretical Bases and Selected Literature Review 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
49 
 
organizational economic theorists and The Critical Legal Studies (hereinafter “CLS”) 
movement, although currently wielding less influence, was its fierce critic. The critique 
was not only based on “left” or “right” politics, but instead held the view that law was a 
constructed institution and interpretive exercise and not merely descriptive and “carved 
in stone”. Much of the CLS movement concerns itself with destabilizing the established 
legal order, emphasizing “incoherence”, “legal consciousness” and the exercise of power 
disguised as rationality. It was also a movement that believed that laws that served a just 
and social purpose could be “rebuilt” or constructed. In many ways it was the reclaiming of 
law as a moral, as opposed to liberal, institution.  
The Law and Economics movement, putting into action the mandate of Coase, albeit in a 
mechanistic manner and arguably misguided by what even Coase had recognized about 
markets, empirically investigated the consequences of particular laws and as well  
attempted to prove that the system of laws itself is somehow economically efficient as if 
guided by the invisible hand of the market (although the market is, ironically, the creation 
of legal rules and norms). Law and Economics fits snugly within the parameters of TCE. 
From a different perspective, relational contract theory purports to set legal contracts 
within the context and relationships in which they were made and operate (see 
MacCaulay, 1963; MacNeil, 2003, 1985). Williamson, in his later work, fleshed out his NIE 
by relying on relational contract (Williamson, 1987) and has inspired work done in the 
cooperative sector in relation to networks and chains (e.g. Karantininis and Nilsson (Eds.), 
2007). 
2.6.4.	History	of	Contract	Theory		
However, before we move further into a critique of NIE theories of contract and property, 
it is important to set out a bit of historical information about contract and property law to 
set the groundwork for what we might call the “modern law” of contract and thus 
implicitly, the law of property as well. The common law base is used here, admittedly 
leaving out a wealth of perspective and information on civil law jurisdictions.  However, as 
much organizational theory (predominantly IOF based) is “imported” from common law 
based countries, the influence in economic and business theory is evident. 
The erudite and classic “Introduction to the Law of Contract” (Atiyah, 1995) outlines the 
historical foundations for the modern law of contract. A few observations are useful for 
our purposes: by the 19th Century the philosophy of laissez‐faire	took root, meaning that 
the law should interfere with people as little as possible and that the function of law was 
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to ensure that people could be left alone to realise their own will “unhampered” by 
governmental influence (Atiyah, 1995:8). The law of contract in essence was and is 
designed to provide for the enforcement of the private arrangements that contracting 
parties had agreed upon. Natural law theories espoused the inalienable right to own 
property and therefore to make arrangements to buy or sell or otherwise deal with such 
property and to enter into contracts concerning the same (Atiyah, 1995:8). Society at large 
was seen to benefit because the will of individuals, expressed in private contract, could be 
counted on to be enforced. Two pillars of the freedom of contract include first, the 
agreement between contracting parties and second, that such agreement be based on 
freedom of choice. Equal bargaining power was assumed and each transaction was seen to 
be discrete, expressly attested to by the written, signed formal document. With economic 
growth and complexity, contracts became more elaborate and a greater volume of contract 
followed. This led to a move towards standardization with a lessening emphasis on 
intention. In general the law of contract was then “scientised”. Contract was seen to have 
its own internal logic and its own internal efficiency. 
It is commonly held as well that a decline in the Freedom of Contract ideology occurred in 
1870 to 1980 during which there was an emphasis on more socialist, collectivist political 
values (at least in England and in part, the U.S.) in addition to the increased sophistication 
in the economic understandings of limitations of the freedom of contract. In the law and 
economics field there was recognition of “externalities” (Atiyah, 1995; 19). A rise in 
regulation resulted in the intention of the parties declining as the raison	dètre	of contract. 
Since then there has been renewed interest in the relationship between legal rules and 
their economic effect (see Posner, 2005, Posner, 2003). This is seen as a major 
contributory factor in the current resurgence of the freedom of contract. “Put shortly, it is 
once again being said that freedom of contract is a major instrument for economic 
efficiency” (Atiyah, 1995:29). What is implicit is the reverse of this: the assumption that 
legislative interference with the freedom of contract leads to economic inefficiency. (What 
is not acknowledged is that efficiency itself is defined by legal parameters.) 
This brief (micro) history is set out to illustrate that contract “ideology” is not a static 
formulation. The way that we think about contract and property is varied, at all 
institutional levels. This in and of itself implies that the way we think of the institution of 
law and its role, purpose and effects also has profound variance. However, although 
intellectually we know that a discrete, formal contract has little to do with real commercial 
transactions, economic and organizational theory continue to use it as an intellectual 
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template, particularly in applying the notion of contract to economic theories and the 
theories of the firm.  
To be fair, relational contract had expanded on the notion of the “discrete” contract. As 
mentioned, this trend was picked up by Williamson (Williamson, 1987, 2000). However, 
what occurred was basically just a widening of the net and not an attempt to understand 
how the “consciousness” of contract has dominated our very characterization of 
organization as a formalistic exercise in contract relations, the designation of property 
rights being the subject of such contracts.18 
If we look to the legal theory roots in social analysis, and hence the roots of the demise of 
formalistic classical legal theory, we begin with the Legal Realists which included, on the 
American side, the likes of Jerome Frank, Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr. (considered the 
precursor), Karl Llewellyn, Benjamin Cardozo and Roscoe Pound and on the Scandinavian 
side, Axel Hagerstrom. They rejected the concept of natural law and held that legal 
concepts should be based on empirical observation and study (providing the basis for both 
law and economics and law and sociology). Interested in sociological factors and 
anthropological studies, they held that legal interpretation, including that of contract, was 
an interdisciplinary and indeterminate exercise that was instrumentalist. In their view, the 
law and its interpretation should be utilised to achieve social goals and balance interests.19 
Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., held that the only source of law was facts—that judges decided 
on what the facts were and then wrote the opinion within such rationale. The true basis of 
opinion is “the inarticulate major premise” outside the law (Holmes, 1881).20 While many 
people may informally hold this opinion, it is germane to note that he was the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court.  
For an articulate view of contract from a legal realist, we can turn to Karl Llewellyn who 
was perhaps the most concerned with theories of contract and property. In “What Price 
Contract?—An Essay in Perspective” (1930) he attempted to outline a theory of private 
contractual ordering. Utilising both legal sociology scholarship and commercial case law 
                                                                  
18 Upon reading Williamson´s social analysis framework, which does indeed leave room for a more 
sophisticated view of law, contract and regulation, it is somewhat of a mystery that his work still adopts a 
rather formalistic basic notion of contract, sidestepping the obvious point that “economics” are indeed created 
by legal intervention and thus, as well, our very concept of “effectiveness” and “efficiency”.  
19 European Legal Realism was more akin to analytic philosophy or logical positivism of the Vienna School. The 
U.S. side was dominated by judges who actually dealt with adjudication and legislation on an ongoing basis. 
Interestingly, Jerome Frank taught at the Univ. of Chicago, later the home to law and economics (and Richard 
Posner and Richard Epstein), served on the Securities and Exchange Commission, and was general counsel to 
the Agricultural Adjustment Agency during the “New Deal” of Roosevelt, prior to serving on the US Court of 
Appeals.  
20  Holmes, who wrote this in 1881 was the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.	The attitudes of both Frank 
and Holmes stand in stark contrast to the formalistic views or the “strict construction” of legal interpretation 
which came to dominate law after the 1980s. 
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he delved into the tensions between formal contract rules and societal practice and the 
legal and non-legal obligations in understanding contractual relations in a market society. 
As one commentator noted, he “recognised contract law´s challenge in mastering the 
development of rules adequate to the regulation of a fast developing commercial world, 
bringing the varied interests, starting points and power relations into sharp relief” 
(Zumbansen 2007:5). In other words, he asked “what is the role of contract in a volatile 
and evolving economy and society?” 
Seen in this more subtle manner, an analysis of contract takes us beyond a legal critique 
based simply on considerations of bargaining power and incentives. Contract´s role can be 
appreciated as a method of organising business relations (legitimating at the same time 
the standardisation of contractual arrangements in a business environment but also 
reinforcing the idea of the “freedom to contract” between private persons). Thus the 
concept of “legal contract” finds its major utility in providing 
a framework for well-neigh every type of group organisation and for well-neigh 
every type of passing or permanent relation between individuals and groups, up to 
and including states. (Llewellyn, 1930) 
But here an important point should be made: Llewellyn did not fall into the trap of using 
contract as a reductionist metaphor for all economic or organisational behaviour; rather 
he saw contract as being something that was “adjustable”, the terms of which served as a 
rough guide to underlying agreement.21 It is an institutional rather than formalistic view of 
contract and one that recognises at the same time the “indeterminacy” of language and the 
“unspoken premise” of law and its capacity to shape or constitute relationships or 
organisations. (This insight is useful to keep in mind in reference to the work of Ostrom 
regarding the quality and kind of relationships within institutions.) 
Legal Realism´s work stopped short of analysing “informal contracts”, or in old-fashioned 
language, the notion of contract as “promise” or mere “expectation” or “reliance”. The 
study of contract as promise22 has filled volumes of law journals and aisles of law libraries, 
most of the work being done from a moral philosophy point of view—i.e. “under what 
circumstances is it justified to enforce a promise?”. Technical issues of adequate remedies, 
whether the parties intended to create a contract, whether unilateral or bilateral, mistake, 
etc. are endless and it is certainly not the intention to deal with any of this in this thesis. 
However, the issue of informal contract becomes relevant when dealing with business 
                                                                  
21 This interpretation is supported by Zumbansen (2007:8) where he sets out the Llewellyn´s theory as a 
starting point for the foundation of “reflexive” law of contract, i.e. a “multi-rational” scheme stepping away 
from the distinction of market v. hierarchy.  
22 See Fried, Charles (1981) Contract	 as	 Promise:	 A	 Theory	 of	 Contract	 as	 Obligation. Fried notes Hume´s 
premise of contract as obligation as the basis of a civilised society. 
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organisations and the recognition by relational contract theorist Stewart MacCaulay that 
there are many “informal” or “non-contract” contracts made within the business 
environment. MacCaulay and his colleagues later became known as forming the 
“Wisconsin School of Contract”. 
2.6.5	Relational	Contract	
Stewart MacCaulay, a contracts teacher at the University of Wisconsin Law School used the 
classic Lon Fuller Basic	Contract	Law (1947) for teaching purposes.23 His father-in-law, a 
business man, was not impressed with the characterisation of contract law and took his 
son-in-law to meetings with corporate executives to learn about the “real” world of 
contracts (Smith and King, 2007). Out of that experience came “Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business: A Preliminary Study” (MacCaulay 1963). Rather than being a paper on 
contract it deals with the “non-contractual” or perhaps more accurately, the “extra-
contractual” in business relations between negotiating parties. Among other things the 
paper outlines the regulation of business relationships without resort to written contracts 
(the organisational literature on “trust” and “reputation” drawing from this observation 
with an emphasis on the social context of the contracting relationship over time). Although 
this observation was not particularly intellectually earth shattering the paper ended up 
being one of the most cited law articles ever (Shapiro 1996). As pointed out above, the 
idea that the interpretation of law or contract had a context outside the “four corners of 
the contract paper” was certainly well know to the Legal Realists. Perhaps the perceived 
novelty of the article´s premises speaks to the effectiveness of a legal education based on 
formalism. 
Ian MacNeil, a relational contracts scholar, followed suit after MacCaulay, having met him 
at a NYU summer workshop for young contract teachers in 1962 (MacCaulays´s 1963 
“Non-Contractual” already having been written). MacNeil was in the midst of developing 
his relational contract theory in relation to work he had been doing in Africa (on a Ford 
Foundation and Fulbright scholarship). At that time there was an emphasis on law and 
development that prescribed legal reform as the catalyst for economic development 
(Smith and Braydon 2007:8).24  
                                                                  
23 This is another classic contract textbook used for teaching contract in addition to Atiyah’s, noted above. Both 
Atiyah´s and Fuller´s books were updated for decades, and continue to be so. 
24It is interesting to note empirical work that has been done on whether the connections between formal legal 
institutions and contractual enforcement and economic growth are supported. In an extensive 2006 study by 
Trebilcock and Leng (2006) “The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development” 
the relation was not supported.  
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MacNeil focused on the relationships, rather than on the contracts. He stated that 
contracts are “relations among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to 
be exchanging in the future” (MacNeil 1987). To business people, this is hardly surprising 
and nor to practising lawyers, but to legal academics and economic theorists it appeared 
to have been a revelation. Oliver Williamson fleshed out his new institutional economics 
with references to the relational contract theory, focusing on the relationship aspect of 
contract. Just as relational contract theory had attempted to break away for classical 
contract theory, Williamson attempted to break away from classical economic theory (for 
example, Williamson, 1996). 
In MacNeil´s later work “Reflections on Relational Contract Theory After a Neo-classical 
Seminar” (2003) he makes his argument that relational contract theory, which he by this 
time had renamed “essential contract theory”, is a politically and ideologically “neutral” 
approach to contracts. He sets out the four core propositions that inform any relational 
approach to contracts: 
1. Every transaction is embedded in complex relations. Thus transactions may be 
treated as-if-discrete, but never in fact are discrete; (…) 
2. Understanding any transaction requires understanding all elements of its 
enveloping relations that might affect the transaction significantly; (…) 
3. Effective analysis of any transaction requires recognition and consideration of all 
significant relational elements.; (…) and 
4. Combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions is more efficient and 
produces a more complete and sure final analytical product than does commencing 
with one-on-one contextual analysis of transactions. This is the most controversial 
proposition of the relational approach to contract. (2003: 208)  
He goes on to note that under the relational approach, express terms in contracts are no 
more than an extremely important part of a dense web or network of relations 
(2003:209). This insight, if accepted, has quite a destabilising impact on the use of contract 
(and corresponding property rights) as the “unit of analysis” in agency theory, incomplete 
contract theory and TCE. 
MacNeil´s relational contract theory is a response to both the classical contract law and to 
a particular economic analysis of law. 
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Classical contract law—the law of the discrete contract, the law of 100 per cent 
on/off consent—is a complete and closed intellectual structure. So	 too	 is	 its	
counterpart	 in	 economic	 analysis,	 rational	 choice	 theory. Such closed structures 
provide no exit to other worlds. ….In light of this, the express	terms	are,	from	both	
practical	and	 intellectual	perspectives,	a	singularly	 inappropriate	starting	place	 for	
analysis	when	dealing	with	most	contract	cases	and	issues. (MacNeil 2003: 210-211, 
emphasis added) 
While the above observations of relational contract theory are not incorrect, relational 
contract´s focus however retains its emphasis on the “lower level” of analysis. Instead of 
looking to the four corners of one contract, we look to the business relationships and the 
contractual relationships, both formal and informal, over time. Much work is being done in 
the agricultural cooperative sector utilising this expanded notion of contract in relation to 
“network theory” and “chains” (see for example, Karantininus and Nilsson 2007).  
Having initiated the analysis of contract law (and implicitly the subject of contract, 
property) as a multi-level institutional framework, (in the sense that they included 
political and social analysis in addition to legal forms) we set the stage for the Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS).  
2.6.6	Legal	Concepts	and	Globalisation:	Critical	Legal	Studies	Movement	
 
Legal scholarship in general, particularly that which evolved from the linguistic tradition, 
during the 1980s and 1990s eagerly picked up on the “indeterminacy” argument, throwing 
itself in with the French Critical Theorists like Derrida. But more often than not they 
missed something key that was a cornerstone of Legal Realism and that certain of the CLS 
scholars like Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger picked up as central. When Holmes 
spoke of the “inarticulate major premise” he was not referring to some kind of unchecked 
subjectivity but rather the social, cultural or institutional environment.  
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) was also popular in the “linguistic turn” academic legal world 
in the 1980s and 1990s but lost some momentum as a movement, criticized for not being 
able to offer an alternative complete and coherent legal theory. CLS´s aim was rather to 
provide a view of society and it institutions that informed the practice of politics. Its 
insights endure, perhaps having been ahead of the ability of main stream, liberal legal 
reform to fully digest its message. While other legal movements chose to study “the 
market”, CLS tried to demonstrate how the market was a social and legal construct, capable 
of being re-constructed. 
Duncan Kennedy, the well known contract scholar at Harvard University, with his prior 
education in economics, was one of CLS´s leading voice, developing an investigation into 
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contract, law and legislation at odds with a formalistic approach and with a 
methodological commitment to institutional sociology, historical analysis and 
philosophical consideration. His work on the globalisation of law and his multi-level 
analysis focusing on the law of contract both on the “lower” and “higher” level as an 
institutional and constituting force is perhaps, in hindsight, one of the most useful 
contribution of CLS. 
When Kennedy, uses the term “framework” or “legal context” it is worth clarifying in 
which sense these terms are used. As he states: 
But framework and context are misleading terms for describing the relationship 
between legal and economic activities. This is because economic activity can’t be 
understood as something autonomous in relation to a set of passive institutional 
and legal conceptual constraints, as the terms framework and context suggest. 
Legal institutions and ideas have a dynamic, or dialectical or constitutive 
relationship to economic activity. (Kennedy, 2006:21) 
For Kennedy, law is not merely a reduction to politics, nor a variable or restriction to be 
studied in relation to economic activity. In “Three Globalisations of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850-2000” (Kennedy, 2006) he sets out the three overlapping periods of legal 
institutional and conceptual change in the West, tracking the rise of classical legal thought 
(1850- 1914) and the socially oriented legal thought between 1900 and 1968 (roughly 
agreeing with the time frames of Atiyah cited above, although ending 10 years earlier, as 
Kennedy’s work related to the U.S.). In the third globalisation he points to the trend of 
thinking about “legal techniques…as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting considerations 
in administering the system created by the [preceding] social jurists” (Kennedy, 2006:22). 
One of the mechanisms of this globalisation, among others, is the “new legal consciousness 
through participation in the new world markets on the conditions set by the multinational 
companies and international regulatory institutions” (Kennedy, 2006:22). 
A key insight in the work of Kennedy, and one that is useful in analyzing theories of the 
firm and evaluating the changes in cooperative legislation and policy, is the understanding 
of what we are not speaking. The “thing” that is globalised is not a particular type or form 
of law or a particular political ideology. Kennedy points out that classical legal thought 
(formalism in contract) could be either conservative or progressive, that “social” laws 
could be socialist, Christian democrat or fascist, and that the modern legal consciousness 
is used by both right and left wing theorists and policy analysts. 
In addition, it is not a particular philosophy of law for there is always some heterogeneity 
of philosophical approaches whether positivism, natural law, pragmatism, etc. Neither is it 
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a “transplanting” of a set and complete body of rules, for an infinite variety of positive laws 
were produced for particular situations and environments (“customised” as it were, for 
particular cultures, periods of history, etc.). 
Instead Kennedy is talking about a “mode of thought” or “consciousness” which provided a 
“conceptual vocabulary, organizational schemes, modes of reasoning and characteristic 
arguments.” It is a “reconceptualising” (Kennedy, 2006:22). We can say that the mode of 
thought of “contract” has been globalised: contract as organisation. 
In contrast to Atiyah, Kennedy steps outside the “article of faith of liberal historiography” 
which holds conservative members of the legal profession, entrepreneurs and politicians 
against the working class, the farmers and the “public interest”(Kennedy, 1980:7). He 
considered that relying on an analysis of political power or economic interest was a 
hindrance to understanding modern legal and political theory and suggested that “legal 
consciousness” be recognised as “an entity with a measure of autonomy”. Such autonomy 
was to be viewed as a premise that was qualified as being “relative”, for not only were the 
particular concepts and operations characteristic of any given period, but also the entity 
that was constituted was “intelligible only in terms of the larger structures of social 
thought and action” (Kennedy, 1980:5). 
To Kennedy classical legal thought was a way of understanding the whole of the legal 
system at a time when the historical context consisted of rapid industrialisation, 
concentration of industry and finance, competition, struggles between farmers, railways, 
unions, employees and the relation of state to federal governments in the regulatory 
process (Kennedy,1980:7). While Kennedy and Atiyah may be seen to agree on the 
historical narrative, Kennedy’s focus is different in that classical legal thought was not only 
manifested in interpretive action and political influence, it was a method of “high level” 
ordering. 
One of the functions of systems of legal thought-one	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 their	
existence‐is	the	reconciliation	of	what	appear	to	be	conflicts	between	institutions	and	
contradictions	among	ideas. In other words, system is necessary not just to permit 
us to deal in a cognitively effective way with the chaotic mass of rules, it is also 
necessary because the theorist wishes to show that where many perceive 
confusion, danger, insecurity, rivalry and aggressive action, there exists a latent 
order that has a legitimate claim to our respect (Kennedy,1980:9). (emphasis 
added) 
Hence, classical legal thought permitted the resolution of basic institutional conflicts, one 
of which was the conflict between populist legislatures and private business, as well as 
conflict over legitimacy and jurisdiction between legislatures and courts and different 
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levels of government. Equally important, at the “level of ideas” it “mediated between 
natural rights theories and logical positivism and between democratic theory of legislative 
supremacy and the classical economic prescriptions” about the role of the state in the 
economy (Kennedy, 1980:9). 
How did it achieve this? According to Kennedy, by relying on the basic premise of the 
classical legal system, that is, that the legal system is composed of a set of institutions, each 
with absolute power within such sphere and completely void of power without. Thus, 
within the realm of contract as organisation (economic ordering) private ordering reigns 
(governance by contract) as it does in the domain of Williamson and NIE (contracting ideal 
organizational structure). Agency theory is a pure example of this reconceptualisation 
(contracting ideal behavior). In the legislative and regulatory spheres, contract is 
governed accordingly (governance of contract). Cooperatives are increasingly regulated as 
if they were IOF firms, composed of contracting parties. Any conflict is effectively 
reconciled. This may be the reason why it is so difficult for cooperatives to be conceived as 
anything but a “defective” form of IOF. Any social or moral consideration is left to the 
preamble of cooperative laws, which notes the social contribution, yet provides little in the 
way of legislative tools to carry out such social agenda.  
Another contract scholar, Hugh Collins, follows roughly the same historical path as Atiyah 
and Kennedy in Regulating	 Contracts	 (Collins, 1999) where he writes of the 
“contractualisation of social life” going back to the 19th C. His contribution is his emphasis 
on how markets are in reality legally constituted, thus breaking down the distinction of 
markets vs. hierarchies. 
Collins goes on to note that the dominance of contractual relations in social life declined 
somewhat as it had to co-exist with bureaucratic relations both within large firms and 
government institutions. However he points to the “contemporary resurgence of faith in 
contracts, or rather the advocacy of a particular conception of contracts derived from the 
study of markets in economics” (Collins, 1999:18). A reason justifying this resurgence is 
the supposed success of markets in efficiently satisfying consumer demand and thus the 
implicit claim that any interference with contractual ordering leads to impeding such 
efficiency. Another attraction of markets is “their seductive claim that they avoid any 
governmental choice with respect to the pattern of distribution of wealth in society” 
(Collins, 1999:19). The belief in the invisible hand continues and it has the convenient 
benefit of not requiring any “political justification for its outcomes”. 
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However the justifications for the resurgence of contract leave out the central insight that 
contract is not only about “discrete” or “network” relations but that it also a constitutive or 
institutional force. And one of the most important things that it constitutes is the market 
itself: 
…the legal constitution and regulation of markets does entail decisions regarding 
issues of distributive justice. The legal system only supplies selective enforcement 
of transactions, so that insofar as legal regulation has the capacity to steer 
contractual relations, it influences distributive outcomes. (Collins, 1999:19) 
We find ourselves in a circular logic then: contract	is	justified	by	efficiency	but	efficiency	is	
determined	by	laws	that	enforce	(or	not)	contracts	and	define	what	is	or	is	not	property,	the	
subject	of	contract. We should carefully examine then the use of	economic organisational 
theory to study the legislative remedies “needed” to guarantee success by cooperatives. 
Collins adds to this observation, noting that,  
[p]erhaps the deepest attraction of markets and contracts as institutions for 
organizing and co-ordinating social life is that they provide a solution to a problem 
of loss of confidence in institutionalised structures giving direction to person’s 
lives. The	preference	for	markets	is	symptomatic	of	a	skepticism	with	respect	to	any	
claim	 to	 know	 best	 how	 social	 relations	 should	 be	 organised.[...] By permitting 
contractual relations to flourish, the state effectively delegates to individuals as 
many choices as to the nature of social relations.(Collins, 1995:20)(emphasis 
author) 
Such skepticism about the institutionalised direction of social standards provides the 
“impetus for the extension of contractual relations”. It is the “legalization” of the public 
discourse. 
This observation, combined with Kennedy’s theory of the compartmentalising of legal 
institutional spheres (i.e. that within a given sphere the appropriate legal institution has 
absolute power, but is void of power outside such sphere) means that the legal institution 
of private contract has overtaken public discourse (of values, norms and ethics) and thus 
claims its absolute power to define the sphere in its own framework. The “public” goals of 
the social economy, represented by traditional cooperatives for example, are “privatised” 
through changes to property structures and the introduction of contract rights.  
Paddy Ireland, another contemporary CSL scholar, focuses on property rights. In his article 
“Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory” he addresses Easterbrook 
and Fishel´s seminal work, “The Economic Structure of Corporate Law” (Easterbrook, 
1991) which “played a leading role in putting legal flesh on the rather skeletal, market-
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based, neo-classical economic accounts of the corporation developed by Alchian, Demsetz 
and Jensen and Meckling.” (Ireland, 2003:455)  
Ireland notes that the internal weaknesses of the original contract model have been 
recognized, that being the problem of “so-called” contractual incompleteness which has 
led to the “growing focus on the importance of the allocation of residual control rights” 
and to a greater emphasis on property. According to Ireland, despite academic interest in 
comparative corporate governance and ownership structures around the world, the 
prevailing model of the corporation remains rooted in contractualism and dominated by 
an overwhelming concern with maximising shareholder wealth. 
Ireland holds that attempts to view the corporation through the “prism of contract” are 
misguided and that there should be a shift to a property based perspective. This shift 
would necessarily focus on law’s role “in the constitution and maintenance of intangible 
financial property forms” (i.e. shareholding) (Ireland, 2003:456). However, it is crucial to 
distinguish this position from the position of “incomplete contract” theorists like Hart, 
above. Ireland is suggesting that our starting position should centre on property which 
would then necessarily implicate the role of law and other state institutions in their 
constitutive role. This is distinct from Hart´s interpretation of property. Ireland is not 
ceding the role of regulation to contract or allowing property to be a “back-up” or a 
response to incomplete contract. Ireland’s position requires policy-based regulation, in 
contrast to Hart’s position which relies on “private ordering” through contract. 
Ireland’s critique of Easterbrook and Fisher is detailed and logically devastating in its 
portrayal of the “myth” of the contractual firm, particularly in his depiction of the 
externalisation of the shareholder in the modern corporation. However, for the purposes 
of this thesis it is sufficient to confine ourselves to the observation above. The “share” then 
is best portrayed as a new form of intangible property rather than a stake in a company. 
Or as Ireland succinctly characterises it the “no-obligation, no-responsibility, personality-
poor share”, in reality a “de-contractualisation” that needs to maintain its ideologies of 
contract in order to support deregulation and private contractual ordering. 
Accepting this theory would have significant implications for contract and property based 
theories of the firm, particularly those based on ex	ante	 incentives or ex	post reliance on 
property due to “incomplete contracts”. 
Pausing here, let us consider what this means in relation to cooperatives. Unlike IOFs, 
cooperative ownership, tied as it is to use or activity, is not a “no-obligation, no 
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responsibility, personality poor share”. It	 is	 precisely	 an	 example	 of	 an	 “embodied”	
ownership,	built	on	implication,	obligation	and	requiring	interaction.	As Ireland points out, 
contract theory is a myth, propped up as an ideology for IOFs. Why then, we may ask, do 
cooperative scholars wish to apply it to the cooperative enterprise? 
2.7	 Critique	 of	 Economic	 and	 Legal	 Contract	 and	 Property	 Rights	
Theory	underpinning	Cooperative	Law	
 
Everyone	is	a	genius.	But	if	you	judge	a	fish	on	its	ability	to	climb	a	tree,	it	will	
live	its	whole	life	believing	it	is	stupid.	–attributed	to	Alfred	Einstein.	
 
From a legal theory point of view, using the term of CLS, we have begun to “destabilise” 
contract and property theory. Many of the building blocks of these theories are 
questionable: i.e. the nature of contract, the nature of property rights, the extent to which 
property allocation is a motivating force and the very idea of the individual and that 
individual´s rationality. The neutral concept of “efficiency” has also been questioned. 
Even if we agree that an actor must be “motivated” or “goal aligned” with the interests of 
the principle, for example, what exactly it is that motivates such an actor according to NIE 
is extremely simplistic and limited. 25 Critics of agency theory, or for that matter anyone 
even minimally familiar with human psychology, may indeed point out that “motivation’ 
can come in many different forms and be dependent upon many factors. One of the “blind 
spots” of agency theory is that it is so focused on motivation of the agents to achieve the 
goals of their principles (goal alignment) that it ignores the multitude of other reasons 
why agents may fail to deliver less than ideal results. Such failures may include low 
abilities, poor information, lack of sufficient expertise and knowledge, poor organisational 
skills, lack of strategic thinking and action, failure to recognise competitive environments, 
etc.26 Indeed even Jensen and Meckling acknowledged that such a view of man was too 
rigid and unrealistic (1994).27 Without this narrow “contractualisation” of the individual 
as an economic actor, the whole theoretical house of cards falls.  
But the insistence on contract, property rights and the quest for “efficiency”, motivated 
and measured by material incentives, ignores many other firm behaviours. If only material 
incentives “count” when comparing various types of enterprise, then “it goes without 
saying that the cooperative stands convicted—on the charges of inefficiency—before the 
hearing even begins” (Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010:73).  
                                                                  
25 Given that agency theory is more or less tied into the U.S. corporate culture, it is ironic that such a culture 
champions the value of hard work and not “shirking” when in fact its organisation theory, so closely tied to its 
economic theory, has such a low opinion of “economic man”. 
26 Davis, et al (1997, p. 23). 
27 See Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W.H. (1994).  
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Returning for a moment to Hansmann´s theory (1999) as to why cooperatives exist and 
why they are “transitory” and doomed to disappear or converge with IOFs: he claims that 
different stakeholders have differing abilities to minimize contractual “costs” (asymmetric 
information costs, contracting costs, etc.) and as well different costs in “exercising 
ownership rights” (controlling managers, risk, collective decision-making). What then, is 
at the core of deciding whether a firm “should be” an IOF or a cooperative? According to 
Hansmann, the ability of various stakeholders to be “efficient” in their contracting costs.  
But as Zamagni and Zamagni (2010:76) point out, the notion of “efficiency” is not value 
neutral”: 
As a term of discourse, it is not descriptive, but prescriptive, not positive but 
normative. For it derives from the principle of utilitarianism, which is certainly not 
an economic but an ethical principle…it is still the assumption of utilitarian 
philosophy that must be adopted. How… can it be maintained that comparing two 
types of enterprises in terms of efficiency is objective, value neutral?  
The work of Borzaga, Depedri and Tortia (Borzaga, Depedri and Tortia, 2009; Tortia, 
2008; Borzaga and Tortia, 2006; Borzaga and Depedri, 2005) question such 
characterizations of the individual and their relationships within cooperatives, citing 
advances in behavioural economics and evolutionary economics. They note that while 
people´s willingness to cooperative in interpersonal interaction can derive from economic 
convenience of imposition, it may, as well, derive from social norms or from a real 
community of interest. With respect to cooperatives they observe, 
[m]embers and ‘stakeholders’ behaviours are not only dictated by financial and 
other monetary variables, but instead reflect primarily their social and moral 
norms, and intrinsic interests, which need to be correctly coordinated with 
extrinsic incentives and self interested preferences (2009:10). 
Social preferences which are crucial drivers of behaviours and which are not self 
interested can include interest for the wellbeing of others and a general inclination to 
reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), justice and equity (Fehr and Schmidt, 2001), 
reciprocity (Zamagni, 2005) and altruism (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Empirical evidence as 
to intrinsic motivations in non IOF firms has shown preferences for democratic rules, 
fairness and autonomy (Becchetti et al, 2009; Preston, 1989; Borzaga and Depedri, 2005); 
Borzaga and Tortia, 2006). 
With respect to evolutionary economics (understanding the emergence, development and 
change of enterprises) cooperatives may be seen to be an organizational form that has 
emerged due to innovation. Cooperatives do not focus on profit maximization nor on cost 
minimization. The latter is the cornerstone of transaction cost economics but incoherent 
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in agricultural cooperatives—the cooperative firm can´t survive if it cuts the cost of the 
product, as it sole reason for existence is to obtain good prices for its members. Instead 
cooperatives focus on the production of surplus which is used to satisfy economic and 
social needs of cooperative members. With respect to the human agency of cooperatives, 
altruism and pro-social attitudes were found to be useful in increasing the “reproductive 
success” of organisations by virtue of the ability to inculcate sympathy, trust and sense of 
community (Borzaga, Depedri and Tortia, 2009:11, referring to studies by Hodgson 1993; 
Bowles, 1998, 2004).  
2.8	Governing	the	Commons—Cooperative	Structures		
 
The	 classic	 assumptions	 about	 rational	 individuals	 facing	 a	 dichotomy	 of	
organizational	 forms	 and	 of	 goods	hide	 the	 potentially	 productive	 efforts	 of	
individuals	and	groups	to	organize	and	solve	social	dilemmas	(Ostrom,	1990).	
 
Ostrom (2010:661) in considering what leads to successful collective enterprise and 
governance, noted that simply saying that “context makes a difference” in destroying or 
building up trust and reciprocity was not a sufficient answer to why collective endeavors 
failed or succeeded. She noted that problem solving required “(i) a micro context related 
to the specific attributes of an action situation in which individuals are directly interacting 
and (ii) the broader context of the social-ecological system in which groups of individuals 
make decisions”. She set out the following indicators: 
(i) Communication is feasible with the full set of participants. When face-to-face 
communication is possible, participants use facial expressions, physical actions, 
and the way that words are expressed to judge the trustworthiness of the others 
involved. 
(ii) Reputations of participants are known. Knowing the past history of other 
participants, who may not be personally known prior to interaction, increases the 
likelihood of cooperation. 
 
(iii) High marginal per capita return (MPCR). When MPCR is high, each participant 
can know that their own contributions make a bigger difference than with low 
MPCR, and that others are more likely to recognize this relationship 
(iv) Entry or exit capabilities. If participants can exit a situation at low cost, this 
gives them an opportunity not to be a sucker, and others can recognize that 
cooperators may leave (and enter other situations) if their cooperation is not 
reciprocated. 
(v) Longer time horizon. Participants can anticipate that more could be earned 
through cooperation over a long time period versus a short time.  
(vi) Agreed-upon sanctioning capabilities. While external sanctions or imposed 
sanctioning systems may reduce cooperation, when participants themselves agree 
to a sanctioning system they frequently do not need to use sanctions at a high 
volume, and net benefits can be improved substantially. 
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Looking at the list above, we can observe that both the individual and the situation is far 
more complex than that required of a “rational” actor in a “contract” situation. Rationality 
still plays a part, as does contractual relations—but they are of a fundamentally different 
nature, and not weighed simply by easily calculated material incentives. 
In the Figure 2.1 below, illustrating Ostrom´s action arena, the individuals are participants 
in the situation, not only being affected by the situation, but also having a corresponding 
affect on the action situation. Outcomes have a feedback not only on the action arena, but 
also on the exogenous variables—and so the process continues in an interactive loop over 
time. 
Figure	2.1	Action	Arena	
 
Source: Ostrom (2005) 
Looking back at Olson (1965:2) and Harding (1971, 1968) Ostrom notes that  
The tragedy of the commons, the prisoner´s dilemma and the logic of collective 
action are closely related concepts in the models that have defined the accepted 
way of viewing many problems that individuals face when attempting to achieve 
collective benefits. At the heart of each of these models is the free rider problem. 
[the “logic of collective action” in Olson’s view is that “rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”]  
These three concepts consider that when one cannot exclude others from benefits that 
may flow from others’ actions, then each is motivated not to contribute, but to “free ride”. 
Clearly if everyone “free rides” then there is no collective benefit. We have seen above in 
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Chapter 2 how various theories have prescribed the remedy of clear allocation of property 
rights to avoid such free riding. An obsession with avoiding free riding then informs 
decision making processes and governance structures and as Ostrom points out “all will 
end up where no one wanted to be” (2010:6). 
She notes the power of these models of human behaviour, as they seem to address issues 
that appear almost universal. However, Ostrom also notes the danger of these models 
when they are used metaphorically as the foundation for policy: “the	constraints	that	are	
assumed	to	be	fixed	for	the	purpose	of	analysis	are	taken	on	faith	as	being	fixed	in	empirical	
settings,	unless	external	authorities	change	them”	(emphasis author).		
In whatever philosophy, law or economics class any one of us may have endured studying 
the prisoners’ dilemma, the option of allowing the prisoner to simply leave jail was not on 
offer. Yet not all participants in social-economic situations are incapable of changing their 
constraints (and I wish to underline this idea when considering the case study of Almería 
in Chapter 6 and cooperative initiatives in general). In what is called a “retrogressive step” 
in analyzing the human condition, Ostrom points out classic economic models view those 
who are involved in social dilemmas “as always trapped in the situation without 
capabilities to change the structure themselves” ignoring the fact that whether or not 
individuals have capacities to transform the external variables affecting their own 
situation varies dramatically from situation to the next. It is not a universal condition that 
“prisoners are separated so they cannot communicate” (1990). Ostrom claims, 
I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those 
involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other 
than remorseless tragedies. (2010:6) 
As well Zamagni and Zamagni (2010:2) point out that in light of the cooperative business 
model having spread all over Europe, the USA, Canada and Asia and Africa, despite widely 
varying legislative and tax provisions,  
[i]t will be necessary for economics to admit—with the proper dose of humility—
that the rationality of individuals pursuing their own personal self-interest is not 
necessarily the sole economic rationality; and therefore that the economic action of 
enterprises like cooperatives, driven by a different set of motivations, also 
represents a form of rationality, albeit different from the merely instrumental 
rationality of the capitalist enterprise. 
Even if economics does admit the above, humbly or otherwise, the more difficult question 
then becomes how to describe and evaluate this cooperative economic activity and how to 
regulate it. How do law, policy and organizational structures begin to embody the 
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“cooperative difference” when engaging and competing in a market populated by IOF 
actors, as in the case of agricultural cooperatives? 
Henrÿ (2012) provides a starting point in describing adequate cooperative (and tax) 
legislation which: 
 
 takes into account the difference between profit and surplus 
 understands the rationale of patronage refund payments to members and the 
setting up of indivisible reserve funds 
 applies cooperative specific accounting standards 
 
Added to this list should also be an understanding by competition law of how cooperative 
integration functions differently than IOF mergers, for example. (See above, wherein 
Henrÿ sets out Cooperative/IOF differences). 
If we look at the ILO R.193 s. 7(2) (ILO, 2002) it states that: 
Cooperatives should be treated in accordance with national law and practice and 
on	terms	no	 less	 favourable than those accorded to other forms of enterprise and 
social organization. (emphasis author) 
While it is true that the phrase above in italics opens a debate on various issues on the 
regulation of cooperatives, i.e. whether cooperatives are unfairly treated due to laws 
imposing a “one size fits all” regulation on IOFs and cooperatives alike (evidence of which 
will be seen in Chapter 5) perhaps the more difficult question is if various cooperative 
laws are transforming cooperatives into a type of enterprise that makes it difficult to 
ascertain just what a cooperative is.  
2.8.1	Hybrids	and	Cooperatives	
 
“Firms	 have	 invented	 far	more	 ways	 to	work	 together	 than	 organizational	
economics	 has	 so	 far	 expressed	 (not	 to	 mention	 evaluated).”	 (Baker	 et	 al.,	
2008)	
Elinor Ostrom referred to the “diversity of institutional forms” and Coase (1992) wrote of 
the many forms economic activity can take in the “the institutional structure of 
production”. Ménard (2011) outlined those various arrangements which fell neither under 
pure market relationships nor within ‘firm boundaries’ as “hybrids”, pointing out that such 
arrangements had various names, such as networks (sociology) or alliances 
(management), depending on the discipline (Ménard 2011, 4). The notion of a network, 
based in the sociological discipline is also often used in agricultural cooperatives, to 
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describe systems “of interdependent, reciprocal exchange relationships” (Achrol, 1997: 
68), shaped by “density, multiplexity, and reciprocity of ties and a shared value system 
defining membership	 roles and social responsibilities” (Achrol 1997, 59). This latter 
definition is particularly germane to agricultural cooperatives based on the essential role 
of members. 
The changing terminology reflects the richness of relationships among businesses 
resorting to means of coordination other than the price mechanism or direct 
integration. It also reflects the lack of a unified and satisfying theoretical 
explanation (Ménard, 2011:4) 
Baker et	al.	(2002: 71) pointed out that where what little attention has been paid to such 
arrangements, “the focus has typically been on asset ownership and other formal aspects 
of organizational structure”. Williamson considered hybrids transitory phenomena but 
later revised his view (Williamson 1975, 1991; Ménard 2009: 6). Ménard, in mapping out 
an example, describes a case of flour millers in France who decide to set up a special entity 
to produce and sell high quality bread. It is a case of both competition and cooperation, 
where the millers give up certain control rights to others and yet are responsible for their 
own resources and business strategies. He sets out various situations where “firms hand 
over decision rights and even property rights across boundaries, so that some rights are 
no longer controlled by a single party “illustrating the variety of solutions implemented by 
several different institutional structures dealing with shared control” (Ménard 2011: 8). 
Cooperatives occupy a central role in discussing hybrids: 
Cooperatives define another important category, almost a class of its own. The 
variety of their forms makes	their characterization difficult, since they are spread 
over a wide spectrum, from quasi integrated	firms to market-like arrangements. 
 However, numerous cooperatives share	characteristics of hybrids with respect to the joint 
allocation of rights and their mode of	 governance, dominated by the “one person, one 
vote” principle (see Hansmann, 1988;	 Ménard, 2007b). Ménard examines “”the forces 
which lead to go hybrid [i.e. neither relying only on market transactions nor full 
integration], in the hope of outperforming markets as well as hierarchies” and is not 
content to merely focus on contractual relationships. Noting the well known “continuum in 
organisations” set out by Cheung (1983), where contracts were the focus of attention, 
Ménard points out that this approach is “misleading” (Ménard, 2011:4).  
Ménard goes on to set out the various kinds of hybrid structures (Ménard, 2011:10), such 
as strategic alliances, supply chain systems, joint ventures, partnerships (also dealing with 
common pool resources), consortia, etc. and notes that they all differ from an “integrated 
solution”, the firm and the market. 
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Understanding why firms invest in projects that require loss of control over key 
rights raises important questions about why firms accept this loss of control and 
what pushes parties to go hybrid, rather than relying on pure market relationships 
or fully integrating. 
He concludes that “[h]ybrids provide alternative solutions, possibly optimal ones, when 
there are significant non-contractibilities” (2011:19) and that “[t]here is an increasing 
sense that the network of relationships in which particular exchanges are embedded have 
properties that are greater than the sum of its parts and outcomes that cannot be 
explained by studying its parts alone” (Achrol, 1997: 63). Cooperatives, one of many 
hybrid structures, are “institutional structures of production” with their own 
characteristics and they create specific organizational and governance methods to deal 
with their unique properties: 
(1) property rights that ultimately remain distinct, although significant assets are 
pooled;  
(2) decision rights that keep partners independent, although shared rights restrict 
their autonomy; and  
(3) the need to design adequate incentives in a context in which frontiers among 
residual claimants are blurred. (Ménard, 2011:53) 
Ménard concludes that “[h]ybrids proliferate because advantages of coordination and 
cooperation overcome gains associated with market competition, while remaining 
autonomous provides more flexibility and better incentives than an integrated structure 
can offer.” He refers to the following empirical studies: 
 Hybrids act as an instrument to deal with uncertainty. In developing joint 
strategies, sharing knowledge and risks, implementing common standards, and 
adopting adequate governance, hybrids might provide solutions not available 
to alternative arrangements (Robinson & Stuart, 2007; Baker et	al., 2008).  
 This could explain preferences for socially embedded relationships rather than 
arms’ length relationships when uncertainty is high (Khanna, 1998; Gulati, 
1998) or when high adaptability is required (Uzzi, 1997; Podolny & Page 1998) 
 When it is difficult to differentiate between poor performance and bad luck 
hybrid structures are chosen (Park, 1996: 803).  
Spear (2010) refers to “hybrids” as well (although in the sense of cooperatives assuming 
IOF characteristics) and notes that in Europe during the 1990s there was a wave of 
revisions to legislation in the 1990s in order to address financial and competitiveness 
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problems that cooperatives appeared to be confronting: A useful scheme is set out in Table 
2.3 of the various adaptations and the manner in how they were carried out:  
 
Table	2.3	European	Cooperative	Legislation	Revisions	and	Adaptations.	
Membership Adaptations  
 
• Changes in voting rights: 
• Transactions with non-members  
• restrictions on the openness of membership  
• Extent of capital investment by members  
Financial adaptations  
 
• Openness to Financial members  
• Partial adoption of stock company models  
Financial instruments:  
 
• Issuing of shares/bonds on the market  
• Differentiating shares (and voting rights):  
Managerial control 
 
• Decline in member participation  
• Separation of membership and business 
structures and issues.  
• Governance deficiencies  
• Control by staff and managers  
• Mission and process drift  
Based on Spear (2010)	
But Spear also notes that all adaptations did not follow one route and that there were 
different changes such as broadening membership to a multi-stakeholder model or 
adopting an asset lock and capitalisation of collective reserves. As well, changes moved 
beyond the unitary organization and brought about holdings and consortiums at the multi 
organisational level. 
Strategies included: 
 
• Adaptations to accommodate heterogeneity of membership 
• Adaptations to expand the market or to manage uncertainty in demand or to 
capture benefits for the few (members/managers). 
• Adaptation to raise capital and motivate members financially  
• Adaptations to raise finance (or improve manager rewards)  
• Adaptation to increase management control  
• Adaptations to [widen the scope of cooperative activity] 
• Mutualist adaptations to access finance  
• Adaptations for growth, diversification, and sustainability (Spear, 2010) 
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If we return once again to the work of Chaddad and Cook (2004) we can see how they 
have mapped out such hybrids according to ownership rights. 
 
Figure	2.2	Alternative	cooperative	models:	an	ownership	rights	perspective.	
	Source: Chaddad and Cook 
 
Galera (2004) refers to various models of cooperatives: 
 fundamentally mutualistic (Germanic countries and the USA) 
 fundamentally sociological (Latin America in some instances)  
 in-between model (mainly mutualistic, in which Spain, Italy, France, 
Belgium, Portugal fall) 
 the quasi-public (socialist/communist roots) 
 
She points out that the loss of strict mutuality is not always a path to an IOF, as we can see 
in the case of Italy (Galera, 2004), particularly with respect to social cooperatives (Law N. 
381/1991). In such case the mutualistic restraint gives way to a multi-stakeholder or 
community interest model. The question then, is whether a “mainly mutual” model, 
leaning towards investors, instead of the community can function as a cooperative. This is 
the challenge of hybrids (in Spear’s sense of the work, not Ménard`s).  
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In light of the above observations on cooperatives and the hybrid form (whether we view 
a cooperative as a natural hybrid, or a cooperative form that is drifting towards IOF 
characteristics and thus is a “hybrid”) an interesting case concerning an Italian 
agricultural cooperative, Mezzacorona, is set out below to illustrate how both cooperative 
interests and “competitive” necessities may be met. Venturing farther, it may be that this 
sort of hybrid structure implemented by Mezzacorona actually protects the cooperative 
identity and business form, not to mention the livelihood of many small family farmers, 
but it does so with the actual traditional cooperative entity more or less intact.  
Figure	 2.3	 Example	 of	 Adaptive	 Cooperative	 Group‐Mezzacorona	 (source:	
Mezzacorona).	
 
 
Mezzacorona S.c.a. is a cooperative company, founded in 1904, and now the parent 
company of Gruppo Mezzacorona. The cooperative is located in the region of Trentino, a 
highly cooperative culture, with a cooperative consortium, to which Mezzacorona belongs, 
including credit, agricultural, social and consumer cooperatives. Historically it was also an 
extremely poor area, with a mountainous and difficult farming landscape, isolated, lacking 
infrastructure and a place from which many of its inhabitants had to emigrate to survive. 
(The area has striking similarities with Almería, which is subject to the case study in 
Chapter 6). It´s members hold 2,600 hectares of vineyards in Trentino and Alto Adige, with 
an annual production of 300,000 quintals of quality grapes which produce 320,000 
hectoliters of wine. The modern wineries have a storage capacity of 470,000 liters. 
Mezzacorona owns all trademarks and is the majority shareholder of all companies 
involved in the sale and promotion of the group's wines. 
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Nosio S.p.A. is an IOF company founded by Mezzacorona in 1994 in which the cooperative 
has a 62.5% controlling interest. At such time there was growing heterogeneity of 
members: some had small “hobby” plots, some farmers were older with no children to 
take over and not willing to invest more in the cooperative, while other members were 
amassing larger vineyards and eyeing foreign markets and improvements in quality and 
price. The solution was to form an IOF. It was initially formed to sell and promote a 
premium sparkling wine, the product of those members who were willing to invest in 
farming techniques to produce high quality grapes (and hence lower yields and kilos). 
Today the IOF company also oversees the bottling, distribution and promotion of the 
Mezzacorona´s brands in Italy and 50 other countries worldwide. In addition, the 
American and German markets are overseen by their own importers, Prestige Wine 
Imports and Bavaria Wein Import, respectively. Nosio also owns two estates in Sicily. 
Combined, these estates have approximately 1,000 hectares of land, of which 650 hectares 
are planted with quality vines. It has small minority interests in two other estates in 
Tuscany and Sicily. Nosio as the subholding of Gruppo Mezzacorona controls all capital 
activities and strategic shareholdings of the Cooperative. Nosio S.p.A. stockholders' equity 
is held by over 400 shareholders, some shareholders being member farmers of 
Mezzacorona, some being local cooperative credit banks in addition to private investors.28 
So where does that leave the cooperative and its members? First, it should be noted that 
the cooperative is still the controlling shareholder in all entities. Secondly, the success of 
Nosio is beneficial for the cooperative members. The more Nosio markets successfully, the 
better for the cooperative members. Thirdly, members may choose to be investors in 
Nosio as private investors (note, not as “cooperative investor members”). Whether or not a 
member invests in the IOF has no bearing on the cooperative members relationships 
within the cooperative Mezzacorona. If members with extra capital wish to make an 
investment, they can do so in Nosio (instead of investing, for example in outside funds or 
investments), but there is no requirement to do so. Their investments in Nosio benefit 
Mezzacorona members, but there is not “free riding” since they (as private investors) also 
receive a return (or not) on their investment. To the extent private investors are not 
members, they have no interest in the cooperative, but only in the IOF. Their presence 
does not influence the cooperative. 
                                                                  
28 This information was gathered on several site visits to MezzaCorona in meetings with management.The 
corporate chart is available on the website www.gruppomezzacorona.it. 
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This is just one example of how agricultural cooperatives can change from an 
organizational or legal perspective (i.e. the cooperative needs to be able to invest in IOF 
companies), but in a manner that does not change the property rights of the cooperative 
or its members.  
2.9	Applications	of	theory	to	legislation	
Given the characteristics of the cooperative business form, do the legislative changes 
proposed by economic organisational theories of the firm result in adequate and coherent 
regulation? Or, on the contrary, are these legislative changes, based as they are on 
redefining property and contract rights, part of the process of “reconceptualising” the 
cooperative so that it fits within the coherent framework of globalised legal concepts?  
In Chapter 5 the state of and challenges for Spanish agricultural cooperatives will be set 
out in eight sub-sectors. Thereafter a review of applicable legislation is set out, with main 
characteristics of the laws and policy summarized. The effects of these laws and policies 
on agricultural cooperatives will be examined. This will help us to answer the above 
question, ascertaining whether legislative “fixes” are actually related to solving 
agricultural cooperatives’ concerns. The case study in Chapter 6 will provide a “lower 
level” example of a cluster of agricultural cooperatives to better understand their 
functioning, necessities and adaptations over time.  
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Chapter	3	Hypotheses	and	Objectives	 
3.1	Hypotheses 	
In Chapter 2 the principal economic organizational theories (agency, property rights, 
incomplete contracts and transaction cost economics) underlying the study of the firm 
have been set out. In addition, the nature of contract and property rights which underpin 
such theories have been described. Inadequacies of these theories of the firm and 
formulation of legal concepts as applied to cooperatives have been outlined as well, 
relying on cooperative theorists and collective action institutional theory. Organizational 
and legal change which has occurred in cooperatives has taken the form of “hybrids” in 
many cases, some of which take on IOF characteristics. However, certain developments, 
such as the trend towards multi-stakeholders and widening the object of cooperatives, 
safety provisions such as asset locks, or certain forms of hybrids which include non-
traditional organizational structures, cannot be said to necessarily be an “isomorphic” 
tendency towards IOF models.  
A closer examination of cooperative law in the agriculture sector will provide an “action 
arena” in which to gauge the adequacy of changes in cooperative law, policy and 
organizational form in relation to the cooperative business form. In Chapter 5, the analysis 
of the state of Spanish agricultural cooperatives, the challenges they face and their 
resulting legislative and policy needs provides the background against which to examine 
the organizational, legislative and policy response. Chapter 5 is at the national sector level, 
the sub-sector level, and the firm level (survey of top 5 of each sub-sector). Chapter 6 is at 
the local sub-sector level and includes observations at the firm (cooperative) and cluster 
level. The hypotheses will be applied to the data collected and observations made in such 
chapters, relying on the theoretical background of Chapter 2. 
 As noted in Chapter 2, cooperative law and policy, as an institutional force, attempts to 
reconcile two seemingly contradictory concepts at work: the maintenance of the concept 
of cooperatives and the emphasis on social economy and second, enterprises which are 
becoming more “market-oriented” and leaning towards embracing investor-owner 
organizational design. The “reconceptualisation” of cooperative law and the adoption of 
the different spheres of jurisdiction, as set out by CLS and described in Chapter 2, 
facilitates this coherence. 
Contract and property law (and thus the economic theories built on them) are historical 
narratives and contextual concepts. Recognising law and policy´s role in the creation of 
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markets collapses the distinction between markets and hierarchies, which has been the 
main distinguishing feature of organisational economics, and thus cooperative theory.  
If the institution of law is looked at from the perspective of imposing “coherence” and 
dividing institutional spheres, legislative change in the cooperative sector can be seen to 
be “reconceptualising” the cooperative form, such that the public goals or goods of the 
social economy and in this case, agricultural cooperatives, are “privatized” through 
changes to property structures and the introduction of “well-defined” property rights. In 
order to avoid confusion, we are not referring to “private law” or “public law”; rather we 
are concerned about the transformation and/or characterizations of social-economic 
interests as being the subject matter of a “private order discourse” (Kennedy, 2006). 
Henrÿ (2102:57 footnote 155)) makes this point as well in speaking of cooperative law: 
The legal categorizing of cooperatives as belonging to the private sector must not 
be construed as disregarding the socio-political and economic characterisations, 
whereby cooperatives might be classified as part of the social economy or a third 
sector in some countries.  
Thus, general hypothesis 1 and specific hypothesis H1A: 
1. A “modern” contractual approach to procedural regulation, defined property rights 
allocation and a formalistic approach to cooperative law, often result in a “private 
law” ordering of social and economic interests as opposed to regulation based on 
achieving social and economic objectives. The result of this is the marginalization 
of social or policy driven regulation.  
H1A Spanish Cooperative Legislative and Policy Reform has been based on 
institutional mimicking of investor based firms, without regard to the 
characteristics of cooperative enterprise structures and inherent social objectives.  
Standard economic literature and economic theories of the firm (with some exceptions 
noted in Chapter 2) have not taken into account the characteristics of cooperatives, 
particularly agricultural cooperatives, and do not understand their “natural” hybrid nature 
where certain decision rights and property rights are pooled, while at the same time 
distinct ownership is kept over key assets. The reason why this occurs and under what 
circumstances has not been properly investigated nor understood and is subsequently, not 
well reflected in policy, but rather continues to reflect dual and conflicting goals due to the 
IOF framework by which the agricultural cooperative is evaluated. 
Thus, general hypothesis 2, and specific hypotheses, H2A and H2B, 
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2. Legislation and policy regarding cooperatives has often failed to allow adequate 
measures consistent with cooperative characteristics and organizational reality 
with which to coordinate joint activities and carry out their activities in keeping 
with the hybrid nature of cooperatives and their activities as “network 
enterprises” and their existence within a wider diversity of forms of enterprise. 
H2A IOF prejudices result in policy and legislative emphasis on reallocation of 
property and control rights, as well as firm growth and a “one size fits all” 
approach, rather than networks and other forms of consolidation and 
concentration of offer. 
H2B Cooperative legislative and policy change which mimics investor owned firm 
characteristics weakens the agricultural cooperative´s ability to survive because it 
does not acknowledge or support the strengths of the cooperative business form. 
As pointed out by various scholars, the agricultural cooperative form has proven to be an 
efficient and effective way to manage resources (Euricse, 2010; Valeninov, 2007; Bijman 
2006; Hendrikse, 2004). Viewing the cooperative as a special type of hybrid, Ménard 
(2007, 2011, 2012) also supports this view. Agricultural cooperatives can overcome many 
of the problems with the cooperative business form identified by NIE theories by relying 
more heavily on cooperative institutions and values, rather than adopting IOF strategies.  
Thus, hypothesis 3 and specific hypotheses H3A and H3B 
3. The success or failure of Spanish agricultural cooperatives does not depend on this 
“modern” contractual approach to law and policy but in fact, lies in the 
strengthening and expansion of cooperative principles, business and governance 
practices.  
H3A Both endogenous and exogenous factors are responsible for agricultural 
cooperative success, particularly adequate financing and complementary 
cooperative institutions, professional cooperative management, capacity building, 
as well as historical, cultural and local economic factors. 
H3B Adherence to cooperative characteristics and strategies which are consistent 
with the cooperative business form and values contributes to agricultural 
cooperative success. 
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3.2	Objectives	
The objectives of this thesis are: 
1. To provide a comprehensive description of the current level of development of 
agricultural cooperatives and related forms of producer organisations in Spain and to 
identify the challenges they face. This includes understanding, 
 the interrelation between institutional context and policy measures, the 
position of the cooperative in the supply chain and internal governance 
structures.  
 strategic paths and growth strategies in response to global competition and 
constant price pressure due to their position in the supply chain.  
 historical, cultural and sociologically relevant aspects related to agricultural 
cooperatives and the changes they are undergoing 
2. To analyse cooperative law and policy, as well as certain EU measures, which affect 
agricultural cooperatives and to ascertain whether such measures are adequate for the 
cooperative enterprise and the challenges they face. This objective will include 
consideration of  
 traditional contract and property rights theories which have informed 
suggested strategies for cooperative legislative and organisational change 
 cooperative, tax, competition laws and accounting rules, access to financing, as 
well as certain EU measures  
3. From a theoretical perspective, the thesis,  
 contributes to the theory of collective enterprise and the cooperative form, 
creating linkages between legal theory, NIE, legislative change and implications 
for the cooperative enterprise 
 contributes to a regulatory and organizational approach to agricultural 
cooperatives that is more coherent with the social and economic objectives of 
the cooperative form, taking into account agricultural cooperative 
characteristics and values in the theory of the firm 
 adds to research on a variety of enterprise forms instead of focusing on IOFs
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Chapter	4	Description	and	Justification	of	Methodologies	
4.1	Explanation	and	Justification	for	Mixed	Method	Research	
The thesis will use a mixed methodology (Tashakorri and Teddlie, 2003) or multi-strategy 
research (Bryman 2001). This implies working with different types	 of	 data	 and	 also	
different	 methods	 of	 investigation. The application of different research strategies is 
justified when dealing with a complex range of research questions. Mixed methods 
research is also appropriate when the research subject calls for an interdisciplinary 
approach, thus deflecting attention away from an unduly predominant theoretical 
perspective that is often too specific to particular disciplines and thus limiting to gaining 
knowledge. Quantitative methods often fall within the positivistic tradition and qualitative 
methods fall with the “interpretivist” tradition. Thus it may encourage thinking ‘outside 
the box’ (Brennan, 2005). By using mixed methodology, different kinds of knowledge can 
be generated. 
 As well, developing a mixed method strategy fits with the importance of  ‘practical 
enquiry’ that speaks to policy and policymakers and that informs practice (Hammersley, 
2000). 
The framing of research questions in the case of agricultural cooperative is underpinned 
by both	 philosophical and pragmatic issues, not to mention policy and politics. Mixed 
method research allows appropriate consideration of both pragmatic and	 philosophical 
considerations and permits the study of policy and political considerations. 
Sammons et al (2005) justifies using mixed methods in situations where ‘complex and 
pluralistic social contexts demand analysis that is informed by multiple and diverse 
perspectives’ (Sammons, et al. 2005, p. 221). 
Mixed methods research utilises (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Teddlie and 
Tashakkori, 2003):  
(1) Triangulation which looks for convergence or corroboration of results from different 
methods and designs, studying the same phenomenon—in this case agricultural 
cooperatives.	 
(2) Elaboration or expansion of research by amplifying the breadth of inquiry that using 
different methods allows. As well, qualitative data analysis may exemplify how patterns 
based on quantitative data analysis apply in particular cases. The use of one type of data 
analysis adds to the understanding being gained by another.  
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(3) Initiation: the use of a first method sparks new hypotheses, paradoxes, contradictions 
or research questions that can be pursued using a different method.  
(4) Complementarity – qualitative and quantitative results are often treated as different 
categories, yet each type of data analysis may enhance, illustrate or clarify the other. 
Together the data analyses from the two methods are juxtaposed and generate 
complementary insights that together create a bigger picture.  
(5) Contradictions - Where qualitative data and quantitative findings conflict, exploring 
contradictions between different types of data assumed to reflect the same phenomenon 
may lead to an interrogation of the methods and to discounting of one method in favour of 
another (in terms of assessments of validity or reliability) (Bryman, 2001). 
4.2 	Institutional	Analysis		
As set out in Chapter 2, agricultural cooperatives in Spain are studied within their 
institutional context. In this thesis the social, economic, cultural and historical structures 
are considered when understanding the established environments in which they operate. 
The legal and organizational institutions are particularly highlighted. The processes by 
which the structures and rules and norms become “authoritative guidelines” (Scott 2004) 
for action in the agricultural cooperative sector aid in understanding both legal and 
organizational change in the sector.  
Particularly important when considering the NIE theories of the “firm”, the use of new 
institutionalism in the study of organizations illustrates a rejection of rational-actor 
models (Powell and DiMaggio (1991:8) upon which much economic theories of the firm 
are based.  
As the study of agricultural cooperatives deals with multiple levels, any theoretical 
approach must consider the methodological challenges that require research to link 
several levels of analysis (Schneiberg, 2006:195). Institutional analysis goes somewhat 
farther than just reconciliation. 
The research challenges are as follows: 
1. capturing the influence of higher-order factors on lower-level entities; 
2. identifying specific institutional mechanisms;  
3. assessing rather than assuming coherence (Schneiberg, 2006:196); and 
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4. avoiding approaches which counter institutional models against economic or 
technological determinants (noting in our case that the economic concept of the market is 
in large part created by legal institutions). 
Schneiberg and Clemens (2006, 195) refer to  
a more direct investigation of how alternatives are culturally constituted, how 
choices among alternatives are contested or justified, and the processes by which 
the range of “thinkable” alternatives expands and contracts over time and across 
settings. 
By doing so, we do not settle for following a linear, straight ahead idea of institutional 
analysis as adoption and diffusion but rather a “dynamic and contested [process] of 
institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation” (Schneiberg, 2006:196). 
Fleshing out this approach a bit more in “Institutionalism as a Contested Multilevel 
Process” Schneiberg and Soule (2005) sought to “reconceptualise” institutionalisation as 
the product of struggle and conflict over the fundamental character of social, political and 
industrial order. In doing so, they linked politics and movements with organisational 
theory and institutional analysis. 
Ostrom echoes this approach when she refers to the linking of action arenas and how 
institutional analysis faces a major challenge in identifying the appropriate level of 
analysis relevant to addressing a particular problem and being able to understand not only 
that level, but one or two levels above and below (2005:12). 
In light of the multilevel approach, agricultural cooperatives are studied from a state 
(Spain and the EU) and regional government (autonomous communities) perspective 
(legislation and policy) as well as a community level (Almería).  
However behind all of these levels, is the theoretical plain of what informs organizational 
and legal change: that of concepts of contract, property rights and the idea of the 
individual. In order to do so, the institutional theorist must “dig below and learn how rules 
create the set being analysed” (Ostrom, 2005:18). This approach is different than much 
business and economic theorists’ research who, much like game theorists, do not concern 
themselves with the rules of the game, so long as such rules are known. 
4.3 Qualitative	 and	 Quantatative	 Analysis	 of	 Spanish	 Agricultural	
Cooperatives	
Multiple sources of information were used, such as databases, interviews, site visits, 
corporate documents and academic and trade journal articles. The databases used were 
Amadeus, FADN, INE, MARM and Eurostat, Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Foreign 
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Trade, Spanish Tax Agency, Instituto de Estadística y Cartografía de Andalucía and data 
from Alimarket, CEPES and other social economy databases. Also data provided by Copa-
Cogeca and Cooperativas Agroalimentarias was used. Information on individual 
cooperatives, in addition to the survey carried out in May to July, 2011, which forms the 
basis of Chapter 5.4, has been collected by studying annual reports, other corporate 
publications and websites as well as SABI (sistema de análisis de balances ibérico). 
Interviews have been conducted with representatives of national associations of co-
operatives, managers and board members of individual cooperatives, and academic or 
professional experts on cooperatives. 
The “top 5” cooperatives which were part of the survey were chosen, for the most part 
based on turnover. (This was calculated with the help of Cooperativas Agroalimentarias to 
distinguish turnovers which had to do with agricultural activity from other types of 
activity. Because of this, rankings of turnover may differ from sources such as Alimarket.) 
While choosing only large cooperatives is not particularly representative, there was still 
quite a range of diversity, e.g. a top 5 pork producer is much larger than a top 5 sheep 
meat producer.  
The “top 5” cooperative turnover selection had the following advantages: 
 it covered a larger percentage of the sector and of members 
 to the extent that one of the issues in Spanish agriculture is characterized by being 
“atomised” and lacking participation down the supply chain, larger cooperative 
would most likely be vertically integrated to some extent 
 larger cooperatives may be most affected by agricultural policies at multiple levels: 
regional, national and European 
 more complete data collection is possible 
Market share was estimated and calculated as the cooperative share in relation to the total 
market share.  
The data gathered in the study of Spanish cooperatives gives a detailed description of the 
diverse elements that are associated with legislative and organisational change and the 
functioning of the cooperatives. 
The detailed analysis of cooperative legislation and policy in Spain and the EU, together 
with the compilation of economic data from the agricultural cooperative sector in Spain 
allows us to observe the influence and efficacy of such policies and legislation.  
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4.4	Survey	of	Cooperatives	
Eight main agricultural sub-sectors are examined in Spain using 10 years of statistical and 
research data, with a survey of the top 5 agricultural cooperatives in each of 8 agricultural 
sub-sectors. The Questionnaire, attached as an Appendix, is divided into sections which 
deal with general information, financial data, internal governance and membership issues, 
position in the food chain and strategy. 
The Questionnaire was emailed to the cooperative contact person with an explanation 
thereof. Follow-up phone calls and emails were made during the course of 3 months 
during May, June and July of 2011, and at times, information was taken over the telephone. 
Where information was not forthcoming from the cooperatives, alternative sources were 
used. Where no reliable information was possible, “not available” was indicated. In some 
cases cooperatives gave financial information that was not credible (e.g.. 1000X leverage 
ratios) and in such case the information was either indicated as being “unavailable” or 
obtained from official or reliable industry sources (e.g. Alimarket).  
4.5	Case	Study	methodology	
A case study approach (Yin, 2009) was used to gain knowledge at another level, allowing a 
contrast of both macro and micro analysis (Kelle 2001). Cook and Burress’ (2009) 
framework of the dynamic lifecycle of cooperatives was used to complement existing 
descriptions of the phases of Almería´s F&V cooperative growth (Molina Herrera, 2005). 
Ostrom’s notion of “Action Arenas as Focal Unit of Analysis” is appropriate where the 
phenomena can be studied from different levels.  
The case study of the development of the F&V cooperatives of Almería identifies the 
existing challenges and problems and evaluates the existing legislative and policy 
response and inherent characterization of the cooperative business form, within the 
thesis´ theoretical framework.  
Legislative examples are used to demonstrate the competing interests of agricultural 
cooperative legislation (e.g. adoption of “investor-owner” measures and an emphasis on 
growth vs. social and traditional cooperative values) and the structural dissonance 
between agricultural cooperative purpose, objectives and strengths. 
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Chapter	5	Analysis	of	Agricultural	Cooperatives	in	Spain	and	their	
Institutional	Environment29	
5.1 Introduction	
5.1.1	Objectives	
This Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive description of the current level of development 
of cooperatives (and similar forms of “collective enterprise” producer organisations in 
Spain) and the challenges they face. In order to evaluate the adequacy of legislation or 
policy, it is necessary to ascertain what challenges exist and what problems have been 
identified in need of remedying. The description presented pays special attention to the 
following drivers and constraints for the development of cooperatives:	
 Economic and fiscal incentives or disincentives and other public support measures 
at regional and national; 
 Legal aspects; 
 Historical, cultural and sociologically relevant aspects; 
 The relationship between cooperatives/POs and the actors of the food chain; 
 Internal governance of the cooperatives/POs. 
Second, laws and regulations that enable or constrain cooperative development are 
identified; and 
Third, specific support measures and initiatives which have proved to be effective and 
efficient for promoting cooperatives in the agricultural sector in Spain are identified. 
5.1.2	Analytical	framework		
As mentioned in Chapter 4-Methodology, the study of any cooperative system implies a 
multi-level approach. In order to begin the analysis of agricultural cooperatives in Spain 
this Chapter begins with three main factors that may determine the success of 
cooperatives: (a) the position in the food supply chain, (b) internal governance and 
                                                                  
29 The European Commission in relation to its stated commitment to facilitate the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector by encouraging the creation of voluntary agricultural producer organisations launched a 
study through DG Agriculture and Rural Development, “Support for Farmers' Cooperatives”, that was intended 
to provide background knowledge for farmers to organise themselves in cooperatives	as a tool to consolidate 
their market orientation and so generate a solid market income. This Chapter 5, although substantially revised, 
is based on portions of the Spain Country Report carried out by the author for such project. The table (5.30) on 
legislation, although substantially revised herein, was supervised in the original report by Prof. Carlos Vargas 
Vasserot, the second author of such report who carried out a numeric legal evaluation and a descriptive legal 
report (both not included herein). 
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organizational structure, and (c) the institutional environment. The position of the 
cooperative in the food supply chain refers to the competitiveness of the cooperative in 
relation to other participants, such as processors, wholesalers and retailers. The internal 
governance and organizational structures refers to its decision-making processes, the role 
of the different governing bodies, and the allocation of control rights to members or in 
some cases, professional management as well as the organizational structure of the 
cooperative enterprise (holdings, subsidiaries, etc.). The institutional environment refers 
to the legal, social, historical, cultural and political context in which the cooperative is 
operating, and which may have a supporting or constraining effect on the performance of 
the cooperative. Those three factors constitute the three focal points of the analytical 
framework applied in this Chapter 5. Within this framework, legislative and policy 
initiatives occupy a central role. 
5.1.3 Definition	of	the	cooperative	
The following definition of cooperatives and producer organisations (POs) is used. A 
cooperative/PO as an enterprise characterized by user-ownership, user-control and user-
benefit (Dunn, 1988):  
 It is user-owned because the users of the services of the 
cooperative/PO also own the cooperative organisation; ownership 
means that the users are the main providers of the equity capital in the 
organisation;  
 It is user-controlled because the users of the services of the 
cooperative/PO are also the ones that decide on the strategies and 
policies of the organisation; 
 It is for user-benefit, because all the benefits of the cooperative are 
distributed to its users on the basis of their use; thus, individual benefit 
is in proportion to individual use. 
This definition of cooperatives and POs (hereafter shortened in the text as cooperatives) 
includes cooperatives of cooperatives and associations of producer organisations (often 
called federated, secondary or second tier cooperatives). 
The use of this wider definition is necessary given the wide variety of cooperative entities 
found in Spain and the different legislation to which they are subject.  
There are diverse types of collective enterprise producer organisations and cooperatives 
in Spain, the most common being first and second tier cooperatives, the majority of which 
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are set up under regional cooperative but not national cooperative legislation. As a result 
of different autonomous community legislative frameworks, they have significant 
differences, with distinct social, political, and legislative histories and characteristics.  
As well there exist community exploitation of common lands cooperatives - “CEC”- where 
land is held in common and there are rules governing the ceding of the land to the entity. 
Cooperatives with common use of machinery - “CUMA”- exist in the Basque Country, 
Navarra and Galicia. SATs (“sociedades agrarias de transformación”) are perhaps the most 
popular form of collective entrepreneurship in agriculture after cooperatives. SATs are 
somewhat like general partnerships and capitalistic companies at the same time. Their 
membership is limited to farmers, farm workers or those with farm related purposes, but 
their statutes and bylaws allow voting in proportion to share capital when decisions that 
need to be taken are financial in nature. This chapter 5 focuses primarily on agricultural 
marketing cooperatives.  
5.1.4 Method	of	data	collection	
Multiple sources of information have been used, such as databases, interviews, corporate 
documents and academic and trade journal articles. The databases used were Amadeus, 
FADN, INE, MARM and Eurostat, Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Spanish Tax Agency, Instituto de Estadística y Cartografía de Andalucía and data from 
Alimarket, CEPES, Cooperativas Agroalimentarias and other social economy databases. 
Also data provided by Copa-Cogeca has been used. In addition, information on individual 
cooperatives in addition to the survey which was carried out in May to July, 2011, which 
forms the basis of Chapter 5.5, has been collected by studying annual reports, other 
corporate publications and websites as well as SABI (sistema de análisis de balances 
ibérico). Interviews have been conducted with representatives of national associations of 
cooperatives, managers and board members of individual cooperatives, and academic or 
professional experts on cooperatives. 
The “top 5” cooperatives which were part of the survey were chosen for the most part 
based on turnover. While only choosing large cooperatives is not particularly 
representative, there was still quite a range of diversity, e.g. a top five pork producer is 
much larger than a top 5 sheep meat producer. Top 5 turnover had the advantages as set 
out in Chapter 4.3 -Methodology. 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
88 
 
5.1.5 Period	under	study	
This Chapter in general, covers the decade from 2000 to 2010. In certain cases, where 
indicated, more recent data has been included from 2011 and 2012. The literature that has 
been reviewed is predominantly from such period, but with exceptions for important prior 
studies or more recent cooperative literature. 
5.2 Facts	and	figures	on	agriculture		
5.2.1 Share	of	agriculture	in	the	economy	(not	limited	to	cooperatives)	
Based on Eurostat data, in 2011 agriculture was 2.34% of GDP (Figure 5.1).  
Spain has followed in the last 20 years the same tendencies as European agriculture, with 
agriculture becoming less important in terms of the overall economy. However, these 
changes have not affected equally all regions, resulting in regional and functional 
specializations. This has allowed the sector to become more competitive, notwithstanding 
its reduced size. In addition, the last few years have been a difficult for the Spanish 
economy in general with lower prices affecting farmers. However, many farmers have 
focused on exports, reaching a record of 22,029 million Euros in 2010, representing 8.12% 
more than 2009 (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2010a). As well, in spite of its reduction 
and the overall loss of employment derived there from (though in 2010, employment in 
agriculture started to recover), agriculture continues to be a key element of rural 
development and of many regional economies (Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, 2011; 
Molinero, 2006).  
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Figure	5.1	Share	of	agriculture	in	GDP	
 Data source: Eurostat Nat. Accounts and INE (2008-2011) 
 
 
Figure	5.2	Share	of	manufacture	of	food	products	and	beverages	1995‐2006	
	Data source: Eurostat Nat. Accounts by 60 branches 
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Figure	5.3	Share	of	manufacture	of	food	products	and	beverages	2000‐2011.	
 
Data source: Eurostat Nat. Accounts by 64 branches30 
 
5.2.1 Agricultural	output	per	sector	
Within agriculture, several main sub-sectors exist and in reference to the study of eight 
such sub-sectors, Spain is present in all. The most important is the fruit and vegetable 
sector, followed by pig meat. Olive oil and table olives have experienced an important 
increase, as has wine. Dairy remains constant and the cereals sector remains important 
although fluctuating. Sheep meat has experienced a decline. Sugar outputs are relatively 
minimal (but have been included due to the presence of a large sugar cooperative). In 
Chapter 5.6 each of these sectors is dealt with in greater detail, both from a general 
perspective and from the cooperative perspective. Figure 5.4 provides information on the 
main sectors in Spain.  
                                                                  
30 Figures 5.2 and 5.3 vary due to changes in how Eurostat calculated the GDP. Eurostat provides information 
on national GDP divided into 60 or 64 industries. Information for Spain in 2011 was provided only in the 
category of 64 industries, skewing the results somewhat. 
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Figure	5.4	Development	of	the	different	sectors	in	agriculture,	value	of	production	
at	producer	prices,	in	millions	of	Euro.	
 Source: Agriculture Economic Accounts, Eurostat 
 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the development in output for the period 2001 -2009, calculated on a 3-
year average around 2001 and around 2009 (thus, 2008, 2009, 2010). Fruits and 
vegetables exhibit the highest growth at over 2% followed by dairy. Sugar beet is clearly in 
decline as is the sheep and goat sectors. (See individual sectors in Chapter 5.5 for a more 
detailed description of the characteristics and trends in each sector.) Overall growth in 
outputs, although positive, is approximately 3%. 
 
Figure	5.	5	Trends	in	Output	per	Sector,	2001‐2009.	
 
Source: Economic Accounts of Agriculture, Eurostat. 
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5.2.2 Development	in	the	number	of	farms	
The number of farms in Spain is given in Table 5.1 (2000-2007) and Table 5.2 (2007-
2010) and Figure 5.6. Sugar and dairy show the highest decline in number of farms, with 
cereals, pig meat and fruits and vegetables decreasing as well. Wine and olives hover at a 
decrease of about 1%. Although there is evidence of some consolidation and/or 
abandonment of activity the decrease in the number of farms was well below that of the 
figure for the EU (8.3% from 2003 to 200831) and is evidence of the “atomization” of farms 
in Spain. The high number of farms attests to the endurance of the “Mediterranean” model 
of agriculture and is seen as a persistent “problem” for those who argue for an increase in 
size as a method to gain competitiveness. Cooperatives in Spain traditionally have tended 
to opt for growth through the creation of second level cooperatives, with the exception of 
some areas, Almería being a case in point. Below in section 5.4 there is further discussion 
of consolidation and mergers in the agricultural cooperative sector.	
Table 5.1 shows both the number of farms in total and in relation to which main types for 
2000 and 2007, as well as the development. Table 5.2 shows such data for 2007-2010 (the 
basis for calculation having changed somewhat between the two timeframes). 
Table	5.1	Number	of	farms	2000‐2007.	
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey Historical Data 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
31 Data from Alimarket. 
2000 2007
% change 
per year
Cereals 143,540 114,290 ‐3.20
Sugar 55,480 38,150 ‐5.21
Pig meat 25,480 21,700 ‐2.27
Sheep meat 80,540 81,540 0.18
Total fruits and vegetables 272,980 225,080 ‐2.72
    horticulture 55,980 42,080
   fruit and citrus fruit 217,000 183,000
Olive oil and table olives 231,650 214,800 ‐1.07
Wine 86,460 80,630 ‐0.99
Dairy 46,910 26,640 ‐7.77
Beef 54,270 42,510 ‐3.43
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Table	5.	2	Number	of	farms	2007‐2010	
  2007 2010 
% 
change 
Cereals 109,320 128,800 17.8%
Sugar 11,760 7,830 -33.4%
Pig meat 16,380 16,190 -1.2%
Sheep meat 57,470 50,760 -11.7%
Total fruits and 
vegetables 226,760 199,730
    horticulture 43,110 38,780 -10.0%
   fruit and citrus fruit 183,650 160,950 -12.4%
Olive oil and table 
olives 208,430 213,120 2.3%
Wine 80,820 67,330 -16.7%
Dairy 27,740 23,120 -16.7%
Beef 48,720 55,420 13.8%
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey 201032 
 
 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 below, provides the data in graphical format.  
	
Figure	5.6	Number	of	farms	2000‐2007	with	data	per	specialist	type	of	farming.	
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey Historical data 
 
 
                                                                  
32 The most recent available data correspond to the Farm Structure Survey in 2010 which includes a 
comparison with 2007. However, there are certain differences between the data provided by Eurostat in the 
survey between 2007 and 2010, which can be seen in Table 5.1 and 5.2 for 2007, and thus consolidation was 
not feasible. 
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Figure	5.	7	Number	of	farms	2007‐2010	with	data	per	specialist	type	of	farming.	
 Source: Farm Structure Survey 201033 
 
5.2.3 Size	of	farms	
Farms vary in size from small part-time farms to large exploitations. Figure 5.8 shows the 
distribution of farms per size class, measured in European Size Units (ESU) for 2007 and 
thereafter Figure 5.9 in Standard Output (SO) for 2010. Along with the sheer number of 
farms, the small to medium size of farms in Spain is also indicative of the “atomization” of 
the whole of the agricultural sector. Dairy and pig meat farms are the exception for Spain, 
demonstrating farms of larger size but they are still of relatively small size compared to 
the European standard. The sugar sector has larger farms as well, but as the sugar market 
is small and decreasing this fact is less significant. The average total farm size for Spain, in 
terms of area, according to the 2009 (last year available) Spanish Office for National 
Statistics, Agricultural Census was 30.9 ha (“usable land”, 24 ha).  
Sheep farming is predictably notable for its large number of tiny traditional operations 
(although farm size does not capture the fact that in Spain there is a tradition of sheep 
grazing on common and other privately owned lands not belonging to the farmer. EU 
policy ignores this to the detrimate of such farmers regarding susidies). Fruits and 
vegetables display little deviation from the small to medium size. The size of Spanish 
farms is in line with the small size of businesses in the Spanish agri-food industry. Out of 
31,824 such companies, only 3.44% have more than 50 workers and 96.54% are small to 
medium enterprises. Consequently there is a substantial disparity between the size of 
                                                                  
33 The most recent available data correspond to the Farm Structure Survey in 2010 which includes a 
comparison with 2007. However, there are certain differences between the data provided by Eurostat in the 
survey between 2007 and 2010, which can be seen in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 for 2007.  
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producers and clients, which translates into a clear advantage for the large supermarkets 
which are five to six times larger than the very largest agro alimentary company in Spain 
(Baamonde, 2009).  
Figure	5.8	Number	of	farms	per	size	class,	measured	in	ESU,	per	specialist	type	of	
farming	in	2007.	
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey Historical Data.  
 
 
Figure	5.9	Number	of	farms	per	size	class	measured	in	SO,	per	specialist	type	of	
farming	in	2010.	
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey 201034 
                                                                  
34 The size of farms according to the 2010 survey and thereafter is measured in SO (Standard Output) instead 
of ESU (European Size Unit), 1 ESU being equivalent to 1200 €.  
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5.2.4	Age	of	farmers:	distribution	of	farms	to	age	classes	
The age of farmers differs across Europe. In Spain, with about a third of the farmers over 
65, there is a great difficulty in attracting younger farmers. This is caused by several 
factors: parents encouraging their children to enter other professions and not continue 
with the family farm, as farming is seen as a difficult and not very profitable occupation; 
young people viewing farming as an unstable and insecure future as well as not having a 
socially valuable reputation and young women in particular having few role models 
and/or little encouragement to enter farming. As well, young immigrants who, until the 
recent crisis, made up an important labour group on farms, find themselves with little 
access to capital to take up farming, even if there is an interest and technical experience.  
This state of affairs may have an effect on decision making, as older farmers have a shorter 
term view on the necessity for investment, growth, upgrades, cooperative organisational 
change, mergers and “upheaval” in general. Farms are at times viewed by older farmers as 
potential land investments (pre-housing bust, where agricultural lands were re-zoned for 
urbanisation) which would provide an inheritance for a younger generation.  
Infrastructure funds were used, at times, to purchase supplies and to cover farm costs 
rather than invest in necessary technology, farm structure upgrades and cooperative 
organisational change and investment. As an example, in some areas of southern Spain 
approximately 30% of greenhouses have obsolete designs, as older farmers were reluctant 
to invest in upgrades thinking that the land would be used more lucratively for 
construction. This assumption proved to be false when the housing bubble burst and 
currently there is a significant level of low producing greenhouses.  
The average older age of farmers has had an effect on the vision for the cooperatives in 
general, whether through resistance to mergers, investment in cooperative infrastructure 
or to less local and more national/international focus. Older farmers in Spain also by 
definition signify a lesser degree of professionalization and management/business 
expertise, particularly in areas which concern skills beyond production.  
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Figure	5.10	Percentage	of	farmers	per	age	class,	per	Member	State	and	EU27,	2007	
(ranked	with	countries	with	the	lowest	percentage	of	young	farmers	on	top).	
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey. 
 
 
5.2.5	Specialisation	of	farm	production	
In addition to farm size and farmer age variance, farms also have a different composition 
of their production portfolios and therefore their input. This is even true for specialist 
farms, where, for example, some so called specialist dairy farmers also have beef or sheep 
or sell hay. In addition, a lot of mixed (non-specialized) farms exist. The heterogeneity of 
farming in terms of specialisation can be estimated by calculating the share that 
specialized farms have in the total production. This is shown in Figure 5.11 (split into 
5.11A for plant production and 5.11B for animal production).  
There has been a gradual slight trend in specialisation in most sectors, the highest being in 
the sheep, cow and wine sector and of a slight de-specialisation with respect to cereals and 
sugar. With respect to fruits and vegetables, the heterogeneity is quite regionally varied, as 
in the south farmers using intensive production techniques are very specialised while in 
the north and centre of Spain farms are more highly diversified in product. 
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 Figure	5.	11	A	&	B	Heterogeneity	in	farm	production:	the	share	of	
specialist	farm	types	in	total	production.	
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Accounts of Agriculture, Eurostat 
 
5.2.6 Economic	indicators	of	farms	
The description of Spanish agriculture in general concludes with some economic 
indicators (Table 5.3). These indicators focus on the net value added and income from 
farming for farmers, as well as the level of their investment. While some of this investment 
is in the equity of the cooperatives, by far the most is in farm assets. Net value added is 
lowest in the wine and olive oil sectors and highest in dairy, pork and to a lesser extent 
sheep meat, with fruit and vegetable, cereals and sugar occupying a middle position, the 
income and investment in relation to each sector, reflecting such range as well.  
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Of particular note is the low utilization of agricultural area for fruits and vegetables due to 
intensive agriculture whilst pig meat is notable for the economic size of its farms. 
Table	5.3	Economic	indicators	for	farms.	
Source: DG Agri, FADN. 
 
5.3	Evolution,	position	and	performance	of	cooperatives		
5.3.1 Types	of	cooperatives‐‐Cooperatives	in	general	
Institutional background to cooperatives in Spain 
In Spain cooperatives are seen, at least theoretically, to be firmly within the area of the 
“social economy” as are the entities described above in section 5.1.3. Whether this 
categorization is accepted on a cultural level varies according to region. The recent 
Spanish Social Economy Law places them within a framework which does not privilege the 
economic over the social but rather envisions them as tied together. This in some ways is a 
slight reorientation from the direction that cooperative law and policy has taken which 
has emphasized the economic (see below on historical evolution of cooperative laws). This 
is not to say however, that the view of the Social Economy Law will have any impact on 
how cooperatives perceive themselves. 
Figure 5.12 below shows the evolution of the number of cooperatives and employees 
whilst Figure 5.13 demonstrates the workers per cooperative sector. The decline in the 
number of cooperatives, whilst the number of members remains relatively stable is 
noteworthy. A common theme in the discussion of Spanish cooperatives is their size and 
whether or not mergers are the way forward. Recently Spanish cooperatives have 
experienced such concentration, as discussed below.  
 
Economic indicators average per farm (2006‐2008)
Cereals Sugar
Fruit and 
vegetables
Olive oil and 
table olives Dairy Wine Pig meat Sheep meat
Economic size ‐ ESU 22.50 40.43 26.45 21.07 39.67 22.00 179.90 34.30
Total labour input ‐ AWU 0.97 1.29 1.53 1.36 1.63 1.33 1.73 1.38
Total Utilised Agricultural Area (ha) 75.0 45.6 8.3 13.3 22.1 19.6 22.0 61.7
Total output € 39,589 54,917 40,145 20,911 112,636 28,755 201,430 66,282
Farm Net Value Added € 30,729 37,235 26,595 17,177 56,950 19,783 67,414 40,571
Farm Net Income € 26,098 29,953 19,872 12,640 53,982 15,353 56,129 35,655
Total assets € 331,782 377,304 262,008 247,420 502,906 194,205 482,766 343,178
Net worth € 325,718 370,193 254,955 245,888 487,705 189,716 445,917 330,234
Gross Investment € 1,300 ‐1,277 1,428 506 5,157 1,926 9,334 3,093
Net Investment € ‐1,659 ‐4,699 ‐875 ‐1,055 ‐212 ‐963 ‐734 ‐619
Total subsidies ‐ excl. on investm. € 14,065 14,609 1,437 3,832 10,720 1,347 4,938 13,608
Farms represented 83,183 25,890 144,397 149,587 23,773 53,783 15,867 33,717
note: less than 3 years available
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Figure	5.	12	Development	of	number	of	cooperatives	and	workers.	
		
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2012) 
 
 
Figure	5.13	Development	of	number	of	cooperatives	and	workers.	
 Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2012) 
The two regions with the most cooperatives are Catalonia and Andalusia, with 4,773 and 
4,033 respectively. This is followed by Valencia (2,582) and the Basque Country (1,533) 
and trailed by Murcia (1,380) and Castilla La Mancha (1,294). In terms of employees 
however, the Basque Country leads with 55,125 cooperative workers followed by the 
Andalusia with 53,639 cooperative workers. 
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Figure	5.	14	Geographical	distribution	of	number	of	cooperatives	2012.	
 
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2012) 
 
 
 
Figure	5.15	Geographical	distribution	of	number	of	cooperative	workers	2012.	
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2012)  
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5.3.2 Origins	of	the	Cooperative	Movement	and	Cooperative	Laws	
 
The origins of cooperatives in Spain can be located in the late 1800s and early 1900s 
where cooperation was initially encouraged by the Catholic union movement in its effort 
to counterbalance the socialist worker movements. At such time the social wing of the 
Catholic Church set out to protect the rights of small farm owners, lest they be “swept 
away” by socialism in response to the high debt levels and ruin that was facing farmers 
due to unscrupulous lenders. In 1902 the first credit cooperatives were created (Gómez 
López, 2008/2009). 
The Associations Act was brought into force in 1887 followed by the Farm Unions Act in 
1906, providing a consolidation of the movement and also a framework in which farm 
“unions” or cooperatives could begin formal development. This was evidenced by the fact 
that the number of such farm unions rose from six in 1906 to 1,772 a mere six years later 
in 1912 (Juliá y Segura, 1987). It should be noted that these cooperatives were 
fundamentally of an economic ordering nature (such as in-house credit sections, services 
and commercialisation), rather than of a blatantly political nature. For example, the 
cooperative laws did nothing to merge the interests of farm workers and farm owners 
(Gómez López, 2008/2009).  
Parallel to this development was that of the more politically motivated cooperatives and 
unions that were formed to collectively farm land held in common (CEC). During the 
second Spanish Republic these cooperatives found more support and there were some 
incidences of expropriation and collectivisation of farmlands. Some cooperatives of this 
form still exist today and although in small numbers their numbers have curiously 
increased recently (OSCAE, 2010).  
A Cooperative Law was brought into force in 1931 and lasted throughout the Second 
Republic until 1939. In 1942 a Cooperatives Act was enacted in order to fulfill the 
purposes of Franco´s regime to monitor and control cooperatives, giving the supervisory 
body the right to veto members´ elected management. However, many cooperatives (as so 
defined under the laws of that time) were set up during the dictatorship and in 1969 7,500 
cooperatives were recorded. With the 1974 Act a business approach to cooperatives was 
introduced and after Franco´s death the 1978 Regulations solidified such an approach, 
encouraging second tier cooperatives to form (Juliá and Marí, 2002).  
In 1978, article 129.2 of the Constitution provided that public powers must allow for the 
formation of cooperatives societies through adequate legislation. As well the prologue or 
the “explanation of motives” for the law refers to cooperativism as a formula that 
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facilitates economic and labour market integration, making perfectly compatible the 
requirements for profit and competiveness with cooperative values. Rather poetically it 
also purports that the elements of an enterprise of persons, e.g. a cooperative, can live in 
“harmony” with the demands of the market, for “if not, the cooperative world would be in 
a situation divorced from reality and from law.” 
During the 1980s most autonomous communities passed their own acts and in 1987 the 
Cooperatives General Act was passed. The resulting regulatory framework consisted of a 
“weak” national law, which provided a basic regulatory scheme applicable to those 
cooperatives which chose not to set up under autonomous community laws, and many 
substantively different autonomous community laws. Autonomous communities have 
jurisdiction over cooperative legislation, although not over commercial legislation, and 
they have assumed an important role in the promotion of cooperatives. This is in contrast 
to IOFs which have a centralized and homogeneous legislative structure. The great 
majority of Spanish agricultural cooperatives are governed by autonomous community 
laws, for which the provisions of the particular autonomous community laws are 
especially relevant. This multitude of cooperative laws is found nowhere else in the rest of 
Europe. 
The 1987 law brought about a significant change which was the recognition of 
cooperatives as a business and not as a not-for-profit, that is, that surpluses could be 
distributed on the basis of member activity but not in proportion to capital invested. 
References to mutualism were left out (Juliá, 1994). 
The following Spanish national law, the Law of Cooperatives 1999 (Ley 27/1999, de 16 de 
julio, de Cooperativas) which is still in force, stipulates: 
La cooperativa es una sociedad constituida por personas que se asocian, en 
régimen de libre adhesión y baja voluntaria, para la realización de actividades 
empresariales, encaminadas a satisfacer sus necesidades y aspiraciones 
económicas y sociales, con estructura y funcionamiento democrático, conforme a 
los principios formulados por la alianza cooperativa internacional, en los términos 
resultantes de la presente Ley. 
The	 cooperative	 is	 an	 enterprise	 made	 up	 of	 people	 who	 voluntarily	 and	 freely	
associate,	in	order	to	carry	out	business	activities,	with	the	aim	of	satisfying	economic	
and	social	needs	and	aspirations	 in	conformance	with	 the	principles	 formulated	by	
the	international	cooperative	alliance,	on	the	terms	resulting	from	the	present	Law.	
[translation	by	author]	
However, agricultural cooperatives, as a generalisation, comprised of small and medium 
farmer-members who are grouped around economic projects, are often characterized as 
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not being particularly guided by traditional cooperative principles of solidarity (Gómez 
López, 2009). 
In actual fact, cooperatives in Spain have played a very important role in the development 
of rural economies. In most cases agricultural, credit and other cooperatives are located in 
areas where, at least originally, no investor owned firm would have chosen to operate 
(Julia and Marí, 2002). The link between cooperatives and rural economic development 
suggests that the “social” component and value of cooperatives, although not necessarily 
established by legislative fiat, has persisted and flourished due to the cooperative form put 
into practice. 
The recently passed Spanish Social Economy Law includes cooperatives as one of the 
important forms within the social economy in Spain. While cooperatives continue to be 
subject to the statutes under which they are created, the new law attempts to give them a 
more pronounced social profile. Whether this will result in achieving more in relation to 
the development of cooperatives than the privileged position given to cooperatives under 
the Spanish Constitution remains to be seen. Worker cooperatives (education and social 
services) increased during the 1980s and are an important cooperative sector in Spain. 
During the opening up of European Community markets, agricultural cooperatives went 
through significant changes. Credit cooperatives (which have their own cooperative credit 
sector law), most notably the rural cooperative banks, were crucial in the development of 
agricultural cooperatives (Giagnocavo, et al, 2012) as were cooperative credit sections in 
areas such as Valencia. Their role went far beyond the traditional provision of credit—
they invested in new technologies, created advisory and risk management services and 
transformed individual farmer risk into shared cooperative risk, thus fuelling innovation 
and advances in infrastructure, in research and development and also community building 
in rural areas that had been left socially shattered and institutionally barren by the long 
dictatorship. Farmers had been unaccustomed to free markets and international trade, 
had little political experience and undeveloped entrepreneurial orientation. The Cajamar 
Group, based in Almería in the autonomous community of Andalusia in southern Spain, is 
the largest cooperative bank in Spain and is intertwined with the fruit and vegetable 
cooperatives of the province of Almería, which represent one of the most important 
agricultural cooperative sectors in Spain, along with Valencia, home to ANECOOP.  
Mention must be made of Mondragon, in the Basque Country in the north of Spain. 
Mondragon, created in 1956, is an important national and worldwide reference for its 
industrial cooperative production and retail which is also tied to its financial cooperative 
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sector. The Basque Country has a decidedly cooperative culture and its cooperative 
movement is intertwined with its sense of identity as a people (much like Québec), making 
it unique and not an easily reproducible phenomena. However, its cooperative laws 
introduced changes well before other autonomous areas, with other autonomous 
community laws playing “catch up”. 	
National and regional associations  
The Spanish Confederation for Social Economy enterprises (CEPES) plays a key role in 
advocating for cooperatives in general. Cooperatives participate in the social dialogue 
between trade unions and employers’ organisations through the CEPES therefore CEPES is 
able to promote and communicate the interests of Spanish cooperatives. It also has one 
representative at the European Economic and Social Council (EESC). CEPES has a broad 
range of members throughout Spain including Mondragon, confederation of cooperatives 
in Catalonia, Euskadi and Valencia, confederations of social economy enterprises, workers 
cooperatives, housing cooperatives, associations for the blind, etc.35  
Cooperative organisations active in sectors such as consumer goods supply, agriculture 
and transport express the interests of their members through sectoral forums or councils, 
as privileged actors; these cooperative organisations communicate cooperatives’ 
expectations on significant issues through the regular sectoral bodies which defend the 
interests of the sector and not specifically those of cooperatives within such sector. In 
Andalusia, CEPES Andalusia has signed an agreement with public authorities and trade 
unions on the Andalusian Pact for social economy which allows participation of 
cooperatives in consultations. 
The Spanish Confederation of workers’ cooperatives (COCECTA) participates actively in 
the consultation process by interacting with the Ministry of Labour, political parties and 
parliamentary representatives (CEPES, 2010). 
The national confederation “Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias”36 represents and defends the 
economic and social interests of the agricultural cooperative movement, with 
approximately 70% of the total sector of agricultural cooperatives being its members. 
Cooperatives Agro-alimentarias is made up of 16 Federations, Territorial Unions of 
Agricultural Cooperatives (FUTs) y Sergacan, a second tier cooperative in Cantabria. The 
services offered by the Federations of cooperatives are usually advisory in nature in areas 
                                                                  
35 See the CEPES’ website at www.cepes.es. 
36 Previously named, Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives of Spain (Confederación de Cooperativas 
Agrarias de España-CCAE). 
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such as economics, accounting, agriculture, labour, tax, legal and commercial. They also 
inform the cooperative members of new developments in their sectors. Further, they 
interact with official bodies for the management of aid and subsidies (Montegut et al, 
2007). They also have a Spanish Agricultural Cooperative Social-Economic Observatory 
(OSCAE). 
Table	5.4	Agricultural	federations	of	cooperatives.	
Agricultural	federations	 Community	
Asociación	Gallega	de	cooperativas	agrarias	(AGACA)	 Galicia
Cooperativas	Agro‐alimentarias	Castilla‐La	Mancha Castilla‐La	Mancha	
Cooperativas	Agro‐alimentarias	de	Aragón Aragon	
Cooperativas	Agro‐alimentarias	de	Navarra Navarra	
Cooperativas	Agro‐alimentarias	del	Principado	de	Asturias Asturias	
Cooperativas	Agro‐alimentarias	Extremadura Extremadura	
Cooperatives	Agro‐alimentaries	Comunitat	Valenciana	 C.	of	Valencia	
Cooperatives	Agro‐alimentaries	Illes	Balears Balearic	Islands	
Federación	Andaluza	de	Empresas	Cooperativas	Agrarias	
(FAECA)	
Andalusia	
Federación	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	Cataluña	(FCAC) Catalonia	
Federación	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	Euskadi	(FCAE) Basque	Country	
Federación	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	la	Rioja	(FECOAR) Rioja
Federación	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	Murcia	(FECOAM) R.	of	Murcia	
Unión	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	Madrid	(UCAM) Madrid	
Unión	Regional	de	Cooperativas	Agrarias	de	Castilla	y	León	
(URCACYL)	
Castilla	and	Leon	
 
Three horizontal professional organisations represent producers at the national level: the 
Union for Small Farmers and Livestock keepers (La Unión de Pequeños Agricultores y 
Ganaderos-UPA), the Agricultural Association for Young Farmers (Asociación Agraria 
Jovenes Agricultores-ASAJA) and the Coordinator for Organisations of Farmers and 
Livestock Keepers (Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos-COAG) 
There are various interprofessional organisations as well as the General Council of Agro-
alimentary Interprofessional Organisations in relation to fruits and vegetables, eggs, 
bread, milk and dairy products, lemon and grapefruit, table olives, grape juices, oranges 
and small citrus, sheep and goat, pear and apple, dried figs, fodder, olive oil, etc.  
5.4 Agricultural	Cooperatives	in	Spain	
The following classifications are used to describe agricultural cooperatives in Spain: 
sector, main functions, diversity of functions and products, position and function in the 
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food chain, type of members, geographical scope, financial/ownership structure and legal 
form. In addition, a general overview is given and recent trends in mergers are discussed. 
General overview  
In 2011 there were 3,415 agricultural cooperatives, which employed 64,108 workers, 
according to the Ministry of Employment (2011).  
In the last few years there has been a decline in the number of cooperatives, which was 
3,659 in 2005 and 4,118 in 2000. In contrast, the number of employees has grown from 
48,437 in 200037. 425 cooperatives of community exploitation of land (CEC, as defined in 
section 5.1.3) also exist (OSCAE, 2010).38  
Turnover in 2011 rose to 17,405 million Euros, with 1,160,337 members and 93,733 
employees. This demonstrates a 6.6% increase from 2005, in which year turnover was 
16,323 million Euros. Membership in 2005 was 1,160,337 and 107,377 employees in 2005 
(OSCAE 2005)39. 
	
Table	5.5	Number	of	Spanish	farmers,	cooperatives,	cooperative	employees	and	
turnover.	
Year	 2000	 2003	 2008	
Numbers of farmers 1,157,100 1,058,100 1,160,300 
Numbers of cooperatives 3,902 4,175 3,989 
Numbers of employees 48,440 78,440 94,156 
Turnover (million €) 10,820 14,190 18,889 
Source: Cogeca (2010) 
 
 
Table	5.	6	Number	of	agricultural	cooperatives	by	region	(2011).	
Region	 Cooperatives %
Andalusia 736 21.55%
Aragon 202 5.92%
Asturias 24 0.70%
Balearic Islands 35 1.02%
Canary Islands 78 2.28%
Cantabria 8 0,23%
Castilla - La Mancha 419 12.27%
Castilla and Leon 379 11,10%
Catalonia 326 9.55%
C. of Valencia 370 10.83%
Extremadura 288 8.43%
Galicia 193 5.65%
                                                                  
37 Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2011) 
38 Ministry figures vary slightly, as set out in Table 5.6. 
39 Certain differences exist between the statistics supplied by Cooperativas Agro-Alimentarias to the COGECA 
report and those statistics provided by the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, given that the first figure is an 
estimation and the latter is the number of companies officially registered. 
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Madrid 19 0.56%
R. of Murcia 140 4.10%
Navarra 95 2.78%
Basque Country 62 1.82%
Rioja 41 1.20%
Ceuta and Melilla 0 0.00%
Spain	 3,415 100.00%
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2011). 
 
 
Table	5.	7	Number	of	agricultural	cooperatives	by	number	of	employees	(selected	
years).	
Number	of	workers	 2011 2005 2000	
0 – 5 1,924 56.33% 2,113 57.75% 2,442 59.30% 
6 – 10 594 17.39% 621 16.97% 979 23.77% 
11 -25 527 15.43% 509 13.91% 415 10.08% 
26 – 50 163 4.77% 190 5.19% 130 3.16% 
51 – 100 88 2.57% 94 2.57% 76 1.85% 
101 – 250 68 1.99% 76 2.08% 60 1.46% 
> 250 51 1.59% 56 1.53% 16 0.39% 
Total 3,415 100.00% 3,659 100.00% 4,118 100.00% 
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration, (2012) 
 
 
Table	5.	8	Number	of	agricultural	cooperatives	by	year	of	foundation	(2011).	
Year	of	foundation	 Cooperatives
Before1960 206
1960-1969 216
1970-1979 202
1980-1989 910
1990-1999 923
2000-2009 842
2011 and after 116
Total 3,415
Data source: Ministry of Employment and Immigration (2012) 
There is a great diversity of models and size: from local cooperatives which focus on 
supplying services to their members to others whose major goal is to channel supply for 
commercialisation to industry or intermediates, to very large cooperatives that process 
the products of their members and market them directly to retail distributors. Sixteen 
percent of Spanish cooperatives represent 75% of total turnover by cooperatives. The top-
10 first tier cooperatives have a total turnover of 1,381 million Euros and employ 1,379 
people and the top-10 second tier cooperatives have a turnover of 2,427 million Euros and 
have 4,378 permanent workers. (Baamonde, 2010; OSCAE, 2009) 
In any case, Spanish agricultural cooperatives are small in size compared with European 
standards in spite of the fact that the average turnover went from 2.7 million Euros in 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
109 
 
2000 to 4.4 million Euros in 2007. Only 39% have more than 1,000 members and only 
1.7% of these cooperatives have a turnover above 30 million Euros, 77% have less than 5 
million Euros and 39% less than a million (Table 5.9). In contrast, the European average 
turnover is above 10 million (Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias 2010; OSCAE 2007; 2009). 
Table	5.9	Percentage	distribution	of	agricultural	cooperatives	according	to	number	
of	members	(2009).	
Number	of	members	 %	Cooperatives
< 100 3.7
100 to 199 7.7
200 to 299 8.8
300 to 399 7.5
400 to 599 14
600 to 1,000 19.3
> 1,000 39
Source: OSCAE (2009). 
 
Table	5.10	Percentage	distribution	of	number	of	agricultural	cooperatives	
according	to	turnover	(2009).	
Turnover %	Cooperatives
< 1 M Euro 39
1 – 2 M Euro 17
2 – 5 M Euro 21
5 – 10 M Euro 13
10 – 30 M Euro 8
30 – 60 M Euro 1
> 60 M Euro 1
Source: OSCAE (2009) 
 
It is argued that this situation creates difficulties for Spanish agricultural cooperatives in 
relation to the concentration of offer, investment needs for new projects, achieving 
economies of scale and wielding market power. Many studies have pointed to excessive 
“atomization” of cooperatives (Caballer, 1995; Campos i Climent, 2011; Juliá and Server, 
1999; Juliá and Meliá, 2003; Meliá, 2004; Montero and Montero, 2005; Vargas, 2007). 
Cooperatives Agroalimentarias (the national confederation) in their strategic plan for 
Spanish agricultural cooperatives called for addressing this issue in order to achieve a 
competitive dimension (OSCAE, 2009, 2007) and continues to do so. As a general rule in all 
sectors of the Spanish market there has been pressure to consolidate and agricultural 
cooperatives have experienced the same pressures, with the resulting mergers and 
acquisitions, group formation, integration of cooperatives into second tier cooperatives, 
etc. (Meliá and Martínez, 2011). 
During the period 1995-2005 a total of 147 mergers have taken place in which 374 
cooperatives have participated. Sixty six percent of such processes have occurred in the 
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autonomous communities of Valencia, Andalusia, Catalonia and Castilla La Mancha (in 
descending order.) It should be noted that empirical evidence as to whether these mergers 
have actually achieved their objectives (i.e. improvement of economic-financial situation, 
reduction of costs, increase in cooperative and member profits, etc.) is scarce in Spain. As a 
result, currently it is difficult to empirically back up the assumptions that mergers will be 
the “cure” for the problems of Spanish agricultural cooperatives (Meliá and Martínez, 
2011) although many in the sector argue that it is a structural necessity. 	
Figure	5.16	Distribution	of	mergers	according	to	agricultural	cooperative	sector	
(1995‐2005).	
 Source: Meliá and Martínez, (2011) 
 
In terms of percentage, there are several autonomous communities which are notable: 
Andalusia (30.2%); Catalonia (10.4%); Castilla and Leon (9.5%); Valencia (9.6%), 
Extremadura (6.8%) and Galicia (6.7%). In terms of employment Andalusia represents 
31.2% and the community of Valencia 26.6% (OSCAE, 2010). 
Sector	
The volume of business has been significantly different in the various sub sectors. Fruits 
and vegetables, which represent about 20% of total turnover for Spanish cooperatives, 
have experienced an impressive growth going from 2,400 million Euros to 3,300 million, 
representing an annual growth of about 9% during the four-year period of 2004 to 2009. 
The olive oil sector as well has increased its volume of turnover, due to a strategy of 
focusing on value added products such as bottled extra virgin oils of higher quality. Other 
sectors have maintained modest growth (see individual sector analysis in Chapter 5.6 for a 
more in-depth description). 
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Figure	5.17	Evolution	of	turnover	of	main	agricultural	sectors.	
 Source: OSCAE 2011 
 
Figure	5.	18	Sectoral	Distribution	of	Cooperatives.	
 Source: Meliá et al. 2011 
 
Main functions 
The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for fruit and vegetables sets out the key function 
of the POs. According to Article 3 of the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1182/2007, POs 
must have one of the following objectives: (i) ensuring that production is planned and 
adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of quality and quantity; (ii) concentration of 
supply and the marketing of members’ products; (iii) optimizing production costs and 
stabilising producer prices.  
With respect to their main function, most Spanish cooperative POs fall within (ii) above. 
The stabilisation of producer prices is also an objective, as is the optimisation of 
production costs. Coordination of production, so that it adjusts to demand in terms of 
quality and quantity, varies across sectors. In sectors with highly perishable farm products 
which cannot be stored, planning production is more difficult.  
Processing of products is important for certain cooperatives as is procurement of supplies. 
There is some ancillary activity in nursery, farm machinery, credit, insurance and animal 
breeding. Cooperative in-house credit services (referred to as “credit sections”) continue 
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to be popular in some autonomous communities, although this function in many areas has 
been taken over by cooperative credit entities, most notably in Andalusia. Credit sections 
arose out of the absorption of rural banks by local agricultural cooperatives or on the 
initiative of the cooperative which decided to internalise their financial activity. 
The strong decline in financial activity within cooperatives is due to the great pressure put 
on these entities by public authorities. They are being substituted for rural banks that 
have better operating capacity, more favourable credit terms and conditions, and offer 
more services to members. However, the loss of in-house credit sections could result in 
agricultural cooperatives having a more difficult time in accessing credit during a lending 
crisis.  
Diversity of function and products 
In 2009, 61% of first tier agricultural cooperatives offered supplies to their members, 46% 
distributed fuel, and 57% owned retail stores. By engaging in such activities, first tier 
cooperatives have been able to diversify their business to complement the income of their 
members and also have stimulated the local economy. As well they offer specialty services 
such as technical assistance, specialized machinery services, treatment with fertilizers and 
pest control, replanting, harvesting, etc. Social services to the members have also been 
provided, a key feature in attracting the next generation. Lobbying is done on the level of 
interprofessional groups (e.g., Hortyfruta is a large interprofessional group for the fruit 
and vegetable sector in Andalusia). 
Position and function in the food chain  
 
The food supply chain in Spain is equally divided between traditional and modern 
marketing systems. For example, with respect to vegetables, traditional retail (i.e., SME 
and/or family owned businesses located near residential areas) accounts for 42% of the 
sales of vegetables, followed by large distribution chains (40%). A similar pattern is 
observed in the fresh fruit sector, in which small retailers market 45% of the total product 
value, and large distribution chains 42%. Besides farmers and retailers, the sector includes 
a very wide range of economic agents (about 10,000) who perform various operations 
along the supply chain, related to product sorting, conditioning, processing, transport, etc 
(Camanzi, et al., 2009). 
Sectors vary as set out in Chapter 5.5 herein, but Spanish fruit and vegetable POs are 
highly specialized in tomatoes (both primary and processed product and providing 96% of 
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total value of marketed product), onions, shallots, garlic, leeks (two main products account 
for 87% of total value of marketed product), nuts (85%), cucumbers (76%), apples and 
pears (70%). Seventy-three percent of products from POs is marketed as fresh product; 
wholesale represents 35%, and supermarkets another 23%. In terms of processing, they 
sell 16% of products to the processing industry and self process 11% (Camanzi, et al, 
2009). See descriptions of various sectors in Chapter 5.6.  
Negotiating Power 
With respect to market power, according to Arcas Lario et al (2011) the percentage of 
cooperative turnover to both distribution (Figure 5.19) and industry (5.20) is low.  
 
Figure	5.19	Negotiation	power	of	agricultural	cooperatives	compared	to	
distribution	(2008).	
 
Source: Arcas Lario, et al, (2011)  
  
	
	
Figure	5.20	Negotiation	power	of	agricultural	cooperatives	compared	to	
distribution	(2008).	
	
Source: Arcas Lario, et al (2011) 
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Type of members  
In 2005, 64.7% of first tier cooperatives were members of a second tier cooperative, in 
contrast to 61% in 2009. In 2005, 22.4% of second tier cooperatives were also members of 
another second tier cooperative, as opposed to 13.33% in 2009 (OSCAE, 2010). Figure 
5.21 below shows the levels of membership in Spanish first and second tier agricultural 
cooperatives.  
Figure	5.21	Membership	in	first	and	second	tier	cooperatives.	
 
Source: OSCAE (2010)40 
 
Geographical scope 
Given the cooperative legislative regime in Spain, where cooperative laws are on an 
autonomous community basis coupled by a weak national law, membership tends to be 
local (provincial or autonomous) and supra-regional cooperatives are rare. Below is an 
indication of the commercial activity of cooperatives, on a provincial, regional, national, 
and international basis.	
Table	5.	11	Scope	of	commercialisation	in	Spanish	cooperatives.	
Scope	of	commercialization	(%) 2005 2009
Local 34.2 39
Provincial 48.8 43
Regional 59 47
National 66.8 61
EU 36.3 35
Outside EU 7.4 15
Source: OSCAE, (2009) 
	
                                                                  
40 CECs refer to Cooperativas de Explotación Comunitaria (Cooperatives of Common Exploitation) 
85%
4%
11%
Membership in Agricultural 
Cooperatives in Spain
1st tier cooperatives
2nd tier cooperatives
CECs
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Table	5.	12	Principle	indicators	of	the	level	of	internationalization	of	Spanish	
cooperatives.	
  
2005 2009 
1st 
grade 
2nd 
grade 
1st 
grade 
2nd 
grade
Average exportation of cooperative exporters (Million €) 6.06 13.3 4.73 12.47
Theoretical global export tendency 
(% exportation/turnover) 23 25.1 16.67 15.81
Percentage of exterior presence  6 10.34 3.67 7.41 
Source: OSCAE (2009) 
 
Financial/ownership structure and Legal Form 
Cooperatives in Spain are mainly traditional cooperatives, with some being SATs, CECs 
and CUMAs as described in	section 5.1.3. 
5.4.1 Market	share	of	farmers'	cooperatives	in	the	food	chain	
Cooperatives play an important role in the food chain in Spain and represent a significant 
market share in many sectors. The term “market share” refers to the percentage of total 
turnover related to such companies in such sector. Using information from Cooperativas 
Agroalimentaria, the national confederation, we set out below the market share relating to 
the 8 sectors under study. These figures are best estimates, with 2008 being the most 
recent year available. In the case of wine and olive oil, the market share is 70% and 75% 
respectively. In the most important agricultural sector in Spain, fruits and vegetables, the 
market share reaches almost 50% (as the scope of fruits and vegetables is so wide and 
varies within the sector, the value given by Cooperativas Agroalimentarias was 25-45% 
percent, although vegetables would be closer to 50%). The lowest figure is 25% in the 
pork sector. According to the statistics given, there has been little change in market share 
in the period between 2000 and 2008. 
For a more in-depth discussion of the various sectors, see Chapter 5.5.  
Table	5.	13	Market	share	of	cooperatives	in	selected	sectors.	
Sector	
Agricultural	 Market	share	
(%)	
Farmer	members	
('000)	 Turnover	(billion	€)	cooperatives	
(number)	
2003	 2008	 2003	 2008	 2003	 2008	 2003	 2008	 Var	%	
Cereals 520 484 35 35 67.2 58.6 0.588 0.975 66% 
Sugar 1 1 28 28 n/a n/a n/a 0.134 n/a 
Pig meat 101 n/a 25 25 25.25 25 0.674 0.756 12% 
Sheep meat n/a n/a n/a 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Fruit and vegetables 945 945 15-45 15-45 153 160.5 2.066 3.7 79% 
Olive oil and table olives 915 772 75 70 274.5 276.5 1.208 1.42 18% 
Dairy 242 396 40 40 43.5 27.8 0.713 0.88 23% 
Wine 715 625 70 70 167 172 0.653 1.4 114% 
Data sources: Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2010), Cogeca (2010) 
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5.4.2 	List	of	top	50	largest	farmers’	cooperatives		
Table	5.	14	The	50	largest	farmers’	cooperatives	in	the	food	chain	of	Spain	and	
Turnover	(millions	of	Euros).	
  Name	of	the	
Cooperative	
Sector(s)	involved	in: Turnover	
(1)	
Turnover	
(2)	
1 Coren, S.C.G. Livestock 966.00 942.00 
2 An, S.Coop Fruit and vegetables, feed, 
l k
420.40 554.00 
3 Anecoop S.Coop. Fruit and vegetables 439.21 467.00 
4 Hojiblanca S.C.A Olive oil 276.00 340.00 
5 S.C.A Ganadera del Valle 
de los Pedroches COVAP 
Livestock, dairy 266.95 272.28 
6 Acorex, S.C.L Fruit and vegetables, livestock, 
cereals 
245.68 212.00 
7 Del Camp d´lvars d´Urgell 
i Secció de Crédit; SCCL 
Feed 188.95 188.95 
8 Casi, S.C.A Fruits and vegetables 175.49 169.17 
9 Cobadu, S.Coop. Livestock, feed 123.26 167.35 
10 Copaga, SCCL Livestock 130.58 130.59 
11 Arento, S. Coop Cereals, feed, supplies 144.89 121.70 
12 Agropal S. Coop Livestock, cereals, feed, supplies 139.63 120.00 
13 Copiso Soria S.Coop Livestock, feed 78.86 119.26 
14 Alimer, S.Coop Livestock, Fruits and vegetables 113.98 118.67 
15 Actel, SCCL Fruits and vegetables, supplies 119.64 118.67 
16 SAT Arco Iris Livestock 120.00 111.89 
17 Feiraco, S.C.G. Dairy 73.22 108.62 
18  SAT Central lechera 
Asturiana 
Dairy 125.37 108.04 
19 Unica Group, S.C.A. Vegetables 101.22 101.22 
20 Acor, S. Coop Sugar 140.00 99.38 
21 Avigase, S. Coop Livestock 86,.18 90.23 
22 Agropecuaria d´-artesa 
de Segre, SCCL 
Livestock, feed, wine, cereals, 
supplies, other services, gasoil, 
retail 
88.51 88.52 
23 S.C.A. Santa María de la 
Rábida 
Fruits and vegetables 77.65 86.89 
24 Vicasol, S.C.A. Fruits and vegetables 92.38 81.22 
25 Coarval Coop.V. Supplies 93.15 80.22 
26 Suca, S.C.A. Supplies 78.13 79.69 
27 Carchuna La Palma, S.C.A. Fruits and vegetables 79.92 78.42 
28 Acopaex S. Coop Fruits and vegetables,flowers, 
oil, cereals, supplies, services, 
gasoil 
72.58 72.58 
29 Murgiverde, S.C.A. Fruits and vegetables 108.01 70.20 
30 S.C.A. Cuna de Platero Fruits and vegetables 55.07 67.65 
31 S. Coop. Avícola y 
ganadera de Burgos 
Pig meat, dairy, feed 62.56 67.55 
32 Cotecnica, SCCL Livestock, feed 59.21 65.68 
33 Jaencoop, S.C.A. Olive oil 66.14 61.20 
34 Camp y secció de Crédit 
Sant Isidre de Ballcaire 
Livestock/credit 65.74 60.90 
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d´Urgell, SCCL 
35 Agrária Plana de Vic i 
secció de Crèdit, SCCL 
Livestock 59.84 59.85 
36 Kaiku, S. Coop Dairy - 58.95 
37 Oleoestepa S.C.A. Olive oil 54.74 53.80 
38 Agrosevilla Aceitunas 
S C A
Table olives 52.55 52.64 
39 Icos, S.C.G. Dairy 46.61 50.27 
40 Casat Fruits and vegetables, cereals 49.78 49.79 
41 Uteco, S. Coop Supplies, gasoil 66.33 49.19 
42 El Grupo, S.C.A Fruits and vegetables 47.45 48.41 
43 Agro-Olivera San Cosme 
y San Damián, S.C.A. 
Olive oil 33.84 46.66 
44 Agrupación Coop. Valle 
del Jerte 
Fruits 45.42 44.50 
45 Agropecuaria Catalana, 
SCCL 
Livestock, feed, cereals, other 
services 
44.23 44.23 
46 Copal S.C.J Poultry 39.53 43.50 
47 S.C.A Oleicola el Tejar 
N.S. Araceli 
Olive oil - 43.27 
48 Garlan S. Coop. Cereals/supplies, fruits and 
vegetables 
48.00 42.75 
49 Gregal S.Coop. Fruits and vegetables 52.34 41.94 
50 Olivar de Segura, S.C.A. Olive oil 47.47 41.45 
Top 50 chosen on information provided by Cooperativas Agroalimentarias in 2011 taking into 
account the estimation of the actual subsector activity (as opposed to other activity) of the 
cooperative.  
Turnover (1): Source CEPES 2010  
Turnover (2): Source Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 2010 
 
5.4.3 List	of	top	5	largest	farmers’	cooperatives	per	sector	
Table	5.	15	The	most	important	cooperatives	in	the	sectors	studied	in	this	project	
(millions	of	Euros).	
Sector	 Name	of	Cooperative	 Turnover	(1)	 Turnover	(2)	
Cereals An, S.Coop 420.40 554.00 
Acorex, S.C.L. 245.68 212.00 
Arento S. Coop 144.89 121.70 
Agropal S. Coop 139.89 120.00 
Actel 119.64 118.67 
Sugar Acor S. Coop 140.00 99.38 
Fruit and 
vegetables 
Anecoop S. Coop 439.21 467.00 
CASI, S.C.A 175.49 169.17 
Unica Group S.C.A 101.22 101.22 
Acorex, S.C.L. 245.68 212.00 
Murgiverde, S.C.A. 108.01 70.20 
Olive oil and 
table olives 
Hojiblanca, S.C.A. 276.00 340.00 
Agrosevilla Aceitunas, S.C.A. 52.55 52.64 
Jaencoop S.C.A. 66.14 61.20 
Oleoestepa, S.C.A. 54.79 53.80 
Olivar del Segura, S.C.A 47.15 41.45 
Wine Baco Bodegas Asociadas Cooperativas, 
S.C.L. *29.80 - 
Coop Virgen de las Viñas 44.00 26.35 
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Viñedos de Aldeanueva, S. Coop *21.56 - 
Bodegas San Valero *18.31 - 
S.C. Cristo de la Vega 30.08 - 
Dairy Covap, S.C.A 266.95 272.28 
SAT Central Lechera Asturiana 125.37 108.04 
Feiraco, S.C.G. 73.22 108.62 
Kaiku, S. Coop - 58.95 
Cadi SCCL 47.28 - 
Sheep meat Carnes Oviaragón S.C.L - 26.74 
Oviso, S.Coop 38.01 38.01 
Dehesas Cordobesas, S:C.A - - 
Pig meat Coren, S.C.G. 966.00 942.00 
S.A.T. Fribin - 198.00 
S.A.T. Grupo Arco Iris 120.00 115.00 
Grupo Avigase 86.18 79.00 
Covap, S.C.A 266.95 272.28 
Top 5 of each sector selected on information provided by Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 
taking into account the estimation of the actual subsector activity (as opposed to other 
activity) of the cooperative 
*Turnover data from SABI, last available year 
Turnover (1): Source CEPES 2010  
Turnover (2): Source Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 2010 
 
5.4.4 Transnational	cooperatives		
Many cooperatives are active internationally. In most cases the foreign activities of 
cooperatives are limited to marketing, trade and sales. Usually they do not buy agricultural 
products from farmers outside Spain, or supply inputs to them. However, there is a 
growing group of cooperatives that do business with farmers in other EU Member States. 
These cooperatives are referred to as international cooperatives. They can be marketing 
cooperatives that buy from farmers in different countries, or they could be supply 
cooperatives that sell inputs to farmers in different countries. One particular group of 
international cooperatives is the so-called transnational cooperatives. These cooperatives 
do not just contract with farmers to buy their products or to sell them inputs; they actually 
have a membership relationship with those supplying or purchasing farmers. In sum, a 
transnational cooperative has members in more than one country.  
There are no transnational cooperatives in Spain (according to Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias, the Confederation which keeps national cooperative data). 
According to available general data (see “Geographical Scope” above) internationalisation 
of Spanish cooperatives is scarce: only 7.41% of second tier cooperatives are established 
outside of Spain and barely half of the first tier ones have any exposure at all. Such lack of 
interest for internationalisation may be due to the risks and difficulties involved and the 
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involvement needed in terms of management resources (Boccherini, 2010). Spanish 
cooperatives use foreign intermediaries (57%) or Spanish companies (between 45 and 
49%). Twenty-six percent sell directly to foreign distribution chains and only 3.5% 
distribute through their own agents or companies in the exterior (Fuentes, Sánchez and 
Santos, 2011)  
The international cooperatives from Spain that are trading with farmers in other 
countries, according to the Questionnaires (Chapter 5.5), are the following: 
Table	5.16	International	cooperatives	from	Spain	that	are	trading	with	farmers	in	
other	countries.	
Name	of	the	Cooperative	 Host	countries	 Sector(s)	involved	in:	
Anecoop	 Not specified Multi product (FV, Citrics, etc.) 
Unica	Group	 Holland Fruits and vegetables 
Fribin	 EU (not specified) Pig meat/beef 
 
5.5	Description	of	individual	cooperatives	
5.5.1	Data	gathering	per	cooperative	
The data gathered for the Chapter 5.5 Questionnaire was based on the answers given by 
cooperatives. Very few cooperatives have such relevant information available on websites 
or through other publications, so such information had to be solicited directly. Where 
cooperatives did not supply information, if a reliable, published source was available, such 
information was used.  
Where necessary, SABI (the system for Iberic accounts-Sistema de análisis de balances 
ibérico) was also used for the accounting part of the survey, the year founded, location, 
whether it was a holding company, whether a cooperative or SAT (legal form) and the 
structure of the group. 
People at the cooperatives were interviewed by telephone, following up repeatedly during 
the course of two to three months by telephone and email correspondence. Federations, 
associations and farmers, were contacted as well in order to extract as much information 
as possible. Numerous sector publications and news items, internet sites, trade magazines, 
power point and other presentations by associations, confederations, particular 
cooperatives, etc. were used. Particularly useful were those materials that contained 
points of view on strategy or interviews with the various heads of organisations or 
associations related to sectors.  
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
120 
 
The Confederation (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias), which is the only national 
cooperative data collection entity, was reluctant to provide information, due to concerns 
about the privacy of their members (their members represent about 70% of the 
cooperative sector). Federations also expressed this concern, but were helpful with certain 
questions to the best of their knowledge 
5.5.2 Position	in	the	food	chain,	general	data	and	strategy	
See Chapter 5.4 for a more detailed analysis of Spanish agricultural cooperatives and their 
position in the food chain (marketing, first and second processing, wholesale and retail) 
and related data, charts and figures, including internationalisation, negotiating power, etc. 
See also Chapter 5.6 for such an analysis in relation to each of the 8 sectors studied herein. 
With respect to the cooperatives which were the subject of this study, most are second tier 
cooperatives. However, most of the wine and dairy cooperatives are first tier cooperatives. 
Figures 5.23, 5.24, 5.25 and 5.26 set out the number of members in first and second tier 
cooperatives by cooperative and by sector. 
Figure	5.22	Members	of	Cooperatives.	
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Figure	5.23	Number	of	members	of	first	tier	cooperatives.	
  
	
Figure	5.24	Number	of	members	by	sector	in	first	tier	cooperatives. 41	
 	
	
                                                                  
41 COVAP, with 16,000 members, is included in both Dairy and Pig meat.  
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Figure	5.25	Number	of	members	in	second	tier	cooperatives.	
 
 
	
Figure	5.26	Number	of	members	by	sector	in	second	tier	cooperatives.	
  
Table	5.	17	Cooperatives	by	year	of	foundation.	
Year	of	foundation	 Cooperatives	
Before1960 7 
1960-1969 4 
1970-1979 5 
1980-1989 8 
1990-1999 5 
2000-2009 3 
Total 32 
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The 1980s was a period in which many cooperatives were founded, due in part to 
legislation which encouraged the formation of new cooperatives. What is of note overall 
though, is that the most successful Spanish agricultural cooperatives are relatively young, 
with only seven having been founded before 1960. 
 
The cooperatives focused upon in this study are mainly devoted to the functions of 
collecting and forwarding member products to the next vertical stage of the food supply 
chain, marketing, and procurement of supplies, as shown in Figures 5.27 and 5.28, in 
keeping with what we have observed in Chapter 5.3. However, as can be expected amongst 
the largest cooperatives there is more emphasis on processing and marketing branded 
products than amongst smaller cooperatives. Although cooperatives considered certain 
functions and activities to be relevant in the Questionnaire, such as marketing branded 
products and integration, there is a significant gap between theory and practice. In 
general, high product specialisation is observed (Figure 5.29).  
 
Figure	5.27	Position	in	the	Food	Chain‐Functions.	
		
	
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
124 
 
Figure	5.28	Number	of	cooperatives	by	main	functions.	
  
Figure	5.29	Specialization	of	members.	
 
 
With respect to marketing strategies, it is notable that 62.5% of cooperatives consider 
differentiation to be a key marketing strategy for success as opposed to 34.38% who 
highlighted cost leadership. Focus on a niche market was least popular at 18.75%.  
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0%
28%
72%
Low specialization
Medium specialization
High specialization
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
125 
 
Figure	5.30	Marketing	strategies.	
  
 
Growth strategies rely to a high degree (46.88%) on “organic” or autonomous growth 
(selling more, obtaining more members and thus more activity). Horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions account for 40.63% and vertical mergers and acquisitions account for 25%. 
Not surprisingly, international mergers and acquisitions comprise only 18.75% of such 
growth strategies, although given the historically low rates of internationalisation, even 
this is somewhat encouraging for the Spanish market in general.  
 
Figure	5.31	Growth	strategies.	
 
 
5.5.3	Institutional	environment	
Chapter 5.3 set out the institutional environment of cooperatives, making reference to the 
history of cooperatives, both agricultural and otherwise, political, sociological and 
institutional support and their importance in the Spanish economy in general (see section 
5.3.1 in particular). Chapter 5.7 sets out in detail relevant laws and policies and comments 
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on their effectiveness, particularly in light of legal barriers, tax and competition issues. In 
sum, although cooperatives benefit to a certain degree from a “privileged” tax treatment, 
the restrictions on their activities, not to mention financial constraints, arguably outweigh 
any such privilege. In section 5.7.3 we provide a summary of these restrictions. 
In general, we can observe that within Spain there is a reasonably high institutional 
support for cooperatives, at least formally. Provisions related to cooperatives are included 
in the Spanish constitution and more recently in the new Social Economy Law. The 
problem, as set out in other chapters referred to above, is that the actual legal and 
cooperative organisational structures limit the effectiveness of such support. As well, by 
virtue of the sheer volume of cooperative laws and policies at the autonomous community 
level, there is no united policy orchestration which would be ideal in confronting an 
increasingly competitive and globalised marketplace. Most cooperatives are incorporated 
at the autonomous community regional level to take advantage of regional policies. 
Resulting inconsistencies between regions complicates inter-regional cooperation, thus 
ultimately inhibiting growth stratagies and at times internationalisation. Financial 
constraints are common in cooperatives, and even more so when such cooperatives are 
“confined” within regions. Policy direction is incoherent and contradictory. More and more 
emphasis is put on encouraging cooperatives to increase size in order to gain market 
power, concentrate offer, etc. However, once they reach a “large” size and outgrow their 
small-to-medium enterprise status they lose the chance to benefit from a multitude of 
subsidies and funds that are available to SMEs. While this may be an important issue for 
European cooperatives in general, in the case of Spain it is even more so, given the smaller 
cooperative size and the imperative task of gaining size and market weight. A restrictive 
interpretation which does not recognise the specificity of cooperatives is 
counterproductive. 
On the national scale, there seems to be some “disconnect” between the importance of 
agricultural cooperatives and the political acknowledgement of such agricultural 
cooperatives concerns. Whether this is a rural/urban issue or simply a predisposition for 
investor-owned firms as a default is difficult to judge. A telling example was that in a 
national government “crisis” round table of 30 business leaders in Spain under the former 
government, only one cooperative was invited (Mondragon) and no agricultural 
representatives (or credit cooperatives) even though agricultural cooperatives are 
currently generating employment and credit cooperatives are among the few financial 
institutions that haven´t abruptly stopped lending to small and medium businesses.  
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5.5.4 Internal	Governance	
In Spanish cooperatives the three obligatory corporate bodies are: The General Assembly, 
the Management Board and the “Intervenors” (the latter, under certain autonomos 
legislation is optional). The General Assembly is the body composed of all the members of 
the cooperative and the Management Board is the administrative body. 
The Intervenors (also known as “Intervention” or “Account Intervenors”) is a social body 
that has a long tradition in Spanish cooperativism and is obligatory in the national 
cooperative legislation and the majority of the autonomous laws. However, its utility is 
limited, above all in small cooperatives, and it cannot be considered to perform a true 
supervisory function. The powers vested in such a body to control and supervise the 
cooperative are limited to access to cooperative documentation and the review of annual 
accounts. This said, the cooperative statutes may, in theory, grant greater powers to this 
body. In some autonomous laws the Intervenors body is not obligatory (Valencia and 
recently, Andalusia) and in others only when the cooperative has more than a stated 
number of members (Basque Country and Catalonia). 
With respect to the SAT, the obligatory bodies are: the General Assembly and the 
Management Board (art. 10.1, Royal Decree re: SAT). 
The Spanish legal framework is quite inflexible as it allows little margin to freely modify or 
amend company statutes. For example, the administrative body is always the Management 
Board (“Consejo Rector”), which has a very predetermined composition and only allows as 
an alternative the existence of a sole administrator in cooperatives with few members. 
With respect to SATs that have less than ten members the General Assembly can assume 
the functions which pertain to the Management Board, both constituted in a single body. 
With respect to such body, it is worth noting that instead of providing for the possibility of 
a sole administrator, as occurs in the national cooperative legislation, it dispenses with the 
Management Board, leaving the General Assembly to function as the sole body. This 
resulting odd situation raises the possibility of legal and administrative/operational 
uncertainties. If for any reason, the General Assembly is unable to reach decisions or to 
resolve a dispute or cooperative problem, a decision making void results. 
The national legislation establishes the possibility that the cooperative statutes allow for 
the naming of Management Board members that are not members of the cooperative. The 
number of non-member managers cannot be more than one third of the total members of 
the Management Board and must be people that are qualified and experts in their fields. In 
addition, such non-members are prohibited from serving as Chairperson or Vice-
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Chairperson. All of the cooperatives in this study had boards (“consejo rector”) composed 
of cooperative members, and such members were often professionals in charge of the 
operational management of the cooperative. On this point, there are differences between 
the various Spanish cooperative laws. The majority, like the national law, fixes the 
percentage of the non-member managers to one third. In turn, SATs, establish that all 
members of the management board be members of the SAT and chosen by the General 
Assembly (art. 10.4 RDSAT). 
With respect to the departure from the principle of “one person, one vote” and the 
possibility of a “plural” or “multiple votes” in the General Assembly, there are notable 
differences in the contents of the distinct autonomous community cooperative laws. 
However, in all cases the additional votes must be assigned in proportion to member 
patronage. Also, there is a limit to such votes, depending on the particular law. 
The national law allows regional statutes to choose whether multiple member votes are 
permitted or not. The term “members” refers to members that are cooperatives, entities 
controlled by cooperatives, or public entities, and includes as well members who are 
physical persons in certain types of first tier cooperatives. In relation to agricultural 
cooperatives the national law provides that multiple votes cannot exceed five votes and 
that a member cannot hold more than one third of the total votes of the cooperative. 
Autonomous community laws vary in this regard. In Figure 5.32 we can observe that the 
single most popular arrangement is still one member-one vote (37.5%). Voting that is fully 
proportional to equity capital contribution represents 25%, with the rest following 
various arrangements based on volume, value or proportional with an upper limit.  
However, all cooperative laws in Spain permit proportional voting at the second tier 
cooperative level if permitted by a cooperative’s bylaws. Additional votes must be 
proportional to the level of a member’s (cooperatives or SATs) patronage and/or the 
number of its active members. Limits are usually established so that a member cannot 
have the majority of the votes.  
With respect to SATs, the relevant regulation makes reference to the possibility of a vote 
per person or votes in proportion to capital contribution. In the latter case, additional 
voting rights can only be exercised if the decision under discussion would carry economic 
obligations. In this way, a plural vote is allowed in relation to economic matters. However, 
this differs from the manner in which agricultural cooperatives allow for multiple votes in 
proportion to patronage and with a limit of votes per member. In the case of SATs such 
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plural votes are a function of the equity capital that each member has put up and are 
without limit. 
Figure	5.32	Percentage	of	cooperatives	that	permit	one	vote	or	proportional	voting.	
 
 
The majority of cooperatives in this study do not have non-active members and if they do, 
their power is minimal. In some cases, such members are waiting to leave the cooperative. 
The only cases in which non-active members were represented were found in two SATs, 
Central Lechera Austuriana and Fribin, which function in compliance with the SAT 
legislation. In general non-active members have low influence, although 26% of the 
cooperatives did not provide information in this regard. In 5% of the cases cooperatives 
had non-active members with high influence, suggesting that the role of outside investor 
has been restrained.  
Figure	5.33	Influence	of	non‐active	members	on	decision	making.	
 
 
Overall, cooperative membership is easy to attain in line with the cooperative principles of 
open membership, and only in a small percentage is it restricted, as set out in Figure 5.34.  
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Figure	5.34	Membership	policy:	How	easy	is	it	to	become	a	member	of	the	
cooperative?	
 
 
With respect to capital contributions, in 31% there was a substantial contribution 
required, whereas in 41% only an entrance fee was required. However, the information on 
the other 28% was unavailable. The providers of equity capital in 72% of the cases are 
members, as set out in Figure 5.36 In 12% of the cases, non members also provided equity 
capital, although with respect to 16% of the cooperatives this information was not 
provided. 
Figure	5.35	Membership	policy	on	capital	contribution.	
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Figure	5.36	Providers	of	equity	capital.	
 
 
With respect to the composition of the Board, Hojiblanca stands out as having a high 
number of members, where the first level cooperatives have representation on the board. 
As well Anecoop, Arcoiris and Oviaragon have a significant size board, particularly the 
latter in proportion to size of the cooperative. 
Figure	5.37	Number	of	people	in	the	Board	of	Directors.	
 
 
Election criteria are diverse, and no particular reason is dominant, as can be seen in Figure 
5.38. 
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Figure	5.38	Election	criteria	for	members	of	Board	of	Directors.	
  
In keeping with the trend of Spanish cooperatives in general, very few cooperatives in the 
survey had supervisory committees, and only 3 % with outsiders. 
	
Figure	5.39	Supervisory	committee.	
 
 
In some instances cooperatives trade with non-member farmers as seen in Figure 5.40 and 
as well, perhaps surprisingly for other cooperative jurisdictions, only 62% of cooperatives 
indicated a legal obligation to trade exclusively with the cooperative, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.41, although these figures are skewed by the presence of SATs and also the fact 
that a large portion did not answer.  
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Figure	5.40	Trade	with	domestic	non‐member	farmers.	
 
 
Figure	5.41	Legal	obligation	to	deliver	all	their	products	to	the	cooperative.	
 
 
 
Only 13% of the cooperatives gave a premium for members who trade large volumes 
(Figure 5.42). Although this figure is not completely compelling, given that in 28% of the 
cases this information was unavailable, it does suggest that in Spain such premiums are 
not widely used, even in the largest cooperatives, as an incentive measure. 
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Figure	5.	42	Premium	obtained	by	members	with	large	volumes	of	trade	with	the	
coop.	
 
 
 
Members are predominantly grouped along product lines and not in regional groups, 
which is interesting given the traditional view of cooperatives as based on territory and 
community ties. However, product lines often overlap with regional grouping (e.g. F&V 
areas or dairy). 
 
Figure	5.43	Formal	groupings	of	members.	
 
 
5.5.5	Performance	of	the	cooperatives	
The market shares of cooperatives in the eight sectors studied are discussed in Chapter 
5.4, Section 5.4.1. Further, performance of agricultural cooperatives is analyzed in Chapter 
5.6, with reference to the evolution of the sector, prices, production, exports, relative 
performance with IOFs and challenges for the future, as well as policy concerns. 
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As a sketch of the performance of the cooperatives´ under study, turnover of each 
cooperative from 2000 (where available) and 2010 is compared in Figure 5.44 below and 
by sector in Figure 5.45.  
Data is incomplete as there are several cooperatives which do not have figures for 2000, 
having merged the activities of several entities since such time. SABI does not contain 
2005 figures for many of the cooperatives and thus a mid-decade comparison is not 
included. The data in this section 5.5.5 should be considered as orientative and should be 
coupled with the fact that to a certain extent turnover suggests at least some measure of 
success. We can see below that most impressive is Coren´s performance in terms of 
turnover.  
Figure	5.44	Turnover	of	the	Top	5	Cooperatives	(million	€).42	
  
 
With respect to sectors, the growth in the fruits and vegetables and pig meat sectors is 
noticeable, with cereals experiencing growth as well.  
                                                                  
42 In some cases, there are less than 5 cooperatives per sector represented: the sugar sector has one 
cooperative and sheep meat, three. 
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Figure	5.45	Turn‐over	of	Top	5	in	Each	Sector.	43	
 
 
 
Figure	5.46	Turn‐over	of	Top	5	in	Each	Sector	in	last	year	available.	44,45	
 
 
As Figure 5.46 illustrates, the most important sectors amongst the principle Spanish 
cooperatives are those in pig meat, with 30% of total turnover total, followed by F&V 
(21%) cereals (17%) and olive oil and table olives (15%). The elevated importance of the 
pig meat sector is due to the presence of COREN, whose 2010 turnover reached more than 
942 million €.  
                                                                  
43 In some cases, there are less than 5 cooperatives per sector: the sugar sector has one cooperative and sheep 
meat, three. 
44 In some cases, there are less than 5 cooperatives per sector: the sugar sector has one cooperative and sheep 
meat, three. 
45 Acorex is included in the sector of cereals and F&V. COVAP is included in dairy and pig meat.  
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Figure	5.47	Total	assets	of	the	Top	5	Cooperatives	(million	€).46	
 
 
Figure 5.47 illustrates total assets of the analysed cooperatives from 2000 and 2010. 
Figure 5.48 sets out the total assets by sector. This information is not available for some of 
the cooperatives. However, we can observe in general that the majority of the cooperatives 
have experienced significant growth in total assets, especially COVAP, COREN, Grupo AN 
and Acorex. 
Figure	5.48	Total	assets	of	Top	5	in	Each	Sector	(million	€).47	
  
Equal to what has occurred with respect to turnover, the most significant growth in total 
assets has occurred in the F&V sector and pig meat, as well as cereals.48 
                                                                  
46 In COREN, Grupo Avisage and SAT Arcoires (Pig meat); Bodegas San Valerio (Wine) and Grupo AN (Cereals) 
last year available is 2009.  
47 Acorex is included in the sector of cereals and F&V. COVAP is included in dairy and pig meat. 
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Figure 5.49 illustrates individualized equity capital of the Top 5 and Figure 5.50 sets out 
the individualized equity capital per sector. Individualized equity capital can be defined as 
the percentage of individual capital of total equity capital. Unica Group, COVAP and Central 
Lechera Asturiana have the highest ratios of individual capital. In contrary, the individual 
capital of ACTEL, ACOR or Dehesas Cordobesas, falls below 20%. The social capital of these 
cooperatives represents a reduced share of total equity, due to the importance of the 
indivisible reserves.  
When the ratio is low it means cooperatives have other sources of equity capital. Also if 
legal reserves can ‘t be distributed if a member leaves the company, if most of the equity is 
non individual equity capital, even if members leave equity will not be as affected. 
 
Figure	5.49	Individualized	equity	capital	of	the	Top	5	Cooperatives	(%).	
 
	
Per sector, the highest ratios for individualized capital are in F&V, olive oil and dairy, 
having values of approximately 60%. On the contrary, the sugar sector reaches only and 
approximate value of only 5%. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
48 The elevated growth in the sector for olive oil is due to the lack of complete and reliable  information for 
some of the olive oil cooperatives in the year 2000. 
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Figure	5.50	Average	individualized	equity	capital	of	the	Top	5	in	Each	Sector	(%).	
 
 
	
5.6	Sector	analysis	
5.6.1	Introduction	
In this chapter developments in the eight sectors that are central in this study are 
discussed. Trends in the markets, important changes in (agricultural) policy are reported 
on and linked to the strategies and performance of the investor-owned firms and 
cooperatives in the sector. The period of observation is 2000 – 2010, updated in some 
cases to 2011, although certain information was not available for all years in the 
aforementioned period. Challenges of, and issues related to, each sector are identified and 
linked to the overriding concerns of agricultural cooperatives in Spain; that is, the small 
size and “atomization”, decreasing and volatile prices, over-emphasis on production 
related activities (i.e. at the “bottom” of the food supply chain), lack of commercialisation, 
weak bargaining power vis-à-vis the other actors in the food supply chain, regionalism and 
lack of internationalisation, ageing farmers, “extra” demands on cooperatives in relation to 
rural development and environmental demands, etc.  
5.6.2 Cereals	
Cereals are an important sector in Spanish agriculture both as a primary input to the 
processed foods industry as well as animal food. Given the interrelationship between this 
sector and the rest of the agri-food system, changes in the cereals sector, whether in terms 
of price, supply, etc., have an impact on other sectors (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 
2004). The use of cereals in the production of bio-fuel has risen from 1.9 million tons in 
2007 to 7.7 million tons in 2009 (Grupo AN, 2010).  
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Production. In 2010 the cultivated area of cereals in Spain was 6,040,000 hectares, 
reaching a production of 19,880,000 tons. Although surface area under cultivation has 
decreased, production continues to rise. Yields have increased with improved production 
methods. Cooperatives have 35 % of the market share. The principle cereals cultivated in 
Spain are wheat, barley, oats and corn. 
Table	5.	18	Production,	value	and	area	of	cereals,	2000‐2010.	
Year 	 Production	(th	tons)	 Value	(th	€) Area	(th	ha)	
2000 24,567 3,184,137 6,807 
2001 18,055 2,575,447 6,428 
2002 21,683 2,894,872 6,729 
2003 21,17 2,924,833 6,627 
2004 24,849 3,412,054 6,603 
2005 14,241 2,359,344 6,596 
2006 19,091.8 2,629,835 6,305 
2007 24,0543.7 4,777,990 6,244 
2008 24,179.8 4,625,040 6,74 
2009 24,274.8 3,491,240.2 6,076 
2010 19,88 3,268,396 6,04 
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
Distribution	by	region. The cereals sector is principally in Castilla and Leon (36.96%), 
Castilla - La Mancha (15.2%), Aragon (14.49%) and Andalusia (8.88%). The fact that 
processing companies are usually not close to production (e.g. in Catalonia, Valencia, 
Andalusia, Murcia, and Galicia) results in high transportation/commercialisation costs 
(Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2004).  
External	trade.	Spain has a deficit in the production of cereals to meet consumption and 
is a net importer. From 2000 onwards imports have risen and exports decreased. Exports 
mainly are destined for EU countries such as Portugal, France, Italy and the UK.  
Prices. The cereals mentioned above have followed approximately the same price trend. 
Between 2000 and 2006 prices remained relatively stable, rising significantly in 2007 to 
2009. In 2009 the prices dropped to 2006 levels. The disappearance of price protection 
and the globalization of markets have resulted in high price volatility and the use of 
cereals as a speculative commodity. Lack of price stability is a key characteristic of the 
sector which affects the income of the farmer and the sale price. As well it makes the 
establishment of long term contracts between producers and the processing industry 
difficult due to the complexity of estimating future prices.	
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Figure	5.51	Average	prices	of	main	cereals	(€/100kg).	
 Data source: MARM (2011d) 
Cooperatives	 in	 the	 Cereals	 Sector	 and	Necessary	 Action. The cereal supply to the 
processing industry is in the hands of three types of entities: cooperatives, wholesalers 
and large multinational companies with capacity for warehousing (Catón Vázquez, 2004). 
The dispersed offer of cereals in Spain represents an obstacle in dealing with the highly 
concentrated agro-food industries. In general, it is made up of small and medium 
enterprises with the consequent high structural costs (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 
2004). 
The majority of cooperative cereal production is commercialized through second tier 
cooperatives, although there are some first tier cooperatives with a significant commercial 
capacity. Many of the first tier cooperatives that are not members of a second tier 
cooperative are basically local storehouses of various products and supplies; generally 
they do not engage in direct sales and they often work through wholesalers of a certain 
size. A weakness of the sector is its lack of adequate commercialisation strategy to adapt to 
demand and also to allow supply to the market throughout the whole of the year. 
Commercial cooperatives, with the appropriate infrastructure for storage, can plan price 
strategies and have the capacity to provide a steady and homogeneous supply throughout 
the year. Where cooperatives do not have such capacity they are forced to sell to third 
parties at less than optimal prices (Grupo AN, 2010). 
Another weakness is the lack of stability and trust in the contractual relationships 
between cooperatives and the processing industry due to a mutual lack of confidence and 
above all, speculation brought about by price volatility. In certain cases, agreements have 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Wheat 12,93 14,88 13,41 13,8 14,15 13,96 13,93 21,03 21,89 16,03 17,41
Barley 11,6 12,7 11,8 12,2 12,6 13,3 12,6 18,4 17 12,5 15
Oats 11,84 12,47 12,62 12,3 12,5 14,15 12,8 15,82 17,11 12,69 13,97
Corn 14,33 13,64 13,7 14,79 14,67 13,5 15,19 20,45 18,2 14,42 18,28
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been entered into between the principle cereal cooperatives and the processing industry 
with certain clients in order to ensure supply independently of volatile market conditions.  
In addition to attempts to deal with volatility and inadequate commercialisation measures, 
potential strategies may be the differentiation of product through quality measures and 
classification of product for final use (e.g. specific flours).  
5.6.3 Sugar	
Production. In 2010, 43,400 hectares were dedicated to the production of sugar beet 
resulting in 3,535,000 tons of sugar beet. The cultivation of sugar cane in Spain has 
practically disappeared, decreasing to a mere five hectares and 220 tons in 2010 from 
1,068 hectares and 106,000 tons in 2000 (MARM 2011d). 
Sugar production has decreased by half over the decade, going from 1,260,000 tons in 
2000 to 636,000 tons in 2010. The Spanish sugar sector has been reduced to only 2 
producer companies: Azucarera Ebro, an investor owned firm with 72% of the market and 
ACOR, a cooperative, which commands 28% of the market.  
Territorial	 Production.	 Sugar production is very concentrated, mainly in Castilla and 
Leon (73.51% of area and 78.94% of production), followed by Andalusia (19.22% area and 
12.74% production). ACOR (the cooperative) is situated exclusively in Castilla and Leon, 
while Azucarera Ebro is more dispersed throughout Spain.  
External	 Trade.	 In keeping with the reduction in production, imports of sugar have 
increased in a significant manner while exports, mainly to France and Portugal, have 
suffered strong fluctuations, with a general negative tendency.  
Prices.	Prices have fallen, as a consequence of the lowering of minimum prices. 
Table	5.19	Average	sugar	beet	price	received	by	farmer	€/100kg	(not	
including	subsidy).	
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
Policies. The Common Market Organisation resulted in the loss of sugar production, not 
only in Spain, but also in the entire EU. Under such regulation the sugar production quota 
was reduced and the minimum prices for sugar decreased. The companies received 
restructuring funds in exchange for reducing production. Community and state aid exists 
for producers in this sector.  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Price (€/100kg) 5.05 5.12 5.15 5.88 6.08 5.5 4.37 3.51 3.71 3.71 3.58 
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The impact for Spain has been very significant, with the closure of a number of factories 
under the restructuring plan. As a response to the restructuring, ACOR (the cooperative) 
substantially reduced its production and closed one of its installations. In 2009 it 
established an alliance with a French cooperative group, TEREOS for the production and 
commercialisation of sugar in Spain, through the acquisition of 40% of its social capital. As 
a result since 2010, the TEREOS group carries out the commercialisation of the production 
of both of the Spanish companies.  
As well, ACOR has diversified its activity into renewable energy through the construction 
of a biodiesel plant, a photovoltaic solar park and an agreement with the Cooperative 
Group Arento for the manufacture of flour, diversifying its production which had been 
limited to sugar (Alimarket, 2011e). 
Necessary	Action. The current CMO and the scenario after 2014 when a new market 
situation will leave sugar even more unprotected are pressing issues. If the situation does 
not improve, the costs of production and the decrease of prices will make the 
disappearance of the cultivation of sugar beet inevitable. Diversification as outlined above 
in relation to ACOR is a survival option. 
5.6.4 Fruits	and	vegetables		
The Spanish F&V sector (production, transformation and commercialization) is the second 
largest in Europe behind that of Italy and the first in worldwide exports. In 2012 it 
represented 30.82% of final agricultural production and more than 50% of final vegetable 
production (MARM, 2012). The role of cooperatives is extremely important, representing 
approximately 50% of the market share.49 It is also one of the sectors that is notable for 
the creation of employment, particularly in rural zones, whether directly in agricultural 
activity or in complementary activities (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011c; Fundación 
Cajamar, 2002). 
Production50. The surface area dedicated to fruits and vegetables has experienced a slight 
decline in recent years while the area dedicated to citrus has increased in the last decade. 
Within the fruit sector, dried fruits and nuts represent the largest area, in excess of 60% of 
the total. The production of vegetables has been increasing progressively until 2005, after 
which it declined, picking up again in 2009. Production levels of fruits of all kinds continue 
                                                                  
49 Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, as a source for the market share. 
50 Note that in Spain there are no fruit and vegetable sector specific statistics—official statistics are by product 
(e.g. tomato, cucumber, oranges, etc.)  Data on Vegetables, Citrus and Fruits have been consolidated and as 
well some of the most important products as indicative of trends have been chosen. 
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to increase. These increases are due to the increased important of intensive agriculture 
and clear orientation to exportation, with ever improving technical sophistication in the 
farms and higher crop yields.  
Table	5.20	Area	(ha)	and	production	(tons)	of	vegetables,	citrus	and	fruits.	
Year	 Vegetables Citrus Fruits
Production	 Area		 Production Area Production	 Area		
2000 12,802,044 408,848 5,382,511 294,629 4,005,979  982,894
2001 12,885,810 400,109 5,738,660 303,826 4,073,381  968,010
2002 13,206,141 402,861 6,096,715 305,496 4,082,042  957,831
2003 13,194,103 396,866  6,295,890 306,676 4,343,111  958,370
2004 13,751,458 404,787 6,097,991 305,407 3,490,730  928,734 
2005 13,896,107 406,688  5,342,452 311,004 4,073,673  925,306
2006 13,511,668 394,718 6,862,635 311,627 3,969,740  873,225
2007 13,500,620 379,564 5,303,490 315,580 3,783,100  854,407
2008 13,006,461 360,539  6,383,882 318,385 3,774,545  845,822
2009 13,925,553 379,497 5,291,819 316,623 4,049,928  865,298
2010 12,649,000 341,000 6,092,435 319,163 4,186,264 855,360
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
External	trade.	A substantial part of Spain’s fruit and vegetable production is destined for 
export. The principle exports are to the EU due to the close proximity, the perishable 
character of the product and the high acquisition power of its consumers. Exports have 
increased in the last 10 years with growth opportunities in Eastern Europe. 
Distribution	 of	 farms	 in	 national	 territory. The fruit and vegetable area is very 
centralized in the Mediterranean zone as well as in autonomous communities such as 
Extremadura and Castilla-La Mancha. Specifically, the areas dedicated to vegetables are 
concentrated in Andalusia, Murcia and Castilla-La Mancha, while citrus are concentrated in 
Murcia, Valencia and Andalusia. 
Consumption. The consumption of fruits and vegetables in 2010 reached 11,009 million 
Euros, the per capita consumption evolving positively in the period from 2000 to present, 
with an average growth of 1% (Fundación Cajamar, 2010b). New social trends give more 
importance to the processing of the product, making it necessary for producers to offer 
more products in the 4th or 5th range. 	
Prices51. Prices of fruit and vegetable products are determined by the conditions of offer. 
Given that production is not very flexible and the product is perishable as well, prices are 
adjusted to ensure the sale of the product. The resulting lack of stability in pricing is 
further acerbated by market characteristics where distribution channels exert great 
                                                                  
51 It should be noted that there are no national statistics on the F&V sector prices. Prices are difficult to track 
as national statistics are only kept in relation to particularF&V. In figures 5.52 A, B and C some of the most 
relevant statistics are set out. 
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pressure on prices and there is huge difference between prices paid to the farmer and that 
paid by the consumer.  
Figure	5.52	A,	B	&	C	Average	prices	(Euros/100	k)	received	by	farmers	in	vegetables	
and	fruits.	
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Data source: MARM (2011d) 
	
Policies.	 The production of fruits and vegetables is strongly regulated in terms of 
marketing or quality standards, as a consequence of the CAP. The sector has undergone a 
high degree of market liberalisation and there are limited means to correct prices. The 
sector depends very little on subsidies and EU community aid represents a reduced part of 
the product value. This situation is in contrast to other agricultural sectors in which the 
profitability of the farmers is dependent on the amount of aid received (Fundación 
Cajamar, 2002).  
With respect to POs, two laws are particularly relevant, the first being Royal Decree 
1972/2008 28 of November, which recognizes POs of fruits and vegetable and establishes 
the basic norms of their organisations and associations. The second law is the Royal 
Decree 1302/2009 regarding funds and operating programs of fruit and vegetable POs, 
which established the basic norms in relation to the agricultural common market 
organisation (CMO) Council Regulation (EC) n. 1234/2007. This was further developed by 
Royal Decree 1337/2011, which was passed October 3, 2011, regulating funds and 
operating programs for fruit and vegetable producers. Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 
indicate that there are, citing their 2011 information, 697 OPs, of which 307 are 
cooperatives. The renewal of the agricultural protocol between Morocco and the EU, 
brought into force March 1, 2000, is a point of contention for many Spanish producers. 
FAECA (the federation in Andalucía) has acknowledged that although the renewal may be 
positive overall for the EU as a whole, in their opinion it is and will be very prejudicial for 
the Spanish fruit and vegetable cooperative sector. They claim that producers of 
cucumber, tomatoes, zucchini, strawberries and citrics will be disadvantaged and call for 
preference to be given to EU producers, arguing that it is not fair that the conditions of 
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production in Morocco would not be permitted in Europe. As of the writing of this thesis 
the issue is yet to be resolved, with progress having been made on talks, with following 
announcements of non-compliance. 
With respect to other policy issues, general observations and selected insights from the 
perspective of those managing associations of producer organizations have been elicited, 
structured around the 3 pillars of investigation mentioned in the description of the project 
(institutional environment, position in food chain and internal governance):  
i) Institutional Environment 
Funding structure: A concern from association managers’ point of view is the 
perceived inefficiency in the administering of operating funds meant to encourage 
and support OPFVs and associations of POs and to facilitate concentration and 
beneficial activities in the cooperative sector. For example, whilst the APO 
manages expenses and investments, the funds in question are first given to the 
cooperatives, which then must in turn give such funds to APO. This results in a lack 
of efficiency and agility when considering useful actions that the APO could take on 
behalf of the cooperatives. The	concentration	of	offer	must	be	viewed	not	only	as	a	
commercial	concentration,	but	also	a	concentration	from	an	organizational	point	of	
view.	
Incompatibility between Structural Funds and Operating Funds: While this is a 
well known issue, and one that perhaps doesn´t need more elaboration here, it is 
useful to point out that it has real detrimental effects. For example, meaningful 
research and development activities (which have economic and environmental 
implications, such as wise use of natural resources and energy and reduction of 
pesticide and contamination, etc.) require significant funds, yet FEADER funds are 
not available if one has used operating program funds. Those that are within an 
OPFV are in a worse position than those that are not in relation to such structural 
funds. 
Perceived Rigidity in OCM for FV: While it is acknowledged that the OCM for fruit 
and vegetables sector is perhaps the most superior, there is still some frustration 
with how such funds can be used to support actions to be taken for the benefit of 
the cooperatives. While co-financing is a good control method in that it weeds out 
less than effective activities, the restrictions presented by an enumerated list of 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
148 
 
permissible actions limits effective decision making on the part of the Associations 
of POs.  
The general opinion seems to be that associations are in the best position to 
determine the needs of their cooperatives and should be given more freedom to 
use funds accordingly. In sum, simplification, more flexibility and more confidence 
in the OPFV and associations of POs to do what is best for their members. 
ii) Position in Food Chain 
From the perspective of important producer associations there is no longer any 
negotiation with, but rather an imposition from, the supermarket chains. 
Competition between chains does not result in sufficient prices for the farmers. 
Fruit and vegetables represent a small part of the supermarket sales, but they are 
products which need to be bought often and thus bring people into the stores on a 
regular basis (who then go on to buy other products). Fruit and vegetables are the 
“bait” so to speak and thus the battle for low prices in fruit and vegetables is fierce.  
This weakness in bargaining position needs to be taken into account as a starting 
point and look for ways to go beyond product as a simple commodity. Strategic 
alliances are one option (e.g. with seed companies for exclusive use during a 
determined period of time, etc.). Niche and prepared products are also important. 
While it is an “accepted truth” that atomization of Spanish cooperatives must be 
addressed in order to gain more market power, the development of processes of 
concentration of cooperatives (whether by merger, 2nd level, etc.) and OPFVs need 
more attention.	 The	 concentration	 of	 capital	 is	 easier	 than	 the	 concentration	 of	
people	and	 thus	cooperative	concentration	processes	need	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	
cooperative	business	form,	culture	and	environment. Another key area is looking at 
abuses in distribution practices. In terms of policy it is useful to study whether 
certain subsidies or policies favor or disfavor certain actors. Several examples 
come to mind: the subsidies of plastic cases and related systems (as opposed to 
bio-degradable carton) and adoption of certain private quality norms, in some 
cases carried out by specific laboratories, for example. In addition, there is a 
disparity of required quality norms: certain supermarkets ask for different, less 
demanding norms, for discount stores. This put cooperatives in a difficult position 
when demanding quality standards from their members. 
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Two themes which could be included in the debate to improve the position in the 
food chain: 
-Reinforce dialogue with the distributors, requiring retail chains to sit down with 
Interprofessional Organisations to discuss market conditions/affairs. Currently 
Interprofessional Organisations do not have real negotiator/representative 
presence (with a few exceptions) as commercial representatives. The true 
negotiation should be with those who really decide the conditions and this is not 
the commercial wholesaler, nor the importers, nor the industry: the “deciders” are 
the large retail distributors.  
-Reinforce the obligation of traceability extending it until the final consumer. 
Currently the regulations are demanding with the producer and the 
buyers/traders of first instance, but the obligations become more diluted as it 
reaches the retailer. There are very severe examples in E.Coli matters, that in 
addition to permitting fraud in the final destination as to the origin of the product, 
as well leaves those involved in the primary links of the chain vulnerable as to 
their liability/responsibility. 
iii) Internal Governance 
Professionalisation of fruit and vegetable cooperative management in cooperative 
business practices and models is a key task, otherwise cooperatives will not be 
competitive. The internal workings of the cooperative business form needs to be 
understood and leveraged to take advantage of its inherent strengths. 
Management models based on capitalistic training is inadequate to understand the 
dynamics involved in the much needed organizational modernization of the 
agricultural cooperative sector. Internally, democratic decision making needs to be 
balanced with efficiency and agility. 
Networking amongst European cooperative management on issues such as best 
practices, change management, concentration processes, etc. is important in 
bringing about change in Spanish agricultural cooperatives. The agricultural 
cooperative movement needs its own equivalent to the “Harvard case study” 
methodology and case study data base and field experiences.  
As a final comment, policies related to Crisis Prevention and Management need to 
be reformed, including new available actions. In order to prevent crisis one must: 
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know/understand; be informed; communicate; and educate. To manage crisis 
there is a lack of protocols with precisely these factors.  
Structure	of	the	Sector.	The sector is made up of predominantly small farms, although in 
the last few years there has been a decrease in the number of farms and an increase in 
farm size, principally due to mergers and concentration. Such mergers are both an attempt 
to gain market power and to join forces and share risk in the face of the necessity to make 
major investments in technology. The “atomization” of the sector contrasts with the 
growing power of distribution entities which exert constant pressure on obtaining 
normalized production in terms of quality, ripeness and precision in the supply. 
Another characteristic of the sector is that traditionally such products have not been 
marketed under a producer brand, but instead have been considered homogeneous goods 
without the possibility of differentiation. This has led to a large part of production being 
sold under the brand of the distributor. At the moment there is an attempt on the part of 
the producers to differentiate themselves, creating different brands targeted to various 
destinations or to niche markets. 
Supply	Chain	and	Cooperatives. Traditionally the fruit and vegetable sector supply chain 
had been based on wholesalers and in the sale of product through an exchange (a centre in 
which the farmer sells their product by an auction system). Such exchanges also offer 
services including the integration of logistic activities and commercialization. However, 
market conditions have pushed for a more modern model based on associations of 
producers, distribution entities and logistics operators, in which the cooperative plays a 
key role, resulting in horizontal and vertical integration which permits farmers to 
concentrate their product and control directly sale of such product. 
Cooperatives and SATs principally market the products of the members, whether in their 
natural state or after being processed (Fundación Cajamar, 2010). Increasingly 
cooperatives are carrying out warehousing, transformation and marketing tasks as well as 
selling product. Cooperatives in this sector have been the principal instrument of adding 
value to the farmer’s product in commercialization channels (Montegut and Cristóbal, 
2005). Advisory, consulting and crop planning services are offered to farmers so that all 
products comply with client demands in terms of quality, quantity, characteristics and 
delivery times. 
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Principal weaknesses in this sector are related to the high atomization of production and 
the existence of obsolete infrastructures52 However, there has been an increase of 
concentrations in this sector (e.g. Unica, Murgiverde, Vicasol, Anecoop, Alimer, etc.) and 
major investments have been made in new technologies, practices and processes to 
increase production. As well, advances in laboratory testing, certification systems, health 
and safety issues, integrated agricultural practices, bio-control instead of pesticides, 
traceability, etc. have increased production and added product value. 
Since 2005/2006 the province of Almería in southern Spain, which is the most important 
producer of vegetables, has gone through a “green” revolution based on biological control 
systems. The products to which biological control is applied vary: In 2010/2011, 90% of 
the farming area dedicated to peppers was controlled biologically, while 26% of the area 
of tomatoes was so controlled. Research in bio control is ongoing as it is a method of 
adding value and also protecting the environment at the same time. Associations of 
cooperatives were instrumental in rolling out the adoption of bio-control and integrated 
practices.  
Necessary	Action.	In general, the fruit and vegetable sector considers that concentration 
of offer and improving the supply chain position, market power and thus some control 
over prices as crucial.53 There has been some issues which have made the effective 
operation of, and integration into, POs difficult and this needs to be addressed in the 
future. A focus on quality product, food safety and security and traceability as well as the 
development of added value products is also recommended. Improved logistics and 
infrastructure are also key to reaching other European and international markets. Efforts 
to give the Interprofessional groups more than just an observer/advisor status have been 
initiated, with the goal of obtaining a legal framework in which they can exercise more 
influence and enact certain measures. It should be noted that this position is not 
wholeheartedly supported by the confederation, Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, who are 
of the view that although interprofessional groups are important in terms of quality 
norms, promotion and marketing and R+D+i, their role does not serve to incentivise much 
needed concentration in the sector. The position of Cooperativas Agroalimentarias in 
relation to policy which concerns the imbalances in the supply chain, atomization of 
producers and their weak position as against distributors is set out in more detail in the 
                                                                  
52 Instead of investing in upgrading structures, some farmers had hopes of selling land at high prices for 
construction purposes and did not make the necessary investments in new technologies and new greenhouse 
structures, the latter being the most important determining factor in production levels. In some areas almost 
30% of the sector is composed of obsolete greenhouses. 
53  A new law project report, at a national level, on encouraging cooperative integration was released on 
October 16, 2012 ("Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de Fomento de Integración Cooperativa"). 
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discussion of policies in Chapter 5.7. Plummeting prices continue to be a main concern and 
the sector is actively seeking, with limited success, to remedy the situation. See “Policies” 
above for other specific actions. 
5.6.5 Olive	oil	and	table	olives		
Spain is the largest producer and exporter of olive oil and table olives in the world (38.6 % 
of world total), with the largest area destined for olive cultivation. Olive oil and table 
olives are one of the principle sectors in the Spanish agro food system, not only in 
economic, but also in social terms. Cooperatives generate 70% of the Spanish production 
of olive oil. Approximately 360,000 farmers are growers and they bring their olives to 
1,738 olive presses, of which 1000 are cooperatives. The size of such presses varies, 
although many are small or medium enterprises and the involvement of international 
capital is still small. The largest olive presses are responsible for the majority of total 
production. The number of packagers/bottlers has risen to 1,520 of which 90% are 
associated with olive presses (Mercasa, 2010).  
The activities of the cooperatives in this sector differ depending on whether they are first 
or second tier: the first tier focus on pressing olives whilst the second tier cooperatives 
carry out packaging, commercialization, management of bulk oil and olives, extraction of 
non-edible oil and exportation; basic processing activities and commercialization 
(Montegunt, et. al, 2007).  
This table shows the percentage of cooperatives per community in Spain both in terms of 
olive presses and production, in 2009/2010.  
Table	5.21	Number	of	presses	and	olive	oil	production	by	region	(2010).	
Autonomous	
Community	
Number	of	Olive	Presses Production	(tons)
 Total	
Cooperati
ves	 %	 Total	
Cooperativ
es	 %	
Andalusia	 820 428 52.20% 1,168,170.9 822,856.4 70.44% 
Castilla‐La	Mancha	 243 126 51.85% 85,455.5 52,662.9 61.63% 
Extremadura	 115 57 49.57% 59,831.3 33,728.5 56.37% 
Catalonia	 202 113 55.94% 32,716.1 22,437.6 68.58% 
C.	of	Valencia	 130 107 82.31% 18,296.6 15,168.5 82.90% 
Aragon	 101 52 51.49% 12,891.9 6,757.9 52.42% 
Navarra	 16 9 56.25% 3,941.7 2,322.2 58.91% 
Madrid	 19 12 63.16% 284.9 2,158.3 75.76% 
R.	of	Murcia	 38 9 23.68% 8,588.7 2,139.7 24.91% 
Castilla	and	Leon	 15 10 66.67% 1,711.1 1,017.3 59.45% 
La	Rioja	 22 13 59.09% 1,317.6 718.3 54.52% 
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Balearic	Islands	 12 5 41.67% 370.3 222.4 60.06% 
Basque	Country	 4 2 50.00% 114.5 44.6 38.95% 
Galicia	 1 0 0.00% 1.2 0 0.00% 
Spain	 1738 943 54.26% 1,396,256.4 962234,6 68.92% 
Source: Estimation of Harvest of Olive Oil in Spain. Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 2010 
Area	and	production. Spain has 2.48 million hectares of olive groves of which 82 % is not 
irrigated, hence “traditional” as opposed to “intensive”, “super-intensive” or in 
“bush/hedge” form. Since 2000 the area of olive groves has increased by 211,000 ha as set 
out in Figure 5.54. Traditional olive plantings took advantage of poor soils and/or inclined 
lands which were good for little else and the low need for water and the relative less work 
involved than other crops (except for the intensive harvest period in which temporary 
workers are often used) New techniques introduced in the 1990s helped to increase 
productivity (Lanzas Molina, et al. 2009).In the last 10 years Spanish producers of both 
table olives and olive oil have planted new intensive groves based on modern designs and 
structures and with sophisticated irrigation techniques meant to substantially increase 
production. New plantings have been encouraged by the global consumption of olives and 
as well aid programs by the EU. Many of the new plantings are of high density (superior to 
that of 1,500 trees/ ha.) irrigated (thus not particularly sustainable in water-challenged 
southern Spain) and harvested mechanically.  
Andalusia is the autonomous community with the largest area of olive groves representing 
61.75% of the national total in 2010. Castilla-La Mancha with 14% and Extremadura with 
10.6% are also important producers. In terms of production (2009/2010 harvest) 
Andalusia produced 82.12% of the Spanish total, followed by Castilla-La Mancha, 6.12% 
and Extremadura 5%. Although olive groves have spread to other zones in Spain including 
in the north (Galicia) the sector continues to be very concentrated geographically.  
Figure	5.53	Area	of	Olive	(for	Oil)	Groves	in	Spain.	
 Data source: MARM (2011d) 
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Table	5.22	Area	of	Olive(for	Oil)	Groves	in	Spain	(1000	ha).	
 
 
 
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
Prices.	 The majority of olive farmers experience losses. Superior quality oils do not 
receive the price premium that would be expected. Further, variations in product 
availability result in price swings. In recent years producers and representative 
organisations argued that the price in origin has not reflected the offer and demand 
situation, and has pushed for methods to address low prices. The EU has allowed (in 2009 
by Reg (EC) 542/2009) private systems of storage to be put in place to address this 
problem, with the goal of allowing prices to recuperate and thus break such negative 
tendencies. This program commenced in July 2009 (Oleoestepa, 2010 ). Alimarket (2012), 
noted that private warehousing was proving to be insufficient and other corrective 
measures were necessary, although it has been argued that such measures came too late 
and only applied to virgin oils (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2010a). It was also noted 
that low prices had not resulted in increased consumption, which has stabilised at 
approximately 332 Ml. (see below, discussion in “Policies”). Figure 5.54 shows the Spanish 
production, consumption, exports and the average price of olive oil. 
Figure	5.54	Spanish	Production,	Consumption,	Exports	and	Prices	of	Olive	Oil.	
 
Data source: Cooperativas agroalimentarias (2011d) 
 
 
 
 
 
Year	 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Area	 2,195 2,232 2,266 2,266 2,271 2.293 2,298 2,314 2,299 2,281 2,280 2,450 2,443 
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Table	5.23	Spanish	Production,	Consumption,	Exports	and	Prices	of	Olive	Oil.	
Year	 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10	 2010/11
Production (tonnes) 1,111.4 1,236.1 1,030 1,041.5 1,390.5 
Consumption + Losses (tonnes) 560 537.5 533.6 533.4 553.4 
Exports (tonnes) 591.4 666.1 675.3 780.1 827.7 
Total consumption (tonnes) 1,151.4 1203.6 1,208.9 1,313.5 1,381.1 
Medium price (€/100kg) 248.439 244.413 193.684 188.61 180.361
Source: Cooperativas agroalimentarias (2011d) 
 
Figure 5.55 sets out a longer view of the relationship between production and price54. As 
can be observed, price fluctuations are more volatile than production fluctuations.  
Figure	5.55	Relation	between	Spanish	Production	and	Prices	of	Olive	Oil.	
 
Data source: Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2010a, 2011d) 
 
External	Markets. Although there has been an increase in Spanish olive oil production 
and Spanish domestic consumption is unlikely to increase significantly, world markets are 
capable of absorbing production. In Figure 5.56, the data according to Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias supports this point. This “equilibrium” between production and global 
demand is noted by recent studies in the olive sector where global production has 
increased approximately 30% as has demand (Velasco Gámez, et al. 2011). Exports 
maintain a high level in spite of increased foreign competition (COAG, 2010). More than 
70% of exports are destined for the EU in 2012, mainly to Italy (41%), Portugal (11%) and 
                                                                  
54 Data from 2003/04 to 2005/06 is sourced from Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2010a) and data from 
2006/07 to 2010/11 from Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2011d). 
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France (9%). Outside the EU, the US is an important market (9%). Exports of table olives 
are less important and 80% are destined to the EU (Portugal (48.7%) and Italy (15.6%)55. 
Imports are even less significant, although it is worth noting that the majority is from Italy, 
which buys Spanish oil in bulk and then bottles it to be exported as product “made in 
Italy”. 
Figure	5.56	Global	Production	and	Consumption	of	Olive	Oil.	
 
Data source: Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2010a). 
Exports are a key strategy to avoid the excess of production on the national markets and to 
counteract falling prices. This will require a more concerted effort on the part of olive oil 
cooperatives to obtain a bigger presence in international markets. Successful examples of 
this strategy may be found in Hojiblanca, Interóleo and Tierras Altas (all in Andalucía).  
Exports already represent 60% of sales according to the Olive Agency (Agencia del Olivar-
AAO) and Alimarket (2011b) and continue to rise. Spain is now ahead of Italy as the 
principal world exporter and it is increasingly consolidating its leading market position in 
many countries. According to Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2010a) publicity campaigns 
by Interprofessional groups have helped the sector grow, in spite of the crises.  
Policies. Given the high percentage of cooperatives in the olive oil and table olive sector, 
any olive sector policy has a huge impact for the cooperatives therein. The decoupling of 
subsidies from the olive groves (and instead forming part of the single payment) had a 
significant impact on small growers in traditional zones (with low yields due to sparse 
planting and no irrigation), not to mention the environment and the rural economy. Where 
policy favours high volume, highly mechanized and highly irrigated olive groves, olive 
                                                                  
55 Agencia Tributaria, Base de Datos de Comercio Exterior, 2012.  
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cooperatives with a high percentage of non-irrigated traditional small holdings, are greatly 
affected. As well CAP has not prohibited the mixing of olive oil with other cheaper seed 
oils. According to the union COAG (2010) the elimination of an intervention price 
provokes low prices and thus results in the buy-out of producers at lower prices. As a 
result they argue that the income of the producers depends even more on the large buyers 
(COAG, 2010).  
The activation of private warehousing measures is a key concern in relation to prices as 
mentioned above. There are varying opinions in the cooperative sector on the utility of 
private storage schemes. FAECA, (Andalusian Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives) 
which is an important voice in this debate given the importance of Andalusian production 
(60% of Spain, 30% of EU) is in favour of using such available measures as a method of 
stabilising prices . This is not to say that FAECA would suggest that it is, or should be, the 
only tool to do so. As well, Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias of Castilla La Mancha (another 
important autonomous community in terms of olive oil) also positively evaluates such 
measures, as did the National Confederation, Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias. Over 50,000 
signatures were gathered on petition supporting the activation of private storage. 
In the past Spain has had to appeal to the Commission to activate the storage mechanism 
with  such appeals being originally denied due to the fact that prices were still considered 
to be above the official minimum. Spain argued that in reality prices were lower than that 
reported and therefore below such minimum and in any event, such minimum amount had 
been set 12 years ago. Eventually, the European Commission approved such activation 
proposal.  
This incident aside, it may be useful to look a bit closer at the situation in Spain, and see 
where price problems arise. Spain produces high quality oil, and lots of it. Worldwide 
markets absorb production. As mentioned, cooperatives produce 70% of the national total. 
There are a few very large cooperatives such as Hojiblanca but there are many, many small 
ones. (See Table 5.21 for figures).  
We can observe in general:  
 little presence in retail 
 lack of unity amongst smaller coops, multiple brands thus weak brands, leading to 
virtually no brand recognition and subjection to supermarket brands 
 high bulk sales but lack of adequate commercialization, repackaging by others 
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 inability to leverage quality and differentiate product. 
 in reality there are only 5 major buyers, thus little market power for cooperatives 
in spite of 70% of production—producers are too atomized. 
If we accept the above and as well that the way forward for Spain´s olive oil sector is 
efficiency, commercialization, marketing, increased added value in packaging etc., brand 
recognition, internationalization, concentration of offer, etc. then one has to look at what 
storage has the possibility of achieving.  
Critics of private storage schemes have pointed out that: 
 storage systems still don´t have the ability to counteract the fact that buyers have 
hugely disproportionate market power 
 storage means that oils are devalued—lack of differentiation lowers quality and 
traceability of product is inhibited 
 doesn´t solve bulk issue (in fact it contributes to it)  
 may allow some slight price control but doesn´t address the fact that most farmers 
experience losses—short term answer for structural problem. 
In conclusion, while private storage schemes have had some utility and may be seen as a 
tool, however blunt, in the short term, it is not the method to address price issues caused 
by structural sector problems. However, as a transitory tool the olive oil sector views it as 
necessary to at least alleviate brutal price plunges.  
While it may seem odd that cooperatives which represent 70% of the market sector still 
have a difficult time imposing control on the market, it is important to remember the 
hugely disproportionate size of the buyers even as against a large cooperative such as 
Hojiblanca. In the last several years, Hojiblanca has entered into agreements with Cargill 
and has entered into various corporate arrangements with IOFs (including doing a share 
exchange related to its brand name). The company has had international success in the 
past, and is changing structure at a dizzying pace. Whether this strategy will continue to 
serve it well and its farmer-members, is too early to ascertain. From a different 
perspective, Andalusia has very recently introduced a new Olive Farm law which attempts 
to balance the commercial needs of the industry and also sustainability issues. More time 
is needed to gauge whether such measures will be effective, especially for traditional olive 
farmers. 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
159 
 
Olive	Oil	Cooperatives.	The cooperative olive oil companies have little presence in retail 
establishments as the large agro food distribution companies control this market niche. 
Five buyers purchase over half the market. The small size of the sector (in relation to the 
size of the distribution companies) and the small and medium companies which make up 
the sector result in big disadvantages when competing and negotiating with large firms. 
The market share of distribution brands (“DB”) averages 65% and in some categories 
reaches 83% (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2010 “Estimation of harvest”).  
Cooperatives also suffer from localisation (all local villages have the “best oil”) and 
personality considerations (king of small cooperative vs. member of large cooperative) 
which inhibit effective alliances in the olive cooperative sector.  
Two alternatives exist to commercialize the product for olive cooperatives: bulk or 
packaged. To sell oil in one manner or another depends on the quantities obtained in each 
harvest. If there is an excess of production and a lack of adequate commercialization the 
cooperatives are obliged to sell in bulk. The price obtained by the farmers is low as the 
added value comes from the higher margins on packaged product (Montegunt et. al, 2007). 
In 2007, 55% of exports were still bulk sales although in recent years the cooperative oil 
presses are increasing the sale of bottled oil.  
While cooperatives have made great efforts to position their product on the market with 
their own brands in an attempt to compete with supermarket brands, two problems have 
arisen: The lack of unity amongst smaller cooperatives has resulted in the creation of 
multiple brands which have strong competition from the larger brands. In addition, there 
is a passive commercial behaviour which is not particularly market oriented. Secondly, in 
addition to the challenges of the opening up of, and the competition within, markets, is the 
phenomena of new plantings of olive groves, not only in Spain, but in other countries 
where Spanish techniques are used. The majority of these new intensive or super-
intensive olive groves are using new systems of production (using a system of “espaldera” 
and irrigation) to which many Spanish cooperative producers do not have access due to 
lack of capital investment, training, resources or simply the adequacy of the landscape. 
Although increased production per hectare is clearly a worthwhile commercial goal, it has 
put many traditional cooperative producers in a position where they cannot hope to 
compete on productivity. One can expect in the coming years that the olive oil production 
on a worldwide level will increase. The low profitability of traditional olive groves often 
associated with cooperatives is a challenge for future viability as their costs are often 
below market price (and “environmental externalities” are not figured into the “market”). 
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Amongst the several possible scenarios that could be suggested to address the crisis in 
olive oil price would be: increase price through promotion and increasing demand 
(exports); reduce costs using modern methods; or, reconvert groves to be intensive and 
mechanised. For those groves that are traditional it is not possible tochange the system of 
cultivation nor increase mechanization, nor would it be beneficial from an 
environmentally sustainable point of view. The only “way out” is to differentiate due to 
quality/unique characteristics (including ecological) and increase value added (with the 
requisite adequate commercialisation) and leverage aid available due to its 
environmental, rural or landscape/tourism value. 
Necessary	 actions	 according	 to	 the	 Cooperative	 Sector. In order to meet these 
challenges, the sector must focus on quality and develop Spanish producer brands, 
develop a packaging project and a promotion, marketing, export and market/consumer 
orientation. Increased exports are a necessity. The recommendations ten years ago 
(Moyano and Fidlalgo, 2001) calling for internationalisation, growth, mergers, 
acquisitions, alliances and associations as well as investments in R&D, and innovation as 
crucial strategies are echoed in the recent Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (2011g) annual 
report. Agreements with distributors are also a constant theme. The sector advocates for 
the market intervention of inter-professional groups in crisis and the definition of a 
contractual and regulatory framework at the EU level to prohibit abusive practices.	
5.6.6 Wine	
Production. Spain is the first in the world in terms of area planted with vineyards with 
1,045,620 hectares, representing 30% of EU vineyards (MARM, 2010a). It produces 
5,535.33 tons of grapes, out of which 95.45% is destined for wine (the rest for juice and 
raisins) and 35.5 million hectoliters (09/10) of wine production places it third in the 
world after France and Italy. There are 580,000 vineyards (medium of 1.9 ha) with slightly 
more than 40% of the wine having a geographic indication. Cooperative market share is 
overall 70%. There are 700 cooperatives which represent 70% of the production without 
such geographic indication (in addition to some cooperative production with geographic 
indication). The area and production has declined since 2000, reducing in area by 12% in 
the last decade and production by 20%. The trend shows that production is increasingly 
geared towards wines with geographic denomination, as set out in Figure 5.57 “Wine 
Production”. 
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Table	5.24	Area	of	vineyards.	
Year	 Area (th	ha)	
2000 1,194.59 
2001 1,201.73 
2002 1,185.84 
2003 1,165.08 
2004 1,166.65 
2005 1,159.96 
2006 1,134.61 
2007 1,130.68 
2008 1,108.25 
2009 1,045.62 
2010 1,037.35 
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
 
Figure	5.57	Wine	Production.	
 
Data source: Consejería de Agricultura Castilla – La Mancha (2011) 
 
Table	5.	25	Wine	Production	with	Denomination	and	IGP	(indicación	geográfica	
protegida)	(Mhl).	
Year	 DOP+IGP	 Other	wine Grape	juice	 Total
2001/02 12.34 17.23 2.98 32.55
2002/03 13.45 19.47 5.76 38.68
2003/04 16.52 23.83 6.29 46.64
2004/05 16.35 25.57 6.75 48.67
2005/06 14.86 20.38 4.3 39.54
2006/07 16.1 21.66 5.12 42.55
2007/08 15.78 18.54 5.49 39.81
2008/09 15.34 20.4 5.55 41.29
2009/10 16.52 18.24 3.57 38.33
2010/11 17.73 17.04 5.09 39.86
Data source: Consejería de Agricultura Castilla–La Mancha (2011) 
Table 5.26 sets out the turnover of cooperatives in each region, as well as the number of 
cooperatives and members. Rioja is the best known wine region of Spain with the highest 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
162 
 
turnover per cooperative whilst Castilla-La Mancha has the most cooperatives and 
members. See “Wine Cooperatives” below for further analysis on cooperatives. 
Table	5.26	Wine	Cooperatives	in	Spain.	
Autonomous	
Community	
Wine	
coops	 Members Turnover	€	
Members/
Coop	
Turnover	
€/	
coop	
2nd	
grade	
coops	
Galicia 10 2,507 25,580,518 251 2,558,052  
Basque 
Country 7 544 11,836,346 78 1,690,907  
Navarra 29 4,697 44,549,798 162 1,536,200 2 
Rioja 34 6,949 103,597,532 204 3,046,986  
Aragon 36 11,672 77,783,849 324 2,160,662  
Catalonia 75 21,502 97,940,298 287 1,305,871 2 
Balear 
Islands 3 12 103,219 4 34,406  
C. of Valencia 69 32,124 77,952,238 466 1,129,743 3 
Castilla and 
Leon 36 8,719 67,736,483 424 1,881,569 1 
Castilla-La 
Mancha 254 92,554 574,753,738 364 2,262,810 8 
Madrid 13 3,904 4,250,102 300 326,931  
Extremadura 23 9,675 48,317,234 421 2,100,749 1 
R. of Murcia 3 2,328 98,64,721 776 3,288,240  
Andalusia 36 13,585 67,751,632 377 1,881,990 2 
Canary 
Islands - - - - - - 
Spain 628 210,772 1,212,017,708 4,256 25,205,116 19 
Source: Cooperativas agroalimentarias (2011e) 
External	Trade. Spain is a net exporter of wine with growing exports, although due to the 
crisis in the last few years there has been a decline. According to the Confederation 
(Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011e) at the end of 2010 there has been an increase in 
exports (+15.6% relative to 2009) due to a 5% downward price adjustment. As well, 
global volume decreased and new markets such as Russia and China are opening up. Since 
2004/5 exports have exceeded internal consumption. The principle export destinations, in 
volume, are France, Germany, UK and Portugal in the EU and the US, Switzerland and 
China outside the EU (COAG, 2010). 
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Figure	5.58	Evolution	of	wine	production,	markets	and	exports	(1000	Hl).	
 Data source: Cooperativas Agroalimentarias 2011e 
 
 
Table	5.27	Evolution	of	wine	production,	markets	and	exports	(1000	Hl).	
Year	 2006/2007	 2007/2008 2008/2009 2009/2010	 2010/2011	
Total 
production 37,757 34,314 35,736 34,766 34,846 
Internal market 15,026 14,438 14,123 13,307 12,634 
Exports 14,511 14,791 14,302 15,383 20,001 
Source: Cooperativas agroalimentarias 2011e 
	
Prices.	Since 1999 the prices of bulk table wine has fallen more than 40% due to a general 
crisis in the sector. In 2009 the prices in origin were at the same level as 1989. In contrast, 
in the same period, the consumer price index has increased 80%. In many cases receipts 
are less than the cost of production for growers. COAG (2010) has noted that over the 
years a majority of growers have made big investment in the process of restructuring their 
vineyards and thus run high financial risks. Prices received by farmers for wine grapes are 
set out below: 
 
Table	5.28	Average	price	received	by	farmers	for	wine	grapes	(2000‐2010).	
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 
Price 
(€/100kg) 
43.71 45.47 43.31 42.84 41.41 50.49 50.32 54.84 53.84 56.74 62.5
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
Consumption.	Consumption continues to decline due to changing consumer habits. The 
financial crisis has greatly affected consumption levels during 2009 both in restaurants 
and homes. Domestic consumption has fallen 41% between 2001 and 2010 according to 
the Panel of Alimentary Consumption (MARM). Given such decline in consumption and an 
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increase in production, there is a disequilibrium in offer and demand which suggests a 
structural rather than just a temporal problem of circumstance. 
Policies.	 The evolution of the EU wine industry during the last several years has been 
influenced by a combination of factors: the restructuring of vineyards, the reform of the 
specific Common Organisation of Markets for wine (Council Regulation EC No.479/2008 of 
29 de April of 2008) and the wine crisis induced by the strong European and worldwide 
production. With an emphasis on competitiveness, a Program of National Support was 
approved in October 2008 with financing for the period 2009-2013 resulting in Royal 
Decree 244/2009, of February 27.  
While this is not specific to cooperatives, given the high level of market share that wine 
cooperatives have in Spain, coupled with the fact that traditionally cooperative wines 
tended to be in the bulk or lower range offerings, these changes have profoundly affected 
wine cooperatives. According to Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, while there have been 
problems with the application of Commission Regulation 555/2008 due to technical and 
legal issues, restructuring of the vineyards and promotion efforts have been welcomed by 
farmers (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011e). However, given the loss of traditional 
instruments of control, particularly in alcohol sales, distillations, juice and export 
restitutions, prices have been affected as has all links of the production chain. Direct 
payments for wine grapes only partially compensate farmers who must lower their costs 
and adapt their vineyards to market demand in order to benefit from restructuring and 
reconversion.  
The wineries (“bodegas”) have experienced a loss of revenues given lower prices and the 
lack of remuneration for some of their by-products. Cooperatives have been especially 
affected by the lack of demand for wine to use in the elaboration of drinkable alcohol due 
to the elimination of aid, as well as the disappearance of crisis distillation. These losses 
however are compensated by other types of aid to encourage promotion and investment. 
In the last few years aid for improving the competitiveness of the sector and encouraging 
exportation to foreign markets has increased. Under the “Measures for Promotion to third 
countries”, 464 programs in more than 30 countries have been approved with an 
investment of 160 million Euros. According to OEMV in 2010-2011, 485 programs were 
carried out with a total investment of 60 million for Spain, which implied CMO aid of 30 
million Euros. For 2011-2012, with an initial budget of 80 million Euros, 932 programs 
were approved with a final investment of 106.7 million Euros (OEMV)). 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
165 
 
In 2010/2011: 
 activities related to public relations and promotion represented 59% (35 million) 
of that invested 
 activities related to congresses and expositions represented 15% (8.8 million) 
 the cost of information about the European system of quality indicators was 13% 
(7.3 million) of the total 
 investment in market information was limited to 7% of the total (4 million) 
 investment in evaluation of measures reached 7% (4.2 million) (OEMV, 2012) 
One interesting point on the form in which Spain is applying its promotional methods is 
that the beneficiaries tend to be private or producer organisations and in countries like 
Italy and France public entities and inter-professional groups benefit more so from such 
funds (OEMV, 2010). 
Three main difficulties have been found in the implementation of CMO by the Spanish 
Ministry, the Autonomous Communities and FEGA (the entity which makes payments) 
which limits the efficiency of the methods: 1) renunciation of solicited programs at the 
moment of adjudication, often because of problems obtaining guarantees; 2) lack of 
execution of a part of the presented program; and 3) problems with justifying executed 
costs.  
As well Cooperativas Agroalimentarias has pointed out issues in implementation: 
 limitations of the regulation in investment matters  
 the necessity to establish restrictions to ensure the efficient use of funds within the 
appropriate time period  
 the obligation to avoid overlapping with other aid that can have the same end  
 the postponement of the application of measures  
The subsidised pulling up of vines resulted in more than 85,000 ha in 3 years, 
representing 6.1% of the area planted at such time at the commencement of the CMO in 
August 2008. Castilla-La Mancha is the autonomous community in which the highest 
quantity of vines have been taken out (OEMV, 2010). 
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Wine	 Cooperatives.	 The business structure of the wine subsector in general is 
characterised by a high level of vertical integration. A dual structure coexists wherein a 
small group of large dynamic companies that have managed to deal with market changes 
is in contrast to many companies that have not yet adapted to new and competitive 
markets. These small companies are dedicated only to agriculture, leaving 
commercialisation tasks to other companies which control this process.	
Within cooperatives a similar structure exists as in the rest of the wine sector; that is, a 
predominance of small and medium cooperatives and a few IOFs. The structure is very 
fragmented and in addition there are various levels of development. As a rule, small 
unprofessional cooperatives are dedicated to production and do not participate in later 
stages of production and supply chain. They have limited negotiating power. Another 
group of cooperatives commercialise bottled wine although their principle activity 
continues to be the sale of bulk wine. Finally there is a small group of cooperatives that 
commercialise the product of their member with a clear professional market approach. 
In light of this, the commercialization of product from cooperative wineries continues to 
be quite insignificant compared to the industry in general and represents one of the main 
problems of cooperative wineries (Navarro and Millán, 2007). As well, commercialization 
through second tier cooperatives is also insignificant and they generally are active in the 
sale of bulk wine. The creation of commercial companies and the externalization of 
services are some of the alternatives being employed by the sector. The sector has 
recognized the need to group production to achieve competitiveness both in external and 
domestic markets through Organisations of Wine Producer Businesses to reorder the 
sector, reducing the number of businesses and increasing their size (Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias, 2011). As a complement to this strategy is a push for higher quality 
wines produced by niche producers. 
With respect to distribution, the methods most employed are the use of non exclusive 
distributors and the sale to large distributors, thus reducing direct sales made by the 
cooperative. Intermediary importers are used for external markets.  
Necessary	Action. The necessity to highlight cooperative brands that can be recognized 
by the consumer as well as the need to strengthen market knowledge and commercial 
strategies and improve distribution networks, which are poorly developed due to the 
prevalence of bulk sales, is clear. The cooperative sector advocates the increase of 
production and visibility in order to obtain negotiating power with the large distribution 
chains. In addition, more effort needs to be put towards promotion both domestically and 
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internationally, investigating alternatives to distillation, ensuring quality and 
differentiation, and devising appropriate financing and insurance to allow export. 
Cooperative branding and strengthening market knowledge of “cooperative advantage” is 
also relevant. 
The lack of communication between autonomous communities and the Administration is a 
real concern that has directly affected the efficacy of policy measures, such as not utilising 
available budgeted aid and a lack of a coherent strategy across the various wine regions of 
Spain. Although this has been recognised by the sector, progress needs to be made. 
As for appropriate strategies to follow for the future, both the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperativas Agroalimentarias have been of the opinion that the future of the sector 
requires a reduction in the number of farms and an increase in size thus deducting that 
this will translate into competitiveness and more market opportunities. Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias has also indicated their belief that aid to wine farmers and businesses 
should be conditioned on their grouping in order to “balance” the supply chain 
(Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011e, 2011f; Garrido, 2011). 
If we look at bit more closely into the issues which atomisation in wine cooperatives raise 
in the sector we can see that: 
 small wine cooperatives are not usually market oriented and their 
members and management may be more traditional (clearly, there are 
exceptions) 
 the small dimensions of cooperatives make it difficult to have adequate 
commercial networks, both in and out of Spain 
 in addition, taking on innovative projects may be difficult for small 
cooperatives 
 there are a great number of small wine bottlers that function during few 
days per year. This is inefficient given the large number of installations and 
the relatively small amount of wine that is bottled per annum  
While grouping together of cooperatives may alleviate these problems there is no reason 
that they will necessarily do so: 10 small cooperatives grouped together without vision, 
management skills or interest in customer focused products will only be 10 times as 
ineffective as one small ineffective cooperative. There are also ways in which “soft” 
cooperation and networks can serve to alleviate the above mentioned problems without 
mandating groupings. Commonly held bottling facilities, experimental farms financed by 
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cooperative funds, cooperative management advisors (perhaps as part of a credit 
cooperative involvement), distribution and marketing coordination, etc. are also feasible 
alternatives, particularly in product that is so closely related to territory.  
As in other sectors such as fruits and vegetables, one of the largest hindrances in the 
cooperative wine sector is the lack of coordination further down the supply chain. Where 
cooperatives could be poised to take advantage of such vertical arrangements—indeed 
between the grower members and the cooperatives they have proven this ability—they 
have not yet taken advantage of it.  
Given the huge range of wines and their markets, each cooperative must determine 
whether their future depends on groupings (which would be beneficial for those 
producing basic product) or whether there are some particular wine cooperatives, 
however small, that have the quality of grapes, the marketing savvy and a cooperative 
support network in terms of promotion, marketing, logistics and distribution to succeed. 
Aside from the wine cooperatives listed in the “top 5”, the Cooperative Adega e Viñedos 
Paco & Lola has garnered a lot of press attention due to its successful marketing and 
internationalisation strategies (Alimarket 2007, 2010b, 2010c, 2011c, 2011d). It produces 
the “albariños” (a much appreciated white wine, locally and internationally) “Paco & Lola” 
and “Rosalía de Castro”. In 2010 its turnover increased by 10%, reaching 3.8 million Euros. 
With 430 members, it is the cooperative most important in the Denomination of Origin 
Rías Baixas. 
In the last few years it has consolidated its distribution at the national and international 
level, increasing its sales of its own labels by 50% and reducing bulk sales and bottling for 
third parties by 23% and 50% respectively. In 2010 the cooperative exported 70% of its 
production, reaching 20 countries. The cooperative also received various awards due to 
both product innovation and also product presentation. 
5.6.7 Dairy	
In 2010 the dairy sector represented 15.71% of final livestock production and 6% of final 
agricultural production, the principal product being cow milk (MARM, 2012). The 
cooperative market share is 40%. 
Spain occupies the seventh place in terms of volume of milk production behind Germany, 
France, the U.K., Holland, Italy and Poland. Spanish milk production represents 4.2% of the 
total volume of milk produced in the EU. The number of cows for milk production in 2010 
was 23.6 million in the EU-27 and in Spain 828.000 (Eurostat). 
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Production. In 2011 86% of dairy production was cow milk, while sheep and goat milk 
each represented 7% for a total of 14%. Equal to the rest of the EU, cowherd suitable for 
milk production has decreased significantly in favour of those suitable for meat. Currently, 
30% of herds older than 2 years are dedicated to milk production as opposed to 58% in 
1990 (MARM, 2011d). In contrast, sheep and goat milk has evolved positively in the last 
decade. The production of sheep milk by cooperatives has reached 24% of total 
production while the production of the principle goat cooperatives constitutes 15% 
(Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2010c).56  
The principle autonomous communities which produce milk are Galicia (34%), Castilla 
and Leon (16.87%), Andalusia (9.05%), Catalonia (8.72%) and Asturias (7.4%). The 
production of sheep milk is focused in Castilla and Leon and Castilla-La Mancha, whilst 
goat milk is important in Andalusia (43.39%), the Canary Islands (18.77%) and Castilla-La 
Mancha (11.44%).  
The sector is based principally on the elaboration of liquid milk (60%) while the rest is for 
milk products. This structure is very different than that of other large EU markets, which 
are based more on cheese, butter and powdered milk. The majority of packaged milk is 
sold to grand distributors and the distributors brand represents 52% of internal 
consumption (MARM, 2009b). 
Table	5.29	Milk	production	(million	litres).	
Year	 Cow	milk	 Sheep	milk Goat	milk Total
2000 6,107 392 439 6,937
2001 6,330 394 489 7,213
2002 6,418 406 513 7,337
2003 6,443 411 487 7,340
2004 6,384 410 479 7,274
2005 6,370 408 472 7,250
2006 6,192 424 492 7,108
2007 6,143 414 489 7,046
2008 6,157 427 491 7,075
2009 6,069 490 515 7,074
2010 6,172 566 507 7,245
2011 6,299 504 467 7,270
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
Prices. The medium price received by farmers in the sector has risen gradually until 2009. 
However, the price still was below the cost of production. Falling prices, lack of 
profitability and rising costs of production create a complex situation.  
                                                                  
56 It should be noted that these figures refer to only those cooperatives which are members of the national 
confederation, Cooperativas Agroalimentaria. The actual percentage of cooperatives may be higher. 
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Figure	5.59	Average	price	received	by	farmers	(€/100	kg).	
 Data source: MARM (2011d) 
	
Exports	and	Imports.	Spanish exports of milk and milk derivatives increased until 2005, 
at which point they began to decrease especially in 2008. The principle destinations for 
exports are France, Italy and Portugal. Imports have increased significantly, as can be seen 
in Figure 5.60 below, such imports corresponding to a fall in prices of milk as seen in 
Figure 5.59 above: 
Figure	5.60	Milk	Imports.	
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
Distribution	of	Farms. The sector is characterized by significant atomization in contrast 
to the concentration of organized distribution. Such atomization is especially significant in 
production, given that 63.32% of farms hold 22% of the quota, while the remaining 78% of 
the quotas are in the hands of 32.83% of the farms. Since the 1990s production has been 
abandoned by many farms, leading to an increase in their size. The objective of such 
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increase in size had been to improve competitiveness in the sector, but it has ended up 
provoking a contrary effect, producing an important increase in costs (COAG, 2010). Costs 
have increased due to the fact that an increase in growth has been accompanied by a 
greater intensity of production, thus resulting in higher costs.  
 
Figure	5.61	Number	of	farms	(2000‐2010).	
 Source: Informe Coag (2010) 
 
Policies.	 Dairy, being a quota system has traditionally limited Spanish production. The 
plans to do away with the quota system in 2015 poses a series of uncertainties for the 
sector and probably represents the most important influential factor in the future 
configuration of milk prices in Spain. The quota system not only has repercussions for the 
level of production but also for costs and the margin for producers given that the quota 
affects the amortizations and investments in capital and personal, amongst other factors 
(MARM, 2009b)  
Another factor that has traditionally influenced the results of the sector has been the 
commercial relation between suppliers (individual producers and cooperatives) and 
processors that have existed under various contractual arrangements. Since 2008 
standard contracts have been used, such that the contractual relations now exist within a 
given framework and with greater stability. (By Order ARM/2394/2008, 18 of July, the 
homologation of a dairy contract template being done through various ministry orders, 
ARM/2581/2009 and ARM/2834/2010.) Such contractual arrangements have been 
viewed positively by the milk sector and the Confederation. Fixed contracts for 12 months 
are the most common. 57 
Dairy	Cooperatives.	 During the last several years, cooperatives have concentrated and 
amplified the service offered to their member farmers. In doing so cooperatives have been 
                                                                  
57 See http://www.agro-alimentarias.coop/ficheros/doc/03322.pdf wherein the contracts have 
been described as a success. 
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able to assure the collection of milk, have offered more financial help to give liquidity, etc. 
As a strategy to ensure competitiveness of the dairy cooperatives, integration is seen 
within the sector as a method to improve the negotiation capacity with the rest of the food 
chain (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011b), however concerns exist, as mentioned 
above, in relation to increased costs. As well, the production of sheep and goat milk is in 
the middle of an important change in terms production methods, such that intensive	
production is more and more common as compared to traditional methods. 24% of the 
total production of sheep milk is now through cooperatives, which is leading to ambitious 
processes of collaboration both in terms of processes and also in the concentration of 
offer. 
Necessary	 Action. The sector has identified the following strategies: concentration of 
offer, transformation and adding value to products, commercialisation, control of 
production to manage offer and demand and aid for “doing” not “being”. 
5.6.8 Sheep	meat	
The sheep and goat live stock sector has a great territorial importance, not only for its 
economic contribution but also from the point of view of social cohesion and the 
sustainable use of lands in which they operate, contributing to the maintenance of the 
environment and the continued human presence and economic viability in disfavoured 
rural zones (MARM, 2009a). The importance of the sector within agriculture has 
decreased in the last decade. In 2000 it represented 13.71% of livestock production and 
4.67% in final agricultural production. In 2012 sheep and goal meat made up 1.87% of 
final agricultural production and represented 4.95% of final animal stock production. The 
production of sheep meat in Spain represents 17.25% of the EU total and is superseded 
only by the U.K.: (36.19%) (Eurostat). Cooperatives make up 25% of such sector (source-
Cooperatives Agroalimentarias).  
Production.	From 1992 to 2000 the number of sheep in Spain was practically stable and 
thereafter has fallen considerable due in part to the CAP reforms which affected subsidies 
received by the sector. The new CAP approved in 2006 and completed in 2010 resulted as 
well in a decline, given the decoupling of production with sector aid, tied now to the 
historic rights in function of stock number held in 2008. As a result, many stock keepers 
have abandoned their herds or reduced their numbers (Alimarket, 2010a). The price of 
feed has also affected production as well as the variability in the price of goat milk. 
However, at the moment these reductions are less than that those of other EU producers. 
Production fell 19.4% between 2007 and 2009.	
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Spanish sheep production is concentrated in 5 communities: Extremadura (20.65%), 
Castilla and Leon (19.28%), Castilla – La Mancha (15.64%), Andalusia (13.01%) and 
Aragon (11.79%). These 5 communities represent 80.37% of the total. The production of 
goat in Spain is concentrated in 4 communities: Andalusia (35.70%), Castilla – La Mancha 
(15.41%), Canary Islands (10.94%) and Extremadura (10.23%). These four communities 
represent 73.29% of the total. The 3 principle cooperatives in the sector are found in 
Aragon (Cooperative Oviaragon), Extremadura (Oviso) and Andalusia (Dehesas 
Cordobesas). 
Figure	5.62	Number	of	sheep	and	goats	(2000‐2011).	
 Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
Prices. As seen below, prices have remained relatively stable, although there is a great 
fluctuation throughout the year. It should also be noted that the price of the skin, which 
varies greatly during the year as well as between different communities in Spain, has a 
notable impact on the final price of sheep product as does the price of wool to a lesser 
degree. Goat and sheep meat is also very seasonal (more popular during Christmas and 
Easter season) but as well, is seasonal in terms of breeding (more difficult to breed in 
spring). This results often in a situation where higher product price also signifies higher 
breeding costs. Strategy is dependent on which market is sought. 
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Figure	5.63	Average	price	received	by	farmers	2000‐2011	(€/100	kg).	
 Data source: MARM (2011d) 
 
External	Trade.	 Spain is a net exporter of sheep and goat meat (although goat meat is 
quite insignificant) principally to EU member states with 97% of the total, concretely 
France (41.78%), Italy (17.13%), UK (11.36) and Portugal (7.18%). The Arab countries 
represent an important new strategic export market, although export to non-member 
countries presents difficulties. 
Structure	 of	 the	 Sector.	 Production is very dispersed, from many small operations to 
cooperatives with thousands of heads of stock. The complexity and number of actors in the 
commercialisation in origin depends on the avenues of commercialization and whether 
the direct purchases are possible in the slaughterhouses. The wholesalers which carry out 
commercialisation in origin cover the management of the animal from the purchase from 
the farmer until its final transformation. The fundamental differences between the agents 
at the sales points lie in their size, volume and variety of product. 
Aside from the basic value chain, there is a difference between the traditional and modern 
model: in the former the butcher buys from the slaughterhouse directly and is then 
responsible for breaking it down and preparing it. The modern model is characterized by 
the presence of large distributors at the sale point who require product which is more 
specialized and exacting in specifications (MARM, 2009a). In addition, the zones of 
consumption and production are mismatched; that is, there is important production but 
low consumption in the south and high consumption and low production in the north. This 
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fact has an impact on the commercialisation and business strategy of the various 
cooperatives who produce goat and sheep meat, dependent on where they are situated. 
Policies.	 See “Production” above for consequences of the CAP reform and also 
“Cooperatives” below for the reference to Royal Decree 104/2008 and grouping of 
producers. Royal Decree 1615/2007 of the 7 of December (BOE 20 Dec.) established the 
bases upon which to grant subsidies to encourage the production of quality agro food 
animal products and has resulted in many cooperatives increasing the number of 
members due to the fact that the concentration of offer has resulted in more price stability 
and a stronger presence in the market. The restructuring of the sector has decreased the 
number of operations but increased the size of those that continue in production 
(Alimarket, 2011f).  
One concern pointed out by the Spanish Society for Sheep and Goat Production in relation 
to the new CAP draft (2014-2020) and its assessment of producers based on farm size, is 
that it does not take into account those farmers that rely on agricultural plant residues and 
common grazing areas where the farmer does not hold title. The productive use of plant 
residues and the control of excess vegetation in public areas can contribute to the public 
good and yet are detrimental to those farmers that rely on such practices, instead of being 
large land owners. As well, those operations which are not also dedicated to sheep or goat 
milk require less land and thus are more intensive. This distinction is not taken into 
account. 
 A policy that the Spanish Society for Sheep and Goat Production claims to be effective is 
that of the "Protected Geographical Indication" identifying a quality area. In sheep meat 
(lamb) there are six such PGI. Oviaragon is tied to the PGI of "Ternasco de Aragon" and the 
cooperative Oviso is closely related to "Cordero de Extramadura". The use of such 
indications is seen to be an important strategy to integrate further down the supply chain 
and as well this strategy has proven to be less expensive and time consuming than the 
establishment of trademarks of guarantee or collective trademarks, which must be 
registered under patent and trademark laws. As well this strategy serves to protect 
traditional breeds and production practices.  
Sheep	Cooperatives.	 The cooperatives in this sector are a key element in avoiding the 
disappearance of this type of livestock operations in many zones of Spain and compensate 
the loss of profitability of the farmers. However the many small operations are a problem 
for the adequate development in the sector. As a result the sector is going through a 
profound process of cooperative integration with the creation of second level cooperatives 
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and other cases of cooperative mergers. This process was done under the impetus of Royal 
Decree 104/2008 that established aid for groupings of producers. The region of Castilla La 
Mancha has introduced a new law for the granting of subsidies to form producer groups in 
the sheep and goat sector (Orden AYG/893/2012, 17 of October). This type of incentive 
already exists for areas such as Castilla Leon, as set out in Chapter 5.6. 
The cooperatives which produce lamb have changed drastically their path and have 
improved production, consumer orientation and increased the processes of collaboration 
between cooperatives to access markets. In addition much R&D in adapting to consumer 
demands has been carried out. 
Given that one of the principle problems of the sector is the decline in consumption, 
measures must be taken to increase demand. This could be achieved by extending both 
production and demand to cover more seasons so as to minimize profound price 
fluctuations. 
The strengths of the sector lie in flexibility (animals can graze in many places) with a need 
for little infrastructure, the high quality of meat and the high number of autochthonous 
breeds (MARM, 2009a).  
Challenges for the cooperatives are the lack of structures and channels of 
commercialisation, decrease in demand, high prices of animal feed, aging farmers and 
difficulty in finding workers, competition with other EU member states with more sector 
subsidies and third countries with lower costs, lack of promotion of the sector (Union of 
AgCoop, Castilla-La Mancha, 2008).  
Necessary	Action	According	to	the	Sector.	The sector proposed that operations must be 
larger and more specialized. More producer groups are needed that develop vertically and 
that increase efficiencies and there should be a favouring of long term agreements 
between distributors and producer cooperatives. The product should be identified with 
Spain, with a protected geographical indication, and with traditional foods. As well there 
should be the development of aid linked to agro-environmental issues and pastures and 
publicity to increase consumption and exportation, and the reduction of seasonality. On 
the human resources side, there should be an emphasis on incorporating youth and also 
the proper training of qualified butchers and in the preparation of prepared product to 
meet consumer demand. Support for developing consumption in the restaurant and hotel 
sector is also important. New export markets should be developed. 
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5.6.9 Pig	meat	
The pork sector in Spain represents 37.05% of the total animal stock production and 
14.05% of final agricultural production (MARM, 2012). Spain is the second country in the 
EU in number of pigs (Germany being the first) with 17.24 % of the European stocks in 
2011, and the fourth in the world in pork production. Cooperatives represent about 25% 
of market share (Cogeca, 2010). Of the cooperatives which form part of Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias (national confederation) 51 cooperatives, 13 produce Iberic products.  
Production.	Stock numbers increased up to 2007, after which there has been a decline. 
Rising animal feed prices and falling prices due to the excess of production were 
responsible such that a market adjustment was necessary. This trend was similar to that 
experience in Europe although the growth phase in Spain was steeper (MARM, 2011a). 
Pork production is mainly in Catalonia (27.27%), Aragon (21.35%), Castilla and Leon 
(14.06%) and Andalusia (8.86%). As cooperatives are governed predominantly by 
community laws, the cooperative laws of such regions would be most relevant in this 
sector. The top 5 pork cooperatives in this study are located in Galicia, Andalusia, Aragon 
and Castilla and Leon. 
Prices.	In the pork sector, there is no direct aid nor the application of reference prices for 
the sector such that the market price is strictly that of supply and demand, depending on 
the level of production (Dir.Gen of MR, 2011). In the last several years, in spite of the fall in 
demand and the excess of offer, prices have still risen. 
Figure	5.64	Pig	meat	average	prices	2000‐2011	(€/100	kg).	
 
Data source: MARM (2011d) 
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External	 Trade.	 Exports have grown significantly in the last 10 years as the Spanish 
market cannot absorb all of its production (COAG, 2010). As a result, the sector depends 
on exportation to stabilize the sector and as well must adapt costs and prices to guarantee 
competitiveness on an international level (Escribano, 2006). The principle destination for 
Spanish pork exports are EU member states representing 85.6% of total exports, 
concretely France (26%), Portugal (10.14%), Italy (12.08%) and Germany (6.74%). 15% is 
destined for other countries outside the EU. 
Structure	 of	 the	 Sector.	 Given the difficult market conditions, the pork sector has 
experienced a decrease in the number of farming operations and above all in “free” farms 
which were not included in the various vertically integrated businesses in the sector 
(COAG, 2010) 
In other cases, pork operations have opted for different modes of association. The sector 
has pushed for concentration to meet heightened market competition, reduced margins, 
distribution pressures and the high cost of animal feed (Alimarket, 2011a). 
In 2010, the number of pork farms was 94,252, of which 46% were of small or medium 
size. In 2007, the number of small and medium operations represented 60% of the total 
(MARM, 2011a). 
Traditionally, the pork operations have functioned through diverse forms: 
 as a residual activity alongside other agricultural or stock animal activities 
 via contracts with large companies through “integration” 
 association with cooperatives, where the farmer, maintaining independence could 
benefit from a series of services and representation, as well as the social benefits of 
the cooperative (Cooperativos Agroalimentarias, 2004) 
Policies. Royal Decree 324/2000 of the 3rd of March establishes regulations for pork 
production with the object of guiding and managing growth in the sector and also of 
providing the sector with a comprehensive and unified regulatory landscape. This 
legislation has been considered to be a key element in the success of the sector, 
notwithstanding increased costs and the modification of the productive map (Escribano, 
2006).  
Pig	 Meat	 Cooperatives.	 Cooperative pork production is made up of two types of 
cooperatives: the first are pork producer cooperatives, which as a service to the members 
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provide food for the animals. The second are those marketing cooperatives that carry out 
the sale of the live animals and the products obtained after their sacrifice. 
Analysing the marketing cooperatives one can observe that the majority are dedicated to 
selling live animals. Of those cooperatives that market products obtained after the 
sacrifice, the sale is done predominantly through channels. As there exist more restrictions 
and health and sanitary problems in relation to live animals than with meat and products 
derived from pork, for this reason, cooperatives should centre not only in the sale of 
animals but also in the production of transformed/processed/value added products. In 
addition, this would facilitate sales and exportation.  
Some cooperatives of the first level have united, amongst pork producing cooperatives, 
and also with cooperatives that are not dedicated to the production of pork in second level 
cooperatives. Currently, eight second level cooperatives are dedicated exclusively to the 
production of pork.  
Pork cooperatives are developing projects concentrating the offer, with the object of 
accessing new markets both within and outside of the EU. In addition, pork cooperatives 
have seen that their members are suffering from the complex and costly processes of 
adapting to the new EU norm, which increases demands for hygiene, environmental 
conditions and animal welfare. 
Amongst the proposed strategies to develop the cooperative pork sector were the 
following proposals: 
 differentiation, promoting the sale of cooperative product not as a low 
cost product but one which also has social value, environmentally 
friendly, with sound production practices and which promotes the 
rural economy 
 new markets which permit the marketing of member production-for 
this a certain distribution volume is necessary which can only be met 
by the grouping of cooperatives 
 grouping in order to control costs that exporting would imply and to 
reach a competitive volume of product and optimize investments 
 promotion of cooperative product with the creation of a unique 
cooperative label that permits the consumer to link the product with 
cooperative activity (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2004) 
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5.7 Overview	of	policy	measures		
5.7.1	Regulatory	framework		
The performance of cooperatives, including producer organisations, is influenced by the 
regulatory framework in a country. This framework is multi-level: EU regulations, national 
laws and particularly in Spain, regional policies influence the way cooperatives can 
operate. In this chapter the regulatory framework that influences the competitive position 
of the cooperative versus the investor-owned firm (IOF) or the competitive position of the 
cooperative versus other players in the food chain (e.g. the retail sector) is set out.	
These competitive positions are influenced within the regulatory framework by much 
more than the law that establishes the rules for running a cooperative (business 
organisation law). Well known other examples include agricultural policy (e.g., the EU’s 
CMO that deals with POs in the F&V sector), fiscal policies (at the level of the cooperative 
and the way returns on investments in cooperatives are taxed at farm level) and 
competition policies. There are different types of policy measures in the regulatory 
framework (McDonnell and Elmore, 1987): 
POLICY	MEASURE	TYPE	 DEFINITION
Mandates  Rules governing the actions of individuals and agencies 
Inducements Transfer money to individuals in return for certain actions
Capacity Building Spending of time and money for the purpose of investment 
in material, intellectual, or human resources (this includes 
research, speeches, extension, etc.) 
System Changing Transfer official authority (rather than money) among 
individuals and agencies in order to alter the system by 
which public goods and services are delivered 
 
The objective of this section is to identify support measures that have proved to be useful 
to support farmers’ cooperatives. In Chapter 5.7.2 the relevant policy measures are 
identified. In Chapter 5.7.3 a summary highlights main measures and trends 
(recommended for those readers who wish a general overview instead of the detail in 
Tables 5.30 to 5.34). Chapter 5.7.4 deals with competition law and Chapter 5.7.5 highlights 
tax issues.  
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5.7.2	Policy	measures	
The Table 5.30 below58 identifies the policy measures that influence the competitive 
position of the cooperative. (Please note that the CAP will be discussed in a general 
manner in Chapter 5.8 as it affects Spanish cooperatives, in addition to its having been 
referred to in Chapter 5.6 in relation to certain sectors.) In the list below, all the norms 
concerning policies and incentives at the state level and above all, at the level of the 
autonomous communities, have not been enumerated due to the sheer multitude of 
legislatives sources which are found in Spain. In light of this, certain Autonomous 
Communities and other norms have been chosen as representative examples. 
Below the laws and policies have been ordered in the following manner: 
 specific to cooperatives (Table 5.30) 
 specific to agricultural business (Table 5.31) 
 applicable to agricultural subsectors (Table 5.32) 
 applicable to business in general, but with an important impact on agricultural 
cooperatives (Table 5.33) 
Within such subcatergories, they are ordered first by national and then regional (including 
“foral”) regulation. Finally, selected EU policies have been included in Table 5.34. 
Table	5.30	Policy	Measure	Description–Specific	to	cooperatives.	
Policy	Measure	
Name 
Policy	Measure	
Type Description	of	agricultural	cooperative	relevance 
Spanish	
Constitution,	1978	
(art.	129.2) 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
‐National‐mandate	 on	 public	 powers	 to	 provide	
adequate	 legislation	 for	 the	 creation	 and	
promotion	of	cooperative	enterprises	
	
Social	 Economy	
Law 5/2011, 29 
March 
5.	Other. 
Promoting social 
economy 
 
‐National‐provision	of	framework	that	recognises	
and	gives	better	visibility	of	the	social	economy.	
‐Recognition,	as	a	general	 interest	matter,	of	 the	
promotion,	 stimulus	 and	 development	 of	 social	
economy	 entities	 and	 their	 representative	
organisations	
-Cooperatives	 and	 SATs	 (sociedades	 agrarias	 de	
transformación)	 are	 mentioned	 as	 being	 social	
economy	entities.	
Cooperative	 Law	
27/1999, 16 July 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-National	 law applicable to cooperatives that carry 
out their cooperative activities in various 
autonomous communities.	
-Not	applicable	where	the	cooperative	carries	out	
the	majority	of	 their	activity	 in	one	autonomous	
community.	 (As	 a	 practical	 reality,	 most	
agricultural	 cooperatives	 are	 formed	 under	 the	
                                                                  
58 This table was compiled under the supervision of Professor Carlos Vargas Vasserot, University of Almería, 
Faculty of Law.  
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laws	of	an	autonomous	community.)	
-This 1999 law, in contrast to the 1989 law, made	
more	 flexible	 the	 economic	 and	 administrative	
regime	of	 the	cooperatives	and	 included	a	series	
of	changes	 in	material	regarding	the	 financing	of	
the	cooperative.	
-Art. 93 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives 
and arts. 94 and 97 to cooperatives	 of	 common	
exploitation	 of	 farm	 lands	 (CEC). With respect to 
the former, it defines agricultural cooperatives and 
enumerates the permitted activities and provides for 
certain particular situations such as the 
establishment	of	a	limit	on	transactions/dealings	
with	third	parties. With respect to the latter, the law 
provides a concept of such term and sets out who can 
be members, the ceasing of use and the enjoyment of 
benefits and its economic regime.	
Royal Decree 
1776/1981, 3 
August, approval of 
the Statute that 
regulates the 
Agrarian	 Societies	
of	 Transformation	
(SATs)	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation	
National-This regulation provides for the Statute	of	
the	Agrarian	Societies	of	Transformation	 (SATs),	
defining their character and their functioning, the 
regulation of the rights of members and the 
participation of the same in the agrarian common 
company. This norm sets out basic characteristics 
which must be fulfilled, the rules applicable to 
members, necessary documentation, organisational 
bodies, dissolution, liquidation and cancellation of the 
SAT.  
Order of 14 
September, 1982 
which develops 
Royal Decree 
1776/1981, of the 3 
of August, 
approving the 
Statute	which	
regulates	the	
Agrarian	Societies	
of	Transformation	
(SATs)	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation	
-Establishment of the requirements for the 
constitution and registry inscription of	SATs.	
Royal Decree 
136/2002, 1 
February,-approval 
of	 Regulations	 of	
Cooperatives	
Registry. 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
National-The regulation organises/systemizes 
registry material concerning cooperatives regulated 
by Law 27/1999 (above) as a	method	of	giving	legal	
security	 and	 formality, the effect of which is to 
guarantee the publication and the legality of the 
founding of cooperative enterprises. 	
Andalusian	
Cooperatives	 Law	
2/1999, 31 March 
* Repealed and 
replaced with Law 
14/2011, of 
December 23, 
Andalusian	
Cooperative	
Societies 
 
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Arts. 152 and 153 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and Arts. 154 and 157 to cooperatives	
for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	lands	
‐ Notable	in	respect	to	agricultural	cooperatives	is	
the	 potential	 for	 inter‐cooperative	 relations	
pursuant	to	very	 flexible	provisions,	which	could	
be	 considered	 to	 be	 transactions/dealings	 with	
third	parties.	
-During the writing of this thesis, a new Andalusian 
Cooperative Societies Law was introduced which 
stated object was to reinforce	competitive	capacity	
and	 address	 the	 needs	 of	 this	 sector	 in	 such	
autonomous	community.  
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
183 
 
-the stated objective of this new law is to allow for 
greater competitiveness for cooperatives and to 
provide	 legal	 and	 economic‐financing	
instruments which will be at the disposition of the 
cooperatives that are compatible	with	the	nature	of	
the	cooperative	movement.		
- Elimination of numerous bureaucratic	hurdles 
-The law allows more freedom for the cooperatives 
to craft	their	own	bylaws 
- There is a new	 figure	 of	 capitalist	 member	 or	
member‐investor. 
-novel introduction of “trial”	investor  
- Voluntary establishment of plural	votes. 
- Free assignment	of	capital	contributions	to	third	
persons. 
- Greater liberty	in	the	distribution	of	benefits. 
- Reduction	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 dealings	 with	
third	 parties	 and the strengthening	 of	 mergers 
through the simplification of procedures. This new 
law is further described in Chapter 6.	
Decree 267/2001, of 
11 December, 
Regulation	 of	 the	
Development	 of	
the	 Law	 of	
Andalusian	
Cooperatives  
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
 
-This decree regulates the functioning of the Registry	
of Andalusian Cooperatives 
Aragon	
Cooperatives	 Law 
9/1998, 22 
December, 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 80 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and art. 81 to cooperatives of common	exploitation	
of	farm	lands 
Decree 15/2011, 25 
January of the 
Government	 of	
Aragon,	 approving	
the	 Regulation	 of	
the	 Agrarian	
Societies	 of	
Transformation	
(SATs) 
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation	
-Regulation applicable to SATs	that	have	their	place	
of	business	 in	Aragon and that are inscribed in the 
SAT Registry of Aragon as a consequence of having 
been constituted and having carried out their 
activities in such autonomous community. 
-This	 Decree	 intends	 to	 correlate,	 to	 the	 extent	
possible,	the	 figure	of	the	SAT	to	the	cooperative	
prototype,	with	 the	 objective	 that	 the	 SATs	will	
be,	 in	 the	 near	 future,	 a	 tool	 for	 local	
development,	an	advanced	alternative	 for	 family	
agriculture	 and	 an	 instrument	 for	 the	
diversification	 of	 the	 agrarian	 economy	 with	 a	
collective	 and	 entrepreneurial	 character.	This	 is	
the	 first	 autonomous	 community	 norm	 which	
regulates	 the	 legal	 regime	 of	 the	 SATs	 and	 it	 is	
being	 constitutionally	 challenged	 for	 lack	 of	
legislative	jurisdiction/competence. 
Cooperative	Law	of	
the	 Principality	 of	
Asturias 4/2010 29 
de June 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 161 to 163 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and arts. 164 to 171 to cooperatives	
for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
-Notable	in	respect	to	agricultural	cooperatives	is	
the	 provision	which	 allows	 cooperative	 statutes	
and	 bylaws	 to	 require	 a	 minimum	 or	 exclusive	
participation	 and	 a	 minimum	 term	 for	
cooperative	members. 
Cooperative	Law	of	 1.	Mandate. Cooperative 
-Art. 130 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and arts. 131 to 134 to cooperatives	 for	 the	
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Castilla‐La	
Mancha, 11/2010, 4 
November. 
(Cooperative 
Registry--Decree 
178/2005, 25 de 
October) 
legislation common	exploitation	of	farm	lands	
-With	respect	to	agricultural	cooperatives,	certain	
modifications	have	been	introduced	 in contrast to 
the prior revoked law (more precision in definitions, 
minimum time requirement for members and 
required obligations, dealings with third parties, etc.)	
most	 notable	 the	 possibility	 to,	 in	 conjunction	
with	the	social	object	of	such	cooperatives,	carry	
out	other	economic	activities	and	services	related	
to	 development,	 sustainability,	 promotion	 and	
transformation	 of	 the	 rural	 environment,	 rural	
tourism,	 environmental	 activities,	 cultural	
activities,	 new	 technologies,	 assistance	 services,	
consumer	 services,	 advising	 services	 and	
whatever	other	activity	of	like	or	similar	nature.	
Community	 of	
Castilla	 and	 Leon	
Cooperative	 Law	
4/2002, 11 April 
(Cooperative 
Registry Decree 
125/2004, 30 
December) 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Arts. 113 and 114 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and arts. 108 to 111 to cooperatives	
for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
Cooperatives	 of	
Catalonia	 Law	
18/2002, 5 July. 
(Cooperative 
Registry- Decree 
203/2003, 1 
August) 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Arts. 93 to 95 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives,  
Cooperative	
Societies	of	
Extremadura	Law 
2/1998, 26 March	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Arts. 125 to 128 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and arts. 129 to 133 to cooperatives	
for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
Special	
Cooperative	
Societies	of	
Extremadura	Law	
8/2006, 23 
December,	
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Applicable to smaller	 cooperatives	 (from	 2‐20	
members) that carry out their principle cooperative 
activity in the Community of Extremadura. 
Cooperatives	Law	
of	Galicia 5/1998, 
18 December	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 111 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and arts. 112 and 113 to	 cooperatives	 for	 the	
common	exploitation	of	farm	lands,  
‐Notable	in	such	law,	amongst	other	peculiarities,	
is	 the	 possibility	 to	 incorporate	 as	 a	 member	
Galician	 Family	 businesses,	 an	 institution	 under	
Galician	civil	law.	
Cooperatives	Law	
of	the	Balearic	
Islands	1/2003, 20 
March		
(Cooperative 
Registry-Decree 
65/2006, 14 July) 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Arts. 120 to 122 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and arts. 123 to 127 to cooperatives	
for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
 ‐The	 law	 regulates	 and	 provides	 for	 the	
particularities	 that	 characterize	 agricultural	
cooperatives	 and	 allows	 for	 the	 promotion	 and	
motivation	 of	 agricultural	 modernization	 with	
structures	 that	 incorporate	 new	 techniques	 of	
exploitation	 and	 commercialization,	 in	 such	
manner	 providing	 for	 the	
business/entrepreneurship	nature	of	agricultural	
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cooperatives.
Cooperatives	of	La	
Rioja	Law	4/2001, 
2 July 
(Cooperative 
Registry Decree 
18/2003, 7 May)	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 113 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and arts. 114 and 117 to the cooperatives	 for	 the	
common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
Cooperatives	 of	
the	 Community	 of	
Madrid	 Law	
4/1999, 30 March 
(Cooperative 
Registry Decree 
177/2003, 17 of 
July)	
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 109 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and art- 110 to the cooperatives	 for	 the	 common	
exploitation	of	farm	lands 
Cooperative	
Societies	of	the	
Region	of	Murcia	
Law	8/2006,16 
November	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art. 116 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and arts-117 to 120 to the cooperatives	 for	 the	
common	exploitation	of	farm	lands 
 -The	law	regulates	and	provides	for	the	
particularities	that	characterise	agricultural	
cooperatives,	attempting	to	motivate	
modernisation	as	well	as	
business/entrepreneurship	in	such	entities.	
Cooperatives	of	
Navarra	Law	
“Foral”	14/2006, 11 
December	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Art.	66	is	dedicated	to	agricultural	cooperatives,	
providing	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 system	 of	
rotating	 capital	 and	 as	 well	 contemplates	 the	
obligation	 to	 reflect	 in	 its	 accounting	 specified	
patrimonial	funds.	
Cooperatives	of	
the	Basque	
Country	Law	
4/1993, 24 June	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Applicable to cooperative societies with their place 
of business in the territory of the autonomous 
community of the Basque	Country that carries out 
its principle cooperative activity in such territory. 
- Arts. 109 and 110 are dedicated to agricultural	
cooperatives and arts. 111 and 113 to the 
cooperatives	for	the	common	exploitation	of	farm	
lands 
Small	Cooperatives	
of	the	Basque	
Country	Law	
6/2008,	25	June	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
‐This	law	arose	out	of	the	necessity	to	provide	for	
the	 creation	 of	 a	 dynamic	 that	 favoured	 the	
entrepreneurship	 of	 small	 cooperatives	 in	 their	
capacity	of	agents	that	created	employment,	high	
quality	 employment	 and	 with	 the	 ability	 to	
distinguish	 themselves	 in	 their	 business	
environment,	 all	 under	 a	 scheme	 of	 self‐
management.	 In	 light	of	 this,	processes	 for	 their	
constitution	and	 inscription	were	 simplified,	 the	
number	of	necessary	members	reduced,	etc.	
Decree	58/2005,	
29	March,	
Regulation	of	the	
Cooperatives	of	
the	Basque	
Country	
(Registry of 
Cooperatives- 
Decree 59/2005, 29 
March) 
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-Regulation	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	
Cooperative	 Law	 of	 the	 Basque	 Country,	 which	
amongst	 other	 aspects,	 provided	 for	 the	 legal	
statute	 of	 distinct	 classes	 of	 members,	 the	
development	of	an	economic	regime	in	matters	of	
own	funds	and	the	clarification	of	applicability	of	
certain	legal	concepts. 
Community	of	
Valencia	
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
-Art. 87 is dedicated to agricultural	 cooperatives
and art. 88 to cooperatives	 for	 the	exploitation	of	
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Cooperatives	Law	
8/2003, 24 March	
legislation common	lands
European	
Cooperative	
Society	domiciled	
in	Spain Law 
3/2011, 4 March	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation and 
incorporation 
law 
-Adaptation	 and	 transposition	 of	 Spanish	 law	 to	
Community	 Regulation	 1.435/2003	 which	
regulates	 the	 European	 Cooperative	 Society	
domiciled	in	Spain.	
Cooperative	Tax	
Law	20/1990, 19 
December	
2.	Inducement.
Financial 
incentives 
National-Measure allows for the “favourable”	 tax	
treatment	 of	 cooperatives such that certain taxes 
do not apply such as for example, tax on capital 
transfers and notarized legal acts, Corporation Tax, 
etc. and to a greater degree of specially	protected	
cooperatives,	 in	which	 agricultural	 cooperatives	
are	included.	
Royal Decree 
1345/1992, 6 
November, re: 
norms for the 
adaptation of the 
dispositions which	
regulate	the	
taxation	of	the	
consolidated	
benefit	of	
cooperative	
societies	
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation 
 
-This normative disposition regulates the tax	regime
in relation to consolidated	 benefits	 of	 groups	 of	
cooperative	 societies, in which commenced	 the	
concept	 of	 a	 group	 of	 cooperative	 societies	 (art. 
1.2) and implanted	 a	 system	 of	 consolidation	
suitable	 for	 the	 characteristics	 of	 such	
cooperatives	 (a	 system	 of	 consolidation	 of	 tax	
liabilities	(cuotas	tributarias)	in	place	of	a	system	
of	 consolidation	 of	 taxable	 base	 (bases	
imponibles).  
Cooperatives	of	
Navarra	Tax	Law	
Foral 9/1994, 31 
June	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
-In order to receive the tax	 treatment provided for 
under this law, the cooperative must be established 
under the law of the community of Navarra. With 
respect to Corporate Tax law, such tax is applied to all 
such constituted and inscribed cooperatives. The tax 
rate is, in those protected cooperatives, 20%	for	the	
cooperative	results and the general	rate	for	extra‐
cooperative	results, and with respect to the rest, the 
general rate of tax. 
Cooperative	
Societies	of	Alava	
Tax	Regime	Norm	
“Foral”	16/1997, 9 
June	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
-Establishes the tax	 regime	 for	 Cooperative	
Societies	 of	 Alava (province	 of the Basque	
Country). 
 
Cooperatives	of	
Guipuzcoa	Tax	
Regime	Norm	
“Foral” 2/1997, 22 
May	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
-Establishes the	 tax	 regime	 for	 Cooperative	
Societies	 for	 Guipuzcoa (province of the Basque	
Country) 
 
Cooperative	
Societies	of	
Vizcaya	Tax	
Regime	Norm	
“Foral” 9/1997, 14 
October	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
-Establishes the tax	 regime	 of	 the	 Cooperative	
Societies	 of	 Vizcaya (province	 of the Basque	
Country) 
Order	ECO	
(Minster	of	
Economy)	
3614/2003,	16	
December,	
approval	of	norms	
respecting	the	
accounts	of	
1.	Mandate. 
Cooperative 
legislation 
-This order had as its objective the adaptation of the 
valuation norms and the elaboration	 of	 annual	
accounts	 to	 the	 peculiarities	 of	 cooperative	
societies, being of obligatory application, 
independent of where the principal activity was 
carried out and the autonomous norm to which such 
cooperative was subject. 
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Cooperative	
Societies	(was in 
vigour until January 
1, 2011)	
Order	EHA	
(Minister of 
Economy and Tax) 
/3360/2010, 21 
December,	
approval	of	norms	
respecting	the	
accounts	of	
cooperative	
societies	
1.	Mandate.	
Cooperative 
legislation and 
incorporation 
law 
-This Order was approved so that cooperative 
societies could have at their disposition accounting	
norms	that	allowed	such	cooperative	to	continue	
supplying	financial	information	in	the	framework	
of	 the	 General	 Accounting	 Plan	 and	 the	 General	
Accounting	Plan	for	SMEs,	in	keeping	as	well	with	
the	 International	 Accounting	 Standards	 for	
financial	 information	 adopted	 by	 the	 European	
Union	but	without	abandoning	an	important	part	
of	 the	 special	 regulation	 approved	 in	 2003,	 in	
certain	 cases	 simply	 including	 mere	 formal	
revisions.	
-Some	 of	 such	 standards	 prevent	 a	 specific	
accounting	treatment,	as	for	example,	in	the	cases	
in	which	a	member	acts	as	a	supplier	of	goods,	as	
is	the	case	of	agricultural	and	other	cooperatives,	
that	perform	the	role	of	commercialization	of	the	
members’	products	or	the	provision	or	supplier	of	
services,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 of	 Worker	 Association	
cooperatives	(Standards	8	and	9)	
Royal Decree 
1278/2000, 30 June, 
which adapts 
specified 
dispositions/provisi
ons of Social	
Security	for	its	
application	to	
Cooperatives		
2.	Inducement.	
Economic 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building 
 
-This	 norm	 applies	 to	 all	 cooperative	 societies. 
The principal novelty of such regulation is the 
application of provisions of Social Security providing 
for the inclusion	 of	 part	 time	 workers to the 
member workers of such worker associated 
cooperative societies in which their activity is carried 
out part time. 
Royal	Decree	
1300/2009,	31	
July,	of	urgent	
measures	of	
employment	for	
autonomous	
workers	and	
cooperatives	and	
labour	societies	
(measures	
applicable	until	31	
December	2010)	
3.	Capacity	
Building	
2.	Inducement. 
Economic 
incentives 
 
-Measure to	 encourage	 employment	 for	
autonomous	 workers,	 cooperatives	 and	 worker	
societies, improving certain conditions of access and 
payment of unemployment benefits with a single 
payment during the period in which the Royal Decree 
is in vigour. The 24 month time limit of the prior 
norm applicable to salaried workers was allowed to 
be exceeded so that such measure would foster 
employment. 
Resolution of 19 
April, 2011, of the 
Secretary of State of 
Rural and Water 
Environments 
providing for the 
publication for 2011 
the convocation of 
aid destined to	
promote	the	
integration	of	
cooperatives	at	the	
state	level	
2.	Inducement.
Economic 
incentives 
-Establishes the convocation of competitions for 
subsidies	 for 2011 in relation to the promotion	of	
cooperative	integration	at	the	state	level, provided 
for in Order APA/180/2008. Amongst the evaluation 
criteria for awarding the subsidy: the fusion	of	 two	
or	more	 entities, having as a principle	 objective	
innovation	 in	 production	 processes, have as a 
principle objective innovation in commercialization	
processes, fostering	 the	 participation	 of	women, 
being a cooperative	society	of	worker	association	
with	 agrarian	 activity, being a second	 level	
cooperative, etc. 
Financing	Program	 2.	Inducement. -Beneficiaries	 of	 this	 financing	 can	 include	
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for	Social	Economy	
businesses (ENISA-
National Innovation 
Company)	
Financial and 
other incentives 
	
cooperatives	and	labour	societies	which	are	SMEs	
according	to	EU	definitions. 
The financing assumes a participative loan (period of 
amortizations of 9 years, interest rate in function of 
the results of the beneficiary with a minimum and 
maximum, without guarantees, etc.) 
 
Order of 9 June 
2009, for the 
establishment of the 
regulatory bases for 
the concession of	
aid	for	the	primary	
integration	of	
agrarian	
associative	entities	
into	Andalusian	
agricultural	
cooperatives	of	a	
higher	level	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	Inducement.	
Financial and 
other incentives 
 
-This Order establishes the regulatory bases to 
concede aid	 for	 the	 primary	 integration	 of	
agricultural	 associative	 entities	 in	 already	
consolidated	 superior	 level	 Andalusian	
agricultural	 cooperative	 societies: Provided that 
commercialization of the products which are subject 
to such integration are amongst its activities. The 
legal forms of potential beneficiaries are: a) 
Andalusian agricultural	 cooperative	 society	 b) 
SATs with its legal place of businesses in Andalusia 
(which meet certain conditions). 
-The expenses	 of	 the	 agricultural	 associative	
entity	for	the	participation	in	the	social	capital	of	
the	 existing	 second	 or	 higher	 level	 cooperative	
may be subsidized. The maximum	quantity	of	such	
aid	 is	 limited	 to	 100,000	 Euros per beneficiary 
entity. 
Order 12 June, 2009, 
establishing the 
regulatory bases for 
the concession of	
aid	for	the	fusion	
of	agricultural	
cooperatives	and	
the	constitution	of	
second	level	(or	
higher)	
agricultural	
cooperatives	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building 
-This Order establishes the regulatory bases to 
concede aid	in	the	creation	of	entities	which	are	a	
result	of	merger	projects	of	agrarian	cooperatives	
and	 the	 constitution	 of	 second	 level	 or	 higher	
agrarian	 cooperatives. The legal form of the 
possible beneficiaries must be: a) Andalusian	
agrarian	 cooperative	 society, b) second	 level	
Andalusian	agrarian	cooperative	 society, c) SATs 
with its legal place of business	 in	Andalusia (which 
meet certain conditions), d) cooperative	 societies	
and	SATs	with	industrial	establishments inscribed 
(registered) in Andalusia. 
-The following may be	 subsidized:	 pre‐merger	
expenses assumed by the entities that merged; pre‐
constitution	 expenses	 of	 a	 second	 level	
cooperative assumed by the entities that 
participated in its constitution; etc. 
-The maximum	 quantity	 of	 such	 aid	 is	 20,000	
Euros	 divided between the number of businesses 
that participated in each merger process or 
constitution. 
Order 29, June 2009, 
for the 
establishment of the 
regulatory bases for 
a	program	of	
support	for	
innovation	and	the	
development	of	
the	social	
economy,	and	the	
provisions	for	
related	
convocations	for	
2009	until	2013	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	Inducement. 
Financial and 
other incentives 
 
-Provision of measures directed at encouraging	the	
development	of	an	innovative,	competitive,	
entrepreneurial	social	economy	in	the	framework	
of	the	Andalusian	productive	social/cultural	
fabric	and	in	its	own	economic	and	social	
principles	and	values.	
-The following entities which comply with the 
relevant conditions may be beneficiaries: 
Confederations of the Social Economy and Federation 
of the Social Economy, Foundations, Cooperative	
Societies and Worker Societies. The possible lines 
are: diffusion, promotion and innovation in the social 
economy, professional development and 
development of associationism. 
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(Andalusia)	
Order 20 April 
2010, establishing 
the regulatory bases 
for the concession of	
aid	to	support	the	
increase	of	size	
and	dimension	of	
agro	industrial	
cooperatives,	to	
promote	business	
cooperation,	
integration,	
mergers	and	
strategic	alliances	
and	fostering	the	
constitution	of	
second	and	higher	
level	associative	
entities	
(Andalusia)	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	Inducement. 
Economic 
incentives 
-The object of this aid is the promotion	 of	
integration	 activities	of	 cooperatives	of	 the	 agro	
industrial	sector,	especially	directed	at	promoting	
concentration	 projects	 through	 the	 constitution	
and	 consolidation	 of	 second	 or	 higher	 level	
cooperatives. 
Order 
EMP/34/2008, of 
13 March, 
convocation of 2008 
for subsidies	
destined	to	
promote	the	social	
economy	in	
Cantabria	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Regulation of subsidies destined for the promotion	
of	 employment,	 improving	 competitiveness,	
consolidation	 of	 cooperatives	 and	 labour	
societies,	 promotion	 of	 training	 activities,	
promotion	 and	 diffusion	 of	 social	 economy	 and	
the	support	 for	 internal	organizational	costs	and	
functioning	 of	 associations	 of	 worker	
cooperatives,	 autonomous	 workers and other 
entities representative of the social economy in 
Cantabria. 
Order of 
30/12/2009, of the 
local Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development, 
which modifies the 
Order of 
11/12/2008 of the 
local Ministry of 
Agriculture and 
Rural Development, 
approving the 
regulatory bases of	
aid	for	the	
improvement	of	
the	de	associative	
agrarian	
structures	en	
Castilla‐La	Mancha	
(FOCOOP)	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
-This Order is financed	100%	by	the	local	Ministry	
of	Castilla	la	Mancha, without European or national 
financing, is for the promotion	 of	 cooperation.	
Beneficiaries	 are	 agrarian	 cooperatives	 and	
second	 level	 or	 higher	 level	 cooperatives	
integrated	 by	 agrarian	 cooperatives. The lines of 
aid, all especially to promote the concentration and 
integration of cooperatives, are the following: 
contracting of technical personnel; technical 
assistance in the improvement	 of	
commercialization; financial expenses derived from 
integration	 processes	 in	 second	 level	
cooperatives	or	en	businesses	participated	 in	by	
cooperatives;	investment	destined	to	improve	the	
provision	 of	 common	 services	 in	 primary	
production. 
Resolution 
EMO/1195/2011, 5 
May , approving the 
convocation for 
2011 for the 
concession of public 
subsidies for the 
financing of specific 
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Objective is to open the concession of subsidies 
directed at the financing	 of	 training	 programs 
directed at employed workers promoted by the 
Consortium of Continuing Education and Training of 
Catalonia.  
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intersectoral 
training	plans	for	
the	social	
economy,	and	
sectoral	training	
directed	at	
occupied	workers	
that	promote	the	
Consortium	of	
Continuing	
Education	in	
Catalonia.		
Order of 26 
February, 2003, of 
the local ministry of 
Justice, Employment 
and Social Security 
(Basque Country) 
providing subsidies 
contained in Decree 
283/2000, 26 of 
December, which 
regulates support	
measures	for	
employment	in	
cooperative	
societies.	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
 
-This Order establishes the framework of aid which 
the Basque	Government through the Department of 
Justice, Labour (now “Employment”) and Social 
Security, have put in practice to subsidise	 the	
substitution	 of	workers	 in	 cooperative	 societies	
by	 unemployed	 people, striving for a double 
objective: on one hand, guaranteeing	 an	 income	
equivalent	 to	 90%	 of	 the	 retirement	 pension	 to	
which	 such	 retiring	 cooperative	members	would	
have	had	 the	right,	upon	reaching	 the	regulatory	
retirement	 age and on the other, the intention to 
encourage	 labour	 insertion	 in	 specified	
unemployed	 collectives	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	
vacancy	 caused	 by	 early	 retirement of such 
cooperative member according to the conditions of 
such Decree. 
 
Order of 3 of June of 
2011, of the local 
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Affairs, 
establishing	
subsidies	for	
training	in	Social	
Economy,	Basque	
Country		
3.	Capacity	
Building		
-Regulation of subsidies for training	 activities,	
research	and	dissemination	in	relation	to	specific	
aspects	of	the	Social	Economy, that are carried out 
in the autonomous region of the Basque	Country. 
-Cooperatives and labour societies and other public 
or private entities with their place of business in the 
autonomous community of the Basque Country.  
Order 3 June 2011, 
of the Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Affairs, 
regulating 
subsidies	for	the	
incorporation	of	
members	into	
social	economy	
businesses.	Basque	
Country	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	Inducement. 
Financial and 
other incentives	
-Objective is to facilitate the collection of capital
required	 when	 a	 person	 becomes	 a	 member	
worker	in	a	social	economy	business. 
 -Beneficiaries may be people who become worker 
members or fulltime worker and who belong to the 
following groups: unemployed,	 owners	 of	 a	 farm,	
livestock	or	forest	areas	that	become	cooperative	
members, and employees	 of	 a	 social	 economy	
company	 that	converts	 into	a	worker	member in 
such company. 
 
Order 3 June, 2011, 
of the Ministry of 
Employment and 
Social Affairs, 
establishing 
subsidies	for	the	
consolidation	of	
associative	
structures	for	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-The Regulation of subsidies for the consolidation	of	
associative	structures	for	social	economy	entities 
in the autonomous community of the Basque	
Country. The subsidies are directed at the financing	
of	 costs	 related	 to	 the	 maintenance	 and	
consolidation	of	associative	entities.  
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social	economy	
businesses	and	
entities	in	the	
autonomous	
community	of	the	
Basque	Country	
Order 3 June 2011, 
of the local Ministry 
of Employment and 
Social Affairs, for the 
articulation of	
subsidies	for	
entrepreneurship	
in	the	Social	
Economy	in	the	
Basque	Country.		
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-Regulation of subsidies for:
1.– the promotion	 and	 constitution	 of	 social	
economy	 businesses	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	 the	
entrepreneurship	culture. 
2.– The accompanying technical and economic-
financial study necessary to develop inter‐
entrepreneurship	projects.		
3.– The carrying out of activities necessary for the 
planned territorial	 promotion	 of	 social	 economy	
businesses.  
Amongst possible beneficiaries are cooperative and 
labour societies. 
Order 3 June 2011, 
of local the Ministry 
of Employment and 
Social Affairs, for the 
articulation of 
subsidies	for	the	
realisation	of	
investments	in	
Cooperative	and	
Labour	Societies	of	
the	autonomous	
community	of	the	
Basque	Country.	
2.	Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives	
-Regulation of subsidies for the financing	of	interest	
payment	 on	 loans	 made	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
investing	 in	the	amplification	or	consolidation	of	
cooperative	 or	 worker	 societies	 in	 the	 Basque	
Country.	
Cooperative and worker societies of a small	size can 
access such financing, following the criteria 
established in the Order. 
 
Order 14, April, 
2009, of the local 
ministry of 
Agriculture, Fishing 
and Alimentation, 
approving the 
Regulatory bases for	
aid	for	Valencia	
agricultural	
cooperatives	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	Inducement.	
Financial and 
other incentives 
 
-The object of this Order is to approve the basis upon 
which the concession	 of	 aid	 to	 agrarian	
cooperation is regulated and the convocation for 
2009 for the same. Beneficiaries may be: a) agrarian 
cooperatives and businesses of other types in which 
cooperatives have a majority interest, always subject 
to the condition that the activity maintained is in 
connected to	 rural	 development	 related	 to	 the	
agrarian	 and	 alimentary	 sector; b) the 
representative organisations of agrarian cooperation. 
In addition, the beneficiaries must have their 
business domicile in the autonomous community of 
Valencia.	
-Auxiliary	activities are those which fall within the 
following measures: a) modernisation	 of	 business	
management, b) constitution	of	new	cooperatives	
and	 diversification	 of	 activities	 in	 existing	
cooperatives c) cooperative	 integration and d) 
business	growth	and	capitalisation.  
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Table	5.31	Policy	Measure	Description–Specific	to	cooperatives.	
Policy	Measure	
Name 
Policy	
Measure	
Type 
Description	of	agricultural	cooperative	relevance 
Sustainable	
Development	of	
the	Rural	
Environment	Law 
45/2007, 13 
December	
2.	
Inducemen
ts	
Economic 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-This law sets out actions	to	promote	agriculture	which	is	
compatible	with	sustainable	rural	development,	giving	
preferential	treatment	to	agricultural	professionals	and	
priority	to	titleholders	of	farm	lands. In addition, it 
promotes the adoption	of	measures	by	Public	
Administrations	focused	on	economic	diversification,	
support	for	the	creation	of	businesses,	self	employment	
and	cooperative	employment.	
-Prioritises	activities	carried	out	by	associative	entities.	
Law 38/1994, 30 
December, 
regulating 
Agricultural	
Interprofessional	
Organisations	 
1.	Mandate. 
Incorporati
on law 
-Applicable to the agricultural	inter‐professional	
organisations	at	the	national	level	or	a	level	superior	to	
that	of	an	autonomous	community. The object of the law 
is to regulate the recognition of such entities and bestow a 
private	legal	identity and the powers that is inherent in 
such status, such as the agreements into which they enter.	
 
Royal Decree 
705/1997, 16 May, 
approving 
Regulation of Law 
38/1994 of 30 
December,	
regulating	 Agro	
Alimentary	
Interprofessional	
Organisations,	 as	
modified	 by	 Law	
13/1996,	 30	
December,	of	tax,	
administrative	
and	 social	 order	
measures.	
1.	Mandate. 
Legislation 
-This Regulation advances	significantly	Law 28/1994 of 
30 December, regulating	Interprofessional	
Organisations.		
Law 2/2000, de 7 
January, 
regulating	
contract	 types	 of	
the	 agro	
alimentary	
products. 
5.	Other	 -Object is to regularize	 the	 homologation	 of	 agro	
alimentary	 contracts	 whose	 ambit	 of	 application	
extends	 beyond	 on	 autonomous	 community, such 
contract capable of being adapted if voluntarily agreed. 
Establishes the procedures for homologation, stating the 
necessity	 to	verify	 that	 it	meets	 the	stated	goals	of	 the	
law	 and	 does	 not	 breach	 the	 objects	 provided	 for	
therein. 
Resolution 27 
March, 2009, of 
the General 
Directorate of 
Industry and 
Alimentary 
Markets, 
establishing 
measures	to	
promote	
innovation	in	
agrarian	and	
agro	alimentary	
businesses.	
3.	Capacity	
Building	
 
-The agreement establishes measures	 to	 promote	
innovation	 in	agrarian	and	agro	alimentary	businesses	
through	 interest	 incentives	 of	 the	 credit	 lines of the 
National Institute of Official Credit known as “ICO” such as 
ICO-PYME 2009-for small and medium enterprises, ICO-
Crecimiento Empresarial 2009-for business growth, ICO-
Emprendedores 2009-for entrepreneurs and ICO-
Internacionalización 2009 del Instituto de Crédito Oficial-for 
internationalization, ICO-Liquidez (Liquidity) 2011, and 
others.	
Resolution of 27 3.	 Capacity	 -Object to hold convocations for subsidies for the carrying 
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January 2010, of 
the Secretary of 
State for Rural and 
Water Affairs, 
allowing for 
convocations in 
relation to	
subsidies	for	
programs	of	
information	and	
promotion	of	
agricultural	
products	in	third	
countries.		
Building	
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives	
out of information	 and	 promotion	 programs	 for	
agricultural	produces	in	third	countries.	
‐Professional	 and	 interprofessional	 organizations	
representing	 the	 agro	 alimentary	 sector	 in	 Spain are 
beneficiaries of such programs as they carry out such 
activities.  
Royal Decree 
457/2010, of 16 of 
April, regulating 
the concession of 
subsidies	for	the	
renewal	of	the	
national	
industrial	area	of	
agricultural	
machinery.		
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Objective to promote the renewal of a	national	industrial	
area	 of	 tractors	 and agricultural	 machines to improve 
work conditions, achieve better energy	efficiency and have 
a lower	environmental	impact. Amongst other who can be	
beneficiaries: agricultural	 cooperatives,	 CUMAs,	
agricultural	worker	cooperatives	and	SATs	
 
Order 
ARM/1428/2011, 
25 May, 
establishing the 
bases for and 
convocations for 
aid	to	livestock	
farm	owners	to	
facilitate	Access	
to	financing.	
(Recurring	
convocations)	
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives 
-Establishes the regulatory bases and the convocations for 
the concession of aid destined for bearing	 the	 cost	 of	
necessary	 guarantees	 for	 the	 obtaining	 of	 loans	 for	
owners	 of	 livestock	 farms	 to	 improve	 and	 modernise	
the	production	structures	of	agriculture	businesses. 	
Order of 30 
January 2008, 
regulating the 
measures of 
support	for	the	
realisation	of	
preliminary	
studies	for	
integration	of	
and	cooperation	
between	agro	
alimentary	
businesses	with	
the	goal	of	
concentration	of	
offer,	within	the	
framework	of	the	
Rural	
Development	
Plan	of	Andalusia	
2007	to	2013,	 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives 
 
-This program is available for the realisation of	preliminary	
viability	studies	for	the	creation	and	development	of	
commercial	structures	that	integrate	existing	
companies	through	mergers	or	cooperation	in	relation	
to	investment	projects	for	the	modernisation,	
amplification,	transfer,	equipping	and/or	reforming	of	
existing	commercial	establishment	to	accommodate	the	
new	commercial	structure.	
-Micro‐businesses	 and	 agro	 alimentary	 SMEs	 of	
Andalusia	 which	 demonstrate	 their	 intention	 to	
constitute	 a	 commercial	 structure	 of	 cooperation	 or	
integration	 amongst	 themselves	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	
end	may	be	eligible	applicants	under	the	program.	
Order 9 December 
2008, establishing 
3.	Capacity	
Building		
-Promotion	of	innovation	and	business	development, in 
particular in the creation of businesses and their 
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the regulatory 
bases for a 
Program	of	
Incentives	for	the	
Promotion	of	
Innovation	and	
Business	
Development	in	
Andalusia	and	
the	holding	of	a	
convocation	for	
the	same	for	the	
years	2008‐2013	
2.	
Inducemen
t. Economic 
incentives 
modernisation,	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 cooperatives,	
research	and	development	and	business	innovation.	
Order 31 July 
2009, establishing 
the regulatory 
basis for the 
concession of 
subsidies	for	the	
modernization	of	
agrarian	
exploitations	in	
the	framework	of	
the	Program	for	
Rural	
Development	of	
Andalusia	2007‐
2013.	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	
Inducemen
t. Economic 
incentives 
 
-The object of this aid is to establish	 non‐refundable	
incentives	 for	 the	 modernization	 of	 agricultural	
exploitations	 which	 are	 owned,	 amongst	 others,	 by	
cooperatives	or	by	SATs.	
Order 26 July 
2010, establishing 
the regulatory 
bases for the 
concession of 
subsidies	for	the	
transformation	
and	
commercializatio
n	of	agricultural	
products	in	the	
framework	of	the	
Program	for	
Rural	
Development	of	
Andalusia	2007‐
2012		
3.	Capacity	
Building	
2.	
Inducemen
t.	 Economic 
incentives	
-Agricultural companies dedicated to the transformation 
and commercialisation of agricultural products for 
investments	 directed	 at	 increasing	 added	 value	 of	
products	and	acquiring	innovative	and	environmentally	
friendly	technologies.	
Resolution 9 
August 2010, of 
the local Ministry 
of Rural Areas and 
Fishing, providing 
subsidies	for	the	
modernisation	of	
agricultural	
farms	and	the	
first	placement	of	
Young	farmers	in	
the	Principe	of	
Asturias	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-Convocation of subsidies for the modernisation	 of	
agricultural	farms	and	the	placement	of	young	farmers. 	
Order of 21 3.	Capacity	 -Concession of subsidies, pursuant to competitions, of 
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December 2007, of 
the local Ministry 
of Agriculture, 
establishing 
regulatory basis 
for the concession 
of	subsidies	to	
promote	the	
production	and	
commercialisatio
n	of	agro	
alimentary	
products	of	
differentiated	
quality	
Building		
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives	
subsidies for the promotion	 of	 production	 and	
commercialisation	 of	 agro	 alimentary	 products	 of	
differentiated	 quality. . 
-Beneficiaries can be owners of agricultural farms or the 
agro alimentary industry located in the territory of the 
autonomous community of Castilla	La	Mancha. 	
Order of 
23/07/2009, of 
the local Ministry 
of Agriculture and 
Rural 
Development, 
which establishes 
the regulatory 
bases for the 
increase	of	added	
value	of	
agricultural	
product	and	the	
promotion	of	
agro	alimentary	
quality	(FOCAL)	
(Community	of	
Castilla‐La	
Mancha)	
2.	
Inducemen
t.	Financial 
and other 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building 
-Concession of aid	 to	 agro	 alimentary	 businesses	 that	
attempt	 to	 increase	 their	 added	 value	 through	
investments	 that	 are	 related	 to	 the	 transformation	
and/or	commercialisation	of	specified	products.	
-This aid is available to both physical and legal persons that 
transform	 and/or	 commercialise	 agricultural	products 
in establishments within Castilla‐La	 Mancha. The point 
system upon which aid is granted is an objective system 
according to a competitive process. However, within such 15 
point system, 5 of such points are related to projects 
proposed by cooperatives or inter-cooperative agreements 
and one of the criteria of the point system is the 
prioritisation	of	the	olive	oil	and	wine	sectors.	
Order 
AYG/691/2009, of 
24 of March, 
approving the 
regulatory bases 
for the	subsidies	
for	the	
transformation	
and	
commercialisatio
n	of	agricultural,	
wild	and	
alimentary	
products,	in	
Castilla	y	Leon.		
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives	
-Subsidies for the promotion	of	productive	 investments
and the improvement of competitiveness	 in	 the	 area	 of	
transformation	 and	 commercialization	 of	 agricultural,	
wild	and	alimentary	products in Castilla and Leon.	
-Beneficiaries can be physical persons or legal persons, 
including SATs that are involved in processes of 
industrialisation and/or commercialisation of products 
obtained and/or made in the territory of Castilla and Leon.	
Order 
AYG/695/2011, 6 
of	May,	for	the	
convocation	of	
subsidies,	co‐
financed	by	the	
European	
Agricultural	and	
Rural	
Development	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-Subsidies included in this Order are:
a) Modernisation	of	agricultural	farms (investments in 
farms through plans for improvement and investments for 
the efficient use of irrigation water. b) Placement	of	young	
farmers.	
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Fund	(FEADER),	
in	the	
improvement	of	
production	
structures	and	
the	
modernisation	of	
farms,	in	the	
application	of	
Council	
Regulation	(EC)	
1698/2005	and	
subsidies	
financed	by	the	
autonomous	
community	of,	
for	the	carrying	
out	of	other	
investment	in	
agricultural	
farms	in	Castilla	
and	Leon.		
Order “Foral” 
8E/2011,10 of 
June of the local 
Ministry of Rural 
Development and 
Environment, for 
the 
establishment	of	
subsidy	rules	and	
regulations	for	
the	creation	of	
agro	food	micro‐
businesses,	in	the	
framework	of	the	
Program	for	
Rural	
Development	of	
the	territory	of	
Navarra	2007‐
2013,	and	the	
approval	of	the	
convocation	for	
2011‐
Autonomous	
Community	of	
Navarra.	
2.	
Inducemen
t. Financial 
and other 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-Measure directed at the creation and development of 
agricultural	micro‐businesses	through	the	subsidy	of	
investments	and/or	expenses	of	setting	up	a	new	
project	that	is	based	on	the	utilisation	of	primary	
agricultural	materials	and/or in the provision of 
agricultural services or which has as a final goal a product or 
service which supports agricultural or agro alimentary 
activity in general in the territory of Navarra.	
Order 26 July 
2010, establishing 
the regulatory 
bases for the 
concession of 
subsidies	for	the	
transformation	
and	
commercializatio
n	of	agricultural	
products	in	the	
3.	Capacity	
Building	
2.	
Inducemen
t.	Economic	
incentives	
-Agricultural companies dedicated to the transformation 
and commercialisation of agricultural products for 
investments directed at increasing added value of products 
and acquiring innovative and environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
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framework	of	the	
Program	for	
Rural	
Development	of	
Andalusia	2007‐
2012 and the 
convocation of the 
same for 2010 
 
 
 
Table	5.32	Policy	Measure	Description–Specific	to	an	agricultural	subsector.	
Policy	Measure	
Name	
Policy	Measure	
Type	 Description	of	agricultural	cooperative	relevance	
Royal Decree 
104/2008, 1 of 
February, which 
established the 
regulatory bases 
for the concession	
of	subsidies	to	
groupings	of	
producers	in	the	
sheep	and	goat	
sector	
2.	Inducement. 
Financial 
incentives 
-Establishment of the regulatory bases for the 
concession	of	subsidies,	subject	to	a	competition, to 
promote the reform	and	adaptation	of	the	sheep	and	
goat	sector	during the 2008-2012 period, through the 
grouping	of	producers. The adoption of such 
measures in this sector is advisable in order to avoid 
the decline in the farming activities. Groupings of 
livestock keepers are an ideal method of reform and 
adaptation as it is the most efficient form to organize 
the offer.	
Royal Decree 
1972/2008, 28 
November,	re:	
recognition	of	
organisations	of	
producers	of	
fruits	and	
vegetables	
1.	Mandate. 
Incorporation 
law 
 
-Establishes the basic rules for the recognition	of	
organisations	of	fruit	and	vegetable	producers	and	
associations	of	organisations	of	producers.	
-To guarantee the correct execution of the activities of 
such organisations in terms	of	duration	and	
efficiency	of	concentration	of	offer, the decree 
establishes categories	of	products	among	which	the	
organisations	must	choose	in	order	to	be	
recognized. It also regulates: assignment of votes, 
terms upon which its members, subsidiaries or 
external services can provide the necessary measures 
to carry out their functions, concretize the procedure 
and the conditions which are necessary for such 
recognitions, the activities which can be carried out by 
such associations, etc.	
-An	organisation	of	producers	must	be,	in	any	case,	
an	associative	entity	constituted	on	the	initiative	of	
the	producers.	
Royal Decree 
244/2009, 27 
February, for the 
application of	
measures	of	the	
program	of	
support	for	the	
Spanish	
viticulture	sector	
1.	Mandate. 
Incorporation 
law, and market 
regulation and 
competition 
policies	
2.	Inducement. 
Financial and 
other incentives	
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Development of program of support for the Spanish	
viticulture	sector for the application of the new	
normative	framework	with	the	object	to	contribute	
to	competitiveness. The Royal Decree regulates 
aspects related to the promotion in third country 
markets, restructuring,	reconversion	of	vineyards, 
distillation	of	sub‐products,	distillation	for	
consumption	and also for specified circumstances.	
Resolution 27 
March, 2009, of 
the General 
Directorate of 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
 
-The agreement establishes measures	to	promote	
innovation	in	agrarian	and	agro	alimentary	
businesses	through	interest	incentives	of	the	credit	
lines of the National Institute of Official Credit known 
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Industry and 
Alimentary 
Markets, 
establishing 
measures	to	
promote	
innovation	in	
agrarian	and	
agro	alimentary	
businesses.	
as “ICO” such as ICO-PYME 2009-for small and medium 
enterprises, ICO-Crecimiento Empresarial 2009-for 
business growth, ICO-Emprendedores 2009-for 
entrepreneurs and ICO-Internacionalización 2009 del 
Instituto de Crédito Oficial-for internationalization, 
ICO-Liquidez (Liquidity) 2011, and others.	
Royal Decree 
1302/2009, 31 
July,	re:	funds	and	
operating	
programmes	of	
F&V	producer	
organisations.	
2.	 Inducement.
Financial 
incentives 
 
-Establishes	the	basic	norm	in	relation	to	the	funds	
and	operative	programs	in	development	of	Council	
Regulation	 (EC)	 n.	 1234/2007	 –Agricultural	
Common	 Market	 Organisation	 (CMO)	 and	 it	
establishes	 specific	 dispositions	 for	 certain	
agricultural	products	(Single	CMO	Regulation)	and	
the	 Regulation	 (EC)	 no.	 1580/2007	 of	 the	
Commission	in	which	they	establish	the	disposition	
of	 the	 application	 of	 Council	 Regulations	 (EC)	 n.	
2200/1996,	 (EC)	 2201/1996	 and	 (CE)	 no.	
1182/2007,	in	the	sector	of	fruits	and	vegetables. 
Resolution of 8 
April 2011, of the 
General 
Management of 
Agricultural 
Productions, 
providing for 
convocations of	
subsidies	 for	 the	
groupings	 of	
producers	 in	 the	
sheep	 and	 goat	
sector	of	Castilla‐
La	 Mancha	 in	
2011	
2.	 Inducement.
Financial and 
other incentives 
 
-The object of this resolution is the carrying out of a 
convocation for 2011, in a competitive process, of 
subsidies	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 reform	 and	
integral	 suitability	 of	 the	 sheep	 and	 goat	 sectors	
through	 the	 grouping	 of	 producers, in the 
framework of the base regulations of these subsidies 
approved by Royal Decree 104/2008 of the 1 of 
February (which established the regulatory basis for 
the concession of subsidies for such action) and by the 
local Ministry of Agriculture for Castilla	La	Mancha by 
Order of 20/05/2008 for the such activity. 
-The subsidised investments must follow one of the 
following priority objectives: the reduction	 of	
production	 costs,	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	
reorientation	 of	 production;	 the	 improvement	 of	
quality;	 the	preservation	 and	 improvement	of	 the	
natural	 environment;	 or	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	
conditions	of	animal	health	and	well	being. 
-Beneficiaries may be: groupings	of	producers	in	the	
sheep	 and	 goat	 sector located in the autonomous 
community of	 Castilla	 La	 Mancha,	 which meet the 
relevant requirements of the Resolution. 
Order 9/2011, 3 of 
March of the local 
Ministry of 
Industry, 
Commerce and 
Innovation, 
regulating 
subsidies	 in	 the	
areas	 of	
internationalisati
on	 and	
promotion	 in	
2011,	
Community	 of	
Valencia.	
3.	 Capacity	
Building		
2.	 Inducement.	
Financial and 
other incentives	
-Objective of this Order is the establishment of system 
for the concession of subsidies with the purpose of 
supporting the	 internationalization	 of	 businesses	
and	 the	 promotion	 of	 products	 from	 the	
Community	 of	 Valencia. As well, it contributes to	
promotional	 activities that aid growth and the 
consolidation	of	presence	in	international	markets.	
-Beneficiaries may be business associations, and 
Regulatory boards related to certification of origin, 
both related to the Community of Valencia and 
consortiums, promotion groups and SMEs with legal 
personality located in the Community of Valencia. 	
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Royal Decree  
1337/2011, of 
October 3 
regulating	funds	
and	operating	
programs	for	
OPFH		
2.	 Inducement. 
Economic 
incentives 
	
Establishes the	 Spanish	 norm	 in	 relation	 to	 funds	
and	operating	programs	for	POs re: Commission (EC) 
Reg.1234/2007 of Oct.22	 creating	 an	 OCM, and 
establishing	 provisions	 for	 specific	 agricultural	
products; and also executing Commission Regulation 
(EU) 543/2011 of June 7 establishing	the	application	
of	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	 1234/2007	 in	 the	
transformation	 of	 products	 in	 the	 fruit	 and	
vegetable	 sector. *Note- of particular importance to 
agricultural cooperatives 
Olive	Farm	Law	‐	
Andalucía	5/2011 
approved 28,29 of 
September, 2011	
1.	Mandate. 
Legislation 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
Recent Andalusian law establishing framework to 
improve	 olive	 cultivation	 and	 to	 facilitate	
sustainable	 development as well as to improve 
quality and promotion of product.  
	
 
 
Table	5.33	Policy	Measure	Description–Applicable	to	business	in	general.	
Policy	Measure	
Name 
Policy	
Measure	Type Description	of	agricultural	cooperative	relevance 
Royal 
Decree395/2007, 
23 March, regulating 
subsystems for	
professional	
training	for	
employment. 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Objective is to regulate the distinct training initiatives 
that make up professional	employment	 training, its 
system of operating and financing as well as 
organisational structure and participating institutions.  
Plan	of	Initiation	
for	Foreign	
Marketing	(PIPE)	
2.	
Inducement.	
Financial and 
other 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-The Plan for the Initiation of Foreign Marketing (PIPE) 
is the first program on a national level aimed especially 
at Spanish	SMEs	that	seek	commercial	development	
through	exports. 
 
ICEX-ICO 
Agreement-
Financial	Support	
for	exporters	
through	the	
(official	state	line	
of	credit)	ICO‐
LIQUIDEZ	2011	
2.	
Inducement. 
Financial and 
other 
incentives 
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-ICEX has entered into a collaboration agreement with 
ICO, the official	 state	 credit	 institute, creating a 
section of Financial	Support	for	the	Exporting sector 
through the line of credit “ICO-LIQUIDEZ 2011”. 
 
Payment	
Insurance	in	the	
framework	of	the	
Initiation	Plan	for	
Foreign	Promotion	
(PIPE)(see	above)	
2.	
Inducement. 
Financial and 
other 
incentives	
-Insurance	 policy	 for	 export	 credit designed 
especially for SMEs belonging to the PIPE club that are 
attempting to consolidate their activities in the 
exterior. 
Order 9 December 
2008, establishing 
the regulatory bases 
for a Program	of	
Incentives	for	the	
Promotion	of	
Innovation	and	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	
Inducement. 
Economic 
incentives 
-Promotion	 of	 innovation	 and	 business
development, in particular in the creation of 
businesses and their modernisation,	 the	
competitiveness	 of	 cooperatives,	 research	 and	
development	and	business	innovation. 
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Business	
Development	in	
Andalusia	and	the	
holding	of	a	
convocation	for	
the	same	for	the	
years	2008‐2013	
Decree 335/2009, 
22 September, 
regulating the 
Ordering of 
Professional	
Training	for	
Employment	in	
Andalusia.		
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-Objective is the regulation	of	Professional	Training	
for	Employment in Andalusia and its functioning and 
financing. 
Program	of	the	
Andalusian	Agency	
for	Foreign	
Promotion	
(EXTENDA	–	
Regional	
Government	of	
Andalusia)	
3.	Capacity	
Building	
-EXTENDA offers an wide range of programs and 
services with the objective of increasing	the	number	
of	 Andalusian	 companies	 in	 the	 process	 of	
internationalisation, improving the international 
position of Andalusian companies that are already 
active in such process and	 increasing the foreign	
Andalusian	investment 
Resolution of 28 
April,2011, of the 
Institute for 
Economic 
Development of the 
Principe of Asturias, 
approving aid for 
the concession of 
subsidies	within	
the	program	of	
Support	for	SMEs	
(InnoEmpresa)		
3.	Capacity	
Building		
	
-Objective to concede	 subsidies	 through	 a	
competitive	 process to regional projects en the 
Principe of Asturias, within the program of support for 
innovation	 in	 small	 and	 medium	 businesses.	 The 
subsidies are for innovation	 and	 advanced	
management,	technical	 innovation	and	quality	and	
collaborative	 innovation. Cooperatives may be 
amongst the beneficiaries. 
Programme	of	
commercial	
strategy	with	
multilateral	
organisations‐
Foundation	
ADEuropa	and	
Castilla	and	Leon.	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	
Inducement.	
Financial and 
other 
incentives	
-Program of Subsidies for the Support	 of	 Plans	 for	
Growth	in	the	Exterior, offering support to businesses 
in the region of Castilla and Leon and their process of 
foreign establishment. -beneficiaries of this support 
can be those companies which have a more advanced 
level of internationalisation  
 
Order 9/2011, 3 of 
March of the local 
Ministry of Industry, 
Commerce and 
Innovation, 
regulating 
subsidies	in	the	
areas	of	
internationalisatio
n	and	promotion	
in	2011,	
Community	of	
Valencia.	
3.	Capacity	
Building		
2.	
Inducement.	
Financial and 
other 
incentives	
-Objective of this Order is the establishment of system 
for the concession of subsidies with the purpose of 
supporting the	 internationalization	 of	 businesses	
and	 the	 promotion	 of	 products	 from	 the	
Community	 of	 Valencia. As well, it contributes to 
promotional activities that aid growth and the 
consolidation of presence in international markets. 
-Beneficiaries may be business associations, and 
Regulatory boards related to certification of origin, 
both related to the Community of Valencia and 
consortiums,	promotion	groups and SMEs with legal 
personality located in the Community of Valencia.  
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*Note should also be taken of a current draft Law	 on	 Measures	 to	 Improve	 the	
Functioning	 of	 the	 Alimentary	 Supply	 Chain	 (“Proyecto de Ley de medidas para la 
mejora del funcionamiento de la cadena alimentaria”) presented on July 5, 2011 by the 
Ministry of Environment and Rural Development. Its objective is to improve the balance	
of	 the	 food	 supply	 chain	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 consumers	 and	 operators. It is aimed 
towards strengthening the agro food producer sector through interprofessional	
organisations	and	the	use	of	contracts to reinforce the agro food industry by improving 
its competitiveness, promoting its role in the supply chain and attempting to achieve a 
better equilibrium in commercial relations. Whether this law will prove effective is a 
matter of opinion: agricultural	cooperatives	point	out	that	it	will	be	difficult	indeed	to	
lodge	a	complaint	against	one´s	client.	 
Table	5.34	Selected	EU	Policy	Measures.	
Selected	European	Policy	measures
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1234/2007 22 October 2007 creating CMO for agriculture 
Regulation (EEC) no. 1360/78 ,19 June 1978, regarding producer groups and their associations.
Council Regulation (EC) no. 952/97, May 20 regarding producer groups and their unification,  
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1257/99 May 17, 1999 re: local development –European Funds for 
Orientation and Agricultural Guarantees (Fondo Europeo de Orientación y de Garantía Agrícola 
(FEOGA) ) 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1698/2005 September 20 2005 regarding rural development 
through FEADER 
 Regulation (EC) no. 1974/2006, December 15, 2006 providing for the application of Regulation 
(EC) no. 1698/2005 regarding FEADER 
Council Regulation (EEC) no. 355/77, February 15, 1977, regarding improving conditions for the 
transformation and commercialisation of agricultural products.  
Council Regulation (EEC) no. 866/90 March 29,1990 regarding improving conditions for the 
transformation and commercialisation of agricultural products. 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 951/97, May 20, 1997 regarding improving conditions for the 
transformation and commercialisation of agricultural products. 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1290/2005 June 21,2005, regarding financing of PAC 
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1435/2003 July 22, 2003 regarding European Cooperative Society 
Statute.  
Council Directive 2003/72/EC July 22 , 2003 regarding implication of workers in European 
Cooperative Societies.  
	
5.7.3	Summary	of	legislative	and	regulatory	initiatives	
Cooperative Legislation Mandates 
Spain has a Constitutional mandate for cooperatives (as does Italy, Portugal and Hungary) 
(Fici, 2013). Mandates include the cooperative laws, at the national level and at the level of 
most of the autonomous communities (regional). If an agricultural cooperative carries out 
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the majority of their activity in one autonomous community then they are governed under 
the regional cooperative legislation, not the national legislation. Most cooperatives are 
formed under regional laws.  
Mandates also include cooperative registries, which are important for tracking the activity 
and weighing the importance of agricultural cooperatives.  
As evident in the chart above, regional cooperative laws have been passed at various 
times, as well as the requirements for registries. There is a trend towards “modernizing” 
laws, thus allowing for third party investors, proportional voting rights and provisions for 
distinct classes of members, member-investors and as well provisions which allow for 
financing alternatives (bonds, preference shares). The recent Andalusian cooperative law 
will be dealt with in Chapter 6 in more detail, as an example of such “modernizing” 
changes. 
As well, there are some interesting developments in the recognition that a “one size fits 
all” law is not appropriate and special laws for small cooperatives can be found in 
Extramadura and the Basque Country. Galicia has a special provision for family businesses 
allowed as members. Castilla La Mancha not only recognizes the social object of 
cooperatives, but has provided for the ability of agricultural cooperatives to carry out a 
wide range of activities such as rural tourism, environmental activities, sustainability 
projects, cultural activities, restructuring of rural communities, etc.  
Mandates also include the SAT law at the national level and as can be seen in Aragon, SAT 
legislation at the regional level has been introduced.  
The European Union law for Cooperative Societies has not been utilized as of yet by the 
agricultural sector.  
Cooperative Legislation Inducements 
Inducements include tax laws on both the national and the regional level, resulting in 
different tax regimes for each area. Of note is the fact that the national tax law recognized 
the concept of group cooperatives in 1992 through consolidated tax liabilities and a 
consolidated tax base.  
Subsidies are available in many autonomous communities for modernization and 
innovation. Financial aid for cooperative integration and consolidation are important 
initiatives, on the state level in 2011 and on various autonomous community levels.  
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Cooperative Legislation Capacity Building 
In general capacity building includes training and labour insertion initiatives. Export 
initiatives can be seen in various regions. In particular the Basque Country is strong on 
capacity building with early retirement/replacement with young farmer schemes, 
research and dissemination on cooperative funds, assistance with funding capital 
requirements by new members and access to financing for interest payments, as well as 
export assistance.  
Agricultural Business Legislation (which affect agricultural cooperatives) Mandates, 
Inducements and Capacity Building 
As an attempt to rise above regionalism, mandates on the national level include 
agricultural inter-professional organisations on a level superior to that of an autonomous 
community. As well, in order to bridge autonomous communities, mandates include a 
homologation of contracts entered into by enterprises in different jurisdictions.  
Inducements provided include: ICO credit lines for innovation, internationalisation, 
entrepreneurship, promotion in third countries, provision of guarantees, funds for 
viability studies for integration and mergers, environmentally friendly technologies, 
processing (thus adding value downstream) and farm equipment industry parks. Navarra 
provides financing for agro “micro businesses”.  
Capacity building involves modernisation of farms and the encouragement of young 
farmers.  
Agricultural Subsector Legislation (which affect agricultural cooperatives) Mandates, 
Inducements and Capacity Building 
Various subsectors enjoy specific programs that meet sub-sector needs. These are 
generally inducements or capacity building measures which have to do with restructuring 
and innovation and promotion.  
The special regime for F&V is of interest, as it is considered for the most part to be a 
successful policy. It should be emphasised that it is based on the grouping of producers. 
While not all producer organisations are cooperatives, the majority of them are. If they are 
not cooperatives, many of them are SATs which share some PO features of agricultural 
cooperatives. 
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The recent Olive Farm Law attempts to balance the interests of traditional farms, which 
tend to be more sustainable and contribute to rural sustainability and modern farms 
which are more productive.  
Business Laws in General (which affect agricultural cooperatives) 
General business laws have to do with professional training, SME and exports, export 
credits, innovation and internationalisation. While not for cooperatives specifically, they 
have been very useful. The challenge for cooperatives is to take more advantage of these 
measures. 
5.7.4	Competition	Law	and	Agricultural	Cooperatives59	
 
The essential Spanish competition law is the Defense of Competition, 3 of July 2007, which 
prohibits collusionary practices, the abuse of dominant position and disloyal acts of 
competition which affects the public interest and controls with distinct mechanisms the 
processes of concentration and public aid.  
In principle, these provisions are applicable to all economic sectors and activities, 
including the agricultural sector and those agreements which can be entered into amongst 
the economic actors therein (e.g. cooperatives and/or producer organizations).  
There is no doubt that the agricultural sector falls within the competence of the national 
competition law, as the prior 1989 Law in Defense of Competition eliminated all 
references to the inapplicability of competition law to the agro alimentation sector which 
had been in the 1963 Law. However, there has never been a process of cooperative/PO 
legislative adaptation in order to adequately adapt the competition legislation in Spain. 
A distinct question and one of interest for the agro alimentation sector, concerns future 
modifications of the EU community norms, in particular Regulation 1234/2007 of the OCM 
Single Payment, in relation to the reach of these norms to cooperatives/POs with respect 
to the representation of their members and the collective negotiation of their products. 
Law 15/2007 of the Defense of Competition does not contain any specific provision in 
relation to the agricultural sector in general or to cooperatives in general. The old Treaty 
of the European Community and now, the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, (Chapter 1 of Title VII, arts. 101 to 109) did not establish any safeguards or refer to 
any economic sectors in particular. The Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
establishes in art. 42.1 (old art. 36 of the European Community Treaty) that the Council 
                                                                  
59 Special thanks to Cooperativas Agroalimentaria legal department for explanation of competition law 
and agricultural cooperatives. 
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and the European Parliament can establish waivers to community competition laws with 
respect to the production and commercialization of agricultural products through the 
establishment of regulations, taking into account the objective of art. 39 of the present 
legislation (art. 33 of the old), relative to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
In accordance with this provision, there are two community regulations that establish the 
relation between the community competition and those of the agricultural sector: 
(Regulation 1234/2007, Council, Oct. 22, 2007, which creates a common organization for 
agricultural markets and which establishes specific dispositions for determined 
agricultural products (Regulation of the Organised Common Market “OCM” Single 
payment) and Regulation 1184/2006, relative to the application of determined norms 
concerning competition of the production and commercialisation of agricultural products. 
Each of these Regulations are applied in relation to determined agricultural products 
listed in Annex 1 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union. However, the 
dispositions provided for in each of these norms in relation to the application of 
competition rules are essentially the same.  
Thus, in analyzing these regulations, art. 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the 
European Union relative to the abuse of dominant position is clearly applicable to the 
agricultural sector. To establish the non applicability of article 101 in relation to 
agreements between operators, one has to take note of certain conditions about which the 
EU and the Court of Justice has interpreted repeatedly in an absolutely restrictive sense.  
Subject to competition laws, both national and EU, the Spanish National Competition 
Commission, supports the creation of cooperativism through agreements amongst 
producers. This is understood to mean that there are diverse forms in which agricultural 
producers can increase their negotiating power through associative agreement: for 
example, agreements in relation to joint production, joint warehousing or 
commercialization. These agreements will be in accordance with the competition 
regulations when they comply with a series of requirements, in general related to the 
creation of economic efficiencies. On the contrary, such actions will be considered to be 
anti-competitive when they result in limitations to production, sharing out of markets and 
price fixing. The problem for cooperatives is that their unique characteristics of 
functioning like a “network” and not a fully integrated firm puts them at a disadvantage 
and the competition authorities may see for example “price fixing” in the slightest move. 
In all cases, transactions of concentration are provided for in Law 15/2007 Defense of 
Competition (art. 7-10 and 55-60 LDC) and apply to both agricultural cooperatives and 
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SATs. According to this law, economic concentrations are subject to obligatory and prior 
notification and National Competition Commission, and subject to the obligation of 
suspension (non-execution) until authorisation has been obtained, if the threshold 
provisions of art. 8.1 of such law have been reached. That is, when as a consequence of a 
transaction: an amount equal or superior to 30% of the national market has been acquired 
or increased; or within the national market, relative to a product or service such 
percentage has been reached; or the volume of global business in Spain together with the 
participants in the transaction, exceeds in the last accounting period the amount of 240 
million Euros, and the volume of individual business in Spain of at least 2 of the 
participants exceeds 60 million. 
5.7.5	Cooperative	Tax	Laws60	
 
A special tax regime applies to cooperatives wherein they receive a specific protective 
treatment- Law 20/1990, 20 of December-Tax Regime for Cooperatives (TRC), the basis of 
which is found in the Spanish Constitution. The cooperative tax regulations in Spain are 
both technical regulations and incentive regulations. The technical regulations “adjust” the 
inherent peculiarities of the cooperative form and function. The incentive regulations 
provide for specific tax benefits meant to benefit the cooperative entity. 
The taxes for which a special treatment for cooperatives is contemplated are:  
1. Corporations Tax 
2. Tax on capital transfers and documented legal transactions 
3. Two taxes with a local application—the Trade Tax and Immovable Property Tax. 
The autonomous communities of the Basque Country and the Community of Navarra have 
a tax system and regulate particular tax benefits for cooperatives in their territory, but 
there are not substantial differences with respect to the tax treatment between such 
territorial laws and the national law. 
The cooperatives have a special tax regulation that allows them to enjoy certain tax 
benefits. These tax benefits depend on whether the cooperative complies with a series of 
financial, economic and social requirements.  
There are 3 categories of taxation for cooperatives: 
                                                                  
60 Chapter 5.7.5 relies on Aguilar (2010a, 2010b) and Vargas and Aguilar (2006) and updates from M. 
Aguilar in correspondence. A special thanks for providing clarity on cooperative tax issues. 
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1. Non protected cooperatives: which do not obtain any tax advantage simply by virtue of 
being a cooperative. 
2. Protected cooperatives: cooperatives which fit within the requirements of the national 
cooperative law or one of the autonomous community cooperative law and which do not 
fall within any of the excluded causes enumerated in such autonomous or national law. In 
such protected cooperatives the benefits are as follows: 
Corporation Tax: tax reduced to 20% base rate for cooperative results and in general 30% 
for the extra-cooperative results; ability to choose method of amortization with respect to 
fixed assets acquired within the first 3 years.  
Waiver of the Tax on capital transfers and documented legal transactions: for the 
constitution of the cooperative, amplification of capital, mergers or splits/divisions; for the 
acts of constitution and cancelation of loans; for the acquisition of property and rights that 
are included in the pursuit of the objectives of the Education and Promotion Fund ; trade 
Tax and Immovable Property Tax which applies to rustic property of the agricultural 
cooperatives and of the common exploitation of the land: a 95% rebate of the amount and 
charges (with the possibility of a provincial rebate for the Trade Tax).  
3. Especially Protected Cooperatives: have a more favourable tax treatment than those 
simply protected and requires that the cooperative must meet a series of conditions. 
Agricultural cooperatives (and community exploitation of land entities) are included in 
such category when they comply for example with limiting transactions with third parties 
or when physical persons who own agricultural land group together (e.g. Art. 9 and 10). 
They have the same benefits as protected cooperatives and in addition: 
- Tax on capital transfers and documented legal transactions: waiver in acquisitions of 
property and rights directly related with carrying out their social goals 
-Corporation Tax: tax waiver of 50% of the amount, and waiver of 80% of the amount for 
priority associative exploitation which are specially protected agricultural cooperatives.  
To obtain tax benefits cooperatives need to be classified as protected or specially 
protected. The constitution of a cooperative anticipates that its tax consideration, in 
principle, is protected. However, in the carrying out of its activities, a variety of situations 
may result in the loss of such status: 
1. Non compliance with the regulation and the principles of the obligatory funds. 
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2. Non compliance with the regulations governing economic activities 
3. Non compliance with the requirements derived from the principle of mutuality 
4. The winding up of the cooperative 
As well there are restrictions derived from indirect tax pressures from which cooperatives 
suffer, for example, the requirement to separate the accounting results of the operations 
with members and with non-members. The administrative cost that this implies and the 
added complexity of cooperative management is a special handicap for small and medium 
cooperatives. 
The European Cooperative Society domiciled in Spain is regulated by Law 3/2011 of 4 of 
March. In the absence of a specific tax provision, such regulation assumes the application 
of the Corporation Tax law, according to which such cooperatives would be subject to such 
tax when they have their residence in Spanish territory. As such, they would be 
responsible for the total income that they obtain, independently of the place in which it 
was produced and the residence of the payor. 
Chapter VIII of the Corporate Tax law regulates a special optional regime applicable to 
transactions which change the social domicile of a European Cooperative Society from one 
member state to another member state, with respect to property and rights situated in 
Spanish territory which are later affected by a permanent establishment in such territory. 
The legal and economic structure of cooperatives result in a series of limitations that in 
large part derive from the cooperative principles and restrictive concepts about 
cooperatives and cooperativism. There are various reasons to think that the cooperative 
tax system in Spain is obsolete and does not establish sufficient tax benefits which 
compensate the limitations which are a result of cooperative organizational structure, 
functional and operational limitation and financial limitations (Vargas and Aguilar, 2006). 
Certain “para-fiscal” charges, such as separate accounting for cooperative and extra 
cooperative results or the limitation on transactions with third parties, do not compensate 
for the fiscal treatment. In fact, some of the prescribed benefits in the cooperative tax 
regime, such as the waivers with respect to the constitution of the entity, the amplification 
of capital, mergers and splits/divisions and with respect to the cancelation of loans, are 
not exclusive to cooperatives but also can be utilized by other economic entities. 
The general rate of tax under the Corporation Tax law has been reduced en recent years, 
which has resulted, in comparative terms, in a prejudice against cooperatives, given that 
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the general reduce tax rate of 20% has remained unchanged. As well, not all companies 
pay the general tax rate, as there are other reduced rates as well for various types of 
companies. 
Questions about the continuity and/or the reform of the Spanish cooperative tax regime 
include: 
First, there has been an accounting reform whose provisions concerning cooperatives 
have come into force in December 2010 (Order EHA/3360/2010) in which cooperative 
society accounting norms have been approved) which, together with various elements of 
the economic structure of cooperatives, could carry consequences in the tax treatment of 
the same. 
Secondly, there is a pending procedure in the European Commission that commenced in 
2000, base on an action brought by 2 service station business associations (Madrid and 
Catalonia) against certain measures introduced by Royal Decree-Law10/2000 of 6 
October—in particular, the elimination of the prohibition to distribute a type of diesel fuel 
(for agricultural and machine use) to non member third parties by agricultural 
cooperatives. The European Commission appeared to have focused on the question of the 
tax regime of the cooperatives from the perspective of the compatibility with prohibited 
state aid under article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex. art. 
87 Treaty of the European Community). After a rather prolonged consideration, the 
Decision 2010/473/UE, of December 15, 2009, affirmed the selective nature of the tax 
regime of Spanish cooperatives. The decision was appealed to the General Tribunal on 
April 4, 2010 and an action, T-156/10, has been opened.  
Thirdly, certain cooperative sectors have expressed their discontent with the current 
regulation, considering that various elements of the tax regime are obsolete, a poor fit and 
a penalty on the growth of cooperatives. 
Fourthly, there is a problem related to the possible application of the regime of 
transactions related to cooperatives (in the version operated through the Law of Measures 
for Prevention of Tax Fraud) which would result in huge complexities, as there are various 
types of transactions susceptible to be considered so “related”—e.g. those of cooperatives 
with partners in the carrying out of social ends, those that interact amongst themselves 
without attention to social goals; those carried out by cooperatives of the same group—
and for the necessity to separate income streams for tax reasons of cooperative and extra-
cooperative transactions. 
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All of this led the Confederation of Spanish Social Economy Enterprises to order the 
drafting of a proposal for the reform of the tax regime, such proposal being finished in 
2008. However, the Cooperative Tax Law has undergone very few modifications, none of 
any great importance, since its being brought into force more than 20 years ago, whilst the 
general taxation has undergone important changes pursuant to the General Tax Law in 
2003 and a huge reform pursuant to the Personal Taxation law in 2006, amongst other 
relevant modifications. 
5.8	Assessment	of	developments	and	role	of	policy	measures	
This Chapter provides a concluding assessment on the developments of cooperatives in 
Spain. In Chapters 5.4 the basic statistics on agriculture and farmers’ cooperatives were 
provided. In Chapter 5.5 data on individual cooperatives were reported, especially 
concerning their internal governance, their position in the food chain and the institutional 
environment in which they operate. This lead to some first impressions in section 5.5. on 
the performance of cooperatives in Spain in relation to their internal governance, 
institutional environment and position in the food chain. 
In Chapter 5.6 the data gathering and analysis was broadened by looking at the differences 
between the sectors and the influence of sectoral issues on the performance of the 
cooperatives. Chapter 5.7 looked into more detail on how the regulatory framework 
influences the competitive position of the cooperatives in the food chain and vis-à-vis the 
investor-owned firms. This Chapter 5.8 assesses the (performance) developments of 
cooperatives and how they can be explained in terms of the building blocks (institutional 
environment, position in the food chain including sector specifics, and internal 
governance). Section 5.8.1 focuses on the explanation of the performance of cooperatives 
in terms of their internal governance, their position in the food chain (including sector 
specificities) and the institutional environment (including the regulatory framework). In 
section 5.8.2 an assessment is given on which policy measures in Spain seem to benefit 
cooperatives and which ones have a constraining influence. 
5.8.1 Explaining	the	performance	of	cooperatives	
In general, Spanish agri-food companies, including cooperatives, are quite competitive; 
Spain is one of the principle agricultural producers in Europe. The agri-food sector is one 
of the principle exporting sectors in Spain. Spain occupies the 5th position for food sales in 
the EU-27 (CIAA 2009) and is the third agricultural producer (Eurostat). However, as a 
whole there are some structural difficulties that must be addressed in order to remain 
competitive in the future. As has been noted repeatedly in this report, there are a large 
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number of cooperatives in Spain, the size of which range from micro-cooperatives to large 
cooperatives like COREN or ANECOOP. Predominantly, Spanish cooperatives fall within 
the small to medium company size. Hence, the results of the survey of the “top 5” speak 
mainly of the characteristics of the largest type of cooperatives, which are not particularly 
representative of Spanish cooperatives. In Chapter 5.6 data is presented from the 
Cooperative Questionnaires on such top-5 cooperatives. Below the performance of 
Spanish agricultural cooperatives is commented on, taking into account not only the 
observations on the small group of cooperatives surveyed in Chapter 5.5, and the 
information gathered on agricultural cooperatives throughout the course of this study. 
Internal Governance 
Spanish agricultural cooperatives tend to be excessively “presidentialist”, that is, the 
president wields disproportionate power. This tendency is fostered by national and 
regional cooperative laws. The same person is the president of the cooperative, a member 
of the Management Board and of the General Assembly. Such role carries important 
representative functions, with the risk of too much power ever-present. The President on 
many occasions turns into a de facto “sole representative” of the agricultural cooperative 
(Vargas-Vasserot, 2009; Canalejo, 2000). 
Taking into account this observation and the fact that Spanish agricultural cooperatives 
are many and small in size, the conclusion that the scarcity of mergers and alliances and 
the propensity to shy away from competitive strategies or internationalisation have more 
to do with “human nature” (i.e. big fish in a small pond) than financial or economic 
reasoning is an understandable, if not necessarily “scientific”, conclusion. As well, strategic 
decision-making, or lack thereof, must also be considered against such background. In 
contrast these observations could be countered by the view that strong visionary 
leadership, closely connected to local communities, may also be the result of such 
governance structure, particularly in small cooperatives. 
Internal Governance has been reviewed in Chapter 5.5 (section 5.5.4) and Chapter 5.7. 
Suffice to say that the legal structure and rules on the supervision by the Intervenors of 
the Management Board (“Consejo Rector”) barely function as a supervisory system, due to 
the election of its members, composition (low professionalisation) and limited powers of 
control over the managers. Although at first glance it appears as if the Management Board, 
the General Assembly and the “Intervenors, described in detail in section 5.5.4” mimic 
somewhat the dualistic model of German company law, the Spanish cooperative 
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governance model continues to be “monistic”. The Intervenors do not in reality serve as an 
effective control as their powers are basically limited to reviewing accounts.  
Historically, cooperative governance has been strongly influenced by capitalistic models. 
However, since the last national cooperative law was brought into force in 1999, the law 
with respect to IOFs has been amended due to the influence of the corporate governance 
movement. These recent corporate governance amendments, particularly with respect to 
the incorporation of external and independent advisors, have not yet been adopted by 
cooperatives. To the extent that good internal governance is seen to legitimize a business 
entity, attract new members and foster loyalty and confidence, Spanish cooperatives are 
often lagging behind their IOF counterparts. As an example, cooperative legislation has not 
advanced on the glaring issue of gender parity in cooperative management and boards.  
An amendment to the national cooperative law which represents a significant 
improvement to prior legislation was the provision allowing the naming of professional 
non-cooperative member board members. This amendment has contributed to more 
professional cooperative management and strategy. Remuneration of board cooperative 
members is a still a contentious issue as the post is often unpaid and thus inhibits a more 
serious, focused and professional approach on the part of the cooperative.  
As mentioned in Chapter 5.5, board functions in the large cooperatives subject to this 
study were members who were often also professionals. Outside professional non-
members can be appointed within appropriate limits. However, given the sheer number 
and size range of Spanish cooperatives and the differences in the legislation which governs 
them, this cannot necessarily be taken as a given or norm and used to explain success or 
failure. In medium sized cooperatives a general manager (“gerente”) is often hired as 
professional staff to provide support to a board composed of cooperative members.  
Position in Food Chain (various sectors) 
The food chain in Spain is equally divided between traditional and modern marketing 
systems, varying within sectors. In general POs are focused on production and marketing 
farmers’ products, although this varies somewhat across sectors. Cooperative market 
share is generally high, as set out in more detail in Table 5.13. Where there is less 
atomization there tends to be stronger presence at all levels in the food chain and the 
market share of the largest entities tends to increase over time. In Chapter 5.6, we 
comment on sector particularities (for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 5.6 for the 
relevant sector). See 5.5.2 for a discussion of the individual cooperatives under study. 
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Through the process of mergers, promoted by the government through a system of 
incentives (see below in section 7.2) there is an attempt for producers to have more 
bargaining power vis-à-vis large distributors. Second tier cooperatives are the traditional 
method in which Spain has managed to concentrate production and supply. As set out in 
Chapter 5.5, Figure 5.31, organic growth is the preferred strategy of Spanish cooperatives 
(subject to this study) followed by horizontal merger, then vertical merger and lastly by 
international mergers. Differentiation is considered to be the preferred market strategy by 
the “top 5” cooperatives in each sector. Although this study was limited to a relatively very 
small sample, these results may be seen as representative at least of Spanish cooperatives 
successful in their sector. 
With respect to vegetables, traditional retail accounts for 42% of the sales of vegetables, 
followed by large distribution chains (40%). A similar pattern is observed in the fresh fruit 
sector, in which small retailers market 45% of the total value of product, and modern 
distribution 42%. Besides farmers and retailers, the sector includes a very wide range of 
economic agents (about 10,000) who perform various operations along the supply chain, 
related to product sorting, conditioning, processing, transport, etc. (Camanzi, 2009). Large 
cooperatives have their own primary processing and packaging plants. Most products are 
sold through second tier cooperatives and there is little presence in the retail market. 
Significant mergers have taken place in this area in the last decade along with an emphasis 
on professionalisation and technological advancement, particularly in increasing 
production, advanced product analysis and safety, certification and integrated biological 
farming methods, all in an attempt to gain greater positional strength in the food supply 
chain.  
The cereal supply to the processing industry is in the hands of three types of entities: 
cooperatives, wholesalers and large multinational companies with capacity for 
warehousing (Caton-Vázquez, 2004). The dispersed offer of cereals in Spain poses a 
problem in dealing with the highly concentrated agro-food industries. In general, it is 
made up of small and medium enterprises with the consequent high structural costs.  
The majority of cooperative cereal production is commercialized through second tier 
cooperatives, although there are some first tier cooperatives with a significant commercial 
capacity. Many of the first tier cooperatives that are not members of a second tier 
cooperative are basically local storehouses of various products and supplies; generally 
they do not engage in direct sales and they often work through wholesalers of a certain 
size. A weakness of the sector is its lack of adequate commercialisation strategy to adapt to 
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demand and also to allow supply to the market throughout the whole of the year. 
Commercial cooperatives, with the appropriate infrastructure for storage, can plan price 
strategies and have the capacity to provide a steady and homogeneous supply throughout 
the year. Where cooperatives do not have such capacity they are forced to sell to third 
parties at less than optimal prices (Group AN, 2010).  
The cooperative olive oil companies have little presence in retail establishments as the 
large agro food distribution companies control this market niche. Five buyers purchase 
over half the market. The small size of the sector (in relation to the size of the distribution 
companies) and the small and medium companies which make up the sector result in big 
disadvantages when competing and negotiating with large firms. In 2007, 55% of exports 
were still bulk sales although in recent years the cooperative oil presses are increasing the 
sale of bottled oil. The market share of distribution brands (“DB”) averages 65% and in 
some categories reaches 83% (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2010a).  
The wine sector in general is characterised by a high level of vertical integration. A dual 
structure coexists wherein a small group of large dynamic companies that have managed 
to deal with market changes are in contrast to many companies that have not yet adapted 
to new and competitive markets. These small companies are dedicated only to agriculture, 
leaving commercialisation tasks to other companies which control this process. With 
respect to wine cooperatives a similar structure exists as in the general wine sector, that 
is, a predominance of small and medium cooperatives and a reduced number of large 
companies. 
The structure is very fragmented and in addition there are various levels of development. 
Small unprofessional cooperatives are dedicated to production and do not participate in 
later stages of production and supply chain. They have limited negotiating power. Another 
group of cooperatives commercialise bottled wine although their principle activity 
continues to be the sale of bulk wine. Finally there is a small group of cooperatives that 
commercialise the product of their member with a clear professional market approach. 
In light of this, the commercialization of product from cooperative wineries continues to 
be quite insignificant compared to the industry in general and represents one of the main 
problems of cooperative wineries (Melián and Millán, 2007). As well, commercialization 
through second tier cooperatives is also insignificant and they generally are active in the 
sale of bulk wine. The creation of commercial companies and the externalization of 
services are some of the alternatives being employed by the sector.  
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With respect to dairy cooperatives distribution, the most common methods are the use of 
non exclusive distributors and the sale to large distributors, thus reducing direct sales 
made by the cooperative. Intermediary importers are used for external markets. The 
sector is based principally on the elaboration of liquid milk (60%) while the rest is for milk 
products. This structure is very different than that of other large EU markets, which are 
based more on cheese, butter and powdered milk. The majority of packaged milk is sold to 
grand distributors and the distributors´ brand represents 52% of internal consumption 
(MARM, 2009b). 
The sector is characterized by significant atomization in contrast to the concentration of 
organized distribution. Such atomization is especially significant in production, given that 
63.32% of farms hold 22% of the quota, while the remaining 78% of the quotas are in the 
hands of 32.83% of the farms. Since the 90s, production has been abandoned by many 
farms, leading to an increase in their size. The objective of such increase in size had been 
to improve competitiveness in the sector, but it has ended up provoking a contrary effect, 
producing an important increase in costs (COAG, 2010). Costs have increased due to the 
fact that an increase in growth has been accompanied by a greater intensity of production, 
thus resulting in higher costs.  
There is only one sugar cooperative, ACOR, in Spain and due to the restructuring of the 
sugar sector, sugar production is in decline. In 2009 it established an alliance with a 
French cooperative group, TEREOS for the production and commercialisation of sugar in 
Spain, through the acquisition of 40% of its social capital. As a result from 2010, the 
TEREOS group carries out the commercialization of the production of both Spanish 
companies (the other being an IOF). 
Sheep meat production is very dispersed, from many small operations to cooperatives 
with thousands of heads of stock. The complexity and number of actors in the 
commercialization in origin depends on the avenues of commercialization and whether 
the direct purchases are possible in the slaughterhouses. The wholesalers which carry out 
commercialisation in origin cover the management of the animal from the purchase from 
the farmer until its final transformation. The fundamental differences between the agents 
at the sales points lie in their size, volume and variety of product. Aside from the basic 
value chain, there is a difference between the traditional and modern model: in the former 
the butcher buys from the slaughterhouse directly and is then responsible for breaking it 
down and preparing it. The modern model is characterized by the presence of large 
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distributors at the sale point who require product which is more specialized and exacting 
in specifications (MARM, 2009c). 
Cooperative pig production is made up of two types of cooperatives: the first are pork 
producer cooperatives which, as a service to the members, provide food for the animals. 
The second are marketing cooperatives that carry out the sale of the live animals and the 
products obtained after their sacrifice. The majority of marketing cooperatives are 
dedicated to selling live animals. Of those cooperatives that market products obtained 
after the sacrifice, the sale is done predominantly through channels. As there exist more 
restrictions and health and sanitary problems in relation to live animals than with meat 
and products derived from pork, cooperatives focus not only in the sale of animals but also 
in the production of transformed/processed/value added products. In addition, this 
facilitates sales and exportation. Some first tier cooperatives have united with other pork 
producing cooperatives, and as well with second tier cooperatives that are not dedicated 
to the production of pork. Currently, eight second tier cooperatives are dedicated 
exclusively to the production of pork.  
Institutional Environment (including Regulatory Framework) 
As set out in Chapter 5.7 the legal and economic regulation of cooperatives present a 
series of limitations with respect to other types of companies, such limitations stemming 
for the most part, from cooperative principles and restrictive perceptions of the concept of 
cooperatives and cooperation. They include: (i) limitations derived from their legal-
organisational structure; (ii) functional and operative limits; and (iii) financial limitations. 
See in particular Chapter 5.7.3, for a full explanation of these limitations. 
A central obstacle in Spain is the regulatory framework. As mentioned in section 5.3, 
cooperatives fall within the jurisdiction of the autonomous communities, each having their 
own cooperative legislation. A national law on cooperatives exists, as does a national tax 
law in relation to cooperatives61. Policies that influence cooperatives are enacted by both 
national and autonomous community governments, with autonomous governments, in 
most cases, channelling the various funds to cooperative organisations. For example, a 
cooperative wine producer in the autonomous community of Catalonia is subject to 
different cooperative laws than one in Castilla La Mancha and has the benefit (or not) of 
policies enacted at its own autonomous community level. All of this results in a lack of 
coordination and coherent strategy when dealing with agricultural cooperatives, 
particularly in regard to European agricultural initiatives. Serious improvement is needed 
                                                                  
61 However, Basque provinces have their own tax laws. 
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to ensure communication and coordination between various levels of government so that 
European Union funds are properly used to achieve maximum efficiency and do not 
remain underutilised. Given the various sources of legislation, it is also very difficult to 
track the reasons for success or failure of cooperatives based on subsector.  
In Chapter 5.3 we make reference to the institutional background and support for 
cooperatives contained in the Spanish Constitution and “reactivated” in the recent Social 
Economy Law. We describe support for cooperatives in general and therefore we will not 
reproduce it here (see Chapter 5.3, sections 5.3.2 and Chapter 5.4).  
Historically, Spanish cooperatives possessed various characteristics which were in many 
ways related to the socio-economic background of agriculture in Spain: 
 Atomization, the majority of which are SMEs and small cooperatives.  
 Lack of market orientation, still focusing on production paradigms and finding a place 
to sell crops rather than contemplating a customer to which to sell a unique quality 
product. Implicit in this is the development of commercialisation strategies, logistics, 
product development, etc.  
 Lack of agricultural business education and training, particularly at the production 
level (although technical training is increasing). This is particularly relevant when 
contrasted with the level of education and training at the “higher end” of the food 
distribution chain. High level management training is particularly lacking. Human 
resources and entrepreneurial training must be taken more seriously in agricultural 
cooperatives. In other activities of equal economic weight, much more importance is 
given to these issues. While the transition from peasant to business farmer, even 
perhaps manager, has been achieved, there is still some way to go towards developing 
a culture of entrepreneurial innovators. 
 Tied into the above point is the difficulty in attracting both new farmers and new 
agricultural management as the sector is not seen as an attractive option. 
 Little interest in internationalization, in spite of its tradition of exportation. There is an 
excessive reliance on brokers and intermediaries and Spanish companies are reluctant 
to make the investment necessary to locate in another country, thus limiting the ability 
to consolidate an international presence and add value. The top 200 agro alimentary 
companies in Spain in 2006 were responsible for 53% of the industry turnover 
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(Alimarket). The low incidence of internationalisation has much to do with these prior 
observations. (Boccherini 2010). 
 Autonomous community competencies and regulation which has stunted inter-
regional cooperation and has resulted in layers of administration and lack of policy 
coordination, affecting sectors which have activity in many sectors.  
 Other social/cultural/historical characteristics are risk aversion, little investment in 
R&D and innovation, and lack of financial capitalization (Meliá y Martinez, 2011). 
It is important to stress that the identification of these characteristics is not intended to 
negatively define agricultural cooperatives in Spain. The reality, as detailed in Chapters 5.5 
and 5.6, is that many agricultural cooperative sectors have experienced impressive 
success, and various cooperatives and second tier cooperatives have been able to 
modernise and expand in a very short period of time. All of this has been achieved in	spite	
of the many regulatory, political, geographic and institutional barriers.  
What the list above is intended to demonstrate is the necessity for policies that help 
overcome these historical characteristics to the extent that they affect cooperative 
performance. In 5.8.2 below we touch on policy measures that have been able to address 
these shortcomings or on the contrary, to leverage these characteristics into a competitive 
advantage (e.g. localism also can contribute to a cooperative culture which is the bases for 
successful cooperative performance). 
5.8.2 Effects	of	policy	measures	on	the	competitive	position	of	cooperatives	
Elsewhere in this report, particularly in Chapter 5.6 where we have dealt with individual 
sectors, we have touched on the effects of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 
general such policy, which has favoured the economic liberalisation approach to 
agriculture, has not been positive for Spanish cooperatives in general (Baamonde, 2009). 
While farmers have been compensated for the decrease in market prices, cooperatives 
have not been compensated for the decrease in available production to be traded (sugar 
an exception). Lower member production implies a higher fixed cost for the cooperative. 
The Producer Organisations model for F&V has been, however, a relatively positive 
development. 
Two pressing problems for agricultural cooperatives in Spain are volatility of prices and 
the lack of negotiating power. Farmers have a difficult time maintaining a sustainable level 
of income due to the lack of instruments to control markets and the severe imbalances in 
bargaining power in the supply chain. Recent reforms of the CAP have not effectively dealt 
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with these issues. Instead, the effective dismantling of almost all methods to manage 
markets (e.g. interventions, private warehousing) has fanned price volatilities and 
resulted in lower incomes for farmers. While mechanisms may still exist, the safety net has 
been pitched much lower. Decoupled, direct payments are of little use because such 
payments are discounted immediately in the market; that is, they are factored into the 
price as a discount (Baamonde, 2009). 
In spite of a trend in integration and concentration agriculture in Spain continues to be 
“atomized”. The sheer size and power of the few and large distributors, results in unequal 
bargaining strengths that are difficult to counterbalance. Prices are set by distributors and 
thus Spanish cooperative members, focused as they are on the production and 
commercialization of primary or secondary products receive low prices at the “bottom” of 
the chain. This in turn leads to the social-economic view that farming is “not worth it” and 
few younger people take up farming as a profession. Cooperative members are older and 
cooperative membership is declining. Without strong cooperatives, rural areas suffer and 
their local development and economies are at risk. 
It is clear that the CAP does have measures to deal with some of the latter issues and 
competitiveness in agriculture at the local level under its “second pillar” of Local 
Development. However, given the Spanish cooperative legislative/political structure, such 
measures are weakened. In practice the autonomous communities administer such 
programs and there is a lack of a unified national approach. As a result, projects and 
alliances which would entail more than one autonomous community and which are 
urgently necessary to “scale up “ and meet the demands of global competition are left 
without sufficient support measures.  
As well, cooperatives which exceed size limits for small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) 
lose 50% of financial support available under such measures. This position is illogical for 
agricultural cooperative POs, irrespective of the size of such cooperatives, given that their 
members are small business and family farmers (Baamonde, 2009; EURICSE, 2010). In 
addition, it is incoherent with policies that promote mergers and growth. 
The EU recognised the promotion of groups and associations through Regulations 
1360/78; 746/93; 952/97. The support of producer groups was withdrawn through the 
Regulation 1257/99 and reintroduced through the Regulation 1698/2005 for the new 
Member States. With respect to the CMO the Spanish national cooperative confederation 
has underlined the fundamental role of POs in the concentration of offer, the improvement 
of producer participation in sharing in the added value along the food supply chain and in 
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the adaptation of production to the market. As an example, the significant growth in the 
fruit and vegetable sector reflects the success of such policy.  
However, there are many points of disagreement and in certain important sub sectors 
such as fruits and vegetables, there is much dissatisfaction. Whilst certain important 
points have been reflected in the conditions of the Operative Programs as to the eligibility 
of activities related to product transformation by cooperatives, calculations as to the value 
of commercialized product or the eligibility of investments in farms and installations of 
members and their cooperatives, other important weaknesses persist in relation to the 
Management and Prevention of Crisis and also the reform of System of Entry Prices. Cirilo 
Arnandis, president of the Fruit and Vegetable sector board of Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias has noted the “lack of coherence between the political declarations of 
Community institutions, which are clearly favourable to the concentration of offer, 
downstream integration by producers, a more key role played by POs, and the provision of 
mechanisms to manage crisis versus the vacillation, incoherence if not intolerance, that is 
detected in the regulations passed by the Commission” (Agrocope, 2011). The evaluation 
of all EU measures in relation to agriculture is beyond the scope of this report. However, 
the comment of Arnandis is emblematic of the difficulty in reconciling policy theory and 
actual policies enacted in relation to a multitude of interests. 
Turning our focus to laws and policies in Spain in the scope of this report we focus on 
evaluating the influence of policy measures listed in Tables 5.30. 5.31, 5.32, and 5.33 on 
the competitive position of agricultural cooperatives. Such measures have been broken 
down into various policy themes, as set out below. The list of policies and laws in Spain 
which could influence the competitive position of cooperatives in Spain is extremely long 
(and the list contained herein does not contain all such measures) and thus it is necessary 
to generalise 
Overview	of	Spanish	Cooperative	Legislation. As is evident throughout this report and 
as detailed in Chapter 5.7 Spain does not suffer from a lack of cooperative laws, due to the 
“double layer” of national cooperative laws and policies and those of the autonomous 
communities. Several communities have another law specifically for small cooperatives. 
Laws vary on substantial issues and do not facilitate coordination between cooperatives. 
Some experts have argued for a national law on agricultural cooperatives (Juliá et al., 
2010), a scenario which would be both legally and politically difficult as it would require 
negotiations with all autonomous communities. There have been a range of suggestions 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
221 
 
from the fiscal perspective62 and as well arguments for a more flexible approach to 
cooperative laws that maintain cooperative goals (Vargas-Vasserot and Aguilar, 2006). 
Overall, the autonomous community cooperative laws which are seen to be most effective 
and advanced are those of the Basque Country. However, as noted in Chapter 5.4, the 
Basque Country does not have a great amount of agricultural cooperative activity 
compared to other autonomous communities in Spain, such as Andalusia, Catalonia, 
Valencia, etc. Andalusia has just overhauled its own cooperative law taking on board some 
of the provisions which had already existed in other jurisdictions. (See Tables 5.30 in 
Chapter 5.7 where notable/distinctive sections of the various cooperative laws are shown 
in bold lettering.) 
Given the “atomisation” of cooperative law in Spain, it follows that agricultural 
cooperatives themselves tend to organise around their governing regulation, thus 
resulting in a general cooperative atomisation. The introduction of the European 
Cooperative Society has had very little impact in Spain as of yet. This is not surprising in 
light of the fact that very few cooperatives are set up under the national cooperative 
legislation.  
Fiscal policy provides few substantive incentives to agricultural policies, such advantages 
often being outweighed by the lack of flexibility and the resulting difficulty in accessing 
finance. However, given that Cooperative Tax Law is a national law, there is the possibility 
that a careful reform of cooperative tax policy could contribute to the unification of 
cooperative laws in certain aspects (Vargas and Aguilar, 2006).  
Limitations which result, in general, from cooperative taxation legislation have been set 
out in Chapter 5.7.5, but other issues exist as well based on legal and economic regulation 
stemming for the most part from cooperative principles and restrictive perceptions of the 
concept of cooperatives and cooperation. To make matters clear, this is not to suggest that 
the cooperative form is thus a “flawed” type of company. In order to outline correctly the 
legal-financial situation of these entities and evaluate the necessary reform of their legal 
regulation and their own terms, existing issues must be identified. Whether cooperatives 
are financially viable and represent a form of enterprise that is successful in the market is 
not primarily dependent on whether cooperatives receive more or less subsidies or pay 
more or less taxes. Rather, such success is also due to the cooperative´s ability to leverage 
the cooperative form as a successful business model and attract and retain committed 
members.  
                                                                  
62 See Volume 69 of CIRIEC-España (2010); a special issue on cooperative legislation and tax issues. 
Chapter 5 Analysis of Agricultural Cooperatives in Spain and their Institutional Environment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
222 
 
First, there are limitations derived from their legal-organisational structure: 
A significant risk that cooperatives must face is that members leave the cooperative 
without having to justify a cause. The cooperative must then process the early liquidation 
of such member share. Added to this limitation are the restrictive cooperative legal 
provisions on the assignment or sale of such participations and the inexistence of a 
secondary market in which to trade them (although this has been dealt with in some 
cooperative laws). This limits to a large degree the generational changeover of members 
and the entrance of third parties through the acquisition of the leaving members´ 
contributions. In addition, cooperatives are usually prohibited from acquiring such 
contributions to their own equity capital. This restriction inhibits the buying-back and 
management of its own treasury as well as other instruments which would enable the 
cooperative to manage the correct exit and subscription of its members.  
As well, the political discontent of the most economically active members is a significant 
issue in cases where there are differences between members in terms of level of 
participation in the cooperative activity and the ownership of equity capital. As we have 
seen NIE attempts to deal with this through “well defined property rights” and NGC 
characterisitics. However, as in the case of Mezzacorona, other methods are available to 
deal with heterogeneity of membership.  
Finally, the complication of having “capitalist” members is a notable difficulty. In order to 
keep control of the cooperative in hands of ordinary members, quantitative limits are 
established in relation to the percentage of votes that special types of members may have 
in relation to the total votes, thus limiting their economic rights. One must add to this the 
limits on participation of certain legal persons (i.e. not physical persons but, for example, a 
company) as members of the cooperative which, if such participations are assigned or 
sold, provokes a loss of tax benefits. 	
Second, there are functional and operative limits: 
One of the principal differences between cooperatives and other types of companies is that 
the economic activity is essentially carried out by its members (mutuality principle). The 
principle of mutuality has been traditionally interpreted in Spanish cooperative 
regulations as the necessity to limit operations with third parties. This position has little 
justification in Spanish cooperative law where financial results are accounted for in a 
separate manner, that is, separate accounts for activities which are “cooperative” and 
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activities, which are “extra-cooperative”. Those revenues that are extra-cooperative are 
taxed at the general rate for company tax and destined to collective funds. 
Cooperatives are also subject to limitations when they constitute subsidiary, affiliated, or 
associated companies or participate in commercial companies. The revenues generated by 
these investments will not directly revert back to the parent cooperative members but are 
destined to be allocated to the obligatory reserve fund. The participation of the 
cooperative in a quantity superior to 10% of the equity capital in non-cooperative entities 
is cause for the loss by the cooperative of the protected tax treatment (the percentage is 
increased to 40% when one is dealing with entities that carry out activities that are 
preparatory, complementary or subordinated to that of the cooperative).  
Last but not least are financial limitations:  
The economic-financial regulation of cooperatives is characterized by an excessive rigidity 
and by the existence of determined fiscal and “para-fiscal” burdens that do not 
compensate the theoretical “privileged” tax position that cooperatives enjoy. Cooperatives 
may pay less taxes but the level of surpluses is less as well. Within the financial limitations, 
the most important are those which derive from the variability of equity capital which is, 
without a doubt one of the characteristic features of the cooperative business form and is 
the technical-legal element used by the legislature to put into practice the principle of 
“open doors”. The possibility of the flux of members entering and leaving the cooperative 
is found in the original origins of the cooperative movement. Financially speaking, the 
open door policy means that its equity capital is susceptible to increases due to the 
admission of new members and decline due to the return or refund of contributions due to 
the abandonment by members.  
This variable nature of cooperative equity capital usually is perceived as a sign of the 
financial weakness of cooperatives due to the possibility that the cooperative equity will 
be notably reduced by the exit of members. To avoid this, cooperative laws have at their 
disposal a series of measures that convert the equity capital into partially variable capital, 
that is, a part is always fixed. As well, it allows cooperatives, through their statutes and 
bylaws, to construct sufficient financial guarantees (put limits on variable capital). 
However, at times these legal measures are excessive in comparison to the requirements 
of investor owned companies.  
In addition, such restrictive measures are often not practical or useful. The contributions 
to obligatory funds in order to guarantee the solvency of the cooperative depends on (i) 
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where the cooperative carries out its principal activity, which determines the applicable 
cooperative law and in particular the regulation of allocation of funds and, (ii) the 
accounting and financial policy which is adopted by the cooperative. If, as a matter of 
course, there are no surpluses because the cooperative operates with the goal of zero 
profits, the legal imposition to allocate funds in a manner proportionately significant 
serves little purpose.  
SAT	Legislation.	The minimum regulatory requirements of SATs, dating from 1981, result 
in few limitations and conflicts for such enterprise form (Vargas, 2010). When SAT 
regulation is compared to that of agricultural cooperatives, the advantages are evident: 
there are none of the traditional legal limitations of cooperatives (difficulty to transfer the 
position of member, obligation to allocate funds to collective funds, limits on dealings with 
third parties, limitations to invest in commercial entities, limits in the distribution of 
surpluses, etc.)  
The linking of the social object of agrarian, livestock or forest activity, which constitutes 
the basic element of SATs, is not a unique feature which justifies the existence of this 
enterprise form, with all the advantages it enjoys as compared to agricultural 
cooperatives. The same object can be carried out by agricultural cooperatives, civil 
societies or commercial capitalistic companies. If the concept of SAT is compared to the 
legal definition of agricultural cooperatives (art. 93 Spanish Cooperative Law) a few 
differences are evident. Whether this company type should be maintained or whether its 
legal framework should be substantially reformed is a relevant issue for the Spanish 
agricultural cooperative sector.  
Recently, SAT legislation has been brought into force in the autonomous community of 
Aragon. The law has been challenged on jurisdictional grounds but it sets a worrisome 
precedent for agricultural cooperatives. If this precedent is followed elsewhere, SATs 
could begin to invade at the autonomous community level and enjoy the same 
autonomous community benefits available to agricultural cooperatives while at the same 
time undermining cooperative principles.  
Social	Economy	Initiatives	including	Promotion	of	Cooperatives	and	SMEs.	There are 
quite a few initiatives directed at the promotion and formation of social enterprise 
entities, which include cooperatives. However, as these initiatives are new, it is not 
possible to judge their influence or effects on agricultural cooperatives. What is notable is 
that these initiatives are carried out at the autonomous community level. While this 
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strategy may be positive for local development it may not contribute to a unified strategic 
approach for cooperative entities. 
Such initiatives may foster a more profound cooperative culture as opposed to just a 
cooperative legal form, and thus may positively affect business efficiencies. Perhaps a 
focus on agricultural cooperatives as part of the social economy will encourage the 
participation of more women in cooperative businesses and help break down barriers 
which persist in cooperative culture. 
	Integration	 and	 Restructuring.	 In order to remedy the “ills” of atomisation, much 
discussion and policy work has been focused on the need for mergers, for larger size, for 
market concentration, etc. Indeed, a report was delivered before the Commission of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in the European Parliament (Report regarding 
Alimentary Prices, 24 February, 2009) emphasizing the role of cooperatives in the 
concentration of offer and the request for measures to facilitate the merger of POs in order 
to increase their size and thus market presence.	
It is evident that other agricultural cooperatives in countries such as Denmark, Holland or 
Ireland have relied on creating large cooperatives to improve their capacity for 
negotiation, develop products and increase competitiveness (Meliá and Martinez, 2011).  
As pointed out in Chapter 5.4, Table 5.9 “Percentage distribution of agricultural 
cooperatives according to number of members (2009)” and Table 5.10 “Percentage 
distribution of number of agricultural cooperatives according to turnover (2009)” Spain’s 
cooperatives continue to be mostly of reduced size thus affecting their ability to 
concentrate production, invest in new initiatives, create economies of scale and attain 
negotiating power in dealings with distributors. 
As evident in Table 5.30 there have been various initiatives by national and autonomous 
community governments to promote mergers, integration and concentration at various 
levels and in various sectors in Spain. 	
The push for integration and the creation of second tier cooperatives is to respond to 
global markets, with the idea that it allows better efficiencies, diversification of products, 
opening of new markets, concentration of demand factors, discovery of new industrial 
processes, improvement in accounting management and higher professionalisation 
(Montegut, Cristóbal and Marimom, 2007).  
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While studies of integration processes have been carried out63 the empirical work on how 
mergers affect financial performance in agricultural cooperatives has been relatively 
scarce. It is worth noting that recent Spanish studies have found that mergers are not 
always particularly successful, although such strategy and results would have to be 
studied further on a sector by sector basis (Meliá, Juliá and Martinez, 2010; and Barrio and 
Parras, 2003). The most far reaching and recent Spanish work published (Meliá and 
Martinez, 2011) contributes with interesting insights as to whether such policy has been 
effective or not in the competitive position of agricultural cooperatives. It found that 
mergers on average did not lead to a statistical improvement in relation to the financial 
indicators studies. While it is too soon to come to any solid conclusions in this regard, it is 
interesting to note that governments are advocating mergers as the way forward, often 
based on the experiences of other countries. Which method of integration is the most 
adequate for Spain remains to be seen.  
However, size isn´t just about market power in relation to price. The size of a cooperative 
also dictates whether it is even a “player” at all. Increasingly producer cooperatives deal 
directly with the large distributors without intermediaries. Absent a minimum size such 
distributors will not even bother to deal with small producers and there is a high risk that 
intermediaries will jump in to fill the void. Medium size intermediaries are also 
decreasing, leaving small cooperatives with nowhere to go, unless there is cooperation 
with another cooperative or entity. It is a structural change in the market and not one that 
only has to do with price. 
Efforts to promote second tier cooperatives have been a success across sector and region 
(Martin, 2006; Fernández, et. al, 2008). The government of Andalusia has announced that 
it will severely cut back support to the olive oil sector in terms of upgrading and 
modernizing installations in favour of integration activities and the setting up of 
commercial platforms64. The results of the cooperative Questionnaire found that the 
favoured strategy by cooperatives was organic growth.  
Interprofessional	 Associations.	 National and autonomous community measures that 
have supported Inter-professional entities are considered to have been a success and very 
relevant in organising sectors not only from a business perspective but also in terms of 
mounting an effective lobby. Given the atomisation of both regulatory measures and the 
sector itself, this alternative method of institution building is particularly important for 
                                                                  
63 Many of these studies were published in the period 1995-2002 and are too numerous to cite here. See 
Jimenez, et al. (2006) for an overview of such studies. 
64 Announcement of Clara Aguilera, former Minister of Agriculture and Fishing of the Regional Government of 
Andalusia, on 28 April 2011. 
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Spain. However, more “teeth” needs to be given to these entities so that they have more 
impact and influence. This may include giving them a legal framework in which they may 
influence such power, a position supported by significant actors within the sector (See 
discussion under Chapter 5.6.4- Fruits and Vegetables-Policies.) 
With respect to both "Integration and Restructuring" and "Interprofessional Associations" 
above, it is worth noting the position of Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, which is the 
national confederation of agricultural cooperatives. Their position differs in some respects 
from other opinions expressed by other producers, associations and entities.  
Problems of supply chain imbalances, atomisation of producers and a weak bargaining 
position (and the issues of intermediaries, lack of transparency and speculation which 
accompany such ills) have been referenced. In the opinion of Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias, there are two methods of addressing such problems. The first is to 
argue for a type of negotiation between the actors in the supply chain, where prices would 
be negotiated between producers and the large distributors. Producer representatives, 
such as the interprofessional associations, would act as interlocuters with the capacity to 
negotiate minimum prices in the name of the producers. For this to occur, exceptions to 
competition law would need to be ensured as well as the special status of these 
organisations and the obligation to enter into written contracts, amongst other measures. 
Such collective negotiation measures are not seen as a viable option by Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias. 
In support of this stance, they point to the fact that there are 697 OPs in the F&V alone, 
which represents only one third of the market. As an alternative, they advocate for policies 
which push such OPs to merge or commercially align themselves so that the number of 
operators is reduced considerably, eliminating along the way entities which do not add 
value and which serve to engage in speculation. A suggested measure is that of requiring 
stricter minimum requirements in terms of number of producers and production (seen to 
be currently very low and ineffective). 
In supporting this second option, Cooperativas Agroalimentarias holds that 
interprofessional associations are not by nature commercial but rather representative 
entities. In addition to these practices creating possible issues for competition authorities, 
such organisations are seen to lack business responsibility and control over the 
production about which they are negotiating, leading potentially to lack of efficiency and 
transparency. 
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In the event such negotiation arrangement would be permitted, Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias observes that the representative entities lack enforcement measures to 
ensure that agreed terms are carried out and that they lack the capacity to exercise control 
over the producers (who must legally be party to the contracts). 
In addition, they argue that as price negotiation is just one of many factors such as 
logistics, delivery conditions, quality, etc. and not the root cause of the weak bargaining 
position nor the commercial structure of the sector, the remedy should be seen to be 
through the long term, selected structural policies which incentivise the concentration of 
production and commericialisation.  
This said, Cooperativas Agroalimentarias do see Interprofessional associations fulfilling an 
important role in prompting dialogue about regulations, quality, marketing, R+D+i and 
other issues which affect the sector. 
Marketing,	 Promotion,	 Exportation,	 and	 Internationalisation. Programs to improve 
and support marketing, exportation and internationalization have also been very 
successful. Andalusia´s EXTENDA in one such example. As federations have pointed out, a 
higher level of effectiveness characterises the use of subsidies and other financial 
incentives for which cooperatives have to compete. COVAP in Andalucía is a good example 
of cooperative internationalisation. Its products can be found in 23 different countries 
with a turnover of approximately 300 million Euros in 2009 (Fuentes García, et. al., 2011). 
The EU has given financial support for the improvement of the transformation and 
commercialization of agricultural products over a number of years (Rgts 355/77; 866/90; 
951/97; 1257/99 and 1698/2005) and cooperatives have in some cases benefited from a 
priority treatment.  
Financing	and	Encouraging	Investment.	Adequate financing, whether for large or small 
agricultural cooperatives is of crucial importance and measures that	 provide financing 
taking into account cooperative and agricultural needs are effective. ICO (National Credit 
Institute) financing under the various lines in Table 5.32 are also an important source of 
funds. However, some programs limit financing to SMEs which is counterproductive for 
POs. Some initiatives promote investment in social economy entities, specifically 
cooperatives. The role of cooperative credit banks have been crucial in the development of 
agricultural cooperatives in Spain and support measures for cooperative credit, although 
not detailed in this report is also a fact has influenced the success of cooperative 
agricultural regions (Giagnocavo, et. al, 2012). 
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The recent adoption by the New Spanish Accounting Norms of the international 
accounting standards (IAS) is problematic for cooperatives as the social capital (equity) is 
not considered to meet the standards to be considered equity capital and thus is 
considered as debt. 
Innovation	 and	 Modernisation.	 These types of policies are	 likely dependent on the 
sector and also on other complementary initiatives. In and of themselves, absent a 
coherent commercialisation or integration strategy they have not been particularly 
effective. 
Education	and	Training.	 Quite a few policies are related to subsidising education and 
training directly or to the designation of resources to create programs and provide such 
training opportunities. The programs usually refer to increasing competitiveness as a goal. 
Often they are geared towards unemployed people, labour insertion or ordinary workers. 
Few are dedicated to higher level professional cooperative management training where 
arguably the need is the greatest. On-line training is one of the most popular methods of 
training in spite of doubtful results. 
After speaking with human resources managers of various cooperatives and associations 
of producer organisations a general conclusion was expressed: cooperatives in general are 
not convinced of the utility of such programs, as they currently exist. They engage in 
education and training because of administrative obligations or because of quality 
programs which require such training for certification purposes. The cooperatives 
generally do not create the education and training programs and they try to adapt their 
needs to fit within the training themes designed by the administration. From the point of 
view of the cooperatives, the administration in general does not understand the 
cooperative labour situation and should count on sectors and cooperatives to help design 
programs. Cooperatives as well share part of the blame as they are reluctant to engage in 
continuing education and training.  
Sustainable	 and	 Rural	 Development.	 Investment in quality and environmental 
initiatives has been shown to improve competitiveness in the fruit and vegetable sector 
(Galdeano, 2002), although “integrated” as opposed to “ecological” production has proven 
to be more successful for farmers. Ecological product is not highly valued in Spain´s 
domestic market and most of it is for export. However, Spain has the largest organic 
farming area in the EU 27 with 18.6 % of it area dedicated to organic farming. Programs 
for encouraging organic production are useful to help farms, many of which are 
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cooperatives as well as initiatives to export and market their product. This type of farming 
activity is a key element in sustainable and rural development. 
Figure	5.65	Evolution	of	the	Organic	Farming	Area	in	Spain.	
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, Secretary General of Rural Areas and 
Ecological Production, 2010 
Cooperatives have also been shown to be the impetus for creation of employment in rural 
areas (Bel Durán, Fernández and Miranda, 2005). Environmental issues related to 
agriculture and the sustainability of rural areas are intricately related to Spanish 
agricultural cooperatives, particularly to the vast majority of small and medium 
cooperatives. As part of a comprehensive strategy, these initiatives are important, 
although short term indicators of performance are difficult to measure. When rural 
environments are included as part of the “brand” of agricultural products, agricultural 
cooperatives have a particular interest in these initiatives. 
Spain presented its National Strategic Plan, based on FEADER regulations on April 2, 2007 
and decided to carry out a program based on the Autonomous Community jurisdictions. 
There are 17 regional programs, one for each Autonomous Community. 
In addition, as contemplated by article 15.3 of the regulation, the prior Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fishing and Food, in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment 
consulted all such Autonomous Communities as well as economic and social entities and 
produced a National Framework for Rural Development 2007-2013. All regional programs 
contain such basic measures, but they may add supplementary or more restrictive 
conditions as they see fit. That is, one cannot count on uniformity in a sector. A 
cooperative olive oil producer in Andalusia is subject to not only different cooperative 
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laws, but also to a different program of rural development than a cooperative olive oil 
producer in Catalunya. 
In reference to 2010 the execution of FEADER has reached 24% of the total with more 
than 90 million Euros distributed amongst the autonomous communities. Protocols are to 
be put in place to attempt to remedy the lack of coordination between regions and the 
national government (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2011c). 
According to Salazar Ordóñez (2011) the initial evaluations of FEADER by the agricultural 
sector in Spain has been positive in several aspects. The interest in social issues in rural 
territories has been one way of to legitimate rural activity that has lost relevance in past 
decades (Moyano, 2006). Gallardo (2005) maintains that FEADER funds have 
complemented the sectoral and territorial focus and have consolidated the LEADER 
approach, thus providing a more adequate response to the new social demands of rural 
areas. 
However, the integration of the different aspects of FEADER with agrarian interests has 
not been particularly smooth. Moyano (2006) has maintained that farmers and their 
organisations view FEADER as a method of moving funds from the first to the second 
pillar, which negatively affects actions designed to improve and modernize farm 
operations. Important resources which should have been focused on agricultural activities 
have been used for certain environmental programs which in the opinion of farmers, 
should never have been included in such FEADER program. Consequently there is a real 
concern that there are not sufficient funds to carry out all of the objectives and that such 
diverse objectives themselves complicate strategic activities and a coherent plan.  
González Regidor (2005) from a different perspective, expresses concern that local 
development has been so closely associated with agriculture, as until 2006 rural 
development measures were fundamentally about cohesion and after 2007 they are 
integrated into CAP. 
On a positive note, Moyano (2006) and Salazar Ordóñez (2011) acknowledge the fact that 
much flexibility and decision making capacity has been left in the hands of the Member 
States, allowing them to reinforce rural policies connected to the EU. 
Focusing more closely on agricultural cooperatives, such entities have been acknowledged 
as drivers of local development in Spain (Bel Durán, 2004; Juliá Igual, 2002, amongst 
others). The cooperative legislation of the various Autonomous Communities, as well as 
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the Spanish National cooperative legislation, recognize in one form or another, the role of 
cooperatives in improving the rural environment. 
Agricultural cooperatives are considered local development agents (and thus are given 
some priorities) and act as an intermediary with public administrations and as members 
of the “local action groups” set up by the various LEADER programs (Gallego Sevilla, 
2007). Agricultural cooperatives receive funds from the various Spanish Autonomous 
Communities to carry out local development measures.  
In the current National Strategic Plan cooperatives are considered as intermediaries in 
their capacity of economic and social agents implicated in rural development. The 
alimentation industry is considered a priority given its key function in adding value to 
agricultural products and also as a way to rejuvenate rural economies by increasing 
agricultural product value. 
Olive and wine sectors have particularly benefited, depending on the particular 
Autonomous Community Plan, from aid meant to fund, amongst other things, increase in 
competitiveness, restructuring initiatives and the encouragement and financing of 
innovation (see sector analysis in Chapter 4). Funds aimed at improving environmental 
quality and diversification of economic activity have also been utilised by both sectors. 
The fact that much of these funds have been limited to SMEs is problematic. 
In the discussion above, it should be kept in mind that the success of any particular policy 
is often dependent on complementary policies. There is no one “magic” policy. For this 
reason the co-ordination (including, but not necessarily, the homogenization) of laws and 
policy, although an extremely complex task, is one that is necessary, particularly in a 
county such as Spain. The role of POs, interprofessional groups and other entities capable 
of having a “larger picture” and of building networks and alliances beyond autonomous 
communities are crucial in such challenge given the lack of a uniform regulatory 
framework. As well, in addressing the success of policies in terms of competitiveness, the 
range of indicators that are available to do so are varied. This part of the thesis has relied 
on traditional economic indicators (e.g. turnover), whereas cooperative performance is 
also intrinsically tied to the value that it creates within a larger environment, a 
“cooperative district” so to speak. 
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Chapter	6.	Focused	Case	Study:	Almería	F&V	Cooperatives		
6.1.	Introduction	
6.1.1	Objective	and	research	questions		
 
This case study, focusing on the fruit and vegetable producing area of Almería, in 
southeast Spain, has the following objectives: 
• To understand the “lifecycle” of Almeria´s cooperatives and the various strategies 
they have undertaken to meet challenges. 
• To analyse which support measures have been effective and efficient for the 
promotion and development of the F&V co-operatives in such region.  
• To provide a comprehensive view on the competitive position of Almería F&V 
cooperatives. 
• To draw qualitative inferences on the interaction between institutional 
environment, structure and strategy, and cooperative success. 
In carrying out this case study the following aspects have been considered:  
• Economic incentives and public policies.  
• Legal aspects.	
• Historical, cultural and sociologically relevant aspects.  
• The relationship between cooperatives and other food chain actors (cluster). 
• The relationship between various cooperative institutions (cooperative fabric). 
The following questions will be addressed in this case study: 
1. What strategies of the F&V co-operatives in Almería have been central to overcoming 
potential traditional shortcoming identified earlier in Chapters 2 and 5? 
2. Which public support measures (local, regional, national and/or European) have an 
impact on the development and success/failure of the Almería co-operatives? 
3. How has the historical development/lifecycle of F&V co-operatives in Almería affected 
the strategies and organisational structures of co-operatives? 
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6.1.2	Data	Collection	
The case study will be based primarily on currently available secondary data and data 
available from the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment, SABI, the regional 
government of Andalusia, the agricultural census and other sources noted herein. 
Academic literature, popular press and electronic media, various archives and other 
sources of information will be fully utilised. Triangulation of sources and methods will be 
applied. Additional information was collected through interviews with various experts and 
co-operative stakeholders.  
6.1.3	Brief	review	of	the	literature	on	Spanish	Agricultural	Co‐operatives 
In Chapter 5 general characteristics and challenges in relation to Spanish agricultural 
cooperatives were described as well as the effect of certain policy measures on co-
operative success. One of the main concerns noted in Spain´s agricultural co-operatives 
was their small size. Consequently this characteristic has often been blamed for the lack of 
success and the inability of co-operatives to obtain more value for their members. It is 
argued that atomization creates difficulties for Spanish agricultural co-operatives in 
relation to the concentration of offer, investment needs for new projects, achieving 
economies of scale and wielding market power. Many studies have pointed to excessive 
“atomization” of co-operatives (Caballer, 1995; Juliá and Server, 1999; Juliá and Meliá, 
2003; Meliá, 2004; Montero and Montero, 2005; Vargas, 2007).  
Spain´s agricultural co-operatives are generally small and numerous relative to the 
European average co-operative size and number (i.e. the persistence of the 
“Mediterranean model”) (COGECA, 2005). In spite of the fact that the average turnover 
increased from 2.7 million Euros in 2000 to 4.4 million Euros in 2007, they are still behind 
the European average turnover of above 10 million. Only 39% have more than 1,000 
members and only 1.7% of these co-operatives have a turnover above 30 million Euros 
(Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias, 2010; COGECA, 2005; OSCAE 2007; 2009). 77% have 
less than 5 million Euros and 39% less than a million (OSCAE, 2009). Although the number 
of co-operatives is declining, in 2011 there were still 3,918 agricultural co-operatives 
(3,659 in 2005 and 4,118 in 2000). In 2011 total turnover increased to 17,405 million 
Euros, with 1,160,337 members and 93,733 employees. This demonstrates a 6.63% 
increase from 2005, in which year turnover was 16,323 million Euros (OSCAE, 2011). 
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However, it is important to keep in mind that within this generalization of “atomised” 
Spanish co-operatives, there is a diversity of models and size. As mentioned in Chapter 5.4, 
Spanish agricultural co-operatives have significant differences, with distinct social, 
political and legislative histories and characteristics as well as strategies. The majority are 
constituted under regional and not national legislation.  
In light of the above, it is a complex task to study the factors which are responsible for the 
successes or failures of Spanish agricultural co-operative sectors. The “common wisdom”, 
reflected in both academia and government policies in Spain tends to be that “bigger” will 
mean more successful co-operatives, perhaps following the conventional paths of IOF. As a 
general rule in all sectors of the Spanish market there has been pressure to consolidate 
and agricultural co-operatives have experienced the same pressures, with the resulting 
mergers and acquisitions, group formation, integration of co-operatives into second tier 
co-operatives (or integrated groups in the event that some of the members are SATs or 
non-co-operative), etc. (Meliá and Martínez, 2011). 
Discussion of agricultural co-operatives in Spain continues to be often locked into a 
paradigm of economies of scale and concentration. While size may be an important 
consideration, above all for structural reasons, without taking into consideration other 
factors, the picture will be incomplete. Two observations made in Chapter 5 on the F&V 
sector are noted:  
 The	 concentration	 of	 capital	 is	 easier	 than	 the	 concentration	 of	 people	 and	 thus	 co‐
operative	concentration	processes	need	 to	 take	 into	account	 the	co‐operative	business	
form,	culture	and	environment.	
 The	concentration	of	offer	must	be	viewed	not	only	as	a	commercial	concentration,	but	
also	a	concentration	from	an	organizational	point	of	view.	
The study of regional agricultural co-operative models is useful so that legislative, 
institutional, governance, and other factors may be more coherently considered and 
linked. From a theoretical perspective, path dependency is one method by which to 
analysis the strategy and structure of F&V co-operatives. In general agro alimentary 
systems, exhibit an important inertia or path dependency on old forms or organizational 
logic. That is, they persist even when underlying conditions which dictated the function, 
have disappeared (Gallego and Lamanthe, 2011). Path dependency can also make difficult 
certain necessary adaptations to changing market conditions. However, it may also be a 
source of relationships, capacities and activities which can be reactivated and 
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regenerated” creatively given existing diversity (i.e. not all entities have progressed in the 
same manner and in the same way) and allow creative solutions in times of crises 
(Grabher, 1993; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Gallego, et al, 2008).  
Path dependency also fits within “neo-endogenous” thinking which draws on institutional 
theory. In such case we look to local institutional capacity that is able to both mobilize 
internal resources and to cope with the external forces acting on a region. “This 
perspective emphasizes not only that economic or business development needs to be 
embedded in the region, but that the means of achieving this objective is through the 
participation of local actors in internal and external development processes” (Galdeano 
Gomez, et al, 2011).  
In this case study Almería is examined as an important cooperative F&V region and one 
that offers a good “laboratory” or “action arena” in which to examine policy measures, 
cooperative development and institutional adaptation and a relatively recent lifecycle of 
the cooperative movement. The time frame is approximately 50 years, depending on when 
one starts the clock. Cooperatives were not only useful in the past at “solving” economic 
problems of the area, but they are, and continue to be, a viable, contemporary business 
model which exists amongst a diversity of business forms. In addition, the cooperative 
model is useful from a strategic business point of view in creating sustainable 
entrepreneurial and innovative technologically advanced economies where significant 
value is maintained at a local level. 
Almería is also of interest in that it may be included as an example of an “industrial 
district” or “cluster”, albeit an agricultural one. Becattini (1990:38) described the term 
industrial district as a “social-territorial entity…characterized by the active presence of 
both a community of people and population of firms in one naturally and historically 
bounded area”. Ferraro García and Aznar Sánchez (2008) illustrated that Almería fit 
within such characterization. In the past, “industrial districts” or “clusters” have often run 
into difficulty due to their structural deficits. They tend to be heavily dependent on small 
enterprises, with a sectoral specialization weighted towards mature products and thus 
particularly exposed to low wage competition (Bellandi and Caloffi, 2006:466). Often they 
are slow to adopt new technologies, lack financial management, and resources for basic 
research, thus making them unable to innovate (Brusco, 1992:196). Agricultural clusters 
based on small farmers are especially vulnerable. In keeping with this notion of “decline” 
one also notes in the agricultural cooperative literature concern for “exit”, degeneration 
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and change in cooperative goals over time (Hind, 1999; Valentinov 2007; Murray 1983; 
Fulton 1995).  
This case study illustrates that these traditional failings were avoided in large part due to 
the strategic and active participation of the cooperatives, thus avoiding the tendency of 
mature industries (which intensive agricultural later became) to maintain the status quo 
rather than “retooling to capture emergent opportunities elsewhere” (Whitford and 
Potter, 2007: 6). This case study illustrates a pattern of organizational change that turned 
even more towards cooperative structures and institutions to face competition, expanding 
markets and globalization.  
It should be noted that within Spain, Valencia is the historical agricultural cooperative 
leader with an established tradition of agricultural cooperatives and internationalization, 
given its fertile lands, entrenched commercialization (left relatively unhindered even 
during the Franco dictatorship), extensive infrastructure and relative wealth in Spain. It is 
home to Anecoop, the benchmark second-tier F&V cooperative in Spain. 
In contrast, the poorer province of Almería began its F&V production at a much later stage, 
in a drought ridden and isolated corner of south-east Spain. Although it had in the late 
1800s - mid 1900s a successful table grape trade in the interior, the coastal region where 
the greenhouses now stand was a relative “blank slate” of infertile land. Currently both are 
important cooperative F&V intensive producers. Valencia is dominated by a second-tier 
structure and Almería largely by medium to small size first-tier co-operatives. 
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6.2.	Description	of	the	F&V	co‐operatives	Almería	
 
6.2.1	Facts	and	figures	on	sector	and	co‐operatives	
The Almería cooperative model, in the province of Almería (South-east Spain) located in 
the autonomous community of Andalusia, is a particularly unique case within the Spanish 
cooperative landscape. It is an example of an agricultural “industrial district” or cluster for 
successful sustainable, agricultural development due to the expansion of intensive 
agriculture (Ferraro García and Aznar Sánchez, 2008). Almería is the top fruit and 
vegetable-growing province in Spain, representing over 50% of the national total 
(Galdeano-Gomez, et al 2011) and the largest cooperative vegetable growing area in 
Europe. As a percentage of total value added in 2008, agriculture represented 10.7% in 
contrast to 2.8% for Spain and 1.8% for Europe (Aznar Sanchez, 2011). It is also home to 
the largest credit cooperative in Spain, Cajamar, which is the 15th largest bank in the 
country. 
 In spite of such subsector dimensions, the average landholding is 1.5 hectares, most held 
by small scale or family farmers (13,500 in number) who are members of agricultural co-
operatives. The sector provides direct employment to more than 40,000 workers annually. 
In 2012, agricultural production increased to 2.97 million tons with a turnover of 1,413 
million Euros. Over 69.5% of the produce is exported, resulting in trade surpluses. All of 
this is produced in an area of 29,991 hectares. More than 250 complementary or auxiliary 
businesses, both cooperative and investor owned have been created with a turnover of 
more than 1,000 million Euros (Aznar Sánchez, 2010). Equally important is the equitable 
distribution of wealth generated in the region (Downward and Taylor, 2007). 
What is unusual about the Almería model is its growth into a specialized agricultural 
based sector (i.e. a primary sector), which is heavily invested in technological advances all 
the while maintaining its “atomized” small growers and its cooperative business form. 
Much of the sector´s research and development, which is crucial for such specialization, is 
based on sustainable technologies and practices and is financed by cooperative sources. 
For example, it is Europe´s leader in “biological”, as opposed to chemical, crop control. In 
observing the cluster we can see that the cooperative sector also has important 
institutional relationships with IOFs, regional governments, the university and other 
research centers which have resulted in important innovations. For example, the patents 
related to the Almería cluster account for 31% of all Andalusian agrarian industry patents 
(Fundación Tecnova, 2009). 
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With respect to financing the cluster, the Almería agricultural cooperatives and the credit 
cooperative are intricately intertwined. This in and of itself is not particularly unique, as 
many agricultural cooperatives areas have a close relationship with a local credit co-
operative. However, the growth strategies of the local cooperative bank have resulted in it 
having a wide national presence, outgrowing its local geographical scope in order to feed 
the capital needs not only of its agricultural cooperatives but also of the growing auxiliary 
businesses. The cooperatives are interlinked with many SMEs and larger companies as 
well, resulting in diversity of business forms, but with the cooperative agricultural and 
credit sector as the main economic and social driver. 
Regarding commercialization, the association of producer organizations, Coexphal was 
created in 1977 in order to directly market products. Until such time, product from 
Almería was purchased by other areas in Spain, for example companies in Valencia and 
Murcia would buy Almería product and then market it as their own. Almería farmers were 
unable to obtain fair prices for their product and had little market power until Coexphal 
gave them a unified presence.  
6.2.2	 The	 Economic	 Landscape	 in	 Spain‐Background	 to	 the	 Almeria	
Cooperative	Movement		
Almería’s “true” cooperative movement (as opposed to cooperatives set up and controlled 
by the Franco Regime)65 began to be organized “under the radar” in the 1960s. While the 
Franco years may be known as an era of harsh political repression, what is less well 
documented is the economic ‘terror’ or suffering caused by failed policies which resulted 
in mass starvation and dire poverty. In the post-war years 1939 to 1945, 200,000 
Spaniards died of starvation. From 1935 to 1945 real incomes had dropped by 66 per cent 
(Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 12). In 1950 Spanish disposable income was 40 per cent lower 
than Italy, which had yet to experience its own ‘economic miracle’. Economic reforms in 
1952 and the $487.8 million of US economic assistance (conditional on permitting a US 
military base) did little to ease the economic disaster (Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 12). Within 
this already desperately poor country, the province of Almería was the poorest, with a 
level of income 50% lower than the national average (Sánchez Picón, 2005: 76). The 
province of Almeria, in the south-eastern corner of Andalucía, was a rural, formerly 
                                                                  
65 It should be acknowledged that a “top down” co-operative model from 1910 to 1920 did not function in 
attempts in relation to the table grape business. During the second Republic there was an attempt to 
resuscitate the traditions but this was swiftly cut off. State sponsored “co-operatives” operated during the 
Franco years, but functioned more as workplace associations, their purpose being to monitor and control. In 
1942 through its Law of Cooperatives, the Regime recognized the importance of having “a” cooperative 
movement which was structured to be consistent with the Regime. 
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republican stronghold, isolated in terms of infrastructure and abandoned by even its own 
residents.  
After twenty years of economic failure, Franco relented and allowed Opus Dei technocrats 
(against the protests of the Fascist party Falange) to implement the 1959 Stabilisation 
Plan which essentially meant opening up the market to capitalist practices but leaving the 
dictatorship untouched (Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 12). Spain’s economy as a whole began to 
improve for several reasons: the country had reduced its economic isolation, foreign 
investment began to flow in and 2.6 million Spaniards also emigrated to work in other 
European countries, sending their money back home and injecting much needed capital 
into a still weak economy. In addition, 6 million people relocated within Spain, leaving the 
rural areas sparsely populated (Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 12-13). 
During this period of relative economic improvement, however, income disparity 
increased: in 1974, the year before Franco’s death, half of the population received 20% of 
disposable national income while the other half enjoyed 80%. Within the latter group, 
10% took 40% of such income (Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 14). Geographically, the benefits of 
economic and social development were also unevenly distributed and at the end of the line 
were the rural areas of Andalucía (which includes Almería), Extremadura and La Mancha 
where “abject poverty and illiteracy were rampant and social services scarce” (Cazorla 
Sánchez, 2010: 14). In contrast, the industrial areas of the Basque region, along with 
Catalonia and Asturias, ranked first among the wealthier regions. 
As Spain’s economy grew and became more industrialised and urbanised, Franco’s policies 
played an important role, especially in terms of ensuring that affordable labour was 
abundant. As Cazorla Sánchez observed (2010: 15): 
Francoism created an affordable, disciplined workforce which was achieved by the 
killing of union leaders, by the destruction of genuine, representative 
organisations and by instilling fear and pessimism in the general population. The 
combination of these factors made possible the optimum exploitation of 
employees by both the state and capital interests. The state guaranteed employers 
a ‘business friendly’ environment with a docile and cheap workforce.  
In 1965, public expenditure was 15% of GDP (the OECD average was 31%). In 1970 it was 
barely 20.1% of GDP, compared with France, 51%; Italy, 43.3%; UK, 53.2%; and Germany, 
36.8% (Carreras and Tafunell, 2005: 877). 
This state of affairs, both with regard to the absence of labour leaders and desperate but 
docile workers and the lack of public expenditure and investment, are important in 
understanding the influential role that the cooperatives of Almería would later play in 
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building the economy and filling the institutional vacuum that was the result of the years 
of the dictatorship and its economic and social policies. 
6.2.3	Mapping	the	Evolution	of	the	Cooperative	Sector	
Almería has experienced a huge transformation in the last 40 to 50 years. Between 1970 
and 2000, the rate of population increase of the province was 90% more than that of Spain 
as a whole, 84% more in production and 130% greater in employment than the rest of the 
country. During this period it also saw an increase of 20% in its GDP. While it was not the 
only province to develop economically, it was unique in that it grew both in terms of 
population and in wealth (Molina Herrera, 2005: 15). In 2010, 11% of such production and 
20% of employment is in the agricultural sector (in contrast to 1.6% in the EU-17 and less 
than 2.5% in Spain as a whole in GDP)66. A majority of the agricultural sector is comprised 
of cooperatives, family farms and SMEs. In this section the history of the agricultural co-
operatives and other related entities, including the cooperative bank, 67 are set out.	
The co-operative F&V agricultural sector activity of Almería had been divided by local 
economists into four stages as set out in Figure 6.1: Initial activity (1960-1975); The 
“Take-off” period (1975-1990); Maturity (1990-2000); and Spillover (2000—
onwards)(Molina Herrera, 2005). Here the stages are outlined to demonstrate the 
transformation of mainly marketing cooperatives (and their members and communities) 
from “peasant” farmers and organizations to complex businesses, their activities and roles 
changing over time and the role of policy and regulation. Figure 6.1 below provides a 
thumbnail sketch of agricultural surface, production and profits during such time.  
                                                                  
66 INE, Eurostat. 
67 See Giagnocavo et al (2012) for an in-depth study of the role of cooperative credit in the agricultural 
development of Almería. 
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Figure	6.1	Development	Stages	of	Almeria	Agriculture‐Index	1975=100.	
 Source: Cajamar Foundation.	
 
 
 
 
To expand on Molina-Herrera’s timeframes, a useful framework can be found in Cook and 
Burress’ (2009:1) reference to the agricultural cooperative lifecycles wherein they set out 
5 cycles, instead of 4 (although the final cycle is not linear, but rather a juncture): 
1. Economic justification 
2. Organizational design 
3. Growth, glory and heterogeneity 
4. Recognition and introspection; and 
5. Choice 
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Figure	6.	2	Basic	Life	Cycle	of	a	Cooperative.	
 
Source: Cook and Burress, 2009. 
In constructing a framework which provides more explanatory value, Cook and Burress 
argue for a “dynamic framework” to consider the “cooperative degeneration” hypothesis 
(or the demise and corruption of the cooperative form, as explored in Chapter 2) wherein 
cooperative leaders may act as the protagonists to avoid such process: 
We propose cooperative decision-makers possessing an intimate understanding of 
the dynamics of cooperative growth are in a unique position to evade ownership 
costs by selecting among regenerative solutions when faced with organizational 
decline.  
While Cook and Burress’ model applies to a cooperative, it is also useful to consider it in 
relation to a cluster containing agricultural cooperatives and it echoes Ostrom´s 
observations (1990, 2005, 2010) about the proactive capacity of actors in shaping their 
own institutions and economic relations.  
“Economic justification” is quite straightforward in the emergence of traditional 
agricultural cooperatives. Producers collaborate to improve their social and economic 
positions in situation where they lack access to markets. As seen in Chapter 2, Valentinov 
(2007) sets out the transaction cost arguments to justify such cooperative form of 
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organization. Authors such as Hansmann (1996) and Sexton and Iskow (1988) set out 
other market contracting cost justifications.  
Perhaps it is at this stage in the lifecycle that the “social” and the “economic” aspects of the 
cooperative business form are most inextricable, where members have similar, if not 
identical interests. They are also interests born out of necessity, such necessity breeding 
not only solidarity but creating a shared community. 
Organisational design” entails the institutional embedding of the cooperative form. In 
Cook and Burress’ framework this applies to the constating documents of the cooperative. 
When applied to the cooperative sector, it would refer to the cooperative institutions and 
the relationship between them, decision-making processes and risk bearing arrangements. 
Member input is noted as being an important ingredient in this stage.  
The third phase of “Growth, Glory and Heterogeneity”, refers to successful cooperatives 
experiencing a divergence of interests, which may threaten the viability of the cooperative 
organization. Preferences and interests may be “unaligned” and thus in the terms of 
Hansmann (1996) may lead to an increase in “collective decision making costs”. Burress 
and Cook (2009:5) refer to these “costs” which may arise as “the six basic problems”: free-
rider, horizon, portfolio, free cash flow, influence and control” which are of course the 
cornerstones of agency theory set out in Chapter 2, found in Jensen and Meckling (1986) 
and referred to in Cook and Iliopoulos (1995). It is at this stage that the “remedies” of 
contract and property rights are seen to be the most relevant by property rights, TCE and 
NIE theories. In the case of Almería, we can see that these issues were overcome, not by 
resort to juggling property rights or contract relationships, but by a concerted strategy on 
the part of the cooperatives to “act cooperatively” and to strengthen existing cooperative 
institutions and create others.  
This third phase is given the most attention in the above framework, being a critical phase 
where member interests may diverge due to heterogeneity. Investment behavior and 
member commitment, according to agency theory and TCE, are often the casualties due to 
“lack of alignment”. However, Burress and Cook make clear that they do not assume a 
direct correlation “between heterogeneity in member preferences and heterogeneity in 
member circumstances”, nor between “the existence of heterogeneity and organizational 
outcomes” (2009:6). In fact, they state “[d]iversity in member circumstances may, in fact, 
stimulate the development of creative problem-solving and unique proposals”. As a result, 
their concern is for those situations where there is “divergent stances among members on 
decisions related to the allocation of residual claimant and residual control rights”. This, 
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coupled with “vaguely defined property rights” (Cook 1995), the cornerstone of TCE and 
NIE, is seen as a potentially “debilitating” situation for cooperative organisations. Yet, the 
authors are careful to stress that heterogeneity in terms of preference be given a neutral 
interpretation.  
The fourth phase is that of “Recognition and Introspection” where members are observed 
to fall into one of the following categories: “apathetic, targets for aggressive rivals, 
vacillators and the loyalist”. (2009:13). In this phase heterogeneity inspires “fragmented 
coalitions” wherein “the cooperative purpose and direction becomes less focused and ill 
defined thus accelerating a self-reinforcing degenerative spiral”. There are inherent 
conflicts and tendencies of denial which prompts slow and formal discussion of the issues 
facing cooperatives (characterizes as collective decision making costs in TCE and NIE 
terms). The task for this phase is for cooperative leaders or members to demand “explicit 
action to remedy perceived and real challenges”.  
This leads us to the final “Choice” phase where several options may be taken by 
cooperative members: Reinvent, Tinker, Spawn and Exit. 
“Tinkering” is a redesign of “constitutional or operational mechanisms to align preferences 
and incentives of the membership”. This does not entail any significant change in 
ownership rights. “Reinvention” does involve a change in ownership rights, for example 
allowing redeemability of shares or allowing various classes of “investors”. “Spawning” is a 
process, based on the observations of Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) wherein 
members of a parent cooperative form a separate enterprise. As Burress and Cook 
observe, these enterprises are often complementary and use joint investor networks 
(Burress and Cook, 2009). “Exit” signifies a conversion to an IOF. 
Given that “choice” is a juncture and not necessarily a final phase in the linear analysis, the 
graph may be redrawn as in Figure 6.3: 
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Figure	6.3	Iterative	Life	Cycle	Hypothesis.	
 
Source: Cook and Burress 2009. 
In the case study of Almería there were junctures requiring strategic choices to be made 
by the cooperatives. The defensive or strategic choices taken by the cooperatives at each 
juncture relied on the cooperative network of institutions and strengthened the sector as 
time progressed. Instead of a reworking of property rights or contractual relationships, 
cooperative collective action served to address challenges.  
However, it should be noted that recently the new Andalusian cooperative law response 
on the autonomous community level does provide for a “tinkering”, “reinvention” and 
spawning, whilst other public policy measures continue to avoid dealing with the severe 
exogenous challenges facing the F&V cooperative sector. Legislation provides incentives 
for consolidation and integration. The sector itself notes the downward pressure on prices 
from the large distributors and concerns about unauthorized imports from Morocco and 
other areas which have lower labour costs and less strict compliance.  
The role of cooperatives in Almería´s economy goes far beyond that of traditional 
cooperative marketing activity (i.e. producer cooperatives where farmer/producers bring 
their product to the cooperatives in order to create economies of scale in the marketing 
stage). In order to illustrate their institutional influence and the “virtuous circle” they 
create, the cooperative role is looked at throughout the life cycle of the community and 
cooperative business stages.  
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6.2.4	Lifecycle	of	Agricultural	Cooperatives	 
6.2.4	 (i)	 Phase	 1‐Economic	 Justification‐1960‐1975‐the	 setting	 up	 of	 co‐operatives	 and	
associations	of	producers	
Geographically isolated, with arid land, lack of infrastructure and a high percentage of its 
population having emigrated due to lack of opportunities, the province of Almería in the 
1960s was not the best candidate for agricultural development. In the late1940s and 
1950s, Franco´s development plan had declared some 30,000 hectares in the province of 
Almería, as a zone of national interest in an attempt to increase agricultural production. A 
government programme was implemented to provide wells and pumps thus supplying a 
few hundred hectares with water by virtue of small gasoline pumps, scarce electricity 
precluding much more (Sánchez Picón, 2005: 82). In 1956 crops were planted with 
abysmal results (Cazorla Sánchez, 1999: 229) as the subterranean waters were quite 
saline and not particularly suited for cultivation. Newly settled farmers in an attempt to 
survive in this unlikely agricultural area and in response to the dry soil, saline water and 
vicious winds created a “technological innovation” which consisted of putting down a 
layer of fertilizer, then covering this with a layer of sand, in order to keep the roots moist 
and filter the salt. With the arrival of plastic, a clear plastic sheet was put overhead. These 
structures served as the first rudimentary greenhouses. As uneventful as it may seem now, 
this simple “innovation” radically transformed the region. 
In 1961 the government introduced an electrification plan, allowing more efficient water 
pumps, and thus a model of unsustainable development based on using subterranean 
waters was put into motion. Families were allowed to buy up to 3.5 hectares of land 
although it was impossible to support a family on such small pieces of land. The 
Colonisation Programme was not intended to improve the lives of such farmers, but rather 
to exploit existing resources (cheap labour and underground water), fully expecting that 
the new settlers would be part-time farmers for themselves and cheap labour for others.68 
With increased production underway by use of irrigation and basic greenhouses, families 
needed to sell their production. However, there were few organized marketing efforts and 
farmers would attempt to sell their goods, often completely unaware of what others were 
selling for. Local Almería firms were denied permits to market their products by the 
                                                                  
68 It should be noted that there is a difference of opinion regarding the role of the “Instituto Nacional de 
Colonizacion” (INC). In Flores Jiménez, et al (2005) the authors state that the “INC always paid much attention 
to the living conditions of the settlers [farmers]”, and yet they also point out that the farmers had to reimburse 
the INC for its expenditures on the public interest works and that in order to pay for seed, tools and fertilizers, 
they had to hand over 60% of production. After (or if) the farming activity was deemed to be profitable the 
farmers then had to pay back this debt over the space of 25 to 40 years. 
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Franco government and commercialisation was thus controlled by larger companies from 
Murcia, Alicante and Valencia, who would buy Almería product and re-export it under 
their own labels (Cazorla Sánchez, 1999). Roads and railway lines were also 
underdeveloped. What little financial intermediation existed was largely through private 
auction houses on the initiative of entrepreneurial middlemen, and some even 
implemented a type of ‘financing’ in that they would cover the costs of seeds and supplies 
up front and subtract this from revenues after the harvest. However, the lack of 
transparency in prices and price fixing between large auction houses left the farmers in 
dire circumstances and many lost their land to the auction houses. Auction houses would 
then resell or rent the land to young farmers with an exclusive contract to sell their goods, 
allowing the auction house to fill up their warehouses with produce and combat the efforts 
of farmer co-operatives (Cazorla Sánchez, 1999: 234). A co-operative auction house 
(founded in the 1940s) did exist, but it lacked sufficient capital until funded by the co-
operative bank. 
In 1963 the credit co-operative “Caja Rural Provincial de Almeria” (now Cajamar) activity 
commenced on the initiative of a few local people and was the impetus for farmers to 
organize. It encouraged the farmers to set up their own local cooperatives or associations 
and provided financing for the same. Breaking the rules of traditional finance, unsecured 
loans were given, based solely on the promise of labour. As a result, the cooperative bank 
assumed a different position than that of a traditional provider of credit or capital: it had a 
far higher stake in making sure that whatever activity the farmers engaged in was worth 
financing. This simple, though paradigm-changing, observation has informed the strategy 
of the cooperative bank since that time. 
As the cooperative bank was not officially set up to perform financial transactions, the 
founders withdrew the funds every morning, circulating amongst the farmers to do their 
banking. At the close of business they would deposit the money in a conventional bank. In 
the meantime, a network of customers was created.69 This continued until the Caja was 
officially constituted in 1966. The first formal official loan by the Caja on its own account 
was made in 1967. In 1970, it proceeded to rapidly open ‘branches’ (modest buildings 
amongst the greenhouses) in all of the small towns and villages of the province and in 
1972, it opened its own office in Almería city. When it gained official status, it could only 
give credit or make loans to agricultural co-operatives. To this end, it followed a strategy 
of creating cooperatives in many small towns and villages, dedicating resources and 
people to the task. Deposits from the interior towns were used to finance the emerging 
                                                                  
69 Interview with D. Juan del Águila by C.Giagnocavo, 19 March 2010, Almería. 
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needs of the ‘new’ irrigated farming on the coast. There was a double objective: to find 
new clients and to create an agricultural co-operative network throughout the province.  
In the space of 12 to 13 years, the cooperative bank helped to develop an agricultural 
cooperative movement and established innovations in both information and agricultural 
technologies. Its actual ‘financial’ activity was quite straightforward: simple credits and 
loans in keeping with traditional banking. Its growth was extraordinarily rapid. In 1970 
agricultural loans equaled 200 million pesetas. Three years later this amount was 1,268 
million pesetas. (In contrast, the well established savings bank of Almería had a volume of 
only 862 million pesetas in agricultural loans.) By 1975, the Caja's deposits had reached 
2,490 million.  
While these results are impressive under any circumstances, what is curious is how such a 
cooperative movement and cooperative credit bank managed to achieve this during a 
dictatorship where capital and social structures were tightly controlled by the Regime and 
where there had not been a pre-existing cohesive community embedded in a particular 
territory. It operated ‘under the radar’ and when the Regime noticed, it was already well 
entrenched as an institution in the province. Given the absence of union leaders and 
political organisers, coupled with a distrust of institutions and authority, the cooperative 
bank served as the impetus for farmers to organise. Even though “cooperatives” were still 
cooperatives under a dictatorship, the fact that they were small enterprises with the 
support of independent financing was the start of a new paradigm in the region. 
Economists describing this period (e.g. Molina Herrera, 2005; Cortés García, 2003/2004) 
offer the following observations about Almería: that in general, financing needs were low 
and there was very little linkage between financial and agricultural sectors. Production 
depended on natural factors (availability of some water, cheap land and a sunny climate), 
abundance of cheap labour, and low capital requirements given the basic level of 
technology and the absence of a marketing structure. The agricultural activity is described 
as being squarely within the primary sector and value added was based on sheer labour 
effort. What little financial intermediation existed was noted to be largely through the 
auction house. 
What this analysis does not tell us is that farmers had a critical need for micro-financing 
that was not being met. They also needed capital and an organisation to create a system of 
commercialisation which did not exploit them. While technology was basic, it was still 
significantly more expensive than non-irrigated farming. Without access to cooperative 
capital, further development would have been difficult if not impossible for these farmers. 
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At best, they would have been able to farm part-time in addition to working as cheap wage 
labour for the local urban class. 
The development model as set up by the Franco Regime was unsustainable, relying on the 
over-exploitive use of water, under-investment in further technology, infrastructure and 
commercial avenues and no investment in the people actually working the land. Farmers 
endured atrocious living conditions, without proper housing or sanitation. Children had to 
work alongside parents, often missing school entirely (Cazorla Sánchez, 2010: 107). It is 
likely that they would have remained peasants until the last of the fresh water had been 
squeezed out of the aquifers. 
The cooperative	response to Phase	1	consisted in the: 
• opportunity for farmers to transform labour into capital and to organise 
• setting up of financial and marketing infrastructure 
• rapid expansion of a network based on tiny cooperative field offices which allowed 
the monitoring of both financial and agricultural activities, resulting in the 
dissemination of know-how and the beginnings of social cohesion 
• full alignment of cooperative finance with cooperative economic activities, i.e. the 
finance provider had an interest in making sure activities were successful and 
worth financing. 
6.2.4	 (ii)	 Phase	 2‐Organizational	 Design‐1975‐1990‐technical	 and	 political/economic	
challenges	and	setting	up	the	cooperative	institutions	
Spain began the transition to democracy in 1975. Unemployment was high, there was little 
culture of investing, Spain was isolated and there was a muddled vision of the way 
forward with the loss of the paternalistic state and little sense of external international 
competitiveness. In this sense, Almería was at a clear disadvantage to regions such as 
commercially savvy Valencia, which had not only agriculture but a textile and wood 
industry. The growing agricultural model began to show signs of stress as land prices 
soared and overexploitation of underground water led to the intrusion of seawater. 
Mineralization of the soil increased, pesticides started to accumulate, erosion was a 
problem as was waste disposal. Production started to decrease and energy prices started 
to rise. Supply overtook demand as other areas of Spain (Murcia, Valencia, etc.) also had 
increased production. Countries which had a favoured status within the European 
Common Market and countries which had agreements which gave them preference 
(Holland, Morocco, Israel) were serious competitors. In turn this weakening position gave 
more market power to large agro-food companies (Cazorla Sánchez, 1999). When CAP 
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payments became available, it should be noted that Almería received only 1% of subsidies 
destined for Andalusia. 
The challenges for the cooperative farmers in this stage of development not only were the 
adjustments to be made in the transition to a market economy and to a democracy, but 
there was also a need for innovation, on a social, economic, strategic and institutional 
level. In 1975/76 three experimental farms were initiated and fully financed by the 
cooperative bank with the goal of increasing the technical level of the agricultural 
cooperatives by testing, developing and sharing results with the agricultural cooperatives. 
Its purpose was to transfer in part, experimental and crop risk (and thus, financial risk) 
from the farmer to the cooperative system. In the same year a technical agricultural 
service, fully financed by the credit cooperative was created, where the viability of new 
technologies was tested in order to provide information on establishing the adequate 
finance mechanisms that needed to be put in place for each new technology (basically, a 
system of risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis). While certain technologies were 
innovative, whether they would be profitable was a different matter. 
Many cooperatives, some of which exist to this day, were set up in the late 1970s. In 1982 
the Regional government of Andalusia brought into force cooperative legislation which 
encouraged the setting up of cooperatives (three years later, the Regional government of 
Valencia would bring in their own legislation). The SAT (Sociedad Agraria de 
Transformación) form, which was a hybrid type enterprise which mixed characteristics of 
cooperatives with a company form, was also brought into being (described below) and the 
first one founded in Almería in 1982. In the early 1980s second-tier cooperatives 
attempted to enter (UTECO from the north of Spain) Almería with little success. Large 
shareholder companies were founded as well in areas of auctions, re-sellers and producer-
marketing in the style of the cooperatives. However, companies that had to pay salaried 
workers found it difficult to compete, at that time, with cheaper family labour. In 1987 
FEPEX (exporter association) and FAECA (agricultural federation) were founded. 
With the foundations of both finance and technological investigation put in place by the 
cooperative sector, the process of growth began in the new agricultural sector (“new” 
meaning for the most part drip irrigated greenhouses). Technology became more 
important, where farmers could no longer just rely on hard work. New markets opened, 
particularly that of the European Union, requiring a new strategy. The association of 
producer organizations, Coexphal was created in 1977 in order to access sales quotas (in 
Madrid) and to distribute them to cooperatives so they could market products. 
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Innovations not only significantly increased production but also allowed Almeria’s 
product to enter the market two months earlier, something that was key when faced with 
competition from other countries. 
 With all of this came the need for increased financing and increased coordination.  
The role of cooperatives in this stage in both production and marketing had a dynamic 
character, providing for the incorporation of new technology and above all the 
incorporation of market information in the production process (dates, varieties, ripeness, 
etc.). In addition, because cooperative social funds and benefits were poured back into 
research and investigation, the cooperatives were in the position to interpret how much 
funding was necessary for any particular activity.  
Innovations not only significantly increased production but also allowed Almeria’s 
product to enter the market two months earlier, something that was key when faced with 
competition from other countries. The assumption of research expense and experimental 
risk by cooperative entities, not only spared farmers such uncertainties, but it also created 
a sense of community through a shared knowledge base. In addition, research dealt with 
the pressing environmental issues that were necessary from a sustainability point of view, 
but something that the family farmers would not have been able to undertake, financially 
or technically. 
The cooperative movement also contributed to changing the mentality of the farmers in 
that they were now participants in the commercialization process, with a deeper 
understanding of workings of the market and consumer demand. The tools of pressure 
that they could now use to begin to influence as both producer-exporters on the level of 
the Administration (which was dominated by other producer areas of Spain) became 
stronger as the sector grew and they found themselves with a political voice and power 
not experienced before.  
The cooperative	response to the Phase	2	consisted of: 
• shifting individual farmer risk to cooperative system risk 
• research into new technologies and innovation and cost/benefit analysis of their 
introduction/implementation  
• changing the mentality of “peasant” to farmer who understood markets and 
consumer demand 
• strengthening cooperative institutions 
• tracking market and economic information 
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• providing a political voice and political and economic representation through 
influence on European policies	
6.2.4	(iii)	Phase	3‐Growth,	Glory	and	Heterogeneity‐1990‐2000	
Entrance into the EU, coupled with the impending globalization after the Marrakech 
Agreement of 1995 (replacing GATT and liberalizing world trade) brought again new 
challenges to the Almería agricultural sector. Such conditions required larger infusions of 
capital than had ever been the case to meet increased demand and to enable the farmers 
to compete internationally. Until the early 1990s Almería’s F&V sector and cooperative 
bank created a self sustaining financial system so to speak, as demonstrated in Figure 6.2. 
Beyond such time the Almería economy required credit beyond the deposit amount that 
F&V production alone could generate in order to finance research and development and 
other auxiliary and cluster activity such as construction and infrastructure investment. 
The cooperative bank met these challenges in several ways: it pursued an expansion 
strategy in a neighboring province with an intensive agricultural sector, prompted by the 
failure of such province´s credit co-operative. It also continued to invest in research and 
technology. 
An important issue in the development of intensive F&V agricultural cooperatives was the 
availability of finance. While the credit section of Valencia cooperatives were also 
instrumental in their growth, the particular role of Cajamar made Almeria agricultural 
cooperative credit sections, for the most part, redundant. 
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Figure	6.4	Banking	Resources	of	Co‐operative	Credit	and	Co‐operative	Agriculture	
Production	and	Financing	Necessities	of	the	Cluster.	
  
Source: Cajamar Foundation, based on data from Bank of Spain and Cabrera et al. (2010). 
 
 
During this period there was a widespread incorporation of production technology, 
business management applied to farms, and the conversion of the “peasant” into an 
“agricultural entrepreneur”. The cooperative sector provided management training 
courses for the agricultural cooperative boards, technical sessions for field technicians, 
specialist agricultural courses and assistance with grant applications. The association of 
producer organisations created information systems to communicate with cooperative 
member farms, allowing for immediate dissemination and implementation of crucial 
information and practices. An important function of the cooperative bank and the 
association of producer organisations was to calculate the economic implications of the 
adoption of such technologies, a task which would have been beyond the family farm´s 
capabilities, other than through trial and error. The assumption of experimental risk and 
information and organizational tasks by the cooperative sector became an even greater 
contribution. 
Throughout the 1990s there was a merging of cooperatives into larger first-tier entities in 
order to create efficiencies (Flores Jiménez, F., 2005). Cooperative institutions contributed 
to the creation of new lines of businesses in the cooperatives, supporting business 
associations related to agriculture not only financially but also utilizing its network of 
institutional contacts for the development of their projects. Services and infrastructure 
become similar to that of industrial districts. The infrastructure for cooperative direct 
commercialization was put in place.  
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Cooperative institutions contributed to the creation of new lines of businesses in the 
cooperatives, supporting business associations related to agriculture not only financially 
but also utilizing its network of institutional contacts for the development of their projects. 
Services and infrastructure become similar to that of industrial districts. The 
infrastructure for cooperative direct commercialization was put in place. 
The cooperative	response to Phase	3 consisted of: 
• focusing on technology and further innovative research (and adaptation and 
implementation) 
• securing adequate financial resources for the cooperative sector 
• providing training and education so that “farmers” became “entrepreneurs” 
• shifting of agricultural product as “commodity” to client focused added value and 
participation in more links in the supply chain 
• developing more sophisticated business and information services, thus allowing 
both small and large businesses equal footing 
• creating more advanced cooperative institutional infrastructure and networks 
6.2.4	(iv)	Phase	4	Recognition	and	Introspection‐2000	onwards	
Since 2000, the development and maturity of the agricultural support and services 
industry gave way to sector diversification and the creation of a Local Production System 
or “cluster”. Agricultural production has increased, optimizing costs and the 
implementation of quality control systems have taken on a more significant protagonism. 
As well there is a consolidation in the commercialization phase, particularly in exports. In 
Figure 6.5 (below in 6.5 “Economic data”) we can see the rise of cooperatives in 
commercialization market share. 
Almería´s first-tier cooperatives dominate the market (e.g. CASI, MurgiVerde, Vicasol) and 
are increasing in size and influence. Collaborations, increased efforts in terms of exports 
and internationalization and mergers amongst first-tier co-operatives and SATs have 
characterized the response of Almería’s cooperative sector to increasing competition. For 
example, in 2003 Vicasol merged with Almerisol, which permitted the increase of capacity 
by 40%70. In 2010, Ramafrut SAT and Frucamp merged71. In 2011 Agroiris SAT and Mayba 
SAT merged (Ruiz, 2011).  
                                                                  
70Information from Vicasol’s webpage: http://vicasolproduce.com/ 
71 BOJA nº236, December 2, 2010. Retrieved from: 
http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/boja/boletines/2010/236/d/updf/d101.pdf 
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Differentiation in terms of “biological” or “integrated” and ecological product is being 
vigorously pursued. To reduce the use of agricultural chemicals in the production process, 
the cooperative sector has led the implementation of biological control and integrated 
production to fight against pests and plant disease as an alternative to pesticides, thus 
creating a more sustainable agriculture. This effort, built on the cooperative network, 
resulted in the “green revolution” in 2007 in Almería´s production whereby 70% to 100% 
(of area, depending on product) utilize such methods. Diversification into alternative 
energy activities (e.g. biomass) or related businesses is also common in larger 
cooperatives. Almería also has the largest concentration of ecological F&V product in 
Europe and is increasing the area dedicated to ecological product. 
Food safety and plant health are constant concerns for farmers and a standard demand for 
clients. As a response, the Almeria association of producer organisations (predominantly 
cooperative), created its own laboratory for analysis in 1988 which permits farmers and 
cooperatives to test and control food quality, as well as soil, water, plants, fertilizer, seeds 
and farm installations. Consequently it promoted the elaboration of F&V quality 
production standards and certification within the ISO. These standards are more rigorous 
than those required by Spanish and European law and are now homologated and 
recognized as the highest standards in the market. 100% of the area cultivated by the 
association´s cooperatives has this certification. 
See Chapter 6.2.6 for more information on mergers, collaborations and strategy. As well, it 
appears that efforts in the IV and V range (of processed, ready to eat foods) are gaining 
ground. 
Cooperative representative entities have coordinated agricultural cooperatives to qualify 
as European Union designated Producer Organisations of F&V under the Common Market 
Organisation (CMO) regulations and helped the cooperatives to devise their operating 
programs under the EU regulations.  
The Cooperative	Response to Phase	4:	
 To meet the increasingly demands of a global food economy, cooperatives have 
intensified their networks through both collaboration and consolidation. Since 
intensive agriculture is very dependent on R+D+i, research and institutional 
partnerships are necessary and have included support from other types of 
businesses and institutions. 
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 Coopertive institutions have facilitated the setting up of F&V POs under the CMO 
and the setting up of operating programs and compliance therewith. 
 Both from the association of cooperatives and from the credit cooperative there 
has been a concerted effort to promote horizontal and vertical integration, so as to 
create economies of scale at the marketing level and also shorten the supply chain. 
 The creation and dissemination of economic information to aid farmers and 
cooperatives to act strategically 
 The provision of organizational, human resources and member services by 
cooperative entities contributes to the “virtuous” cycle of cooperative 
reproduction. Departments exist to help with subsidies; risk prevention; HR and 
immigration; production techniques and control of pests and disease; quality 
control, laboratory analysis and investigation, administration, training, marketing 
and foreign promotion, research and statistics, communication, insurance and 
travel.  
 While larger cooperatives may have their own administrative, commercialization, 
marketing, technology, warehousing, training, quality and HR departments, the 
fact that smaller cooperatives have access to the same expertise and sophisticated 
services through the association allows flexibility, autonomy and equality in the 
business sector. It also encourages “new players” to enter the market. By virtue of 
being a cooperative member, most farmers have access to a sophisticated and wide 
array of business, human resource, research, financial, communications and 
technological resources that would be impossible on a non-associated small 
farmer scale.  
6.2.4	(vi)	Phase	5‐Choice	
Above at the end of each Phase, the “cooperative response” has been set out, representing 
the choice that has been made by the sector. Thus far, the sector has chosen to “re-invent” 
itself within the cooperative framework, with some necessary “tinkering” on the side. 
Certain cooperatives have set up joint ventures, platforms and the occasional IOF has been 
set up to carry out specific tasks. The model is predominantly within the cooperative and 
to a lesser extent, the SAT model, although there is a diversity of enterprise forms. 
However, from an institutional perspective, cooperatives continue to dominate.  
Going forward, following the financial crisis and the implosion of the construction sector, 
there has been a renewed focus on agro-food business. In addition, Almería and other 
regions such as Valencia and Murcia will have to deal with ever increasing opening of 
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markets and competition from countries where labour is cheaper such as Morocco and 
Egypt (“social dumping”). Neither fair labour nor environmental standards, much less the 
equality benefits of a cooperative business model, are a priority for such competition. 
Recognizing the importance of the abovementioned CMO, the current challenge is to 
integrate the representative associations of F&V producer organisations on a European 
level to guarantee survival and competitiveness of farmers and their cooperatives. 
Producer organisations and their associations tend to operate on a regional or national 
level, which weakens their position. Cooperatives have traditionally led the associated 
producer movements and must continue to defend farmer interests. The ability to mount 
an effective lobby at regional, national and EU levels cannot be understated  
The constant downward pressure on pricing and the sheer weight and market power of 
the supermarkets and distributors are important and difficult challenges and hence,  
horizontal integration of Almería cooperatives is seen to be an outstanding task. 
Movement has begun in such direction and any reticence to do so appears to have more to 
do with “the concentration of people” rather than worries about the concentration of 
capital. For this, a re-commitment to “collective enterprise” and the cooperative 
community is necessary.  
6.2.5	Economic	data		
 
In 2011 the Almería F&V sector represented 31.84% of Spanish agrarian production and 
56% in Andalusia (MARM, 2011e). In Almería in 2012, F&V production represented 95% 
of agricultural production (not including livestock, which would be 90%) (CAP, 2012) Co-
operatives are responsible for 50% of commercialised production, a growing percentage 
as set out in Figure 6.3 
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Figure	6.5	Percentage	of	Almería	production	commercialized	by	type	of	company.	
	Source: Coexphal 
 
Cultivated area in 2011 decreased to 46,000 ha, the decline being due to production 
moving to other countries such as Kenya and Morocco which have cheaper labour costs. 
However, in terms of ecological production, in 2010 area increased to 1,592.34 ha in 
vegetables, 1,133.34 ha in citrus and 520.27 ha in fruit (CAP, 2010).  
Figure	6.6	Area	(Ha)	Under	Cultivation	in	Almería.	
 Data source: CAP (2012) 
 
Even though area has decreased, production has increased over the last decade. In 2012 it 
reached 3,306,911 tons, of which 93.45% corresponded to vegetables, 6.23% to citrus and 
0.32% fruit. This production represented 43% of the total production of Andalucía. The 
main Almería products include tomato (28%), pepper (15%), cucumber (12%), courgette 
(11%), watermelon (11%), aubergine (5%), lettuce (5%) and melon (4%) (CAP, 2012). 	 
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Figure	6.7	Production	(Tons).	
	Data source: CAP (2012) 
 
Currently 69.5% of Almería vegetable production is destined for export, which represents 
Euro 1.741 million in 2012. Of this total, a large part of exports are carried out by co-
operatives (see Figure 6.8). Export destinations are Germany (30%), France (16%), The 
Netherlands (12%) and the United Kingdom (10%). Major exports are tomato (25%), 
cucumber (18%) and pepper (18%).  
  
Figure	6.8	Total	exports	in	Almería	(tons).	
	Data source: ICEX (2003-2011) and Cajamar (2012) 
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Figure	6.9	Co‐operative	exports	in	Almería	(tons).	
	Data source: Coexphal  
 
Prices of principle products have fluctuated in recent years with a general tendency 
downwards, due to increased production, lack of negotiating power and the necessity to 
compete in markets dictated by wholesalers and distributors.  
 
Figure	6.10	Evolution	of	Main	F&V	prices	in	Almería	(€/kg).	
	Data source: Instituto de Estadística y Cartografía de Andalucía  
  
Table 6.1 gives an idea of the size of Almeria’s cooperatives. In contrast, the turnover for 
Anecoop, the largest second-tier cooperative in Valencia, was 482,000,000 Euros for 2011.	
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Table	6.1	Economic	turnover	of	selected	Almería	agriculture	co‐operatives	(S.C.A.),	
S.A.T.S	and	non‐co‐operatives	(S.L.	and	S.A.)	(mill	€)	(2011).	
COMPANY	 TURNOVER	 COMPANY	 TURNOVER	
Casi S.C.A 196,700,000 Agrupapulpí S.A.T. 51,000,000
Alhóndiga la Unión S.A. 195,000,000 E.H. Femago S.A.T. 49,700,000
Agrupaejido S.A. 120,000,000 Primaflor S.A.T. 41,600,000
Unica Group 120,000,000 Nature Choice S.A.T. 41,000,000
  Cabasc S.C.A. 20,900,000 Indasol S.A.T. 40,000,000
  Casur S.C.A. 30,500,000 Hortamar S.C.A. 36,300,000
  Ferva S.A.T 31,600,000 Acrena S.A.T. 36,000,000
  El Grupo S.C.A. 50,000,000 Ejidomar S.C.A. 30,500,000
  Agrieco S.A.T. 13,000,000 Frutas Escobi S.L. 29,300,000
+Cohorsan S.C.A.  Cualin Quality S.L. 20,900,000
Murgiverde S.C.A. 113,000,000 Ejidoluz S.C.A. 29,059,000
Vicasol S.C.A. 100,000,000 Uniagro S.A. 16,000,000
Bonnysa S.A.T. 108,319,000 Cítricos del Andarax S.A.T. 9,526,000
Agroiris S.A.T. 100,000,000 Agrícola Navarro de Haro S.L. 14,400,000
Hortofrutícola Costa de 
Almería S.L. 95,000,000 Agromullor S.L. 10,400,000
Agroponiente Natural 
Produce S.L. 82,000,000 Fruejido S.L. 5,500,000
Agroponiente S.A 67,000,000 Explotaciones Agrícolas Frulape S.A. 2,260,000
Agrupalmería S.A.T 55,300,000 Horfrasol S.A.T 1,240,000Canalex S.A.T 55,000,000
Note: Anecoop in has 5 Almeria co-operatives which are not included in this Table (see 
under Table 6.4). Data source: Coexphal 
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Figure	6.11	Turnover	of	Almeria	Agricultural	Cooperatives	(Coexphal	members) 
(Mill	€).72 
	Data source: Coexphal 
 
6.2.6	Strategy	and	structure	of	main	cooperatives	
6.2.6	(i)	Position	in	the	Food	Chain 
In order to a obtain a better understanding of which support measures have been and 
could be effective to support F&V cooperatives, it is important to analyze their position in 
food chain. The cooperatives of Almería commercialise the agricultural production of their 
members and are predominantly in the initial or occasionally intermediate phases of the 
supply chain. Thereafter, they are involved packaging, warehousing, transport, logistics, 
and distribution to wholesalers and also some retailers. Diversification into alternative 
energy activities or related businesses is also noted in larger co-operatives. 	
The majority of F&V cooperatives are joint commercialization cooperatives (usually they 
don’t transform the product) which have large suppliers and customers. This limits their 
bargaining power to control prices, as the suppliers and customers both have the market 
power to fix prices. These market structures indicate the support measures that should be 
taken into account given such market structure. The preferential trade agreement entered 
into by Morocco and EU demonstrate an important threat for their F&V producers. This 
agreement treats Moroccan production in the same way as European production, despite 
the fact that Moroccan production is not produced under equal conditions (i.e. control in 
the use of pesticides, different labour market regulations), resulting in a “social dumping”. 
                                                                  
72 The years 2006, 2007 and 2008 do not include Primaflor SAT or Caparrós, two entities whose combined 
turnover is approximately 125 million € and who left and then rejoined the APO. 
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Although there have been efforts through work groups to deal with these issues on an EU-
Moroccan level, non compliance remains the norm.	
6.2.6	(ii)	Research	and	institutional	partnerships 
Intensive agriculture is very dependent on R+D+I. In order to carry out their activities the 
co-operatives require support from other types of businesses and institutions. The 
experimental farm Las Palmerillas of the cooperative bank was an important player as is 
the laboratory of the association of POs. The University of Almería (a campus of excellence 
for agricultural research), both from a business administration and scientific and point of 
view, as well as IFAPA (Agricultural and Fisheries Research/Instituto de Investigación y 
Formación Agraria y Pesquera) are important partners in research.  
6.2.6	(iii)	Institutional/governance	structure	and	legal	form	 
Agricultural producers in Anadalusia are based on different legal structures and tax 
regimes and thus different internal governance requirements and practices. Amongst 
them the most common are: 
 Sociedad Cooperativa Agraria/Agricultural Cooperative Company (S.C.A). 
 Sociedad agraria de transformación/Agricultural Company of Transformation (S.A.T). 
 Sociedad Anónima/Anonymous Company (S.A). 
 Sociedad Limitada/Limited Company (S.L). 
Aside from cooperatives, in Almería SATs are the most popular form of collective 
entrepreneurship in agriculture. SATs are somewhat like general partnerships and 
capitalistic companies at the same time. Their membership is limited to farmers, farm 
workers or those with farm related purposes, but their statutes and bylaws allow voting in 
proportion to share capital when decisions that need to be taken are financial in nature.  
The producer entities most important in the province of Almería are included below in 
Table 6.2, with an indication of their legal form. The high presence of S.A.T.s is notable; 
however the largest entities continue to be cooperatives. Groups are set out in Table 6.3. 
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Table	6.2	Almería	Agricultural	Entities	according	to	Legal	Form.	
S.C.A	 S.A.T	 S.L	 S.A	
Cabasc* 
Camposol*  
Campovicar 
Casi 
Casur* 
Cohorsan* 
Coprohníjar* 
Ejidoluz* 
Ejidomar 
Geosur 
Hortamar* 
Murgiverde 
Parque Natural 
San Isidro 
Labrador 
Unica Group* 
Vicasol	
Acrena 
Agrieco* 
Agroiris 
Almerifresh 
Biosabor 
Bonnysa 
Canalex 
Cirera 
Cítricos del 
Andarax 
Costa de Níjar 
Costadulce 
Costa Ejido 
Dunamar 
Duniagro 
E.H. Femago* 
Eurosol	
Ferva*
Hortasol 
Hortofrutícola 
Mabe 
Indasol 
Inver 
Las 
Hortichuelas 
Las Marinas 
Nature Choice 
Níjar Sol 
Nuestra Señora 
de Gádor 
Parafruts 
Primaflor 
Ramafrut 
Romelina 
Tomasol	
Agrícola Navarro de 
Haro 
Agromullor 
Agroponiente 
Natural Produce* 
Cualin Quality 
Francisco Oliva 
Fruejido 
Frotas Escobi 
Horfrasol 
Hortalizas Indasur 
Hortofrutícola Costa 
de Almería	
Agupoejido 
Agroponiente*
Agrupalmería*
Agrupapulpí 
Explotaciones 
Agrícolas 
Frulape 
Uniagro 
Vega Cañada 
Alhóndiga la 
Unión 	
16	 32	 11 8	
*Included in second-tier group 
	
Very few cooperatives or SATs are part of a second-tier cooperative. Below we can see that 
Anecoop, the second-tier cooperative from Valencia has 5 Almería cooperatives. Unica 
Group has both cooperatives and SAT members and Grupo Agroponiente is an IOF with all 
IOF members. Finally, Uniagro is a mix of IOF and a SAT.	
	
Table	6.3	Almería	Cooperatives/groups	of	second	level.	
CO-OPERATIVES/GROUPS of SECOND LEVEL	
Anecoop S.C.A. 
(Valencian cooperative with 
Almería members) 
 Camposol SCA
Coprohnijar SCA	
Hortamar SCA	
Ejidoluz SCA	
Albentillas SCA	
Unica Group   
Cabasc SCA
Casur SCA 
Cohorsan SCA 
Ferva SAT  
El Grupo SCA	
 Agrieco SAT 
Grupo Agroponiente S.L. 
Agroponiente SA 
Agroponiente Natural Produce SL 
Vega Cañada SA 
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Uniagro S.A. 
Agrupalmería SA 
Agrocastell SA 
E.H. Femago SAT 
	
	
6.2.6	(v)	Most	important	Almeria	Cooperatives	
CASI is a first-tier cooperative founded in 1944 (originally in livestock and F&V) which has 
1700 members, who are owners of 2,450 ha of cultivated land, and 350 employees. 
Production in 2010 reached 213,556 tons, which resulted in turnover of 190 million 
Euros73. Originally this production was destined for the local market of Almería, but 
currently it markets around the world, principally to the U.K. and Germany74. CASI 
participates in the container company Poniente Plast, S.A. (13.28%) and in Andalucía 
Cargo, S.A. (30%), the operator of land transport for its members. It controls 36% of 
Hortofrutícola Ciudad Luminosa, S.L. and as well participate in Níjar Natura, S.L., which 
manages agricultural waste material.  
MurgiVerde is a first tier cooperative created in 2005 as a result of the merger of two large 
cooperatives Agromurgi and Ejidoverde. It latest incorporations have been the co-
operatives Geosur and Campovícar in 2009, which has allowed it to increase production. 
With a total of 1000 ha of greenhouses, its annual production has reached 125,000 tons. 
The turnover of this cooperative was 120 million Euros in 2011 and it has about 700 
workers75. Murgiverde markets part of its production in Germany, the U.K., Scandinavia, 
Eastern European countries, the U.S.A. and Canada. It participates in the Almería company 
Ecovida, S.L. (fruit stores), in the commercial exporter Consofrut, S.L. with a 20% interest 
and in Alcoex Mediterráneo, S.L, with 12.41%76. 
Vicasol is a first-tier cooperative created in 1979. It has more than 400 members who farm 
about 1000 ha. In 2011 its production reached 120,000 tons, with a turnover of 115 
million Euros, of which 90 million corresponded to exports. It is integrated into the central 
buyer for agricultural supplies, Coop Suca. It controls 100% of Vicasol Produce Ltd., 
dedicated to the sale of F&V to the U.K. It participates with 16.66% in Plattform Spanien, 
S.A., which commercialises the production of its members in Switzerland. It has a 12.41% 
interest in the 5th range (prepared and ready to eat) food products producer Alcoex 
Mediterráneo, S.L. and along with other Almería entities in the network of fruit stores, 
Ecovida, S.L. 
                                                                  
73 Data from Alimarket.  
74 Information from CASI’s webpage: http://www.casi.es/ 
75 Data from Alimarket.  
76 Information from Agromurgi’s webpage: http://www.agromurgi.com/ 
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UNICA Group is a second-level integrated group created in 2009 by cooperatives and SATs 
Agrieco, Cabasc, Casur, Cohorsan and Ferva. In 2011 the El Grupo from Granada joined. 
UNICA Group exceeds 160,000 tons of commercialised production with a turnover in 2010 
of 110 million Euros. It has 1,400 farmers77. At the operating level, each of the members is 
specialised in one or a number of products, and there is a substantial ecological 
production. UNICA Group has important commercial agreements such as that with ZON, 
the Dutch co-operative, the commercial agreement with the North American multi-
national General Mills, for the commercialisation of their product under the brand 
“Gigante Verde” (Green Giant) and with the Valencian citrus marketing company 
Cofrumark Quality Distribution Fruits. With respect to the 5th range products it has an 
agreement with the company Alimentaria Andarax and participates through its member 
cooperatives in Alcoex (Durán, 2010). Of the total volume marketed by Unica Group, only 
10% is distributed in the national market, with exports reaching 93 million Euros in 
2010.78 They sell to Germany, France, the U.K., The Netherlands, Italy and Scandinavian 
countries.  
Unica Group has entered into certain contractual “lock up” agreements with its members 
such that their commitment to the second-tier cooperative is rather stronger than that 
provided under the relevant cooperative legislation.  
6.2.7	Relevant	support	measures	affecting	structure	and	strategy.	
	
6.2.7	(i)	Legislation	and	Policy	
 
The Spanish national laws on cooperatives (law 20/1990 and law 19/1995), equally 
applicable to Almería cooperatives, includes tax benefits mainly related to corporate tax, 
that is, if a cooperative has positive results it can take advantage of a tax benefit. However, 
given the majority of cooperatives have levels of profitability near zero such measures are 
not particularly useful. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, SATs, dating from 1981, are subject to few limitations and conflicts 
compared to that of agricultural cooperatives: there are none of the traditional legal 
limitations of cooperatives and it is argued that competitive advantage in the agricultural 
sector is enjoyed. However, the most successful enterprises of Almería are cooperatives, 
thus indicating that the “cooperative” advantage outweighs such benefits. The recent 
Andalusia Cooperative Law (Law 14/2011, 23 December, Ley de Sociedades Cooperativas 
Andaluzas) has introduced changes which give cooperatives more leeway (see Section 2.3 
                                                                  
77 Information from Unica Group’s webpage: http://www.unicagroup.es/ 
78 Data from Alimarket. 
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for further explanation). It should be noted that the change has been to give more 
“flexibility” to the cooperatives, rather than consider whether the benefits enjoyed by 
SATs should be discontinued.  
It is too soon to gauge the potential success or failure of the new cooperative law. The new 
law aims to improve competitiveness: the social object of agricultural cooperatives is 
widened; percentage of contributions to the obligatory fund are reduced; in the case of a 
member leaving, the former obligation to reimburse the social capital by the co-operative 
can be substituted by the member receiving the value of his/her contributions through the 
transfer to third parties who gain the condition of member. New rules apply to non-
member investors. As well, post-liquidation amounts returned to the Administration have 
been reduced from 100% to 30%. A unique concept, in Spain at least, is the notion of a 
“trial period” for new members(See Chapter 6.2.8, below). 
Multiple votes in proportion to member cooperative activity, allowing qualified non 
members to be named as directors (consejeros) in an amount that does not exceed 1/3 of 
the total is permitted and the law establishes that the general assembly has the power to 
determine the new contributions in function of the assets or reasonable value of the 
company. Finally limitations with third parties have been lifted and the process for 
mergers has been simplified. (It should be noted that Valencia´s cooperative law was 
“modernized” in much the same manner in 2003.) 
With respect to POs, two laws are particularly relevant, the first being Royal Decree 
1972/2008 28 of November, which recognizes POs of fruits and vegetable and establishes 
the basic norms of their organisations and associations. The second law is the Royal 
Decree 1302/2009 regarding funds and operating programs of fruit and vegetable POs, 
which establishes the basic norms in relation to the agricultural common market 
organisation (CMO) Council Regulation (EC) n. 1234/2007. This was further developed by 
Royal Decree 1337/2011, which was passed October 3, 2011, regulating funds and 
operating programs for fruit and vegetable producers. A recent study found that there was 
an increase of POF&V in Almería by 21% from 2000 to 2009 (Parra Gómez and Cabrera 
Sánchez, 2011). 
Chapter 5 analyses CAP in general and such analysis will not be repeated here in full. 
However, there are areas of disagreement and dissatisfaction. Whilst certain important 
points have been reflected in the conditions of the OPs as to the eligibility of activities 
related to product transformation by cooperatives, calculations as to the value of 
commercialized product or the eligibility of investments in farms and installations of 
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members and their cooperatives, other important weaknesses persist in relation to the 
Management and Prevention of Crisis and also the reform of System of Entry Prices. 
Associations and Inter-professional groups have been given little power to affect any 
significant change or take important decisions. 
6.2.7	 (ii)	 Relevance	 of	 different	 sources	 of	 income,	 including	 public	 grants	 and	 subsidies	
(Andalusia	and	EU	level)		
Currently 9,000 Almeria farmers are integrated in a POF&V and received aid from OPs in 
the amount of 31 million Euros for the year 2010 and 34 million in 2011. This represents 
60% of such funds destined for Andalusia. Farmers are able to invest in various activities 
for the benefit of the sector. In the period from 2004-2008 they carried out actions worth 
almost 260 million Euros. With respect to the total amount in relation to agriculture that 
Andalusia receives from the EU, Almería receives less than 3%. 
For 2012 the amounts in Andalusia are79: 
Table	6.4	Support	received	for	the	F&V	sector	in	Andalusia.	
YEAR	2011	 AMOUNT	
Value of Marketed Production 1,700,298,868.75 €,	
Operating Funds 136,242,238.96 €	
Member contribution 69,847,255.77 €	
Contribution of FEAGA 66,394,983.19 €	
Data source: Junta de Andalucía 
 
Table	6.5	Destination	of	Support	Received	by	the	F&V	Sector	in	Andalusia.	
ACTIONS	 AMOUNT	
1.Production planning 53,764,265.96 €	
2.Product quality improvement 32,079,916.42 €	
3.Marketing improvement 31,454,388.79 €	
4.Research and experimental production 252,277.55 €	
5.Training and advice services 1,172,121.6 €	
6.Prevention and management of risk 2,107,106.48 €	
7.Environmental objectives 22,205,615.48 €	
8.other actions, activities, investments, etc. 10,930,913.07 €	
Data source: Junta de Andalucía 
 
In 2011, support received by FEGA by the F&V sector in Almería (€) was:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
79 Information form Junta de Andalucía’s webpage: www.juntadeandalucia.es/agriculturaypesca/ 
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Table	6.6	Support	received	by	FEGA	by	the	F&V	sector	in	Almería	(€).	
Type	of	Support	 AMOUNT	
Support per area for stone fruit 5,781,916.25
Operating Funds for POs 33,929,978.04
Exceptional measures for aid to Spanish Vegetables 26,892,825.80
Transitory payment-other fruits and vegetables 435,709.08
Plan for fruit consumption in schools 12,460.93
Total	 66,617,181.02
Data source: FEGA 
 
The regional government of Andalucía also offers aid and subsidies, although for the most 
part not specific to cooperatives, which include: 
 Aid for improvement of quality systems for ecological production 
 Subsidies for carrying out cooperative activities with other parties 
 Aid for management groups of agricultural farms 
 Aid to contract agricultural insurance 
 Subsidies for improving irrigation systems  
 Exceptional aid for supporting the F+V sector  
 Subsidies to improve and modernise production structures for farms  
 Subsidies for the modernization of greenhouses  
According to sector experts the three most important areas of support in the past for the 
consolidation of the Almería model and its success were: 
1. Support for improving infrastructure. 
• support for modernizing the use of water resources and infrastructures 
• as well as infrastructure support for road transport, centers of investigation, 
training of farmers, and other types of support that has been related to the 
productive capacity. 
2. Support for improving structures 
• insertion of young people 
• support for modernizing farms installations (given competitive nature of the 
farming activity, investment in new technologies and structures is important) 
• although the CAP structural support is of limited importance therein, it has been 
one of the fundamental measures used with the highest impact on productivity (in 
between 1986 and 2003 this line of support was more than 219 million (valued at 
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2004 rates), such support coming at a time when the sector reached an important 
economic magnitude. 
3. Support for association and processing and commercialisation 
• subsidies to develop association efforts, since 1986, has counteracted the 
traditional reticence of farmers to create associative structures. However, it was 
noted that at times it has been too easy and too supportive, encouraging the 
division of existing cooperatives. 
• support for commercialization since 1993 has improved the technology of 
commercialisation cooperatives and has contributed to the competiveness of 
Almeria F&V cooperatives. (García Torrente, 2005)  
6.2.8	Analysis	of	the	Law	of	Andalusian	Cooperatives	2011.	 
The modification of the Andalusian Cooperative law (La modificación de la Ley Andaluza 
de Sociedades Cooperativas) which had been in force since 1999 was lobbied for by the 
cooperative association leaders. It was seen as a method by which to “modernise”, adapt to 
global market changes, and the actual situation of cooperatives (CEPES Andalucía, 2011a). 
The 1999 law was seen to be less “flexible” and less “innovative” than more flexible laws of 
other north and east European countries which have strong cooperative sectors. As well, 
the new legislation was received in the context of an Andalusian agricultural cooperative 
context in which farms were small and there was scarce R+D+i investment. (FAECA, 
2011a). The law was well received by the spokespeople of the sector (Observatoría de la 
Economía Social, 2011) who lauded its objectives of “reinforcing competitiveness” and 
eliminating development obstacles (FAECTA, 2011a). The amendments contained in the 
new law were an attempt to give cooperatives legal and economic-financial instruments 
which are available to IOFs, yet “compatible” with the cooperative movement (Méndez, 
2011). It was unanimously supported by all political groups in the Andalusian parliament, 
without any amendments suggested (FAECTA, 2011b). In addition to cooperative 
principles, new principles having to do with business and environment sustainability, 
gender equality, the creation of stable employment and the social commitment to the 
community (CEPES Andalucía, 2011b) have been added. Consensus was reached through 
the participation of the principle representatives of the Social Economy sector, such as 
FAECA (federation of Andalusian agricultural cooperatives), AMECOOP (Association of 
Cooperative Women Entrepreneurs of Andalusia), CEPES (Confederation of social 
economy entities), FAECTA (Federation of Andalusian worker cooperatives) and 
EMCOFEANTRAN (Federation of Andalusian transport cooperatives), as well as the main 
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Andalusian unions UGT y CCOO, and other stakeholders such as COAG y CEA (farm worker 
organisations) (FAECTA, 2011c). In particular AMECOOP was positive as to future 
applications and development (AMECOOP, 2011). 
FAECA underlined the importance of the new law to allow members to add value and 
organize their sales and respond to market challenges. CEPES, which represents social 
economy entities in Andalusia noted the law´s sensitivity to “the aspirations” of the 
cooperative movement (CEPES Andalucía, 2011a). 
However, there has been criticism that the new law has tilted towards a more functional 
and economic IOF legislative concept, centered on the promotion of economic interests of 
the members (Paniagua, 2012).  
Important	Changes	to	the	Law:	
 Added to prior ability to transfer participations between members, is the voluntary 
possibility upon the exit of a member, to freely transfer participations to third parties that 
acquire the condition of members in capital participation, in place of the reimbursement of 
social capital. This is subject to prior agreement of the Board and only if pre-determined 
requisites are met. This change is intended to avoid the decapitalisation of the cooperative 
and as well allow the member to obtain surpluses. It is considered an “added value for 
those entrepreneurs who wish to commence business activity under a cooperative form” 
(Méndez, 2011). 
 Administrative processes are made more simple, permitting the cooperative´s 
constitution without the need for a public deed (an extra notarial cost and fee), reducing 
the time to set up the cooperative and the number of documents required, as well as the 
minimium social capital requirement. 
 The concept of a Cooperative Business Group, which allows the growth of such 
enterprises within the cooperative model, instead of obligating such businesses to adopt 
non-cooperative forms once they reach a certain size and level of change, allows 
intercooperation and encourages groupings. Such groups can be led by a holding group or 
as equal companies, in which case the majority must be cooperatives. As well, mergers are 
encouraged through a simplified procedure and a new regulation for integrated 
cooperatives is introduced, that is, those constituted by a merger with a commercial entity, 
so that they may obtain the same tax benefits that would normally apply to normal 
second-tier cooperatives. In addition, transactions between cooperatives are now 
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considered to be member transactions instead of transactions with third parties and thus 
serious tax consequences are avoided.  
 Reduction in the percentage that must be given to the obligatory funds, getting rid of 
the obligation to give 15% of benefits to the reserve fund when it would represent half of 
the social capital, reduction to 25% the proportion of extra cooperative benefits for the 
reserve fund, as against the current average of 90%. As well, there is the possibility of the 
General Assembly to decide to use part of such reserve for production investments, for 
cooperation or internationalisation. 
 The cooperative has greater leeway with its bylaws and may establish its own rules in a 
greater number of aspects, depending on particular necessities thus offering cooperatives 
the freedom to make modifications thereto in a more agile manner (Méndez, 2011). 
 A plural vote in proportion to cooperative activity is allowed, on a voluntary and 
limited basis. Each cooperative member may have up to a maximum of 7 votes in function 
to productive contributions; not, however in relation to paid-up capital. With this 
modification, the relationship between “economic interests and the business decision 
capacity is more closely aligned” (FAECTA, 2011a). 
 Greater flexibility in the contracting of salaried workers in worker cooperatives in the 
case that employees decline to be members. 
 New technologies are permitted to allow greater flexibility and avoid physical obstacles 
in assembly and board meetings. 
 To facilitate the incorporation of new members, the figure of “trial member” is 
introduced, permitting a trial period which permits both the cooperative and the member 
a greater mutual knowledge before establishing a bond. In addition, the new member is 
allowed the possibility to pay partial or delayed contributions by common agreement.  
 The term “Associate” is now an “investor” and new conditions are established for the 
same. The new law allows an investor to hold up to 49% of the social capital instead of 
30% and up to 25% in the assembly, instead of 20% as provided for in the former law of 
1999. Investors can be both physical and juridical persons, public or private, but they 
cannot become investors if they have the same interests or carry out similar activities, 
except with the express authorization of the cooperative administration. Investors may 
not hold the position of president or vice president. 
 The supervisory body of the “Intervenors” is voluntary and not obligatory.  
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 The Social object of agricultural cooperatives has been widened to allow for 
improvements for the rural population and rural development, as well as the attention to 
other activities or services directly related to agriculture, forestry or livestock keeping. 
 Updating of cooperative principles to include the development of stable and quality 
employment, gender equality and business and environmental sustainability. 
 6.3	Research	Questions 
Below the research questions are answered based on the information gathered and 
analysed above: 
1. What strategies of the F&V cooperatives in Almería have been central to overcoming 
potential traditional shortcomings identified earlier in Chapters 2 and 5? 
 In Almería, most cooperatives are first- tier and are involved in marketing product of 
small farmers and thus they are not traditionally highly vertically integrated. Farmers 
that continue to compete solely on price and increased production, experience 
difficulties. Clearly exports are crucial to their survival and this goes hand in hand with 
the ability to produce high quality, differentiated product. Integrated production, 
biological controls, strict testing and monitoring, compliance with international 
standards, geographically identified products, fair labour and health and safety 
standards are all processes that result in “quality” product. Cooperative institutions 
have been able to facilitate these processes which otherwise would have been difficult 
for small farmers on 1.5 ha. to carry out.   
Local characteristics which had deterred internationalisation and collaborations 
outside of the region and outside of Spain, in the past have begun to change. The 
majority of the largest cooperatives are first tier cooperatives which have proven 
efficient (Murgiverde, CASI, Vicasol, etc.) and governance problems are less 
pronounced. Second tier cooperative such as UNICA have “lock up” measures to avoid 
common second-tier weaknesses. Larger cooperatives generally hire a professional 
manager (gerente). 
Almería F&V cooperatives have a close relationship with the local credit cooperative 
and the agricultural and technical research services and thus generally have not had 
problems with access to credit. The agricultural cluster (mainly cooperatives, SMEs, 
IOFs) has served to create synergies and strengthen the cooperative sector. 
Cooperative institution building in tandem with the economic and commercial 
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necessities of the farmers has allowed them to be flexible and adapt to the market, 
without, it should be noted, any adaptation of the cooperative form to an IOF model.  
Various collaborations and strategic alliances with diverse forms of enterprise have 
allowed them to be agile and to enter into new activities rapidly. Given the 
increasingly larger size of first-tier cooperatives there has been more emphasis on 
professionalization of management, which cooperative institutions have helped to 
inculcate through training and education programs.  
2. Which public support measures (local, regional, national and/or European) have an 
impact on the development and success/failure of the Almería cooperatives? 
The greenhouse cooperatives of Almería are relative newcomers and do not have the same 
commercialization history as other regions. This is an historical fact, and has little to do 
with policy. However, the encouragement to form cooperatives and PO groups has had a 
positive effect on Almería and has allowed it to rapidly develop such that the total F&V 
turnover competes with the likes of Anecoop. From a production point of view Almería has 
progressed exponentially although it still has not reached a sufficient level in terms of 
internationalization/commercialization and organizational capacity.  
Infrastructure and capacity building measures were instrumental in building up the 
cooperatives and allowing them to strengthen cooperative institutions.  
The agreement with Morocco; lack of investment in transport and other infrastructure; 
CAP and the lack of measures to control falling prices; and competition law restrictions are 
exogenous factors. The failure to sufficiently support alternative energy initiatives by 
regional governments has also had a negative impact.  
Cooperatives should not be “penalised” as a result of their structure being different than 
IOFs and suffer restrictions. As set out in Chapter 5.7 this is not always the case. However, 
given the inequalities in the distribution chain, they should be allowed to use necessary 
tools to maintain fair prices and thus achieve their main social function, which is to obtain 
value for their members. If cooperatives do not economically thrive they cannot fulfil their 
social function. 
3. How has the historical development of F&V cooperatives in Almería affected the 
strategies and structures of the cooperatives? 
The parallel development between the agricultural and credit cooperatives in Almeria has 
been crucial to the success of these cooperatives, whereby the credit cooperative financed 
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R+D+i, assumed financial and experimental risk and acted as a catalyst for development 
and change management. The agricultural district or “cluster” model of Almería created a 
“virtuous” cycle of productivity and allowed reinvestment, organic growth and collective 
innovation. Almería’s F&V sector commenced later than other regions, such as Valencia, 
and initially it lacked the more sophisticated commercialisation strategies. In the last 
decade there has been accelerated activity on exports, concentration, internationalisation 
and collaborations. First-tier cooperatives dominate and are seen to be more efficient, 
though mergers are seen to be more complex. Where second-tier cooperatives have been 
set up such as UNICA Group, they are structured contractually to mimic certain first-tier 
characteristics (e.g. asset lock-ups). 
6.4	Conclusions	to	Case	Study	
6.4.1	Challenges	
 
In this case study we have examined a successful intensive F&V cooperative area in Spain 
dominated by small to medium first-tier cooperatives, most of which were set up in the 
late 1970s or 1980s in a poor, isolated and small geographic area with infertile land. Over 
the space of a few decades Almería´s F&V cooperative sector has almost reached the 
dimensions (in turnover) of Valencia and has begun to internationalise, enter into 
collaborations and strategic agreements, etc. The sector has currently a very high technical 
level and a strong R+D+i capability. The supporting cooperative institutional structures 
and fabric is high. Market share of cooperatives is also high.  
The sector is not without serious challenges. These problems are at both a local and 
international level and are rooted in institutional, political and economic factors. 
 From a legal institutional perspective, there are inefficiencies and a lack of harmonization 
caused by the different levels of legislation. The different levels of legal jurisdiction do not 
cause significant conflict of laws. Rather, it is a problem due to jurisdiction (whether the 
cooperative is constituted at a regional level under regional laws or under national law), 
whereby regional governments prefer to maintain control over and take credit for 
agricultural law and policy and aid. This situation reinforces regionalism in cooperatives 
and discourages a national cooperative business perspective.  
Major challenges include the grossly unequal bargaining position of the distribution 
entities, global competition and the lack of adequate measures (CAP) at their disposal to 
influence prices, or for that matter inputs. This has been exacerbated by the agreement 
between the EU and Morocco while at the same time further liberalization is being 
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suggested. With respect to CAP, prices of F&V products are not guaranteed by the 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund in the same way as continental agricultural 
products. For example, the use of withdrawal prices provided in CMO is limited because 
they are lower than in the continental case with regard to the production cost. New 
agreements between Morocco and Mercosur result in decreasing F&V prices, becoming an 
important threat. The use of product withdrawals and amounts raises several issues when 
marketing of other agricultural products is permitted and yet not subject to the same 
requirements for food safety, traceability and labour and environmental guarantees. The 
lower prices of such products are not due to the use of better technology or a higher level 
of productivity. This results in products of higher quality and safety (in terms of 
traceability and food safety) being withdrawn, thus promoting inefficiencies and resulting 
in inequitable treatment for European producers. 
While the sector has mastered the production of quality product, food safety and security, 
traceability and the development of added value products, the ability to capture this value 
down the supply chain is an outstanding matter. In Almería this is even more so given that 
it does not have the logistics and investment in infrastructure to reach other European and 
international markets to the same extent as other areas. 
A pending task is the further professionalization of the cooperative sector and the more 
extended use of advanced technology. Managers who actually understand the “cooperative 
difference” and business form are a rare commodity. Cooperative representative 
institutions such as the association of producer organizations, federations and inter-
professional groups must also function on a more consolidated and professional level and 
they should be given the corresponding power to actually have some affect. The solution 
to these issues may indeed be a more serious and professional re-commitment to the 
cooperative business form. The “modernization” of cooperative laws may, or may not, be a 
piece of the puzzle; in Almería it is too early to tell, but caution should prevail when 
relying on legislative fiat as a driver of change. Often cooperative laws serve to reflect the 
demands of larger economic actors in the sector. But what is clear is that the new law 
approximates more closely certain characteristics of the IOF firm, and significantly relaxes 
the asset lock. Investor members within the cooperative changes the nature of the 
cooperative and this threshold has been increased to 49%. On the other hand, transactions 
between cooperatives are not taxed as heavily before, recognizing the “network” nature of 
cooperatives. Restrictions/penalties have been removed on growth of cooperatives and 
certain group arrangements, with IOFs or other cooperatives.  
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However, if we step back we can see that apart from a few “niceities” (expansion of 
principles) the changes have been to give the cooperative more “flexibility” to behave as a 
quasi-IOF. The main reason for this of course is so that cooperatives can attract 
“investors”. However, as the case study of Almería has shown, involved cooperative 
finance cancels out the usual “problems” of lack of capital, investors and investment. So 
too, does member commitment. Are these changes necessary? Do they have anything to do 
with the needs of the agricultural cooperatives in facing global competition? In the case 
study of Almería, success was due to the cluster of cooperative institutions, which had the 
ability to meet the various needs, both finance and otherwise, of the constantly evolving 
sector. As can be seen, as the sector grew and the competitive environment became more 
complicated, the cooperative market share actually grew.  
If cooperatives have capitalist investors and “investor-members”, can they fulfill the same 
role? Can the cooperative member be reduced to a “mere financier” (Zamagni and 
Zamagin, 2010) and if so, how do we expect such member to behave when it becomes the 
time for “choice”. Do we end up then with a separate contract, that of an “exchange 
contract” rather than a relationship or mutualistic exchange? What is the point of having a 
fiction of an investor member if the membership is not based on the practice and exchange 
of benefits that prompt one to be a member of a cooperative in the first place.  
While the legal fiction of the additional contract may serve to resolve certain 
specific problems…where it is intended as a fund-raising mechanism for 
cooperatives it results in failure and frustration (Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010). 
 
In the changes that have been outlined in the new Andalusian cooperative law, we can see 
evidience of the theoretical observations set out in Chapter 2: that the social goals of the 
cooperative have been made “private”. At the same time that the new law proclaims in its 
“principles” gender equality, sustainability, and employement, the actual provisions which 
have any teeth are moving away from these very “public” goals towards a “firm level” 
mentality and reconceptualising the member-cooperative relationship as a contractual 
one. The new law provided that cooperatives are meant to deal with lack of access to 
credit, for example, by resorting to “member-investors”. In Chapter 2 it was noted that 
instead of a member owning a “no-obligation, no responsibility, personality poor share” 
(Ireland, 2003), the cooperative was an example of embodied ownership, built on 
obligation and interaction. In order to attract and retain members, they must be 
“incentivized” with more control rights (votes). A shadow “market” has been invented to 
mimic the “market” of IOFs.  
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The question is, “what kind of members will these new “incentivized” members be?” 
It is an ironic situation in which we find ourselves: cooperative laws are twisting 
cooperative enterprise into quasi-IOFs so as to supposedly attract financing and investors, 
while at the same time Basle II and proposals under Basle III are making it more and more 
difficult for credit cooperatives to survive (which is another thesis in and of itself) in spite 
of the fact that they have provided SMEs, cooperative and social enterprise financing when 
all other forms of liquidity had been shut off (Birchall, 2010).  
Summing up, in our case study we have found that the Almería F&V cooperative sector 
may be seen from a “neo-endogenous” approach, (a mix of exogenous and endogenous 
factors wherein local level characteristics and actors must interact with external or global 
forces). If the role of cooperatives is to harness, guide and leverage the strengths and 
capacity of local economies in its interaction with other environments, whether in the 
form of markets or political institutions, then the role of cooperative policy and regulation 
should serve to support cooperatives in building the tools by which to do so.  
 In Almería the agro cluster system mediates between external and internal factors and the 
cooperative role therein. Certain factors such as collaboration between cooperatives and 
their institutions, between cooperatives and IOFs (which is	not the same as transforming 
the cooperative itself into a quasi-IOF), internationalization, investment in R+D+i, and 
having management in place such that cooperatives can leverage the strengths and 
capacity of their members and local economies in meeting external challenges is more 
important than policy dictating cooperative structure. 
However, one still finds the same conversation that has been carried out by the Spanish 
agricultural confederation and politicians for the past 20 years. Public policy makers and 
politicians of all stripes in Spain have constantly recommended that the sector needs to 
innovate and be “flexible”, to increase in size to have more weight in the supply chain, 
invest more in research and marketing, and above all, have a “business” vision. The 
minister of agriculture, Miguel Arias Cañete has promised a new plan for cooperative 
integration, which will attempt to enlist the autonomous communities, to push for the 
creation and development of marketing structures of a relevant size that are innovative. 
Along with this is a promise to revise the national cooperative law and the cooperative tax 
law (Cooperativas Agroalimentarias, 2012).  
But what is often absent from this conversation from the management, legal and 
organizational perspective is the very basic, indeed fundamental, fact of the cooperative: 
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the strength of its unique characteristics.  For example, gaining sufficient market power to 
compete with the huge five or six global distributors and supermarkets would be difficult 
even with an emphasis on concentration.  Attributes other than mere large size are 
necessary. As we have seen in Chapter 5, IOF assumptions found in a variety of laws 
actually discriminate against the cooperative form and yet cooperatives maintain and in 
certain instances increase market share. Cooperative principals are expanded in various 
laws to include more social goals and yet legal systems and economic meausures provide 
no method by which the cooperative can actually be measured or valued in its fulfillment 
of such principles. In spite of this, agricultural cooperatives have survived. The logical 
conclusion is that they have done so based on non IOF strengths. 
In 2011 the Spanish National Competition Commission in its report on the relationship 
between producers and distributors in the food sector recognized the inherent inequality 
of bargaining power, and its long term detrimental effects on the sector (Comisión 
Nacional de la Competencia, 2011). In response, the president of the F&V sector of 
Cooperativas Agroalimentarias (Spanish Confederation), Cirilo Arnandis80 observed:  
[The co-operatives] already cannot continue in this situation, because there aren´t 
any resources left. We are providing a great employment value chain, wealth and 
activity, but who is giving the farmer a fair price for their product [?]. We don´t 
want subsidies, we want a new legislation that impedes abuses. At the end, because 
of a few cents per kilo we are going to lose a source of wealth from which so many 
have filled their mouths and now is not defended as it should be (translation from 
Spanish-Giagnocavo). 
Perhaps cooperative legislation should be more concerned about defending cooperative 
values and creating cooperative capacity than mimicking creating a weak IOF structure 
based on a questionable view of the “incentivized” individual. 
6.4.2	The	role	of	cooperatives	in	the	lifecycle	of	Almeria	
 
The cooperatives of Almería have been fundamental in the development of the region, as 
pointed out in the various development stages above, and there is a strong case to be made 
that without the cooperative form, such development would never have been sustainable 
or competitive. As the sector has evolved the focus has moved beyond the national sphere 
and the services that are offered to members such that they can increase production, 
export and compete in European and international markets has been crucial. 
                                                                  
80 Ribera Express (2012): “La federació de Cooperatives Agrícoles reclama medidas para evitar que los 
agricultores abandonen su actividad”. Ribera Express. Retrieved April 2, 2012, from: 
http://www.riberaexpress.es/?p=30856 
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This case study illustrates the evolution of the role and activities of cooperative entities in 
the development of a community, moving from a primary agricultural system to a local 
production system. As a pro-active agent of technological, economic and social innovation, 
cooperatives fulfilled a central institutional role in the contribution to a civil society in a 
population left vulnerable not only by an economically and politically repressive regime 
but also as a result of harsh climatic and geographically conditions. In keeping with Cook 
and Burress’ framework, the cooperative sector has been able been able to respond to 
each “choice” stage, leveraging the cooperative fabric to adapt to new demands.  
Cooperatives have done so by carrying out the following strategies: 
• committing themselves financially and socially to a vulnerable community; 
• encouraging the establishment of a cooperative economic “fabric”; 
• building on but going far beyond traditional agricultural marketing (and credit) 
cooperatives through pro-active production and dissemination of organizational, 
technical, economic and social knowledge and playing an active role in the 
incorporation of the same; 
• shifting and transforming individual economic risk (including technological and 
experimental risk) to community risk, thus involving not only the cooperatives, but 
the community in shared success; 
• recognizing the many stages of the transformation from “peasant” to “agricultural 
entrepreneur” and providing management and financial training as well as support 
to other institutional players; 
• assuming the role of intermediating international and political changes and policy 
for community members;  
• pursuing organic growth strategies in order to sustain innovation and sector 
growth and as well, diversifying activities beyond local specialization (both sector 
and territorial);  
• facilitating concentration in the sector and supporting the organizational changes 
that such horizontal integration implies; and 
• taking seriously the environmentally responsible farming imperative as an 
inherent strategy  
The success of such model, particularly since it was not tied to an already pre-existing 
group defined by territory and cultural ties based on proximity, illustrates that the 
cooperative business model is a current, viable form in which to encourage sustainable 
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economic development and that it is not an outdated business form tied to a specific 
historical or cultural tradition. 
As well, unlike other areas of Spain and Europe, there has been a notable lack of regional 
policy concerning economic development (Galdeano, et al, 2011), a gap which was filled by 
cooperative institutions, including credit and commercialization cooperatives. There is a 
significant “cooperative fabric” which was built from the ground up in the space of a 
decade or two and continues to survive and evolve. In contrast to many initiatives related 
to rural development, which tend to diminish the role of agriculture and focus instead on 
rural “multi-functionalism” or diversity of activities, the Almería model provides evidence 
of a specialized cooperative agro-food sector as being a viable model (Galdeano-Gómez, et 
al, 2011). 
The Cooperative model also co-exists in a complementary manner with investor owned 
firms, thus creating synergistic “networks”. The cooperative sector was responsible for the 
growth of an important auxiliary sector. 
The agricultural cooperative sector in Almería has received very few subsidies: As a 
percentage of agricultural subsidies over agricultural income, for 2005: Almería 1.4% as 
compared to Andalucía, 16.2 %; Spain, 18.2%; and the EU 17.1%. Under such conditions, 
its cooperative model may be viewed and evaluated based strictly on business efficiencies 
and its suitability as an enterprise form.  
In spite of its success, the Almería model is not without its problems. It is currently at a 
crossroads with the sector experiencing a crisis of prices and lack of market power against 
the main distributors. Readjustments are needed for a renewed reordering, 
recommitment and reconsolidation of the cooperative model. It is precisely in such 
renewed commitment that the solution to many of the threats facing the sector may be 
found. 	
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Chapter	7.	Synthesis	of	Results	and	Analysis	of	Hypotheses 
 
The	economic	and	social	sciences	have	significantly	moved	ahead	over	the	past	
five	decades	since	scholars	posited	two	optimal	organizational	forms,	two	
types	of	goods,	and	one	model	of	the	individual.	(Ostrom,	2010:663)	
	
Whether Ostrom´s above optimism is intended to include policy makers and legislators is 
unclear, although she did make mention, in her Nobel address that the most “important 
lesson for public policy analysis” gained from her work on institutions for collective action 
and intellectual progression on the same, was that “humans have a more complex 
motivational structure and more capability to solve social dilemmas than posited in earlier 
rational-choice theory” (Ostrom, 2010:664). 
The dilemma of course is how to translate such observations into cooperative law and 
policy and cooperative organisations. (Or, alternatively, does the the traditional 
cooperative enterprise already translate an adequate vision of the cooperative person and 
economic activity and thus it is only a matter of recuperation? Does it need to 
transformation?) 
This thesis started out analyzing some basic legal concepts of contract and property law as 
the structures underlying and informing organizational economic theories of the firm. 
Those economic theories in turn had an influence on the legislative change in the 
cooperative sector, with an emphasis on the re-allocation or the more “precise” allocation 
of property rights, the “private” contractualisation of firm relationships and the 
transformation of the person into a rent-seeking, free riding, rational contracting 
individual. (No matter that individuals who joined cooperatives in the first place most 
likely had a different vision of the relationship between members and that they were 
aware that cooperatives were not geared towards maximizing returns on investments.) 
Remedies were seen to be necessary to deal with the whole host of problems created by 
incomplete contract and ill defined property rights and the selfish, free riding individual 
who managed to cause endless governance issues and management problems (see in 
general all the NIE citations in Chapter 2, too numerous to name here). Relational contract 
theory (MacNeil, 1985, 1987, 1995 and MacCaulay, 1963) was used to critique the 
formalistic, truncated, discrete transaction based description and function of contract. 
Incomplete contract was shown to be a fictional construct whose only purpose seems to 
be to prop up a theory of “well defined” property rights—that is, property rights based on 
the ability to exclude and differentiate. CLS theorists have pointed out the fallacy of this as 
the “no-obligation, no-responsibility, personality poor share”, used to support private 
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contractual ordering and deregulation (Ireland, 2003). Property rights theories, critiquing 
“ill defined” property rights, advocate for a defined allocation so as to substitute for the 
governance void left by incomplete contract (the impossibility to contract all behaviour). 
An influential movement of a “new” cooperative form (the NGC being an emblematic 
example), with adjustments in property and control rights, was based on such theories 
and has spread to various jurisdictions, prompting legislative change.  
The “modernization” of cooperative law has been seen to involve adaptations with respect 
to membership, financial structure, financial instruments and managerial control (Spear 
2010, 2012). However certain adaptations such as asset locks (particularly in Italian 
legislation), limits on voting by non-members, and limits on investor owners have tried to 
contain IOF tendencies and maintain the cooperative form.  
Critiques of NIE theories of the firm were described, pointing out that the characterization 
of the individual is one-dimensional and incorrect. Cooperative theorists have pointed to 
the wide array of incentives that can motivate individuals and members of a cooperative 
enterprise (Borzaga et al, 2009, 2006 and Borzaga and Depedri, 2006). Ostrom (1990) 
finds fault with the trilogy of free rider theories and as well questions the theory of the 
individual put forth by NIE (1990, 2005, 2010). Above all, her theory characterizes the 
individual or member as having the ability to influence or effect change in the action 
situation (2005, 2010).  
The fact that a cooperative firm varies in its economic, organisational and financial 
structure, and yet that such characteristics are not taken into account is also the basis for 
much criticism of NIE theories of the firm and resulting legislative and policy fixes 
(amongst others, Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010; Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2010; Borzaga et al 
2009, Borzaga et al, 2012, Euricse, 2010, Vargas, 2006).  
Hybrids were then considered. One manner of looking at legislative and organizational 
change, is to start with the “traditional” cooperative and see how those traditional ideals, 
captured within a legal framework and relationships and expressed in ICA principles, have 
been morphed into new laws and something that in some respects, looks more like an IOF 
(Fici, 2012). Undeniably, this has occurred in some cases.  
However, it is also true, as Ménard (2007, 2011), Ostrom (2005, 2010), Cook (2005), Cook 
and Iliopoulos (1999, 2004), Burress and Cook, (2009), Chaddad, et al (2004), Valentinov 
(2007) and others, working on the diversity of institutional structures have pointed out, 
the cooperative form is one of many “institutional structures dealing with shared control” 
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and undefined or “collective” property. Various examples were given, both schematic 
(Chaddad et al, 2004), legislative and from an actual cooperative, of attempts to 
“modernize” the cooperative structure.  
Chapter 5 provided a comprehensive description of the current level of development of 
cooperatives (and similar forms of producer organisations in Spain), focusing on their 
position in the value chain, their institutional environment, and the challenges they face. In 
order to evaluate the adequacy of legislation or policy, it was necessary to discover what 
problems have been identified that are in need of remedying and what legislation and 
policy measures were seen as beneficial. An institutional approach was taken looking at 
economic and fiscal incentives/disincentives and other regional and support measures; 
legal aspects; historical, cultural and sociologically relevant aspect, the relationship 
between cooperatives and other actors in the food chain and internal governance. Laws 
and regulation that enabled or constrained cooperative development were identified and 
those policy measures or initiatives that have been effective were discussed. This 
extensive task was broken down into legislation and policy which affected: i) cooperatives, 
ii) agricultural enterprise iii) agricultural subsectors and business in general, all of which 
had a significant impact on agricultural cooperatives. Important features of the legislation 
were highlighted. An eight sub-sector analysis was performed, contrasting cooperatives 
with IOFs (market share). Challenges and problems that existed for each subsector were 
identified and the adequacy of measures in dealing with such challenges was evaluated.  
In Chapter 5.5.1 the results of the data gathering per cooperative was set out. General data, 
the position in the food chain, internal governance and strategy, and the performance of 
the cooperative was evaluated, as well as institutional environment. While the data is 
detailed and cannot be restated here, some important observations are as follows (results 
in Chapter 5.5.1 must be consulted as in certain questions information was not available 
on cooperatives and the “not available” percentage is high in certain questions): 
 Position in the food chain Most cooperatives in the survey were second tier 
cooperatives. They are specialized (75% highly specialized) and are mainly 
dedicated to the functions of collecting and forwarding member products to 
the next vertical stage of the supply chain, marketing and the procurement of 
supplies. 
 Age Seven of the top cooperatives existed before 1960, with the overwhelming 
majority having been created post Constitution. 
Chapter 7. Synthesis of Results and Analysis of Hypotheses 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
286 
 
 The preferred method of growth was organic growth rather than horizontal, 
vertical or international mergers (in descending order of importance).  
 Preferred market strategy is differentiation rather than cost leadership or 
niche. 
 One member- one vote is applicable in 37.5%; only 3% are fully proportional 
to equity capital contribution. (It should be remembered that SATs are 
included and thus may skew the results relating to cooperatives). Other 
options are proportional to volume and/or value of trade in varying degrees. 
 Entrance to Membership is relatively easy in 38% of cases, with only 3% very 
restricted. 
 Capital contribution 31% require a substantial capital contribution, 41% only 
the entrance fee. 
 Equity Capital is provided by only members in 72% of the cooperatives. 
 Composition of the board in 72% of cases only members, with diverse criteria 
for their election with expertise being less than 25%. The supervisory 
committee is only members in 56% if cases and in 3% there is no supervisory 
board at all. 
 Obligation to deliver all product Delivery obligation in 62% of cases. 
 Premiums 59% without product premiums. 
 Member grouping is by more influenced by product than regionality. 
 Performance of the cooperatives positive trends in both turnover and total 
assets, mixed results on individualized equity capital. 
 Institutional environment Formally, there is a high institutional support for 
cooperatives in Spain. Actual legal and cooperative organizational structures 
limit the effectiveness of the support (regional laws, inconsistencies, lack of 
coordination between various levels of administration). Policy direction is 
incoherent (rural development/SME initiatives at cross purposes with growth 
and integration mandates). 
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Chapter 5.5 contains the results of the sub-sector analysis in which production, exports, 
prices, distribution, policies, and other relevant indicators and factors are discussed. 
Within such analysis is the role of the cooperatives within such sub-sector and “Necessary 
Action” for the cooperatives of that sector. 
Major issues which were relevant to many subsector cooperatives are the following: 
 upstream in the supply chain and thus not taking advantage of enough value 
downstream; too much bulk sales (particularly olive oil and wine) 
 relatively small size 
 PAC policies can be detrimental, exception being F&V PO 
 F&V PO, which is based on collective groupings is considered a qualified policy 
success 
 Uncertainty regarding EU policy change (especially sugar, milk and sheep) 
 EU standards are at times costly to adopt and are more protectionist than 
necessary 
 aid required for “doing” not “being” 
 downward price pressure from major distributors and price volatility yet there are 
competition law issues for cooperatives who wish to set minimum prices 
 social dumping from countries who have lower environmental/labour standards 
 struggle to balance social and environmental benefits of rural role of cooperatives 
and demands of competition and growth (especially in olives and sheep meat—
decoupling of payments; to lesser extent, wine) 
 exports have positive effect in those sub-sectors than can take advantage of it and 
are growing 
 need to focus on quality, I+D+i, development of brands, taking advantage of 
downstream value 
 need to professionalise managers and educate boards to control managers, 
internal governance issues and lack of supervision 
 niche producers need support of larger cooperative network (i.e. wine) 
Chapter 7. Synthesis of Results and Analysis of Hypotheses 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
288 
 
 very few cooperatives considered that a change in legal form was necessary; 
rather, more emphasis on coordinating cooperative potential was seen as the way 
to compete in the future—competing internationally but from a strong local base 
 cooperatives want a “fair playing field” and so called fiscal “advantages” do not 
compensate limitations  
Because of differences in size and structure of the sub-sectors, there is a heterogeneity in 
relation to the size and types of cooperatives: for example a large dairy cooperative or 
cereals cooperative in contrast to a sheep meat cooperative or a wine cooperative. In light 
of this, we can see in the sub-sector analysis that depending in which stage the cooperative 
finds themselves, they require different legislative and policy measures. For newer, 
smaller cooperatives, creating a market and reaching optimum efficiencies was important. 
For cooperatives which have a strong relationship with their “tierra”, exploiting local 
attributes and territorial qualifications was important. Export channels, although not 
necessarily only a cooperative measure, are important, since niche cooperatives are 
usually local and isolated. For large cooperatives we can see that the large distribution 
creates challenges regarding brands, volume, price pressure, and in general, market 
power. Integration measures are important for all cooperatives with the exception 
perhaps of niche cooperatives due to the changing structure of the market (i.e. direct 
interaction with the large distributors and the disappearance of medium size 
intermediaries). However, niche cooperatives can also benefit from logistics and market 
infrastructure of larger cooperatives. 
In Chapter 5.8 the following measures and topics were discussed in relation to the 
economic analysis of the cooperatives, their success or failure and the identified 
challenges and necessities. (As it is a summary in itself of a great deal of information, it will 
not be repeated again here): 
 Spanish and regional cooperative legislation: limitations due to cooperative legal 
form (legal-organisation, legal-functional and operative, and economic-financial 
regulation); “too much law” with a multitude of regional and national measures 
that leads to a lack of coordination and stunts initiatives 
 SAT Legislation 
 Social Economy Initiatives including the promotion of Cooperatives 
 Integration and Restructuring 
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 Interprofessional Association and other cooperative institutions 
 Marketing, Promotion, Export and Internationalisation 
 Innovation and Modernisation 
 Education and Training 
 Sustainability and Rural Development 
Chapter 6 sets out a case study of Almería and the dynamic lifecycle of the agricultural 
F&V cooperatives and the strategies they adopted. Strategies did not adopt IOF 
characteristics, but instead strengthened the cooperative fabric. Cooperatives are the most 
important business form of enterprise and their share in marketing product has increased. 
Cooperative strategies included: 
• commitment to financially and socially vulnerable community; 
• encouraging the establishment of a cooperative economic “fabric”; 
• building on but going far beyond traditional agricultural marketing and credit 
cooperatives through pro-active production and dissemination of organizational, 
technical, economic and social knowledge and playing an active role in the 
incorporation of the same; 
• shifting and transforming individual economic risk (including technological and 
experimental risk) to community risk, thus involving not only the cooperatives, but 
the community in shared success; 
• recognizing the many stages of the transformation from “peasant” to “agricultural 
entrepreneur” and providing management and financial training as well as support 
to other institutional players; 
• assuming the role of intermediating international and political changes and policy 
for community members;  
• pursuing organic growth strategies in order to sustain innovation and sector 
growth and as well, diversifying activities beyond local specialization (both sector 
and territorial);  
• facilitating concentration in the sector and supporting the organizational changes 
that such horizontal integration implies; 
• taking seriously the environmentally responsible farming imperative as an 
inherent strategy; and 
• investment in I+D on a level that farmers would not be able to finance, but such 
research fed back into a virtual cycle. 
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An analysis of the new Andalusian cooperative law was set out, wherein many changes 
have been made to “equalize” the lack of restrictions of SATs with the traditional 
cooperative limitations of cooperatives. Certain IOF characteristics may be seen, most 
notably the increasing presence of the investor-member and the relaxing of the asset lock.  
The legislation is in keeping with many other recent cooperative laws set out above in 
Table 5.30. Overall, the changes amount to an attempt to create a “quasi-IOF”. These 
changes support the discussion in Chapter 2 of the “privatisation” of public goals and the 
mimicking of IOF characteristics. 
Almería is an example of how the agricultural cooperative cluster system mediates 
between external and internal factors and the cooperative role therein. Certain factors 
such as collaboration between cooperatives and between cooperatives and IOFs, 
internationalization, investment in R+D+I, and above all, having a management in place 
such that cooperatives can leverage the strengths and capacity of their members and local 
economies in meeting external challenges appears to be more important than policy 
dictating cooperative structure. 
 
Set out above is a distillation of the multi-levels of analysis and data collection that have 
been carried out in this thesis. In this context, the hypotheses may be discussed. 
1. A “modern” contractual approach to procedural regulation, defined property rights 
allocation and a formalistic approach to cooperative law, often result in a “private 
law” ordering of social and economic interests as opposed to regulation based on 
achieving social and economic objectives. The result of this is the marginalization of 
social or policy driven regulation.  
H1A	 Spanish	 Legislative	 Cooperative	 Reform	 has	 been	 based	 on	 institutional	
mimicking	 of	 investor	 based	 firms,	 without	 regard	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	
cooperative	enterprise	structures	and	inherent	social	objectives.  
 
Chapter 2 set out differences between IOF and cooperative enterprise in terms of contract 
and property and other characteristics. It was shown that legislative reform based on NIE 
justifications and rational did not sufficiently taked into account the cooperative 
enterprise structure and social objectives. Evidence was found to support legislative and 
organizational trends identified in Table 5.30, illustrating that there has been a trend in 
the following:  
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Membership Adaptations: 
 
• changes in voting rights (more multiple voting rights) 
• transactions with non-members (not a novelty) 
• evidence of more restriction on memberships (in a few cases) 
• more capital investment required of members (in some cases) 
 
Financial Adaptations  
 
• investor members (in many cases and with % increased) 
• creation of quasi-markets for participations (in many cases) 
 
 
Financial Instruments  
• partial adoption of some financing instruments such as various classes of shares 
(with different voting rights) and debt (bonds) financing 
 
Managerial Control 
 
• increasing professional management but not corresponding internal governance 
supervison (risk of less member participation, separation of membership with 
business structures, move to voluntary “intervenors” and thus a concern of board 
willingness to control managers). 
 
 
 
Deviation from traditional “one member-one vote” voting rights represents a serious 
change in the dynamic of the cooperative (for example, 37.5% of the top cooperatives 
surveyed maintain one member-one vote). However, when plural voting rights are based 
on volume (use), as opposed to capital investment, the deviation may be considered to a 
lesser extent IOF influenced, and an attempt to deal with heterogeneity of membership. 
For example, in the case of the recent law of Andalusia, plural voting related to volume but 
not capital is allowed, with limits. Transactions with non-members are not particularly an 
issue, as this can be separately accounted for. Changes which call for exclusivity or 
minimum delivery, while perhaps not traditional is non -the -less not particularly IOF 
influenced.  
Adaptations to accommodate heterogeneity of membership may be a necessary step to 
ensure the continuation of the cooperative enterprise. Adaptations which motivate 
members financially, encourage growth and access to finance are not necessarily a 
rejection of traditional cooperatives. There are ways in which cooperatives can provide 
opportunities for such members without changing their traditional structure. 
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The role of the member as investor is, however, a radical, although not new, change in the 
character of the cooperative and can be seen to be an influence of IOF and the rejection of 
the characteristics of cooperative enterprise structures and inherent and corresponding 
social objectives. The fact that such investor members have limited rights does not take 
away from the incongruity/incoherence of such role within a cooperative, although it may 
lead to the failure of such scheme. In Andalusia, the ceiling has been raised to 49% instead 
of 30%, allowing a potential dilution of the identification of membership based on 
mutualistic exchange. 
This trend as well, allows the “contractualisation” of the cooperative: there is an exchange 
contract which occupies a different “sphere”, a private sphere as it were, than the 
mutualistic exchange relationship that a member has with other cooperative members, 
commonly with the cooperative. It is also an attempt to deal with “ill defined property 
rights” and other agency problems identified in Chapter 2. The social relationship is, with 
each rise in the permitted limit, being marginalized and at the same “reconceptualised”: if 
the cooperative is no longer an enterprise built on mutualistic exchange but on capitalistic 
contract, then this changes its relationship with the mutualistic members as well. The 
cooperative member becomes reconceived as a “mere financier” of the cooperative 
(Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010).  
However, within Spain´s cooperative legislative landscape, at the same time there is 
evidence of recognition of the needs of small cooperatives, family owned firms wishing to 
participate in cooperatives, and a widening of agricultural cooperative activity and 
purpose.  
As well, in addition to the cooperative laws, the Constitution provides for cooperatives as 
does the Law on Social Economy, including the cooperative within such category. 
However, the latter is still in a very nascent form, with a declaratory status at the moment. 
Whether this law will have any effect on agricultural cooperatives is doubtful. 
Of some concern in Spain, is the presence of the SAT, which is a legislated hybrid form 
from 1981 on the national level (and which was brought into force on the regional level in 
Aragon in 2011). As mentioned in Chapter 5, it enjoys many benefits that the cooperative 
has with none of the limitations. The existence of the SAT is based on its agricultural 
activity, rather than its cooperative identity. This may be seen to be the Trojan horse of the 
IOF form for agricultural cooperatives, particularly now that it is entering at the regional 
level. 
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This hypothesis H1A is supported in part, in that changes to voting rights, relaxation of 
asset locks and the permitting of “investor members” and the attempt to create a sort of 
“market” for member participations, point towards IOF isomorphism. It appears that the 
Spanish cooperative legislation still exists within the “Janus” or “enfant	terrible” realm of 
conflict: there is still no serious attempt to deal with the “social” objectives of the 
cooperative, yet we see attempts to facilitate the cooperative to better function within the 
IOF market. Given the fact that it is not particularly attractive to invest in cooperatives for 
third parties, given the legal limits on both political rights (limitations on voting 
percentage and limitations on accessing the administrative body) and economic rights of 
such investors. It is extremely unclear  if it will be successful, given the experience in Italy 
(Zamagni and Zamagin, 2010).  
 
2. Standard economic literature and economic theory of the firm (with some 
exception noted in Chapter 2) have not taken into account the characteristics of 
cooperatives, particularly agricultural cooperatives, and do not understand their 
“natural” hybrid nature where certain decision rights and property rights are 
pooled, while at the same time distinct ownership is kept over key assets. The 
reason why this occurs and under what circumstances has not been properly 
investigated nor understood (Ménard, 2012) and is subsequently, not well reflected 
in policy, but rather continues to reflect dual and conflicting goals due to the IOF 
framework by which the agricultural cooperative is evaluated. 
 
Legislation and policy regarding cooperatives has often failed to allow adequate 
measures consistent with cooperative characteristics and organizational reality 
with which to coordinate joint activities and carry out their activities in keeping 
with the social and hybrid nature of cooperatives, their activities as “network 
enterprises” and their existence within a wider diversity of forms of enterprise. 
	
H2A	 IOF	 prejudices	 result	 in	 policy	 and	 legislative	 emphasis	 on	 reallocation	 of	
property	and	control	rights,	as	well	as	firm	growth	and	a	“one	size	fits	all”	approach	
in	relation	to	cooperatives,	rather	other	forms	of	consolidation	and	concentration	of	
offer.	
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H2B	 Cooperative	 legislative	 and	 policy	 change	which	mimics	 investor	 owned	 firm	
characteristics	weakens	 the	agricultural	 cooperative´s	ability	 to	 survive	because	 it	
does	not	acknowledge	or	support	the	strengths	of	the	cooperative	business	form.	
	
Recent trends in Spanish cooperatives law have favoured IOF models with provisions for 
increased investor-members, relaxation of asset locks and non-traditional voting rights. 
However, supervisory requirements have also been relaxed, contrary to IOF trends. 
Cooperative strengths have not been emphasized to any great degree, with a few 
exceptions related to taxation of transactions between cooperatives.  
 
The reconceptualisation of the member in contractual terms may weakend the 
cooperative based on experience in other jurisdictions. Legislative initiatives which have 
to do with capacity building and strengthening of cooperative institutions have been 
positive for cooperatives.  
 
As set out in Chapter 5.8 and Table 5.30, Spain indeed has many cooperative laws and 
policies, particularly those that affect agricultural cooperatives. However, other important 
laws that affect the organization of agricultural cooperatives, such as competition law, tax 
law and accounting law fail to recognise the characteristics of the cooperative form or if 
they do, they have not paid any significant attention to the progression and growth of 
agricultural cooperatives in the last several decades. As noted, there has never been a 
process of cooperative legislative adaptation in order to adequately adapt the competition 
legislation in Spain. With respect to tax laws, the Cooperative Tax Law has undergone very 
few modifications, none of any great importance, since its being brought into force more 
than 20 years ago, whilst the general taxation has undergone important changes pursuant 
to the General Tax Law in 2003 and a huge reform pursuant to the Personal Taxation law 
in 2006, amongst other relevant modifications. 
 
In addition, the general rate of tax under the Corporation Tax law has been reduced en 
recent years, which has resulted, in comparative terms, in a prejudice against 
cooperatives, given that the general reduce tax rate of 20% has remained unchanged. As 
well, not all companies pay the general tax rate, as there are other reduced rates as well 
for various types of companies. The adoption by the New Spanish Accounting Norms of the 
international accounting standards (IAS) has resulted in a mischaracterisation of 
cooperative debt and equity (social capital (equity) is not considered to meet the 
standards to be considered equity capital and thus is considered as debt). 
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That said, the regional cooperative laws, including those providing for small cooperatives, 
cannot be said to attempt a “one size fits all” approach. But, by virtue of so many regional 
laws, agricultural cooperatives suffer, due to the structural problem of a “double layer” of 
national cooperative laws and policies and those of the autonomous communities. Laws 
vary on substantial issues and do not facilitate coordination between cooperatives. The 
argument for a national law on agricultural cooperatives is a scenario which would be 
both legally and politically difficult as it would require negotiations with all autonomous 
communities. There have been a range of suggestions from the fiscal perspective and as 
well arguments for a more flexible approach to cooperative laws that maintain 
cooperative goals (Vargas-Vasserot and Aguilar, 2006). Overall, the autonomous 
community cooperative laws which are seen to be most effective and advanced are those 
of the Basque Country. However, as noted, the Basque Country does not have a great 
amount of agricultural cooperative activity compared to other autonomous communities 
in Spain, such as Andalusia, Catalonia, Valencia, etc. Andalusia has just overhauled its own 
cooperative law taking on board some of the provisions which had already existed in other 
jurisdictions.  
Given the “atomisation” of cooperative law in Spain, it follows that agricultural 
cooperatives themselves tend to organise around their governing regulation, thus 
resulting in a general cooperative atomisation. The introduction of the European 
Cooperative Society has had very little impact in Spain as of yet. This is not surprising in 
light of the fact that very few cooperatives are even set up under the national cooperative 
legislation.  
Hence the “IOF prejudice” is not only a matter of failing to understand the structure of 
cooperatives. It is also a failure to understand the importance of cooperatives and their 
equal need for updated legislation, in keeping with efforts that have been done in relation 
to IOFs. Agricultural cooperatives in Spain are at a critical point in organizational change, 
particularly with respect to their dimension. While there have been recently efforts made 
through laws encouraging integration, little has been done to seriously address the non-
cooperative law legislative/policy and organisational needs of agricultural cooperatives.  
It is a case of omission and at once a reconceptualising of the social aspect of cooperatives 
as being a jurisdictional matter for “tinkering” within regional cooperative legislation over 
investor owners and other financing schemes that are doubtful as to success. 
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3. As pointed out by various scholars, the agricultural cooperative form has proven to 
be an efficient and effective way to manage resources (Euricse, 2010, Hendrikse, 2004). 
Viewing the cooperative as a special type of hybrid, Ménard also supports this view. 
Agricultural cooperatives can overcome many of the problems with the cooperative 
business form identified by NIE theories by relying more heavily on cooperative 
institutions and values, rather than adopting IOF strategies. The success or failure of 
Spanish agricultural cooperatives does not depend on this “modern” contractual 
approach to law and policy but in fact, lies in the strengthening and expansion of 
cooperative principles, business and governance practices.  
 
H3A	 Both	 endogenous	 and	 exogenous	 factors	 are	 responsible	 for	 agricultural	
cooperative	 success,	 particularly	 adequate	 financing	 and	 complementary	
cooperative	 institutions,	 professional	 cooperative	 management,	 capacity	 building	
measures,	as	well	as	historical,	cultural	and	local	economic	factors.	
H3B	 Adherence	 to	 cooperative	 characteristics	 and	 strategies	which	 are	 consistent	
with	 the	 cooperative	 business	 form	 and	 values	 contributes	 to	 agricultural	
cooperative	success.	
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 form the base from which to answer this hypothesis. Chapter 5 in 
the sector analysis and also in the analysis of the “Top 5” has provided details of the 
factors which influence the success of agricultural cooperatives in Spain. Specifically 
Chapter 5.8.2 summarises the measures which have been helpful or harmful to 
agricultural cooperatives. Chapter 6, in the case study of Almería has set out an historical 
analysis or a lifecycle in which the cooperative actors engaged in a dynamic process to 
adapt and confront challenges facing agricultural cooperatives. There are two general 
observations: that the traditional cooperative legal form overall has not been raised as an 
impediment. The second is that more engaged cooperative activity has actually benefited 
the cooperatives. The latter has much to do with institution building and creating 
institutional strength. The former, was a less obvious observation and the cause may be 
that those farmers that are members of cooperatives generally choose the cooperative 
business model as a preference in the first place. As well, Spanish cooperatives have been 
able to deal with heterogeneity sufficiently using organizational and governance tools to 
meet varied interests and expectations.  
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Cooperative horizontal integration, while not the preferred choice for example of the Top 
5, is most likely inevitable given the structural changes to the supply chain, as discussed 
herein. It is of note that the restructuring which has occurred has been within the 
cooperative framework, i.e. unlike other countries such as the USA or Canada where there 
was a move to IOFs. Along with advances in combating the atomization of Spanish 
cooperatives, it is evident that other cooperative institutions have played a key role in 
providing support and services, including that of lobby: the many Federations, the 
Confederation, the Interprofessional Association and the various associations of 
producers. 
The measures that were found to be the most useful were predominantly of a capacity 
building nature and with the range of activities in which cooperative institutions are 
heavily implicated: I+D+i, education, training and professionalization, exports and 
internationalization, platforms and consortia, marketing and financing. This latter point 
was of particular relevance in the case of Almería where the finance role was not simply as 
a supplier of credit, but rather as a financial partner, completely implicated in the success 
or failure of the sector. The cooperative finance entity created risk sharing mechanisms, 
funded innovation and research, negotiated political and international market changes, 
etc. It was also instrumental in the education and training of farmer members, assisting 
the transformation of peasant farmer to agricultural entrepreneur. As well the presence of 
a reliable cooperative credit reduced any need for the financial “tinkering” of contract and 
property rights (voting and investor members, etc.). 
The Almería case also serves to illustrate that while agricultural cooperatives are often 
entrenched in their local culture and economies, thus being somewhat path dependent, 
cooperative institutions are also capable of creating economically viable agricultural 
communities starting almost from “zero”. It is a laboratory for the cooperative potential. 
Due to its strategic choices along the way, as illustrated in the case study within the 
framework of Cook and Burress (2009), further reliance on the cooperative model has 
brought more success. Agricultural cooperatives are still the most successful agricultural 
business form in Almería, in spite of the presence of SATs and their market share has 
increased in the marketing cooperatives. On the national level across sectors, cooperatives 
have maintained or slightly increased their market share. 
These hypotheses are thus supported by the multi-level analysis carried out herein. 
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Chapter	8.	Conclusions.	
Agricultural cooperatives are an example of “institutions for collective action” with certain 
common property rights that can be found almost all over the world where agricultural 
activity takes place. It is a particularly important institution for it not only involves our 
food supply, it also is closely connected with economic and rural development, 
distribution of wealth and environmental stewardship. In Europe agricultural 
cooperatives are particularly popular, where the sector and certain subsectors are heavily 
dominated by cooperatives. This thesis has noted the market share of Spain as having up 
to 70% in olives and wine, 40% in dairy, approximately 45% in F&V and at least 25% in 
the other subsectors studied herein. They are an important part of the Spanish economy 
and an even more important participant in agriculture.  
Much is expected of the cooperative enterprise form if one is to take seriously the 
preambles to not only the various autonomous community cooperative laws, but also the 
Spanish Constitution and the new Social Economy law. They are to be socially oriented, 
provide dignified work, be environmentally sustainable and contribute to rural and 
cultural development. And of course, they must do this all the while competing in the same 
highly competitive market as IOFs, who do not carry such weighty social expectations.  
This thesis has argued that the cooperative	enterprise	form	has	had	to	compete	not	only	in	
the	 non‐cooperative	 agro‐alimentary	market,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 IOF‐skewed	market	 place	 of	
ideas	 and	 institutions	 which	 make	 up	 and	 govern	 the	 market. A comparison of the 
cooperative and IOF form was set out to illustrate the profound differences between the 
very nature of the cooperative enterprise and the IOF. 
The analysis began with the “theory of the firm”, the “firm” by default characterized as an 
IOF enterprise, and the implicit role and characterization of contract and property rights. 
Relying on a contractual unit of analysis and rational-choice participants who are rent 
seeking, free riding and selfish, an IOF theory of the firm has been constructed. This 
framework has been influential not only in educational processes, through the teaching of 
agency theory, incomplete contract, property rights theories and NIE/TCE, it has also been 
influential in crafting a vision of how regulation and policy should apply to enterprise and 
upon what measures enterprise should be evaluated.  
The above theories have been shown to have crept into the analysis of the cooperative 
“firm”. Although some progress has been made to take into consideration certain 
characteristics of the cooperative enterprise form, the underlying assumptions of contract 
and property rights theory, as well as the unchallenged measure of “efficiency” (which is 
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not value neutral, yet treated as objective) have remained unquestioned, and thus such 
progress has fallen short of crafting a theory adequate for analysing the cooperative 
enterprise.  
How the cooperative enterprise is understood through the lens of such economic 
organizational theories has been set out, explaining the	 process	 by	 which	 cooperative	
relationships	are	reduced	 to	 “contract	as	organization”	and	how	contracting	and	property	
rights	“problems”	specific	to	cooperatives	are	identified. Corresponding “solutions” in order 
to address “ill defined” property rights, “free riding”, etc. whether by governance or by 
legislation were detailed herein. 
Critical and alternative theories of contract and property were then introduced. In order 
to “dig below and learn how rules create the set being analyzed” (Ostrom, 1990:18), to 
understand how the structure is itself produced and how these ideas take on an 
established “taken for granted” social reality, institutional analysis was used to examine 
concepts of contract and property rights, which are institutions in their own right. 
First, setting out a micro-history of contractual ideas, this thesis demonstrated that 
conceptions of contract and property rights are historically and culturally contingent. In 
the terminology of CLS, in doing so, they are “destabilized” and “fractured”. How the idea 
of contract came to be viewed through the perspective of legal formalism and thus 
“scientised” as a unit of analysis was also explored. Thereafter, how relational contract 
theory sought to put contract back into the realm of contextual and personalized 
relationships was described.  
While the historical and contextual analysis of contract shed some light on the limitations 
of a particular formalistic view of contract and property (which is the subject of contract), 
CLS illustrated how these views have come to be “globablised” by the high level 
“reconceptualising” of contract as	organization. Contractual	ordering	based	on	the	study	of	
markets	 and	 economics,	 and	 judged	 according	 to	 “efficiency”	 resulted	 in	 the	
contractualisation	of	social	relations	and	the	“legalization”	of	public	discourse.	Cooperatives	
are	transformed	into	a	“nexus	of	contracts”	and	measured	according	to	market	“efficiency”.  
The “inconvenience” posed by the way in which property is held by cooperatives is of 
course a thorn in the side of NIE theories, as is the fact that member‐cooperative	relations	
are	 fundamentally	different	than	shareholder‐IOF	relations,	as	are	the	economic	and	social	
objectives. 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
301 
 
In light of this, cooperative theorists’ critiques and Ostrom´s collective action/institutional 
diversity insights led to the conclusion that there are both serious	theoretical	and	empirical	
doubts	about	the	 IOF	theory	of	the	 firm,	particularly	applied	to	the	cooperative	enterprise. 
While social science and certain economic theory may have become more sophisticated in 
its approach to enterprise, the underlying assumptions of two optimal organizational 
forms (markets and hierarchies), two types of goods (public and private), and one model 
of the individual (selfish, rent seeking, free riding and un-cooperative—in effect, anti-
social), particularly as applied to the theory of the firm and the institutions which govern 
it, have survived and still wield influence in justifications for legislative action.  
While cooperatives are themselves proof of Ostrom´s and others´ theories about the 
capacity and potential of people to organize and to create a wide array of diverse forms of 
collective enterprise, this has yet to be effectively transformed into the laws which fully 
recognize such collective enterprises and the full range of value they contribute (perhaps 
the Italian social enterprise law being the exception). Instead	of	cooperative	law	becoming	
more	aware	and	 coherent	with	 its	 own	 characteristics	and	 strengths,	 it	has	 in	 large	part	
trended	 towards	 IOF	provisions. Economic analysis of agricultural cooperatives has often 
confined itself to how they compete with IOFs. The standard economic literature [and legal 
thoery] does not take into account the cooperative business form which depends on an 
allocation of property rights that do not fit well within the traditional dualistic view of 
“markets” (autonomous and distinctive property rights held by parties who enter into 
market exchanges) and “firms” (with property rights unified within a legally defined 
structure) (Ménard, 2007).  
As Ostrom and Borzaga, et al. have shown, when	the	concept	of	the	person, who is, after all, 
the substance of the firm (notwithstanding Hart´s proclamation that the firm is a collection 
of assets), is	not	confined	to	the	caricature	of	the	rational	choice	individual,	the	theory	of	the	
firm	according	 to	agency	 theory,	property	 rights,	 incomplete	contract	and	TCE,	 is	 severely	
undermined. 
While the theoretical analysis of the economic organisational theory of the firm related to 
cooperatives has been multi-disciplinary, the thesis has used a mixed methodology 
(qualitative, quantitative, survey and case study) and multi-level perspective to study 
agricultural cooperatives: the Spanish agricultural sector: the Spanish cooperative 
agricultural sector; cooperatives within eight distinct agricultural subsectors; at the firm 
level through the top 5 cooperatives of such eight subsectors; and at the regional level by 
examining a cluster of cooperatives in the case study. Organizational and governance 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
302 
 
structures, cultural and historical circumstances and general institutional environments, 
both enabling and hindering, that have an impact on agricultural cooperatives were tied 
into these various levels of analysis, identifying relevant endogenous and exogenous 
factors that influenced agricultural cooperative success. 
An extensive examination of the various laws and policy that affect Spanish agricultural 
cooperatives was carried out, as evidenced by Tables 5.30 to 5.34. Other laws such as 
competition and tax laws as well as accounting standards were also referred to. Evidence	
was	 found	 in	most	 cooperative	 laws	 of	 adaptations	 in	membership,	 financial	 provisions,	
financial	instruments,	and	managerial	control. While some adaptations are not necessarily 
related to IOF influence, others such as “investor members” directly go against the 
fundamental nature of the cooperative. IOF adaptations which attempt to create a 
“market” for participations or for debt instruments (which must have limited rights 
attached) end up with a Frankenstein enterprise, incoherent and at odds with itself.  
The	 trend	of	 “member	as	 financier”	of	 the	 cooperative, as noted in Chapter 7, allows	 the	
“contractualisation”	of	the	cooperative	and	an	exchange	contract	which	occupies	a	different	
“sphere”,	 a	 private	 sphere	 as	 it	 were,	 than	 the	 mutualistic	 exchange	 relationship	 that a 
member has with other cooperative members, in common, with the cooperative. It is an 
attempt to deal with “ill defined property rights” and other agency problems identified in 
Chapter 2. The	 social	 relationship	 is,	 with	 each	 rise	 in	 the	 permitted	 limit	 of	 “investor	
members”,	marginalized	and	at	the	same	“reconceptualised”:	if	the	cooperative	is	no	longer	
an	enterprise	built	on	mutualistic	exchange	but	on	capitalistic	contract,	then	this	changes	its	
relationship	with	the	mutualistic	members	as	well.  
With respect to other laws and policy affecting agricultural cooperatives, apart from 
cooperative statutes, effective	measures	consistent	with	cooperative	enterprise	were	 found	
in	incentives,	capacity	building	measures	(education	and	training,	professionalistion),	I+D+i,	
targeted	financing,	restructuring	of	the	sector,	export	and	internationalization	support	and	
cooperative	 institutions	 building. Specific measures for small	 cooperatives	 in	 some	
autonomous	 communities	 allow	 for	 flexibility	 in	 size	 and	 economic	 development	
opportunities	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 dealing	 with	 potential	 risks	 of	 heterogeneity.	 EU	
policies	that	have	been	most	successful, such as the PO (producer organization) measures 
for F&V, are	based	on	groupings	of	farmers	and	have	democratic	characteristics. While not 
specifically cooperatives, in fact, many POs in Spain are cooperatives. 
Important laws such as competition	and	tax	law	fail	to	accommodate	the	cooperative	to	the	
same	 extent	 as	 the	 IOF. There has never been a process of cooperative legislative 
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adaptation in order to adequately adapt the competition legislation in Spain. With respect 
to tax laws, the Cooperative Tax Law has undergone very few modifications, none of any 
great importance, since its being brought into force more than 20 years ago, whilst the 
general taxation has undergone important changes and reforms. The adoption by the new 
Spanish Accounting Norms of the international	accounting	standards	(IAS)	has	resulted	in	a	
mischaracterization	of	cooperative	debt	and	equity (social capital (equity) is not considered 
to meet the standards to be considered equity capital and thus is considered as debt). 
	The	SAT	legislation, which imposes far less limitations and yet receives many of the same 
benefits that cooperatives have, can be seen to be an	 IOF	 type	 company	 enjoying	 the	
benefits,	but	not	the	limitations	of	the	cooperative	form. 
	
Instead	 of	 bestowing	 IOF	 characteristics	 on	 cooperatives,	 inventive	 cooperative	
organizational	and	governance	 structures	 can	be	 created	which	 can	deal	with	 “problems”	
usually	identified	with	“free	riding”,	“horizon	problems”,	“portfolio”,	“control”	and	“ill	defined	
property”,	and	at	the	same	time,	 leverage	the	strengths	of	the	cooperative	enterprise	 form.	
Various forms of hybrids (as mentioned by Ménard) or “spawns” (Cook and Burress) are 
viable options. The example given of the Trentino cooperative Mezzacorona demonstrated 
how a simple governance structure found a solution for these issues, yet maintained 
cooperative coherency. The agricultural cooperative cluster of Almería in Chapter 6 offers 
another example, where instead of adopting IOF measures, or for that matter, even many 
hybrid structures, the agricultural cooperatives have maintained a very simple 
organizational model: mostly first tier cooperatives supported by strong cooperative 
institutions, including credit (fundamental) and I+D+i, coupled with progressive 
concentration in the sector (which will likely escalate in the near future) to meet the 
structural needs of the market. The	role	of	cooperatives	was	to	harness,	guide	and	leverage	
the	strengths	and	capacity	of	the	 local	economy	 in	 its	 interaction	with	other	environments,	
whether	in	the	form	of	markets	or	political	institutions.	Of particular interest is the fact that 
the Almería agricultural cooperative model was not based on a pre-existing culture or 
historical connection with the land. It has a lifecycle of relatively short duration. 
 
The conclusions in relation to the hypotheses herein and discussed in Chapter 7 are: 
 
1. A “modern” contractual approach to procedural regulation, defined property rights 
allocation and a formalistic approach to cooperative law, often result in a “private 
law” ordering of social and economic interests as opposed to regulation based on 
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achieving social and economic objectives. The result of this is the marginalization of 
social or policy driven regulation. 
 H1A	 Spanish	 Legislative	 Cooperative	 Reform	 has	 been	 based	 on	 institutional	
mimicking	 of	 investor	 based	 firms,	 without	 regard	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	
cooperative	enterprise	structures	and	inherent	social	objectives.  
 
This hypothesis is supported	 in	 part, in that certain changes to voting rights and the 
increasing of “investor members”, relaxation of asset locks and the attempt to create a sort 
of “market” for member participations, point towards IOF isomorphism. However, other 
measures are consistent with the cooperative enterprise form. It appears that the Spanish 
cooperative legislation still inhabits the “Janus” or “enfant	terrible” conflict: there has not 
been any comprehensive attempt to deal with the social characteristics of the cooperative 
enterprise, yet efforts are made to provide “flexibility” and to facilitate the cooperative to 
better function within the IOF market, creating a structural dissonance between 
agricultural purpose, objectives and strengths.  
 
2. Standard economic literature and economic theory of the firm (with some 
exception noted in Chapter 2) have not taken into account the characteristics of 
cooperatives, particularly agricultural cooperatives, and do not understand their 
“natural” hybrid nature where certain decision rights and property rights are 
pooled, while at the same time distinct ownership is kept over key assets. The 
reason why this occurs and under what circumstances has not been properly 
investigated nor understood (Ménard, 2012) and is subsequently, not well reflected 
in policy, but rather continues to reflect dual and conflicting goals due to the IOF 
framework by which the agricultural cooperative is evaluated. 
 
Legislation and policy regarding cooperatives has often failed to allow adequate 
measures consistent with cooperative characteristics and organizational reality 
with which to coordinate joint activities and carry out their activities in keeping 
with the social and hybrid nature of cooperatives, their activities as “network 
enterprises” and their existence within a wider diversity of forms of enterprise. 
	
H2A	 IOF	 prejudices	 result	 in	 policy	 and	 legislative	 emphasis	 on	 reallocation	 of	
property	and	control	rights,	as	well	as	firm	growth	and	a	“one	size	fits	all”	approach	
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in	relation	to	cooperatives,	rather	other	forms	of	consolidation	and	concentration	of	
offer.	
H2B	 Cooperative	 legislative	 and	 policy	 change	which	mimics	 investor	 owned	 firm	
characteristics	weakens	 the	agricultural	 cooperative´s	ability	 to	 survive	because	 it	
does	not	acknowledge	or	support	the	strengths	of	the	cooperative	business	form.	
The “IOF prejudice” is not only a matter of failing to understand the structure of 
cooperatives, which has been demonstrated herein, both theoretically in Chapter 2 and by 
example in Chapter 5. It is also a failure to understand the importance of cooperatives and 
their equal need for updated legislation, in keeping with efforts that have been done in 
relation to IOFs. Agricultural cooperatives in Spain are at a critical point in organizational 
change, particularly with respect to their dimension. While there have been recently 
efforts made through laws encouraging integration, little has been done to seriously 
address the non-cooperative law legislative/policy and organisational needs of 
agricultural cooperatives.  
 
3. As pointed out by various scholars, the agricultural cooperative form has proven 
to be an efficient and effective way to manage resources (Euricse, 2010, Hendrikse, 
2004). Viewing the cooperative as a special type of hybrid, Ménard also supports 
this view. Agricultural cooperatives can overcome many of the problems with the 
cooperative business form identified by NIE theories by relying more heavily on 
cooperative institutions and values, rather than adopting IOF strategies. The 
success or failure of Spanish agricultural cooperatives does not depend on this 
“modern” contractual approach to law and policy but in fact, lies in the 
strengthening and expansion of cooperative principles, business and governance 
practices.  
 
H3A	 Both	 endogenous	 and	 exogenous	 factors	 are	 responsible	 for	 agricultural	
cooperative	 success,	 particularly	 adequate	 financing	 and	 complementary	
cooperative	 institutions,	 professional	 cooperative	 management,	 capacity	 building	
measures,	as	well	as	historical,	cultural	and	local	economic	factors.	
H3B	 Adherence	 to	 cooperative	 characteristics	 and	 strategies	which	 are	 consistent	
with	 the	 cooperative	 business	 form	 and	 values	 contributes	 to	 agricultural	
cooperative	success.	
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These hypotheses are thus supported by the multi-level analysis carried out herein. The 
experience of Spanish agricultural cooperatives in general, on a sub-sector level and in a 
local cluster case study, have demonstrated these hypotheses. 
 
***** 
 
As noted at the start of this thesis, a central challenge for agricultural cooperatives in 
Spain and elsewhere in Europe is the increasing competition on a global scale and the lack 
of balance in the food supply chain. This theme provided an “action arena” in which to 
explore agricultural cooperatives, the identification of their success and failures and the 
legislation and policy that has been brought into force and that is proposed to “fix” their 
“problems”, often resorting to economic theories reliant on IOF assumptions (as 
developed in Chapter 2). The analysis included their (i) position in the food supply chain, 
(ii) internal governance, and (iii) the institutional environment. The detailed analysis 
found within Chapter 5, identifying and evaluating legislation and policy which affects 
Spanish agricultural cooperatives served to contrast the state of Spain´s agricultural 
cooperatives and their necessities, and the legislative and policy “solutions” on offer. 
 
Competing interests of agricultural cooperative legislation and policy (e.g. adoption of 
“investor owned” measures and an emphasis on growth vs. social goals and cooperative 
identity) and the structural dissonance between agricultural purpose, objectives and 
strengths were considered. The final conclusion is that the solution to challenges faced by 
cooperatives lies not in listing towards IOF structures, but instead intensifying and 
consolidating within the cooperative enterprise model. Agricultural cooperatives should 
leverage their ability to be flexible, to create strong networks and to enjoy member 
commitment, so as to improve the lives of their farmers in their work of producing high 
quality and safe food that meets the demands of their clients and in the process leaves as 
light an environmental footprint as possible. In the end, it is indeed about much more than 
groceries and interest rates.  
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Chapter	9.	Future	Research.	
 
Below are topics for future research related to the research goals of this thesis: 
1. Empirical research on the effect of cooperative organizational and legislative 
adaptations to non-traditional cooperative forms including organisatonal and governance 
innovations that are compatible with cooperative values 
As evidenced in the thesis, substantial “tinkering” with the cooperative form has been 
done across the autonomous communities. Whether these changes have had a positive or 
negative effect, not just in a limited economic sense, would aid in crafting better 
cooperative legislation, rather than relying on ideology or results based on IOFs.   
2. Research on building a more appropriate cooperative theory of the firm  
A cooperative theory of the firm (not based on IOF assumptions of contract, property 
rights and a model of the individual that is not consistent with cooperative experience, 
structure or activity) is needed in order to properly study the cooperative enterprise. As 
Ostrom has said, “economic and social sciences have significantly moved ahead over the 
past five decades since scholars posited two optimal organizational forms, two types of 
goods, and one model of the individual. (Ostrom, 2010:663). The cooperative and “hybrid” 
form need further study so that adequate regulatory and institutional environments which 
govern it may be constructed. Work has already begun on issues such as trust, member 
commitment and motivation, cooperative efficiencies and knowledge sharing, but it is in a 
nascent stage.	
3. Measuring the economic social contribution of agricultural cooperatives What are the 
economic roles, in the “triple bottom line” sense, that Spanish agricultural cooperative play 
in the Spanish economy? What measures could be developed so that this economic, yet 
uncounted contribution which makes up the “social” role of the cooperative form be 
recognized, and thus accounted for, in future policy and legislation? How can agricultural 
cooperatives fulfill rural development objectives with stronger economic performance?  
4. Strategies to offset Spain’s complex and atomised cooperative legislative framework-
strengthening alternative institutions. 
Spain’s cooperative law framework is complex and hinders effective coordination, 
internationalisation and growth. However, a change in the division of powers is unlikely 
given that it would represent a Constitutional change and require the relinquishment of 
powers by the autonomous communities. Instead, perhaps a focus on regional 
coordination and the role that complementary cooperative laws and policies can play in 
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the unification of goals and strategies would be fruitful. As well, national laws that affect 
all cooperatives may prove ground for reform, for example tax code reform. As well the 
further strengthening of cooperative interprofessional and inter-regional associations, 
institutions and entities is needed.  
5. Spanish strategies for integration, concentration and coordination 
 While it is true that Spain has a large number of small and medium size cooperatives, 
integration strategies that have been successful in other countries cannot automatically be 
applied to Spain. The most appropriate methods must be researched so as to understand 
what functions in a complex legal,	historical, social and cultural context.  
6. Research into the weaknesses of cooperatives, producer organisations and operating 
programs and strategies to attract more farmer participation.  
There has not been enough movement on producer organisations (Cooperativas 
Agroalimentarias, 2011:18) and thus potential funds are not being utilised. While in other 
countries most farmers are integrated into POs in Spain there are still high percentages of 
farmers who are not integrated. The reasons for this should be determined and remedied. 
7. Strategies for cooperatives to take advantage downstream in the value chain. 
Spanish cooperatives are predominantly upstream in the supply or value chain and need 
to build strategies to create more value and to engage with the large distributors based on 
differentiation of product. 
8. Effective cooperative strategic management, human resource development and 
agricultural entrepreneurship training.  
This issue is at the core of agricultural cooperatives in Spain. While in IOFs it would be 
highly unusual not to take advantage of highly trained and skilled individuals in 
management, in agricultural cooperatives there is still a reticence. This reluctance is in 
part based on “localism” and also may due to the fact that most management and business 
programs are based on IOF logic and theories. The cooperative sector must take it upon 
itself to offer serious and rigorous cooperative management training that understand the 
characteristics of cooperatives. These differences have implications for financial 
management, human resource management, marketing, governance, etc. As well, good 
management affects strategies for adding value through processing, commercialisation, 
the development of innovative products, moving up value chain, differentiation, 
internationalisation, and coordination between cooperatives in different regions. It also 
includes developing adequate management accounting and evaluation techniques unique 
to cooperatives. 
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9. Gender and cooperative decision making.  
Cooperative institutions and their representatives are overwhelmingly male. In Spain, 
traditionally, men are members of the cooperative, even though women are often equal 
owners and workers in the farm business. When initiatives are voted on by the 
membership, the lack of voting representation by women may affect decision-making. 
Gender studies/member decision making and cooperative investment is an important 
field to investigate alongside efforts to incorporate more women as members and as 
managers in cooperatives. This also ties into cooperative governance issues as IOF have 
actually advanced more on this issue than cooperatives. 
10. Opening up the agricultural cooperative doors to full participation of young farmers, 
women and immigrants. 
The lack of involvement and/or inclusion of broad segments of Spanish society within 
cooperatives is evident. Women and immigrants are currently crucial to the functioning 
and performance of agricultural cooperatives in Spain and yet they are almost invisible in 
the agricultural cooperative institutions and higher levels of management. Young people, 
the future of agricultural cooperatives seem to be an afterthought while disadvantaged 
collectives are invisible. Research into how inclusion of diverse groups can benefit the 
performance of agricultural cooperatives is necessary. Similar research has been done in 
other non cooperative, cooperative and social enterprise sectors but is lacking in the 
agricultural sector. 
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Appendix	
 
DATOS	GENERALES	
 
1) ¿Con cuántos socios cuenta la empresa? Los socios, ¿son agricultores individuales o 
cooperativas? 
 
2) ¿Cuáles son las funciones principales de la organización? Indicar si existe más de una: 
____   Producción agrícola.     
____   Maquinaria agrícola. 
____   Procesamiento y marketing del producto. 
____  Aprovisionamiento de suministros agrícolas. 
____  Acceso a financiación. 
____  Seguros y reparto de riesgos. 
____  Reproducción de plantas y animales. 
____  Provisión de agua o sistemas de regadío. 
____  Conservación del suelo y el medio ambiente. 
 
 
3) ¿Qué otros servicios no económicos proporciona la organización a sus socios? 
____  Educación general. 
____  Sanidad. 
____  Seguros. 
_ ___  Infraestructura. 
____  Agua. 
____  Otros. ¿Cuáles? 
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4) Principales productos/sectores en los que participa la organización. 
___ Cereales. 
___ Azúcar. 
___ Ganadería porcina. 
___ Ganadería ovina y caprina.  
___ Frutas y hortalizas. 
___ Aceite de oliva y aceitunas de mesa.  
___ Leche y derivados lácteos.  
___ Vino. 
___ Otros. ¿Cuáles? 
 
 
5) Ingresos por ventas en 2010 o último año disponible (indicar el año si es anterior a 
esta fecha). 
 
6) Ingresos por ventas en 2000. 
 
7) Balance total en 2010  o último año disponible (indicar el año si es anterior a esta 
fecha).  
 
8) Balance total 2000. 
 
9) Ratio de endeudamiento en 2010 o último año disponible, medido como deuda total / 
fondos propios (indicar el año si es anterior a esta fecha).  
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10) Ratio de endeudamiento en 2000, medido como deuda total / fondos propios.  
 
11) Proporción de las aportaciones de los socios dentro del capital social, medido como 
capital aportado / fondos propios totales.  
 
12) ¿Cuál es la responsabilidad de los socios ante las pérdidas de la empresa? 
___  Total. 
___  Parcial. 
___  Excluida. 
 
13) Dentro del capital social de la empresa o en sus subsidiarias, ¿existen inversores que 
no sean socios agricultores?  
 
14) A la hora de entrar a formar parte de la organización como socio, ¿existen 
restricciones por localización geográfica, calidad, volumen mínimo de producción u otras?
 
15) ¿Cómo definiría la facilidad para entrar a formar parte de la organización? 
___  Muy fácil. 
___  Relativamente fácil. 
___  Acceso restringido. 
___  Acceso muy restringido. 
 
16) Respecto a la contribución de los socios al capital social. ¿Contribuye el socio al 
capital social con algo más que su aportación inicial y los beneficios retenidos? 
____  El socio aporta sólo su capital inicial. 
____ El socio además de su capital inicial y el beneficio retenido lleva a cabo 
contribuciones significativas al capital social. 
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17) ¿Tiene la organización socios agricultores en otros estados miembros de la UE? En 
caso afirmativo, ¿qué proporción representan dentro del total de miembros? ¿En qué 
países se encuentran?  
 
18) ¿Compra la organización a agricultores extranjeros que no sean socios de la 
cooperativa? ¿A qué países pertenecen?  
 
19) ¿Y a agricultores nacionales que no sean socios de la cooperativa? ¿Qué porcentaje 
representan estas operaciones con respecto a las operaciones totales de la entidad?  
ELEMENTOS	DE	GESTIÓN		INTERNA	
 
1) ¿Cuál es la estructura legal de la empresa? 
____  La empresa es una única organización. 
____ La empresa forma un holding, es decir, posee una o varias compañías participadas 
con diferentes formas legales. 
 
2) ¿Cuál es la composición del consejo rector? 
____  Sólo socios de la organización. 
____ También miembros que no son socios, que pueden ser: profesionales, académicos, 
políticos, etc. 
 
3) ¿Cuántos miembros tiene el consejo rector?  
 
4) ¿Cómo se estructura el consejo rector? ¿Incluye dentro del mismo a los  supervisores o 
se encuentran estos formando un grupo separado dentro de los órganos de dirección de 
la empresa? Si los supervisores forma un órgano separado, ¿está formado sólo por socios 
de la organización?  
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5) ¿Qué elementos son tomados en cuenta a la hora de seleccionar a los miembros que 
forman parte del consejo rector? 
____  Experiencia personal.  
____  Representación regional. 
____  Representación por tipo de producto. 
____  Otros. ¿Cuáles?  
 
6) ¿Existe un límite en el número de años que una persona puede formar parte del 
consejo rector? Si existe, ¿cuál es este límite?  
 
7) ¿Quién se hace cargo de la gestión operacional de la organización? 
____  Consejo rector. 
____  Directivos profesionales 
 
8) ¿Dispone la cooperativa de una asamblea de delegados además del consejo rector?  
 
9) ¿Cómo es la distribución de los votos entre los socios? 
____  Un socio un voto. 
____  Distribución proporcional. ¿En qué se basa dicha proporción?  
      ____  Capital aportado.  
      ____ Volumen de operaciones efectuadas.  
 ___ Distribución proporcional, pero con un límite superior. ¿Con 
qué límite? 
 
10) En el caso de que la empresa tenga subsidiarias, ¿participan los socios dentro del 
capital social de las mismas de forma directa?  
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11) ¿Tienen los socios la obligación legal de entregar toda su producción a la empresa?  
 
12) ¿Son los socios agricultores/ganaderos especializados? Es decir, ¿se dedican a la 
producción de múltiples cultivos/ganaderías o se centran en sólo uno o dos? 
____  Baja especialización. 
____  Especialización media. 
____  Especialización alta. 
 
13) ¿Usa la organización distintas herramientas de marketing? 
 
14) ¿Agrupa la cooperativa a sus socios de manera formal por producto y/o región u 
otras? 
 
15) ¿Tienen los socios con grandes volúmenes de producción un trato preferente en 
precio?  
 
16) ¿Aplica la organización una política de costes diferenciados?  
 
17) ¿Tiene la organización miembros no activos, es decir, socios que en la actualidad no 
sean productores pero sigan formando parte de la cooperativa? ¿Qué porcentaje 
representan? 
 
18) ¿Cuál es la influencia de estos socios no activos en el proceso de toma de decisiones 
de la cooperativa? 
____  Alta. 
____ Media.  
____ Baja. 
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POSICIÓN	DENTRO	DE	LA	CADENA	AGROALIMENTARIA	Y	ESTRATEGIA	
 
1) ¿Cuál era la posición de la organización en la cadena agroalimentaria en 2000? Para 
cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones, indicar si para la empresa es no relevante, 
relevante o especialmente relevante. 
____  Proporcionar acceso al mercado. Especialmente relevante 
____  Poder de negociación colectiva. Especialmente relevante 
____  Almacenamiento y distribución. Relevante 
____ Transformación primaria del producto (productos intermedios para la industria 
alimenticia). 
____ Transformación secundaria del producto (productos finales para el consumidor). 
____ Venta de la producción a granel o sin marca propia. Relevante 
____ Venta de la producción con marca propia. Especialmente relevante 
____ Venta al por mayor, como mayorista. 
____ Venta al por menor. 
____ Integración de producción, transformación y marketing. 
  
2) ¿Cuál es la posición de la cooperativa en la cadena agroalimentaria en 2010?  
____  Proporcionar acceso al mercado. Especialmente relevante 
____  Poder de negociación colectiva. Especialmente relevante 
____  Almacenamiento y distribución. Especialmente relevante 
____ Transformación primaria del producto (productos intermedios para la industria 
alimenticia). 
____ Transformación secundaria del producto (productos finales para el consumidor). 
____ Venta de la producción a granel o sin marca propia. No relevante 
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____ Venta de la producción con marca propia. Especialmente relevante 
____ Venta al por mayor, como mayorista. 
____ Venta al por menor. 
____ Integración de producción, transformación y marketing. Relevante 
 
3) ¿Cómo definiría la estrategia de marketing seguida por la organización? 
____  Liderazgo en costes: el énfasis se sitúa en obtener bajos costes. 
____  Diferenciación: el énfasis está en aportar un elevado valor añadido. 
____  Focalizada: la cooperativa se centra en un nicho de mercado. 
 
4) ¿Cuándos productos diferentes comercializa la empresa? (Surtido amplio o reducido)  
 
5) ¿Vende la cooperativa productos con marca diferenciada? ¿Qué porcentaje 
aproximado de los ingresos representan los mismos? 
 
6) ¿Cuál es el gasto en investigación y desarrollo como porcentaje de la cifra de ingresos?  
 
7) ¿Cuál es la principal estrategia de crecimiento seguida por la organización? 
____   Incremento de las ventas sin llevar a cabo fusiones o adquisiciones. 
____ Fusiones y adquisiciones dentro del mismo nivel de la cadena agroalimentaria. 
____  Fusiones y adquisiciones en el nivel anterior o posterior de la cadena 
agroalimentaria. 
____  Fusiones y adquisiciones con cooperativas o empresas extranjeras.  
 
8) ¿Tiene los agricultores cooperativas alternativas a las que vender?  
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Agricultural Cooperatives: An analysis of legislative, policy and organisational change 
Insert between end of page 70 and beginning of page 71 (dropped text from printer´s 
version):  Italy reformed its cooperative law in 2003 (brought into force in 2004) and 
defines a cooperative as a company with “variable capital and mutual purpose”.  It 
contains a distinction between “mainly mutual” and “other” cooperatives. The mainly 
mutual cooperatives have two core characteristics: they are obligated to operate 
predominantly with their members (in the case of agricultural cooperatives this translates 
into 50% of total quantity or value of product) and there is a capital remuneration 
restraint (Fici, 2013). “Other” cooperatives do not have such restraint and may freely 
operate with non-members and remunerate capital. However, they cannot take advantage 
of special tax benefits. 
The by-laws of the predominantly or mainly mutual cooperatives must contain the 
requirements of the “Basevi Law” (Zamagni and Zamagni, 2010; Fici, 2013): dividends 
cannot be more than the top rate of postal savings bonds plus 2.5 percentage points; the 
remuneration of financial instruments subscribed by members cannot exceed the ceiling 
on dividends by more than two points; indivisible reserves cannot be distributed to 
members; upon dissolution (liquidation or conversion to an IOF) all assets minus paid-up 
capital must be turned over to a fund for the development and promotion of cooperatives; 
and withdrawing members cannot leave with more than their paid-up capital. Multiple 
votes are however allowed in primary cooperatives, based on volume of use and capped at 
10%. In secondary cooperatives multiple votes are allowed based on capital and capped at 
5 votes. 
What is of note here is that the new law chose to make a distinction between those 
cooperatives which generally follow traditional cooperative values and those which are 
more “market oriented”, rather than dilute or “modernize” a general cooperative law. 
What is of even more interest is that 90% of Italian cooperatives are “mainly mutual” 
cooperatives, choosing to assume the restrictive obligations and limits (Zamagni and 
Zamagni, 2010). While the predominant argument underlying much cooperative law 
reform suggests that “modernization” of cooperative laws is necessary to compete, spur 
investment and capture funds  and that a hybrid IOF model must replace a mainly 
mutualistic model, the Italian experience seems to suggest otherwise. Reasons for this may 
include the tendency of Italian cooperatives to promote a political and economic network 
amongst cooperatives and the cultural consciousness of the social utility of the 
cooperative business form (Fici, 2013). Perhaps another reason is that cooperative 
success has little to do with adopting IOF characteristics. 
 
 
